THE LOST RUSSIAN SKI BRIGADE E-Book

Väinö Mononen

• Herausgeber: Books on Demand
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Serie: Winter War 1939-1940
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 540

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2024

Beschreibung

THE LOST RUSSIAN SKI BRIGADE A hard fate in the Finnish Winter War The work talks about a special operation in the Finnish Winter War in early 1940 and the harshness of winter warfare in Kuhmo in extremely demanding wilderness conditions. The superiority of the Red Army was overwhelming, and it already looked like they would make a breakthrough. But it turned out differently. Colonel Siilasvuo's 9th Division got its lines in order and positioned itself for resistance. The division stopped and tied up the attacking enemy forces on their route of entry. When the actual movement of the Red Army on the main roads became difficult and finally stopped completely, they tried to advance from outside the roads by bringing ski troops to help their own troops. Finns became familiar with one and feared division Dolin's ski brigade. The gathering started a special series of events, which will have its equal in the entire Finnish Winter War. In Russia, even to this day, people wonder where their ski brigade of a couple of thousand valuables disappeared in just a few days. The work contains several narratives, various statistics and war diary excerpts, color and black-and-white photographs and Finnish-language sketch maps, as well as the work's extensive list of contents and sources. MKT, nonfiction writer Väinö Mononen Website: www.sotatutkija.jimdo.com

Leseprobe

Initial words about the content over time, the harsh battles of Kuhmo have been badly overshadowed by the battles of Suomussalmi, even though the Finnish losses in Kuhmo were double. The superiority of the Soviet forces was completely overwhelming. It already looked like the red flag would fly over Kainuu soon. But it turned out differently.

The massive Red Army had been stopped after all. The 9th Division, commanded by colonel Hjalmar Siilasvuo, got its lines in order, and set up for resistance. The division stopped and tied up the attacking enemy forces on their route of entry.

The first part of the work is mainly limited to Lake Saunajärvi, a description of the decisive effect of the large-scale attack of the Finnish troops on the entire war, which turned the general appearance of the battles into that of a motley and guerilla warfare. When the actual movement of the Red Army on the main roads became difficult and finally stopped completely, the Soviet troops persistently pushed forward outside the roads.

So, the Red Army was forced to bring ski troops to help their own troops. The enemy moved to the terrain and began to use more and more of his ski troops, for which the Finns' vital headquarters and maintenance connections were desired targets. The ski troops sent by the enemy caused quite a lot of problems for the Finns, in addition to the infantry of the field army attacking along the road, the powerful artillery and the superior air force.

The ski troops created a lot of extra headaches, especially in the headquarters, command posts and rear maintenance connections. Weeding them out took a lot of time and tied up a lot of men in verification and tracking tasks.

The most dramatic event was the fate of the Russian colonel Dolin's Ski Brigade in the battles of the Kuhmo winter war.

The disappearance of a brigade without a trace in a few days is still a delicate matter on both sides of the border. This is especially true on the east side of the border, where several research and excavation teams have been sent after the ski troops in recent years.

The stories told about the stages of the ski brigade have, in the course of time, taken on the characteristics of folktales in people's speeches and guesses. Regardless of that, or maybe that's why I've gathered different points of view about a mystical series of events that is unparalleled in the entire winter war.

Special thanks for the unforgettable cooperation to Mauno Immonen from Nurmes, who, along with the undersigned, has also studied the faded traces of past winters for years in this truly special struggle, where there was certainly no shortage of goals.

The work is dedicated to the Dolin Ski Brigade and to the memory of the most special raven battle of the winter war, in Kuhmo.

In Eno, Finland, November 30, 2023, Väinö Mononen

MKT, nonfiction writer Väinö Mononen

Table of contents Introduction

• Contents

General situation on the Kuhmo front

• The enemy has been stopped

• From Suomussalmi to Kuhmo

Siilasvuo's motivation task

• Feverish preparations

• Combat division of forces

The operation begins with a diversion…

• Salonmies gets an attack task

Preparing for a major attack

The Finns' big attack on January 29, 1940

Halonen’s II/JR 25

Murole’s Er.P 14

• The departure comes

• Three enemy attacks

• They don't give up

Ruotsalo’s Er.P 12

• Enemy contact is obtained

• Finally, a connection to my own

The enemy strikes from Klemetti

Infantry Regiment 27

Sihvonen’s II/JR 27

• The log forts in front

• Tanks and cannon fire

• Besieged enemy in Niska

• The road will be taken over

• Blockade task

• The goal is achieved

Airimo’s III/JR 27

• Outpost in front

Lassila’s I/JR 27

A change in battle tactics

• The enemy moves to the terrain

• Interrogation of the prisoner

White Death

• Ghosts in Hamaravaara

A diversion attempt…

• Witch fire

• A fierce encounter on the Hukkajoki

• 6.C/JR 65's war diary P 3629 from 26.1.–7.2.1940

Dolin's Ski Brigade

• Courier of death

• A firepower special unit

Looking for Dolin’s Ski Brigade

• Reconnaissance flights

• The brigade is still found

• Bombing flight to Repola

• Flyers to the Saunajärvi

• The chase to Kuhmo

• Comparative information from Russia

Scout skirmishes

• The pick-up coming

• Delay phase

• 6.C/JR 65's war diary P 3629 from 8.2.–10.2.1940

The ski brigade breaks through!

• Fateful night

• Valle's blow

• Strike by military police

• Captain Kekkonen

• The priest's testimony

• Dramatic telegram

• Interpretation of the previous

• The battle continues

• Finnish accounts of the snowstorm

• Cold encounter

Frontline events

• 6.C/JR 65's war diary P 3629 from 11.2.–16.2.1940

• 2.C/JR 65's war diary P 3622 – P 3623 from 11.2.–13.2.1940

The network is tuned…

• Disappearance trick

A blow to the stump

• Log cabin

• Toivonkoski room

Disconnects…

• The 1st secret message of the Russians

• The 2nd secret message of the Russians

• The 3rd secret message of the Russians

• The 4th secret message of the Russians

Battalion as gatekeeper to the north

The "Jigsaw" battalion is assembled…

• The war diary of Infantry Regiment 27 from 12.2.–16.2.1940

Guerrilla Battalion 5

• Relocation assistance

The commissioners face each other in Kuhmo

• A hard command

• A terrible journey

Tough Guerrillas

• Tough place

• The war diary of Guerrilla Battalion 5 from 12.2.–16.2.1940

• Where are the horses

• Ski boots

Reserve officer Toivo Saastamoinen

• Warrior of hard luck

• In Valpo’s shadow

• From Kuhmo to Colorado

Great ski sections

• Remote patrols and Department Moilanen

Rustling in the wilderness page

•

Sergeant major

Lauri Hannikainen's patrol

page

• Other works of destruction

page

The ski battalion attacks from its rear in the south!

