The Missing Scotland E-Book

Willie Sullivan

• Herausgeber: Luath Press
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Serie: Open Scotland
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 164

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2014

Beschreibung

The only reason to vote is if the vote represents power or change. I don t think it does. I fervently believe that we deserve more from our democratic system than the few derisory tit-bits tossed from the carousel of the mighty. RUSSELL BRAND From national and local elections to the debate on the independence referendum, a large part of Scotland is missing from our political and public debates. This book directly gives voice to the missing people of Scotland as Willie Sullivan (in association with the Electoral Reform Society) investigates why this part of Scotland is lost, asking the missing electorate to articulate why they find themselves so politically disengaged, what their take of mainstream Scotland is and what they feel is lacking, and finally exploring what they feel must be done in order change this for the better. A large part of Scotland is missing from our political and public debates, what kind of changes are needed for them to engage? GERRY HASSAN, Open Scotland Series Editor A lot of people in Scotland have no daily contact with democracy; they have no contact in their immediate personal environment with democracy. That is not just a jigsaw piece that is missing in Scottish democracy; it is a founding stone of democracy that is missing in Scotland. DEMOCRACY MAX Report

Leseprobe

WILLIE SULLIVAN is the Director of Electoral Reform Society Scotland and is a political campaigner, activist and supporter of change and reform across many areas of public life. He has worked at senior levels in the business, voluntary and public sector. He was the Campaign consultant on the successful Fairshare Campaign for the introduction of STV for Scottish local government and was Campaign Director for Vote for a Change, the campaign to secure a referendum on electoral reform. Willie is also involved at a Scottish and UK level in Compass, and has written widely on politics, participation and ideas. This is his first book.

Open Scotland is a series which aims to open up debate about the future of Scotland and do this by challenging the closed nature of many conversations, assumptions and parts of society. It is based on the belief that the closed Scotland has to be understood, and that this is a prerequisite for the kind of debate and change society needs to have to challenge the status quo. It does this in a non-partisan, pluralist and open-minded manner, which contributes to making the idea of self-government into a genuine discussion about the prospects and possibilities of social change.

Luath Press is an independently owned and managed book publishing company based in Scotland, and is not aligned to any political party or grouping.Viewpointsis an occasional series exploring issues of current and future relevance.

The Missing Scotland

Why over a million Scots choose not to voteand what it means for our democracy

WILLIE SULLIVAN

in association with the Electoral Reform Society

LuathPress Limited

EDINBURGH

www.luath.co.uk

First published 2014

ISBN: 978-1-910021-39-2

ISBN (EBK): 978-1-910324-23-3

The author’s right to be identified as author of this work under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 has been asserted.

© Willie Sullivan 2014

Contents

Acknowledgements

CHAPTER ONE We Are All Democrats now!

CHAPTER TWO The Non-Voters

CHAPTER THREE A Deeper Look

CHAPTER FOUR Can You Hear Us?

CHAPTER FIVE Liar! Liar!

CHAPTER SIX Understanding New Times

CHAPTER SEVEN From Failure to Success

References

Acknowledgements

Thanks to go to Gavin, Jennie, Senga, Thomas, Louise, Rosie and Danielle and the fantastic team at Luath Press…

Ideas never really belong to one person. They are the result of reading, talking, watching, listening and sharing with other people. I would like to thank Gerry Hassan for asking me to write this book and for the many fascinating and enlightening conversations we have where many ideas are developed.

In the same light I would like to thank Neal Lawson and everyone else that makes Compass such a stimulating and supportive organisation to be part of.

For the in depth focus group research that is the foundation of this book I would like to thank IPSOS MORI Scotland and in particular Mark Diffley, Sara Davidson and Ciaran Mulholland.

For their support, contributions, and encouragement I would like to thanks my colleagues and friends at the Electoral Reform Society: Katie Ghose, Kate West, Darren Hughes, Juliet Swann, Will Brett, Jessica Garland, Chris Terry, Stuart Thomas, Stephen Brooks, Owain ap Gareth, Sarah Allan, Davina Johnston and all the Council members.