• Bad enemy attack

page

• Exciting tracking

page

• No prisoners are taken

page

• The chase to Niskavaara

page

• Taking over the barn

page

• 1.KKK/JR 27’s war diary P 3577 from 13.2.–19.2.1940

page

• 3.KKK/JR 27's war diary P 4829 from 12.2.–19.2.1940

page

Anxiety in Alasenjärvi page

• Twist the game

page

Kesseli endures! page

Kesseli Bang! page

• Surprise attack

page

• Ugly aftermath

page

• Speechless man

page

• Captains on the bow

page

Vetko isthmus is calling…

• Quick alert

• Open dispute

The Battle of Vetko begins!

• Tammisalo and Saikku in trouble

• Between the two deaths

• The destruction of the enemy section

• The commander arrives

Arrangements in Vetko

• Additional forces are available

Takeover of Vetko

• Headquarters in danger

• Fierce close combat

• Hakanen attacks

• Longer hand

• House on fire

• Speculations

• Quite a mess

• The last temptations

The dawn of Kesseli

• They did not surrender as prisoners

• The service road is closed

• The game was brutal

• Kuronen’s lines

Other troubles page

• A posture movement is needed

page

• Operation Eonsuu

page

• Operation Kilpi

page

• Unfortunate event

page

• Trouble elsewhere

page

• Commissioner Grishatshev

page

• Command posts “Kerttu and Parta”

page

• Blockade attempt by the enemy

page

• Devoted funeral

page

• Headquarters on the firing line

page

Terrain cleaning page

• It’s quite upsetting

page

• Mercy was unknown

page

• Order to clean up the terrain of Kälkänen - Kesseli

page

• Fish in cans

page

• Pioneer dugout

page

Cases from Vetko page

• Good luck in the war

page

• A fierce pioneer

page

• Arithmetic skills

page

• Medicine

page

• A herd of bulls

page

The final destruction of the ski brigade page

• A complete blockade

page

• Shocking tracking

page

Accounting

• The star has gone out

• Missing auxiliaries

• Cross-country skiing was doomed

• Lightening the load

• Spoils of war

Regrouping of the Finnish forces

• The organization of the forces and their future tasks

• To all commanders

Summary…

• The fate of the colonels and the staff

• Colonels’ map bags

• The battle of Viitaja cabin

• A cunning plot

• Shocking aftermath

• Attached is a confirmation of the previous events

• Interview with Alpo K. Marttinen

• Who shot Dolin

• Information on the interrogation of prisoners of war

• Yakovlev, Mikhail Ivanovich

• Matveyev, Risto Kusminin

• Stepantshuk, Feodor Terentjevitsh

• Bury in order of rank

Pounding in the Red Army

• Cross-border aftermath

• Does quantity replace quality

Battle report from Kessel

• Commander of 2.KKK/JR65, lieutenant Olli Kuronen

• A funny case

Rutkunpuro regiment

• Nahila cabin

• Scout skirmishes

Russians against each other

• Bloody chain of events

• Auditory perceptions

Russian ski teams

• The distinguishing marks of a soldier

Armament of ski troops

• Submachine gun PPD (M/34)

• Submachine gun PPD (M/34–38)

• Automatic rifle AVS–36 (M/36) Simonov

• Semi-automatic rifle SVT–38 (M/38) Tokarev

• Infantry rifle m/91–30

• Sniper rifle m/91–30

• Maxim machine gun (m/1910)

• "Emma"–quick rifle m/27 Dektyarev DP–27

• Revolver Nagant M 1895

• "Star" pistol Tokarev TT-33

• Light pistol m/1930

• "Naku" grenade launcher (50 Krh/39)

• Hand grenade RGD–33

• Egg grenade F1

• Warning!

Kuhmo's battle memories

Motts and Siberians in the Kuhmo Winter War

• The Siberian dispatch arrived at the Kuhmo front on 12.2.1940

• The Finns start circling the Siberians

We fought Dolin's Ski Brigade

• Opposite was an elite group

• Confusing tactics

When the order came

• Quick cache

• Field of death

• Fake soldier

Other memories

• Tracking Patrol

• Bear wrestling

• Red flag

• Dugout-Järvinen

Notes from Kuhmo's raven lands

• Decision of principle

• Pledge of silence

• Relying on instinct

• The trap was set

• Guides of the animal world

Exchange of ideas and correspondence...

• Commissioner's alley skiing

• Funeral

• Missing point

Grishatshev's escape...

Colonel Dolin's imagined "marching order"

• Initial phase

• Kiekinkoski

• Kesseli

• Lehtovaara

• Alasenjärvi

• General mail

• Cross-skiers

Change the information collected!

Cross-border shed village…

• Eino Pulkkinen's long-range patrol

• Houses and owners near the battle area in the winter war 1939–1940

• The Russian dead of the winter war are being taken home from Finland…

Excerpts from a war diary

• Recorded memory information

• 9.DE war diary T 2572 from 12.2.–17.2.1940

• 1.C/JR 65's war diary P 3622 from 13.2.–16.2.1940

• 1.KKK/JR 65 war diary P 3625 from 15.2.–16.2.1940

• I/JR 27 war diary P 3574 from 14.2.–17.2.1940

• III/JR 27's war diary P 3631 from 12.2.–17.2.1940

• I/KTR 9 war diary P 3548 from 12.2.–16.2.1940

• 9.DE war diary T 2572 from 18.2. / 20.2. / 2.3. / 9.3.–13.3.1940

• War diary of Pioneer Battalion 9 P 3537 from 13.2.1940

• War diary of 2nd/Pioneer Battalion 9 P 3538 from 10.2. – 20.2.1940

• War diary of II/JR 65's from 13.2.–14.2.1940

Photo memories of the Kuhmo winter war

Map appendix list

Photo list

Battle sites in Kuhmo

Winter war memorials in Kuhmo

• Monument to the fallen heroes (cross)

• Monument to the battles in the direction of Kiekinkoski

• Laamasenvaara memorial plaque

• Kilpelänkangas memorial

• Mänttäläinen stone

• Monument to Paloaho (Soviet allies)

• Monument to the Russians

• Luvelahti memorial (for the Soviets)

• Memorial to the Fallen of Taivalkoski

• Jyrkänkoski monument

• Remote patrol department Marttina memorial (Continuation war)

• Veterans Memorial

Bibliography

• Image sources

• Drawings and maps

• Bibliography

• Literature on the winter war in Kuhmo and Suomussalmi

• Separate sources of information and interview data

General situation on the Kuhmo front

The enemy has been stopped: - "When 1939 turned into a new year, we also moved into a completely new decade. We only guessed in general what the near future might still bring. The situation at the front in the direction of Kuhmo was, at least for the time being, somewhat stabilized. Thanks to lieutenant Jussi Kekkonen's fighting forces, the northern side of road Hukkajärventie was entirely in Finns' possession. On the southern Saunajärvi road, the 54th Mountain Division commanded by major general Gusevski had been stopped and its flanks were open to Finnish attacks.