I also thank Paul Cairney, Michael Keating and A. Wilson for their permission to use their unpublished research on MSPs’ backgrounds.

And I gratefully acknowledge the contributions made to this book though research, writing and conversations by Oliver Escobar, John Curtice, Robin McAlpine, Martin Stephens, Ashley De, David Runciman and Lawrence Freedman.

CHAPTER ONE

We Are All Democrats Now!

IT IS 9 MARCH 2014. Posters on polling stations flap in the breeze. Balloons and bunting give a muted tone of celebration. Small queues form as people line up to cast their vote. The media are reporting an excited electorate and a very high turnout. It is Election Day in Mount Paekdu district – the constituency of current North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un.

Across the country, North Koreans come out to vote for their representatives to the Supreme People’s Assembly, as they do every five years. On each ballot paper there is one name only and the voters have a simple choice of Yes or No. It is not known if anyone has ever voted No. Certainly in Kim Jong-un’s constituency, the state media reported that not a single vote was cast against the incumbent – and that on a 100 per cent turnout. It would not be viewed as a democratic act to vote against Kim Jong-un, rather one of extreme foolhardiness, or else treason. We can only imagine what would be the painful outcome for any voter that dared to dissent.

North Korea is probably the least democratic country in the world, but one that goes out of its way to name itself a democracy and to still hold elections for its Supreme People’s Assembly (Economist Explains, 2014). It is strange and fascinating that even the world’s most despotic leaders spend considerable amounts of money on running elections. They are of course a sham, an attempt to give some form of legitimacy to their regimes, but that they should go to such an effort says a lot about the universal power of the idea of ‘democracy,’ best captured long ago in Abraham Lincoln’s statement: ‘government of the people by the people for people’. Now, with Burma’s transition into pseudo-democracy, the only countries in the world that do not feel it necessary to claim that they are democracies are Saudi Arabia and Vatican City.

In Scotland we live in what we think is a democracy, but as the Democratic Republic of Korea demonstrates, naming it is a long way from realising it. Most places claim to be democracies. The list of United Nation member states includes countries claiming it in their title, including The Democratic Republic of Congo and the Lao People Democratic Republic, but neither is a shining light of democratic practice.

Scotland, the UK and the EU (we have several levels of government) are of course far removed from these pretend ‘democratic republics.’ Looking at these places should make us grateful that we live in a state that operates arguably an advanced level of democracy. Here we have many freedoms, the rule of law, and our rights are enshrined and protected in traditions and conventions and, more recently, through the Human Rights Act. However, gratitude at not being the worst should not translate into an acceptance of not being as good as we could be. Once it has taken root, democracy is tenacious and adaptive, but it is not inevitable that it either stays or progresses. Democratic freedoms can go down as well as up.

The EconomistIntelligence Unit Democracy Index 2013 states:

Free and fair elections and civil liberties are necessary conditions for democracy, but they are unlikely to be sufficient for a full and consolidated democracy if unaccompanied by transparent and at least minimally efficient government, sufficient political participation and a supportive democratic political culture. It is not easy to build a sturdy democracy. Even in long-established ones, democracy can corrode if not nurtured and protected.

This book seeks to examine three questions by looking at the people who are currently missing from our democracy in Scotland, that being those who are excluded and/or have opted out of direct engagement.

The first question that will be posed is whether Scotland is as democratic as we think it is. The second concerns how safe our democracy is and whether our rights and freedoms are threatened by the fact that large parts of our population are missing from the actual operation of our democracy. The third will think about how we can bring those that are missing back, to reinvigorate democracy perhaps in an evolved form and in doing so, bring our country closer together.

Why is democracy important?

We need to believe that democracy works in Scotland. We have to think that the government who controls and directs the civil service, the public services and the other parts of the state of Scotland is acting in the interests of the public. We must believe that it will do so because it is in its interests and because its members are part of the people, but also because they have our power on loan. If they do not act on our behalf then we, the people, can remove their power and vote them out at the next election.