For this reason, the Soviet troops retreated completely into their shell, fortifying themselves in the most favorable terrain, while trying to secure their vital supplies.

The departments that got into trouble were left to wait for future reinforcements.

Taking advantage of the opportunity, the Finnish patrols mercilessly attacked the Soviet troops along their supply road to Saunajärvi.

And it hurt. Anti-tank mines were installed on tank tracks used by the enemy, marching sections were destroyed, and service trucks were burned in brutal ambushes".

From Suomussalmi to Kuhmo: - "On the evening of January 18, colonel Hjalmar Siilasvuo received a personal advance order to transfer the main parts of the division from Suomussalmi to Kuhmo.

The next day, he received the actual transfer order. In this way, the entire 9th Division could be quickly detached from Suomussalmi. After all, long-needed additional troops would be coming to Kuhmo. And it wasn't long before combat troops were already being driven from Suomussalmi to Kuhmo in both trucks and buses.

It was a huge rush in the pitch dark and freezing cold. The distance to the destination accumulated on average around 200 kilometers. The trucks marched on. The maintenance formations were first transported by trains from Hyrynsalmi to Sotkamo, from where they marched the rest of the 60 kilometers to Kuhmo.

Under the pressure of the harsh conditions, the division's troop transfers stretched for almost a week and were finally completed in their entirety on the 21st–26th. between January 1940. A total of about 5.000 men who had experienced battles had moved to Kuhmo.

The new forces were formed as follows: - 9. D commander, colonel Hjalmar Siilasvuo and his division staff, Infantry Regiment 27 (JR 27), Infantry Regiment 65 (JR 65) (-1B), Light Company Volanen, a small cannon battery from First Battery/Field Artillery Regiment, assembled from anti-tank artillery teams Anti-tank Company, Message Battalion 9, Pioneer Battalion 9, and maintenance forces.

The missing First Battalion of Infantry Regiment 65 arrived in Kuhmo a little later at the beginning of February.

The troops gathered in Kuhmo first at Jämäs barracks, from where they marched through the church village to the road leading to Lake Kälkänen in Lammasperä.

In addition to this, Er.P 12 under colonel Erkki Raappana moved from Lieksa to Kuhmo on January 27, and later, in the last days of the war, the main parts of Er.P 13. Colonel Hjalmar Siilasvuo settled in Jämäs barracks with his staff. Siilasvuo took command of Er.P 14 under lieutenant colonel Frans Ilomäki on January 23 and Brigade Vuokko on January 28.

Captain Alpo Marttinen was appointed as the chief of staff of the division. Lieutenant colonel Aksel Vuokko, who was initially planned for the position, could not be reached in time, so the infamous communication connections of the winter war had a part to play in the selection of such a crucial person".

Siilasvuo's motivation task

Feverish preparations: - "In Kuhmo, colonel Hjalmar Siilasvuo was given the task of motivating the Soviet troops to their roadside positions and destroying all the motivations that arose in them together with the local troops.

Siilasvuo's ultimate leadership idea was to flank the enemy forces from the east side of Lake Lammasjärvi to road Saunajärventie and cut off their vital cross-border connection with Repola.

At the eastern end of Lake Lammasjärvi, several troop replenishment positions were urgently established, and an important field hospital was moved closer to the future front to Kuhmoniemi school.

Faulty and highly unreliable communications between troops were significantly improved, such as Brigade Vuokko, which had constantly suffered from poor communications.

Until now, the brigade's communication had been painfully slow, because in practice it had had to rely only on combat messengers.

Side roads Polvela – Lutja – Kälkänen and Lutja – Nivala – Kähkölä were plowed over the course of several days for the future horse traffic of the combat troops. The drivable highway from Rajavaara to Kälkänen was contracted by plowing it open in the dark on the night of January 24.

On the other hand, a wide furrow towards the lake was plowed into Lake Lammasjärvi, which became an important ice road for the troops. Its use was limited and intended only for night traffic due to the risk of air.

Since we were aware of the diligent movement of the enemy's security patrols north of road Saunajärventie, it was decided to plow the roads for the purpose of concealment only during the coming major attack.

JR 27, commanded by lieutenant colonel August Mäkiniemi, moved from the 24th to the 25th on the night between January and January to Rajavaara and set up an accommodation area there in the Enso cardboard tents set up in the forest.

The houses in the Rajavaara area had already been burned to the ground before, so the future base became a very important accommodation destination.

The border danger was also of great importance to the troops passing through the area until the end of the war.

Siilasvuo's attack plan largely followed the road Raatteentie model in Suomussalmi. Although the situation would be much more difficult here because the Soviet troops were masters at digging in and had already been shoveling for the second month, fortifying themselves strongly and equipping their well-supported bases along road Saunajärventie".

Maxim: - There should have been significantly more serial and machine guns in the task of destroying motivated enemy forces. The necessary reinforcements had to be taken by force from the enemy forces.

- Maxim machine gun (m/1910) • country of origin Soviet Union • weapon name Maxim machine gun m/1910 Pulemjot Maxima, obraztsa 1910 goda • designed by Sir Hiram Stevens Maxim (1840–1916), USA / Great Britain • manufacturer Tula Arms Factory since 1905 • caliber 7.62 mm • cartridge 7.62x54R • feeding method 250 cartridges cloth belt or 200 cartridges metal belt • rate of fire 520–580 rounds per minute • mode of operation serial fire

Combat division of forces: - “The combat forces of the future major operation were divided into five parts according to the following tasks:

1 • Brigade Vuokko had to tie up the enemy in their current positions in its parts and advance with its main forces via Koiravaara to the Kuhmo – Nurmijärvi road.

From where it had to be ready to continue either in the direction of Lake Saunajärvi or Sivakka.

2 • Major Hyvärinen's II/JR 65 settled in Rajavaara and captain Flink's III/JR 65 in Jyrkänkoski, making sure to head south in the direction of Rasti.

3 • Captain Murole's Er.P 14 had to attack Luvelahti from the north.

4 • Lieutenant colonel Ruotsalo's Er.P 12 had to attack Luvelahti from the south.

5 • Lieutenant colonel Mäkiniemi JR 27 had to attack Reuhkavaara from Kälkänen (from the north).

Three and a half batteries of artillery were available, of which one battery was detached to support JR 27's advance.

In addition, to the east, at the level of river Kuusijoki – Löytövaara, a block section was placed, whose main task was to prevent the arrival of the auxiliary forces of the Soviet forces from the east.

The task of the attacking Finnish forces was twofold. First, each unit participating in the battle had to take over road Saunajärventie in its direction of attack, and then continue to destroy the motivated enemy forces in the direction of the roads with great determination."

The operation begins with a diversion…

Salonmies gets an attack task: - "Siilasvuo already gave Ilomäki an order on January 28 to attack Yli-Hotakka – Kuivala with one battalion. The advance was supported by captain Lehvä's three batteries (3., 8. and 9. Ptri), a total of 10 field guns.

Captain Solmu Salonmies's 400–man battalion (III/JR 25), which was already badly worn at that point, which was at pond of Petäjälampi, was given this attack task, even though it had already lost a third of its strength in previous battles.

At the same time, III/JR 65, commanded by captain Mårten Flink, entered Jyrkänkoski positions to secure the rear. Lieutenants Suuronen (7.C), Elokas (8.C) and Laine (9.C) had a hard time fighting between Jyrkänkoski and Rasti. The price was heavy – company commanders lieutenants Suuronen and Laine fell.

The tactical purpose of Salonmies battalion's attack had been to divert the enemy's main attention from the direction of the planned major attack to Salmivaara and Kankivaara. In terms of the loud sound, it was excellent at that."

Preparing for a major attack

- "The enemy's air reconnaissance activity also started to be very lively. The terrain transfers and supply transports of the Finnish troops therefore had to be done in the dark of night. Troops and loads were hidden and camouflaged during the day, whenever necessary, as carefully as possible in caches in the forests.

The battalion (Er.P 14) commanded by captain Matti Murole, who was at Jyrkänkoski, had been ordered to advance through Kuhmo church village to road Lammasperäntie. The battalion later regrouped at Nivala, preparing there for their own attack towards Luvelahti on 29 January.

After the exchange, III/JR 65, commanded by captain Mårten Flink, took over the responsibility at Jyrkänkoski. Brigade Vuokko's men approached the Soviet troops in the direction of road Nurmeksentie.

Er.P 12, or Detachment Ruotsalo, which was assisted by colonel Erkki Raappana from Lieksa, which had previously left road Nurmestie and continued via Lapiovaara in Lauvus, approached its main target, Saunajärvi's Luvelahti, from the southwest direction.

The battalion was preparing to attack there now with all its strength. At the same time, I/JR 25 ensured the troop's cell connections in the direction of Nurmes.

The troops released from Suomussalmi had proceeded by car along road Hukkajärventie to Korkea, from where they turned south to Kesseli and Kälkänen.

The current road Vetkontie, which runs through Korkea and Reuhkavaara, did not exist then. At that time, the stretch of road ended in Kälkänen.

II/JR 65 remained in reserve, stationed in Rajavaara, and Light Company Volanen secured the western side of Kuhmo church village, and Department Kekkonen, subordinated to the regiment, secured the eastern side of Kuhmo.

JR 65's commander, lieutenant colonel Karl Mandelin's command post was in Lutja and JR 27's commander, lieutenant colonel August Mäkiniemi's command post was in Kälkänen".

– (Sources: Kuhmo in the winter war: Hjalmar Siilasvuo; Ten against one: Niilo Kivakka; www.kuhmo.fi/talvisota; Generals of war: Robert Brantberg; Death alley run: Väinö Mononen).

The Finns' big attack on January 29, 1940

Halonen’s II/JR 25

- "II/JR 25, commanded by captain Erkki Halonen, advanced from Koiravaara through densely grown thickets to road Lieksantie, where it cut and broke the road from the northwest side of pond Kalettomanlammit, about four kilometers southeast of Sivakka.

The main parts of the battalion continued their advance towards Sivakka. Near the Sivakka – Saunajärvi road junction, there was a vast Soviet station opposite, with fortifications and tanks. The fire came hard.

So, it was decided to bind the enemy's main forces around the intersection and at the same time direct part of their own forces to the east behind the enemy.

The 5th Company, led by lieutenant Taskila, started to crawl through the forest from the south side of Sivakka, aiming for Klemetti and its western flank.

Later in the day, another company's worth of men from the battalion were sent after that as reinforcements. The ownership of Klemetti resulted in a fierce confrontation between the Finns and the base of the enemy's 16th Pioneer Battalion. By surprise, the Soviet troops lost their men, horses, and trucks along the roads. The road was cut and taken over on both sides of the base, both east and west. A good surprise can be half the victory at best. The planned blockade was more than successful."

Murole’s Er.P 14

- "Right at the end of January, Finnish officers in terrain reconnaissance started moving in the Jyrkänkoski area, especially artillery officers of Field Artillery Regiment 9. It was soon learned from them that large-scale troop movements were to be expected.

Soon the division's order arrived, according to which Er.P 14 would hand over the Jyrkänkoski positions to captain Mårten Flink III/JR 65 and move with his troops to Lake Saunajärvi Luvelahti.

On January 25, 1940, Company Nieminen, sent a few days earlier from Kajaani, was disbanded and the companies of Er.P 14, which lacked its men, were supplemented.

On January 26th, lieutenant Ville Halonen had sent the IV platoon under the leadership of second lieutenant A. Korhonen to prepare the tracks for captain Matti Murole's battalion between Jyrkänkoski – Tervavaara – Juurikkaniemi – Niva. Captain Murole moved to Niva on the same day.

The departure comes: - "In the evening of the next day, the entire Er.P 14 left Jyrkänkoski in three formations, skiing to Niva. Two rifle companies and parts of the staff company skied under the leadership of lieutenant Halonen via Tervavaara and Juurikkaniemi to Niva. In Tervavaara, a two-group strong unit led by sergeant Tauno Moilanen, which had previously been subordinate to Battalion Salonmies, had joined the unit. The Machine gun company and the Mortar department advanced under the leadership of lieutenant Tuomainen along the plowed road through Lammasperä to Niva.

As the third line, all the load carriers of the column advanced under the leadership of the company commander, second lieutenant Nieminen, who had been transferred to the battalion's finance officer.

The battalion was thus almost completely detached from the defense positions of Jyrkänkoski and moved to the terrain of the Nivala house. Jyrkänkoski was left with only one telephone and pioneer team for the own use of captain Flink III/JR 65, who took over frontline responsibility.

By 24 o'clock on January 27, Murole's battalion was concentrated in its entirety in Lutja and Nivala houses and in the tents erected in their vicinity. The troops were reinforced by second lieutenant Osmo Rasilo's Intelligence Section 4 (TO 4) and second lieutenant Nieminen's pioneer team sent from the division. Captain Murole received right after midnight on 28.1.40 at 00:20 the division's attack order no. 162, whose objective was Luvelahti.

Finally, the departure came. In the bitter cold, the battalion started its advance from the north towards Luvelahti at 23 o'clock in the evening of the same day.