While the state ultimately has the power to make us obey laws, things work much better if people feel that they do not want to break laws, and as citizens operate a level of obligation to the good of the wider society by paying taxes and generally supporting the running of the state. This is true even in North Korea, where rules are enforced with a violently nasty apparatus – those who enact it have an easier job if people believe that it is for the wider good. In Scotland we require a level of consensus and agreement and cooperation with the state. This public consensus, the views of our families and friends, probably affects how much we conform to the agreed rules of our society more than threats of fines or other punishments from the state.

The ability to force people to do things and to punish them if they do not must retain broad support for it to work. Public services and activities should be carried out with people’s support, but focussing for a moment on the coercive functions of the state helps to understand the essential nature of this support. Policing, courts, fines and prisons should be there by tolerance and consent and controlled by the rule of laws made by democratic legislators. Without popular consent, these actions would be oppressive, as they are in states where the population has little real power and are forced from above to acquiesce. Political scientists and philosophers term the proper acceptance of authority ‘legitimacy’ – Scotland’s body politic has legitimacy, whereas North Korea’s does not.

There are long-running ideological clashes about how this legitimacy originates and indeed what it actually is. Great political thinkers including Rawls, Hume, Rousseau, Mill, Kant and many others have explored these ideas of authority and legitimacy – concepts contested because they are so very basic to how any country is run. Ensuring all authority is genuinely legitimate would allow human beings to be as free as possible from oppression and as free as possible to create a good society. An illegitimate state is by definition an oppressive state.

Extreme cases such as North Korea show blatantly that the powerful will often seek sham legitimacy. While this manufactured legitimacy is obvious in such places, it exists to some level here as well. The government and other institutions of power often run consultations and listening exercises that are not really democratic, and claim or imply that they are. In the lead up to the ‘Edinburgh Agreement’ between Holyrood and Westminster, which set the terms for Scottish referendum on independence, both Governments held public consultations which requested evidence being submitted to an email address. Unsurprisingly, only a small number of highly motivated and interested individuals and organisations took part, making politicians later claims, such as ‘75 per cent of the responders wanted a single question’ virtually meaningless in terms of democratic authority (Black 2012) and deliberately misleading.

Philosophers have argued for centuries about whether consent is necessary for legitimacy, and indeed whether democracy is necessary for legitimacy (in Saudi Arabia and Vatican City it would seem that legitimacy conferred by a divinity remains sufficient, as it was here for a long time). This might all be cerebral fun for academics and philosophers, but it is important to connect with what is happening now in Scotland. The simple test would seem to be whether Scots would accept a government that they did not think had won a fair election. We would hope that only a public perception of a party winning a democratic election could give a government permission to govern.

It could be said that legitimacy was briefly questioned in the 2007 Scottish Parliament elections. An unusually large number of votes, representing 2.9 per cent of all those cast on the constituency ballot and 4.1 per cent on the list, were deemed invalid (Gould 2007). This resulted in considerable media furore and widespread public disquiet, but despite serious concerns in some quarters, the parties felt it better to accept the results and steady the system rather than challenge the election. This seems to demonstrate that many Scots need to believe our democracy is working for it to be secure and stable, yet more and more of the population opt out of the most fundamental expression of faith and trust in that democratic process: voting in an election.

Mapping ‘the Missing Scotland’

There are around four million people registered to vote in Scotland and another estimated 400,000–500,000 eligible but not registered, prior to the referedum drive. Compared to other similar states, ten per cent plus of unregistered voters is low to average (Terry 2012). The United States of America, for example, has only 68 per cent, while at the other end of the scale Canada, Australia, and New Zealand are all in the low 90s. These high rates of registration are partly because these countries have compulsory registration and the ability to register on voting day itself. There is now a danger that our registration rate will fall further. UK legislation that used to require the head of household to register everyone in the house and face a fine if they did not return the information was changed so that each individual is responsible. This was the biggest change to registration since the universal franchise was adopted in 1928, and time is now tight for local authority electoral registration officers to achieve the planned implementation (tying in with the Scottish referendum and the UK General Election).

Having over ten per cent of the electorate not even registered to cast their vote cannot be satisfactory. It is possible to speculate at why these people are not registered to vote. Many will be young people who may see little point in voting and/or are moving frequently. Some will be trying to escape from debt or feel uncomfortable about being on a register that identifies them and their address. Many people will just have not got around to it and many will see no point in registering as they do not want to vote. If we are to convince more of these people to take part in our democracy, the reasons for registering to vote must outweigh the reasons not to.

The turnout in the 2011 Scottish Elections was just over 50 per cent, which means that nearly two million Scots who could vote, did not. Even with the higher General Election turnout of 63.8 per cent in 2010, that leaves 1.5 million people that did not vote. The term ‘the missing Scotland’ has been used during the Scottish referendum debate by commentators and others to refer to those Scottish citizens and voters who a generation ago voted and took part in elections but no longer do so, but may come out and vote in the referendum. Figures from Electoral Commission Scotland reveal that 989,540 voters are missing from the 2011 Scottish Parliament elections if adjusted for the 75 per cent turnout of the 1992 UK General Election in Scotland (Hassan, 2014). This has made them a vital target group for the two campaigns, whereas in all other elections they have largely been ignored. The fact that this number of people may have made an active choice not to vote distorts our politics and may represent a serious threat to our democracy.

Over the last century, an ideal of a nation state has developed containing several elements including rule of law, human rights and freedoms as well as elected governments. This ideal seems to respect the principle that all citizens are of equal value, at least politically. Debates raged around suffrage for centuries. Eventually all men got the vote, and then all woman, and now – in the year of the referendum on Scottish independence – all people over the age of 16. It does no harm to remember that just 100 years ago, only landowners could vote, and there are woman alive today who voted in the first election in which woman could do so. In other words, what was thought to be the realisation of this ideal of liberal democracy is still relatively young. For some it was thought to be the zenith of human civilisation that Francis Fukuyama famously and foolishly called ‘the end of history’ (Fukuyama 1989), by which he implied that the principles of liberal democracy may have been the ideal that could not be bettered. Freedom, Equality and Democracy – history still has a long way to run in increasing, spreading and protecting these principles.

While this is not the end of history, much has been achieved. The burning question is: if after centuries of struggle to reach this ideal, an ideal that most still support and aspire to, why did only 50.4 per cent of Scots vote in the 2011 Scottish Parliament elections (Curtice and Steven 2011) and only 39.5 per cent in the 2012 local government elections (Curtice 2012)?

It could be that people are quite happy with how things are and do not feel the need to change anything, but a range of survey data does not support this. In the 2011 Scottish Attitudes Survey, just 18 per cent of Scots trusted the UK Government to act in Scotland’s best interests and only 24 per cent of those over 15 years of age across the UK tended to trust the Government (Office for National Statistics 2014). Voter turnout in UK General Elections peaked in 1950 with over eight in ten (82 per cent) of the electorate voting, in 2010 the turnout was 61 per cent. The Hansard Society’s annual democracy audit has shown a steady decline in trust and perceived effectiveness of politics over the ten years it has been conducted (Korris 2013).

A large number of people have stopped participating in the political and democratic process for reasons other than that they are content. Most worryingly of all, this is a growing situation amongst the young. The purpose of this book is to discover more about these people. Who are they? Why do they not take part? What are their concerns? Would politics and Scotland be different if they joined in? And perhaps most importantly, what would have to change to make that a possibility?

CHAPTER TWO

The Non-Voters

Who doesn’t vote and political inequality

Table 1 – Scottish Council Elections 2012 – Four Lowest Turnout Wards, then lowest by City

Table 2 – Scottish Council Elections 2012 – Four Highest Turnout Wards, then highest by City

Survey data from the likes of the Hansard Society Annual Audit consistently shows that people that belong to social groups with manual labour jobs or unemployed (social class D and E) are much less likely to vote than managerial and professional workers (social class A and B). Election turnout in the 2012 Scottish Local Government elections by ward seems to confirm the relationship between social class and turnout. Wards with high levels of deprivation and high student populations tend to have the lowest turnouts, while Island communities and/or relatively affluent areas tend to have much higher turnouts.