It skied in order 3.C – lieutenant Huhtanen, 1.C – lieutenant Hankio, 2.C – lieutenant Ipatti, Machine gun company – lieutenant Savolainen, Mortar section – lieutenant Tuomainen and Anti-tank team – lieutenant Sandström and Pioneer team – lieutenant Nieminen.

The battalion arrived the next morning around 3 o'clock in Luvelahti, resting about a couple of kilometers away from road Saunajärventie. During that time, the final attack order was given.

According to it, two rifle companies, two machine gun teams and a military unit were to attack under the leadership of lieutenant V. Halonen from the north, aiming for the Saunajärvi highway. As soon as we got to the road, the 3.C led by lieutenant J. Huhtanen of the front line had to split in two, penetrate in the direction of the roads in both directions, east and west, as far as possible.

At the same time, advancing in the second wave, lieutenant K. Hankio's 1.C and the pioneers subordinate to him cut off the road and start building a breach to make it difficult for the attack vehicles to operate.

After lieutenant Halonen gave his orders, the company commanders began to give their own orders and group up, for the upcoming attack.

Second lieutenants Hortling and Immonen teams went to their own side protection positions reinforced by machine guns. The former team moved to positions to the left and the latter to the right at the edge of the swamp.

From second lieutenant Immonen's base backwards, along the base to the northwest, TO 4 led by second lieutenant Rasilo also moved to their own backup positions.

Three enemy attacks: - “Suddenly at 8:30 in the middle of the grouping of the troops, the enemy attacked furiously from three different directions simultaneously.

Along the fabric coming from the front left, along the edge of the swamp on the right under the cover of the bushes and from the left flank, in which direction second lieutenant Hortling and his team had just left a little earlier to secure the flank.

After leaving, second lieutenant Hortling had immediately got into a fight, but had to retreat towards stream of Murtopuro in the face of superior force, losing his machine gun in the clash. Soon the main forces of the enemy were already on the battalion.

- "They came on like a breeze and they knew how to ski!". However, the rapid defense was quickly put in place and the danger was repelled, but the companies went back and forth in the forest.

In this context, among others, the border guard who joined from Tervavaara, sergeant Tauno Moilanen from Kuhmo, fell.

The companies had hardly been put in some kind of order when the enemy attacked for the second time. The backup units had to retreat in front of the whirlwind and the fighting was serious again, now in the middle stages of the canvas, only 50 meters from lieutenant Halonen's command post. The snow-clad enemy caused a terrible confusion among his own troops. Mainly because the men had to be careful who they shot at. Although the enemy raged wildly, it soon began to retreat after suffering significant losses in its rush.

Clearing up the chaotic situation and sending reinforcements to the front and to the sides began again.

Now you could breathe a little. The mortars got into good positions at this point. So, the fire leader, sergeant Räihä, immediately set out to find himself a decent fire control position in the front. However, he soon strayed to the front of his own advance guard. Here, to his horror, he noticed a group of enemies approaching in front of him, who were climbing up the hillside on skis. One enemy was already on top of the hill.

Fortunately, Räihä had a loaded pistol ready, which he had tied around his neck with a leather strap. He dared to shoot the newcomer, who fell straight from his skis, upside down. The other arrivals were already so close that I didn't have time to turn my own skis.

So Räihä made a quick decision and jumped onto the skis of the fallen Russian and managed to get to the shelter before the whole department was on top of the hill.

Speed was an asset, because at the last moment he had time to raise an alarm about the coming enemy attack.

The third attack was much stronger than the previous ones. The enemy came at full speed without stopping at all.

In this connection, a peculiar incident happened, where a non-commissioned officer carrying four triangles on his collar plates was skiing at a tremendous speed, and he rushed far ahead of the others.

However, he was stopped on the center line of the canvas by a throw shot fired by border sergeant Taskinen, which hit directly in the heart. The only thing left on the man's face was a frighteningly angry expression, which was further enhanced by the stiffness of death.

There was nothing special about the man's fall, but later when examining the body, a man who was present noticed something unusual:

- "Isn't this the son of "so-and-so" from Sotkamo, who went secretly to Russia a few years ago?".

Other Sotkamo residents also recognized him and the membership books in his pocket proved that he was indeed a Finn.

- "A traitor to his country and a wretch who joined the ranks of the archenemy he died in the chamber of the country he betrayed and his dishonorable grave together with the Russians in the barren soil of his former province Kainuu, which he intended to hand over to a stranger".

- "Death of a dog", cursed Sotkamo's boys. That was enough of a funeral speech for a traitor".

They don't give up: - "During the battle, captain Murole had also arrived in the terrain of the canvas, wondering a bit about the constant sloshing on the slope. Even the third surprise attack by the enemy was doomed to failure and finally repulsed completely.

The most recent skirmish left the Finns with at least a dozen fallen and about twice as many wounded.

The losses of the attacking enemy were significantly higher due to the over-the-top attack tactics they had already used and the unfavorable terrain conditions.

About 40–50 dead people got cold on the canvas alone, and in the swamp surrounding the canvas, no matter how many more.

All the Russians involved in this attack were fully equipped with automatic and semi-automatic rifles. These weapons, as well as assault rifles and submachine guns, were accumulated as spoils of war from the fallen.

After these extremely tearing skirmishes, a retreat was made to the defenses, where the line formed a horseshoe-shaped arch across the south end of the canvas from swamp to swamp. After grouping up for defense, the troops were offered warm food late in the evening.

It was necessary, because the next freezing night the men had to spend in less comfortable snowmobiles because tents could not be brought forward due to the continuing uncertain situation. Despite the extremely cold weather, they even tried to sleep, because the severe fatigue was weighing heavily on the men.

After all, the previous night had been spent on the return journey from Niva to Luvelahti and the night before that on the ski march from Jyrkänkoski to Niva.

In addition to this, three consecutive, very fierce enemy attacks had been successfully repelled. Despite everything, the coming night passed very peacefully.

After the initial difficulties, the battalion had been able to advance along the bottom of the old log road right next to Luvelahti, about 400 meters from the Saunajärvi highway. The forces led by captain Murole came as quite a surprise to the Soviet forces, because until now the pressure on them had only appeared from the south. Despite that, the enemy's artillery and infantry fire were commendably enough even for the new arrivals.

Er.P 14 had accidentally crashed right into the vicinity of the firepower dugout area of the enemy division headquarters. The enemy tried to attack and harass the battalion both from the sides and from the rear, but in vain. Murole's battalion did not give up an inch and held on to the positions they reached until the last.

After noon on January 31, Murole's troops tried seriously to reach the highway.

Although the enemy's resistance was tough, the troops partially managed to push forward about 200 meters, allowing them to control the highway with their fire.

It had been a violent twist.

The success of the advance was probably influenced by the simultaneous stabbing attack by lieutenant colonel Ruotsalo's Er.P 12 from the south of road Saunajärventie, which partly dispersed the enemy's forces".

Vertical ear rifle: - Finding the right weapon for the purpose always has its own steps, but only the aiming makes the weapon a usable work tool. During YH, men received their weapons from the defense forces, but the aspiration was the same even then - to become you with a weapon.

Ruotsalo’s Er.P 12

- "Er.P 12 commanded by lieutenant colonel Erkki Ruotsalo, or Department Ruotsalo, code name Department R. Er.P 12's name during YH was Os.A/Lie.HK, which name was still commonly used by the crew even during the war in progress.

The battalion consisted of the following units:

1.C/Os.A, Staff Company

2.C/Os.A, a crew of Kiihtelysvaara people

3.C/Os.A, a crew of Tuupovaara people

4.C/Os.A, a crew from Tohmajärvi

5.C/Os.A, Machine gun company's crew from Pyhäselka

6.C/Os.A, Mortar department

7.C/Os.A, column

The battalion, which had already moved from Lieksa on the evening of January 28 to the northeast side of Koiravaara, proceeded from there along the opened road to Koiravaara starting at 18:00.

From here to the east, we could only expect a roadless and snowy dead end. By midnight, the battalion with its heavy loads had arrived and camped at Lake Kivijärvi. There were, among other things, 170 horses in the stable.

Ruotsalo transferred the heavy armament, ammunition, tents, and other movables to the barges and distributed a week's worth of dry food and cartridges to his crew.

Lieutenant Väinö Kariniemi's company (2.C/Er.P 12) continued to east forward from Kivijärvi without rest until the night. On the 29th, when advancing as a vanguard, at 7:40, it solidly broke the road between Tolkee and Rasti, both to the north and to the south.

After that, the company got down to business, driving the enemy out of their positions and at the same time capturing the Saunavaara house and its surroundings for themselves.

In the morning of the same day, the main parts of the department advanced through the gloomy forest, only reaching road Lieksantie at around 15:00 in the afternoon. However, the progress had sped up considerably thanks to the drawbar".

Enemy contact is obtained: - "Brigade Vuokko's 1.C/JR 25, detached from the reserve, led by lieutenant Jussila, diverged from the main force and advanced towards Kähkölä to secure the southwestern shore of Lake Saunajärvi, where the Soviet forces had previously held a strong base.

Ruotsalo's battalion with its tanks approached its target Luvelahti with determination at 07:00, until it collided with the second platoon led by second lieutenant Mattila of lieutenant Rasi's company, about a kilometer before Luvelahti, into a solid Russian outpost near the northwestern end of Lake Saunajärvi.

The meeting of the troops resulted in a tight firefight, which only seemed to drag on. There was nothing going forward. For this, lieutenant Rasi's company had to settle into positions, at least for the time being. Lieutenant Kariniemi and his company simultaneously headed north and towards road Saunajärventie.

At that time, lieutenant Sainio's company was a little further back as a reserve. Intelligence soon found out that the Russian enemy's strong security line still extended at least a kilometer west of Luvelahti. This meant that the actual cutting of the roads had to be done even further west.

Now an extreme effort was required, because the battalion had advanced in roadless terrain for about 28 kilometers and hardly any of its personnel had even gotten to sleep. And the difficult situation was not made easier by the fact that information about the enemy had been almost nonexistent and the terrain completely unknown.

Tents could not be carried along because the speed of advance had to be as high as possible and all available forces were needed to transport only combat material. At least it got warm in the battalion's headquarters who’s fully loaded boxes weighed 300 kilos each at best.

Due to snow and terrain difficulties, the horse-drawn vehicles only got there at the very end of the attack.

When 1.C/JR 25, led by lieutenant Jussila, who had previously separated from the main group, arrived in Kähkölä at around 11 o'clock, it was noticed that the enemy had burned all the buildings in the courtyard and disappeared from the area.

In front of the vast dugout city on the northern shore of Lake Saunajärvi, there was busy traffic, which was maintained by cars, horses and tanks moving back and forth. A big plane also landed there, taking off again after a while".

Finally, a connection to my own: - "In connection with the battalion's first major attack on January 31, crew losses already began to occur.

Later the next day, the battalion continued its persistent effort to get in touch with captain Murole across road Saunajärventie, but even the attack was repulsed by enemy small arms and mortar fire. Along with the artillery, the worst resistance was of course the tanks moving on the road. After several attempts, the highway was finally free to cross. On the same road, part of lieutenant Kariniemi's company advanced in the dark to the north side of the road.

However, the enemy's resistance was so strong that the battalion was ordered to dig into the positions it had reached to avoid unnecessary losses. In any case, the intermediate goal had been achieved and the enemy controlled Luvelahti had been isolated to the west.

After that, Ruotsalo's detachment continued its attacks persistently and pressed the enemy ever more tightly into Luvelahti, clearing out the last enemy colonies on the west bank of the lake one by one.

In the same connection, on the 3rd of February, one enemy plane was destroyed on the ice of Lake Saunajärvi, which was bringing food and ammunition to the Soviet troops in the motte.

The next day, when lieutenant Simo Kähäri, the head of the mortar department, went to inquire about fire control possibilities from the shore of Lake Saunajärvi, he noticed two camouflaged enemy aircraft on the opposite shore.

The men quickly transported one of the launchers to the shore of the lake and with Kähäri leading the launcher, these machines were shot down to make them unusable.

By occupying the western shore of the lake, the enemy stopped using Lake Saunajärvi both as a supply road and as an airport. These last-mentioned incidents raised the mood of the tired men from the bottom considerably, because now, after a hard effort, they began to achieve a visible result.

Tank: - The Red Army tank was a bad opponent. In the picture, the Vickers T-26 on display at Jyrkänkoski, albeit stripped of its weapons.

It wasn't until the evening of February 5 that Er.P 12 got its first proper contact with Er.P 14 on road Saunajärventie, about a kilometer west of Luvelahti, where captain Murole's battalion parts were able to push to the highway with his right wing.

At the same time, a telephone connection between the battalions was quickly established. Now the enemy had been driven into the motte, which commanders Ruotsalo and Murole and their troops held firmly on both sides.

On the 6th of February, a firefight continued in the block of Er.P 12, improving the positions achieved at the same time. The hits were right, because the next day, 7.2.40 one of the enemy's four-engine Tupolev bombers, which had previously landed in front of Luvelahti, was destroyed by flak fire on the ice.

Corporal Lautsila shot from the air with a machine gun on a stand, preventing the bomber from getting into the air, so lieutenant Korhonen quickly called for lieutenant Kähäri, who led a mortar fire at the plane, rendering it unusable with two full hits.

On the same day, the entire Ruotsalo battalion carried out a front-wide attack in the direction of the road. After a day's hard fighting, the positions were on average only about 50– 100 meters away from the enemy positions.

The price was heavy, as the losses totaled around 50 men fallen and wounded".

The enemy strikes from Klemetti

- "When on February 2, the units belonging to Klemetti's Russian 16th Pioneer Battalion got information about the general situation oppressing their troops.

They started to break out in black towards the west of Klemetti towards Sivakka to help their comrades in trouble and open the blocked road.

Faced with heavy enemy pressure and an avalanche of men, the Finns who shepherded Klemetti from the west side were forced to surrender. They badly needed reinforcements.

And they got them at the very last minute, because two teams from lieutenant Koskinen's company in Sivakka, two teams from lieutenant von Essen's light company and three teams from lieutenant Jussila's company in Kähkölä rushed to help. Despite the rush, each company still left their own security departments at their departure points.

The enemy's attack proceeded like a fierce thrust from three different directions at the same time. Despite their tangible defeats or because of that the enraged Russians kept attacking the Finns indiscriminately repeatedly.

One tank was also destroyed in the attack. Merciless close combat took place in a bitter fire and smoke standoff.

To ease the situation, colonel Siilasvuo ordered lieutenant colonel Ilomäki to send one company to attack the enemy that had pushed west of Klemetti from his flank and back the very next morning.

The enemy group persistently attacked the Finnish positions throughout the night. My own anti-tank gun had still received a full hit. So, the opposing side could easily drive their tanks right in front of the Finnish positions. Because of this, the company Taskila, on the order of lieutenant colonel Vuokko, cut off the road from the east side of Klemetti.

However, the company immediately found itself in an oppressive squeeze there because the enemy resistance was simply too strong. At the Taskila roadblock, the Finnish units that advanced to the north had to be quickly pulled back to the south side of the roads.

A good booty was also obtained, because on February 7, the Finnish infantry managed to shoot down one enemy plane in Klemetti with rifle fire, whose crew was caught alive in Koukovaara and captured".

– (Sources: War Archives, Helsinki: Separate battle reports and mutual correspondence between officers – captain M. Murole, captain O. Korhonen, lieutenant V. Halonen, lieutenant S. Kähäri, lieutenant V. Puumalainen, lieutenant J. Rasi, lieutenant V. Varis and lieutenant E. Setälä; Death alley run and Flames of underworld: Väinö Mononen).

Infantry Regiment 27

- "From the northern direction towards Kälkänen, lieutenant colonel August Mäkiniemi's strong, three-battalion JR 27 attacked in two formations in the direction of Korkea path towards road Saunajärventie.

The second battalion advanced on the right and the Third and First in succession on the left.

Due to the difficult terrain, the regiment had two local guides at their disposal, with the help of which they moved forward slowly. The regiment's own cargo column followed behind at its own pace".

Sihvonen’s II/JR 27: - "II/JR 27 was commanded by captain Jaakko Sihvonen. Below is an overview of the battalion's entry phase in Kuhmo and a description of the capture of the Niska base in Saunajärvi:

Transfer of the II Battalion from Raate to Kuhmo between 19 and 20 January 1940

Equipment and organization activities in the battalion in Kuhmo 20.–24.1

. the time between

Kuhmo – Pihlajavaara marching 24.1. at 21.30 – 25.1. at 7:00

Department tent accommodation in Pihlajavaara 25.–27.1. between

Pihlajavaara – Pieni-Kälkänen marching 27.1. from 21:00 to 23:40

The department's tent accommodation in the terrain north of Pieni-Kälkänen on 28.1.

28.1. at 12:00 the regiment commander's attack order and at 16:50 the battalion commander's attack order to the company commanders

29.1. wake up at 02:00 - departure at 03:30 from the Pieni-Kälkänen area

II/JR 27, commanded by captain Jaakko Sihvonen, proceeded along the village road between Kälkänen and Lammi to Vetko, from where it turned over Lake Kälkänen towards Lehtovaara.

The 4th and 5th Companies skied in the front line of the battalion along the western side of the road leading to Lehtovaara.

The first objective was Lehtovaara which would have to be captured, if necessary, in cooperation with III/JR 27 commanded by captain Aarne Airimo, which simultaneously advanced along the eastern road to Lehtovaara.

After this, the II Battalion had to proceed to Saunajärventie, where its task was to cut off the road and close the isthmus between Alasenjärvi and Saunajärvi towards pond of Niskalampi towards the west.

The front line was led by lieutenant Aaro Suokkonen and captain Sihvonen followed about 300 meters away with 6.C, machine guns and four anti-tank guns.

The progress took place in a completely pitch-dark corner, which soon caused a nasty surprise. Of the guides who were there, the host of Lehtovaara guided the leading sections of Suokkonen along the right route, but the other guide accidentally took the next section of Sihvonen behind to the shore of Lake Alasenjärvi. On the opposite bank of the lake, black Russians loomed, traveling along the highway with their horses and cars.

Captain Sihvonen sent the battery's line of fire along the ice to Alasensaari island and left one team from 6.C on the eastern shore of the lake for protection.

The rest of the division, with its heavy weapons, turned eastward and began its journey to Lehtovaara, where it arrived at 8:30 in the morning.

Opposite there was lieutenant Suokkonen's own messenger, who announced that Lehtovaara was already occupied by the Finns. This had happened without any fighting about an hour before, after which the leading parts of the company had continued their journey towards the highway.

Sihvonen's division also continued its journey and soon received another transmitter, which announced that the 4.C had arrived on the Lake Saunajärvi highway at 9 o'clock and had advanced over it, taking up positions on the slope of a small hill.

The log forts in front: - "A little later, Sihvonen also received information from second lieutenant Knuuti's 5.C, who had advanced to a bend on the north side of the Saunajärvi roads, the forest on the front side of which had been thinned and all the lower branches had been removed from the trees.

We proceeded very carefully, being ready for possible fire action. The journey continued until the scouts suddenly stopped after noticing the enemy's dwellings in front of them. Lieutenant Knuuti's 5th Company began to gather silently near the base on the north side of the roads. Right in front of them, on the west side of stream of Niskalammenpuro, there was a big log castle, with black holes gaping in the walls.

Then the greeting of the leader of the 1st team floated across the narrow swamp: - Hello comrades!

The rapid opening of fire completely surprised the enemy, whose unlucky guards were the first to fall, followed by the other comrades who rushed out of the dugouts in a hurry. One of them desperately tried to get on his skis, but immediately fell short of the project.

At that point, Knuuti and his companions received a heavy barrage of rapid fire and machine guns from the enemy's solid log equipment. Fortunately, it was directed well over the men.

Knuuti's company had spread out behind the swamp in such a way that the right wing already reached the southern end of Lake Alasenjärvi and the left wing all the way to the Lake Saunajärvi highway. A firefight began, which soon became quite ferocious on both sides. The series of light streaks fired by the enemy illuminated the entire streamline, forming a dense, bullet-shaped "straw roof" over the Finns.

After lieutenant Suokkonen's 4.C got into position, the enemy's two trucks had driven along the highway towards the east. The men had immediately opened rifle fire at the cars.

The first car had plunged into a ditch when the driver got behind the wheel. The other passengers had escaped by hitchhiking to the other side of the highway.

Sihvonen immediately ordered the anti-tank guns to position along the roads - 2 guns for the 4.C and 2 guns for the 5.C block. Both companies still got machine gun squads to support them.

In addition, the mortar group subordinated to the battalion positioned itself behind the 5.C in a firing position.

The pioneer team quickly broke through the road, but didn't have time to mine it yet, when two tanks were already thundering towards the isthmus. They remained further away from the breach, but still offered the newcomers a stinging fire from their cannon and rapid-fire rifles.

Our own anti-tank guns were not yet in suitable positions, so, tank fire was commendably sufficient.

In addition, the infantry of the enemy base spread a chain of fire from their dugouts along the banks of stream of Niskalammenpuro, also keeping up heavy rifle fire.

After a couple of hours of bullet rain, quite a flock of enemy fighters rushed to the spot to inquire about the situation. They flew in pairs and most obviously tried to find out the positions of the Finns.

As a continuation of all the banging and banging, thunderous artillery fire from the Lake Saunajärvi Isthmus started raining down on top.

It was always enough for the front line of the front and the battalion's command post, as well as the supply road in Lehtovaara. It could only be stated that the opposite side had considerably more firepower.

Sihvonen's battalion tried to capture the fort on the north side of the road with several assaults, but in vain. Attempts were made to soften the log bastion with mortar fire, but without success. It was simply made too strong.

However, the explosions caused anxiety inside the enemy trench to such an extent that some of the men always rushed out and fell in the rain of bullets.

Then one anti-tank cannon captured as war booty in Suomussalmi was pushed into a good firing position. The shells crashed violently through the log walls of the fort, causing great havoc and destruction to the enemy. The firefight continued like this until dusk, until the enemy's busy traffic began on the road".

Tanks and cannon fire: - "The Russians pushed their tanks onto the road and the fight got even tougher. The wagons drove back and forth on the road and fired frantically at the Finnish positions. Amidst the tumult came loud roaring and shouting, blowing of horns and blowing of whistles. Our own anti-tank guns had been pushed into positions from which you can now fire on the Saunajärvi highway.

The enemy began to suffer material losses when one of its wagons ventured too close to the bridge crossing the stream. It drifted into the cannon's sights and immediately the full hit blew up the wagon. The wagon was soon engulfed in a huge, multi-meter flame.

A little later, there was roaring and cursing on the opposite side again when they lost another smaller tank in a full hit, which was left standing on the road in a wreck.

The other wagons retreated to cover in time and remained there in the future. They did fire their cannons as soon as there was even the slightest chance.

The battalion's battle continued with the direct fire of the cannons on the strong log fortifications of the Russians. In the direction of the roads, however, it was no longer possible to move forward, because the enemy's northern fort blocked the road from 5.C and the southern fort from 4.C.

The general situation had become such that this block urgently needed decent firepower.

Colonel Siilasvuo had moved one battery (3.B/KTR 9) from the direction of Rasti to ready fire positions in Kälkänen.

From the morning of the 30th, the artillery battery had also started bombarding the enemy area of the Lake Saunajärvi Isthmus, and the shells hit the target well.

Enemy fort: - The remnants of the log fort from Niska’s dugout area have still been left to be shared by posterity.

The gunners reported that the fire control positions on Alasensaari island and Jumi isthmus promontory had been excellent choices.

The enemy joined in the horseplay, and we soon received anti-artillery fire from Lake Saunajärvi Isthmus to Lehtovaara and to Sihvonen's command post, where we had to urgently dig up shrapnel shelters".

Besieged enemy in Niska: - "When the advance had stopped at the streamline, the 6.C, led by lieutenant Karasmaa, left already in the afternoon to attack from the south of the Saunajärvi roads and pond of Niskalampi, aiming for a clearing attack.

The struggle in the flat terrain turned into a fierce one, which is well illustrated by a couple of lines from a war diary.

30.1.1940: - "At 17-18 a battle with the enemy's outpost. Soldier Einari Seppälä was wounded, who very skillfully and bravely attacked the enemy with hand grenades. 15–20 men fell from the enemy". – (6.C/JR 27's war diary no 1268 / 1939–1940).

To help captain Sihvonen's battalion, lieutenant colonel Mäkiniemi had given captain Lassila the order to attack the highway and the west side of the log equipment from the direction of Lake Saunajärvi shore later that evening at 19:00. Therefore, lieutenant Matti Kattainen 2.C/JR 27 was tasked to advance from Jumi along the eastern shore of Saunajärvi to the north, aiming for the road.

Late in the evening, the company set up in the positions they had reached under the cover of darkness, about 500 meters to the south of the roads.

Both companies, Karasmaa and Kattainen, work together, each of them reaching 31.1.40 in the afternoon in the vicinity of road Saunajärventie.

Lieutenant Kattainen was already able to catch up to the road, but soon had to retreat under the intense fire of the enemy dug into the positions.

In any case, the enemy's defense patterns had been mixed up and the road had come under the fire of two companies. In the afternoon of 1.2.40 ordered the regimental commander to detach Kattainen's 2.C/JR 27 to Kälkänen, because it would soon be needed in the direction of Löytövaara.

Karasmaa now also had to take over Kattainen's positions so that the latter group could leave. This awkward movement of men just now of decision weakened the battalion's side attack power considerably.

31.1.40 in the afternoon the 5.C own strike groups were also able to reach the strong enemy log equipment on the north side of the roads. The fire was fiercely met, but despite this, the pioneers wasted their lives trading hand grenades and TNT inside the settlements. Even though the blast left a grim mark, the enemy did not surrender.

After all, we managed to rush right in front of the equipment and fire into the fort's firing holes. The base's telephone lines had also been cut.

By evening, the corners of the enemy fortress were already beginning to shake. Shortly after this, the embarrassing subject was silenced once and for all.

Many had fallen in the dugout and immediately outside it, packed into a very small space - more than 50 men in all.

The spectacular battle continued until the next day, February 1. until, thanks to the brave pioneers, the final takeover was also achieved on the southern part of the road.

The log fort was strong and difficult to conquer, because only a few thick layers of logs were visible above the ground. The walls had multiple reinforcements and a solid log and earth roof on top.

In the darkness of the night, the men of the attacking strike group were able to initially crawl meter by meter in the snow along the stream of Niskalammenpuro.

And then advance through the undergrowth under the protection of the west side collision and finally attack the main fort itself and its roof with hand grenades.