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- Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Sprache: Englisch
A survey of astonishing breadth and penetration. No cognitive neuroscientist should ever conduct an experiment in the domain of the emotions without reading this book, twice.
Parashkev Nachev, Institute of Neurology, UCL
There is not a slack moment in the whole of this impressive work. With his remarkable facility for making fine distinctions, and his commitment to lucidity, Peter Hacker has subtly characterized those emotions such as pride, shame, envy, jealousy, love or sympathy which make up our all too human nature. This is an important book for philosophers but since most of its illustrative material comes from an astonishing range of British and European literature, it is required reading also for literary scholars, or indeed for anyone with an interest in understanding who and what we are.
David Ellis, University of Kent
Human beings are all subject to boundless flights of joy and delight, to flashes of anger and fear, to pangs of sadness and grief. We express our emotions in what we do, how we act, and what we say, and we can share our emotions with others and respond sympathetically to their feelings. Emotions are an intrinsic part of the human condition, and any study of human nature must investigate them. In this third volume of a major study in philosophical anthropology which has spanned nearly a decade, one of the most preeminent living philosophers examines and reflects upon the nature of the emotions, advancing the view that novelists, playwrights, and poets – rather than psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists – elaborate the most refined descriptions of their role in human life.
In the book’s early chapters, the author analyses the emotions by situating them in relation to other human passions such as affections, appetites, attitudes, and agitations. While presenting a detailed connective analysis of the emotions, Hacker challenges traditional ideas about them and criticizes misconceptions held by philosophers, psychologists, and cognitive neuroscientists.
With the help of abundant examples and illustrative quotations from the Western literary canon, later sections investigate, describe, and disentangle the individual emotions – pride, arrogance, and humility; shame, embarrassment, and guilt; envy and jealousy; and anger. The book concludes with an analysis of love, sympathy, and empathy as sources of absolute value and the roots of morality.
A masterful contribution, this study of the passions is essential reading for philosophers of mind, psychologists, cognitive neuroscientists, students of Western literature, and general readers interested in understanding the nature of the emotions and their place in our lives.
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Table of Contents
Cover
Title Page
Preface
Acknowledgements
Philosophy
PART I:
Sketching the Landscape
1 The Place of the Emotions among the Passions
1. Passions, affections, and appetites
2. Agitations and moods
3. Emotions
2 The Analytic of the Emotions I
1. The representation of emotions
2. The language of the emotions
3. Expressions and manifestations of emotion
4. Emotion, cognition, and the will
3 The Analytic of the Emotions II
1. The epistemology of the emotions
2. Emotion and reason
3. The place of the emotions in human life
4 The Dialectic of the Emotions
1. The Cartesian and empiricist legacies and their invalidation
2. Philosophical and psychological confusions: James
3. Neuroscientific confusions: Damasio and the somatic marker hypothesis
4. Evolutionary accounts of the emotions: Darwin and Ekman
5. The quest for basic emotions
PART II:
Human, All Too Human
5 Pride, Arrogance, and Humility
1. The web of pride
2. Shifting evaluations of pride
3. Pride: connective analysis
6 Shame, Embarrassment, and Guilt
1. Shame cultures and guilt cultures
2. Shame and embarrassment: connective analysis
3. Guilt: connective analysis
7 Envy
1. Envy and jealousy: a pair of vicious emotions
2. Envy and jealousy: conceptual unclarity
3. Envy and jealousy: their conceptual roots
4. Envy: iconography, mythology, and iconology
5. Envy: connective analysis
8 Jealousy
1. Different centres of variation
2. Iconography
3. Jealousy: connective analysis
4. Jealousy and envy again
9 Anger
1. The phenomena of anger
2. The vocabulary of anger
3. Anger: connective analysis
4. Conceptions of anger in antiquity
5. Is acting in anger warranted?
PART III:
The Saving Graces
10 Love
1. Concepts and conceptions of love
2. The biological and social roots of love
3. The objects of love
4. Historico‐normative constraints
5. The phases of love
6. The web of concepts of love
7. The iconography of love
8. Connective analysis I: categorial complexity
9. Connective analysis II: peculiarities of love as an emotion
10. Connective analysis III: some characteristic features of love
11. Self‐love
11 Friendship
1. Friendship and love
2. The roots and marks of different forms of friendship
3. Analysis of the relation
4. Friendship, virtue, and morality
12 Sympathy and Empathy
1. Sympathy: the historical background
2. The analysis of sympathy
3. Empathy: from
Einfühlung
to mirror neurons
4. Empathy and sympathy
5. Envoi
Appendix: Moments in the History of Love
1. The history of love
2. Ancient Israel
3. Ancient Greece
4. From pagan Rome to Christian Rome
5. Early Christianity
6. The deification of love
Index
End User License Agreement
List of Tables
Chapter 01
Table 1.1
A comparison between emotions and appetites (give or take borderline cases)
Chapter 04
Table 4.1
Cicero’s basic emotions
Chapter 06
Table 6.1
Comparison of embarrassment and shame with respect to grounds of embarrassment
Table 6.2
Differences between feelings of shame and feelings of guilt
Chapter 08
Table 8.1
Thirteen differences between envy and marital jealousy or jealousy between lovers (excluding ‘for‐the‐most‐part’ differences)
Chapter 10
Table 10.1
A selection from the vocabulary (1)
Table 10.2
A selection from the vocabulary (2)
Chapter 11
Table 11.1
A comparison of love (erotic and non‐erotic) with friendship
List of Illustrations
Chapter 01
Figure 1.1
The passions of the soul and their relation to other feelings
Figure 1.2
Conceptual links of appetite
Figure 1.3
Conceptual links of moods
Figure 1.4
Forms of emotion distinguished by temporality
Chapter 02
Figure 2.1
Accusatives of emotions (emotion verbs not being factive, their accusatives are intentional)
Figure 2.2
Marks of temporary emotions
Figure 2.3
The conceptual web of an emotion
Chapter 04
Figure 4.1
A representation of Descartes’s theory of emotion (arrows signify direction of causal relations)
Figure 4.2
James’s notion of our intuitive conception of emotions
Figure 4.3
James’s conception of emotions
Chapter 05
Figure 5.1
The web of pride
Figure 5.2
The target of pride: ‘There are many ways of going astray … only one way of getting it right’
Chapter 06
Figure 6.1
The roots of shame
Figure 6.2
Different forms of shame
Figure 6.3
The web of shame
Chapter 07
Figure 7.1
The web of envy
Chapter 08
Figure 8.1
Varieties of jealousy
Figure 8.2
Jealousy as a capital vice: one possible cycle
Chapter 09
Figure 9.1
The dimensions of anger
Chapter 10
Figure 10.1
Connecting threads in the web of the objects of love
Figure 10.2 A synopsis of objects of love
Figure 10.3
Courses of erotic love
Figure 10.4
Positive and negative emotions potentially interwoven with love
Chapter 11
Figure 11.1
Attributes of friendship and of friendship‐love
Chapter 12
Figure 12.1
Hume’s theory of sympathy
Figure 12.2
Sympathy as a centre of variation
Guide
Cover
Table of Contents
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The Passions:A Study of Human Nature
P. M. S. Hacker
Fellow of St John’s College · Oxford
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Names: Hacker, P. M. S. (Peter Michael Stephan), author.Title: The passions : a study of human nature / by P. M. S. Hacker.Description: Hoboken, NJ : John Wiley & Sons, 2017. | Includes bibliographical references and index. |Identifiers: LCCN 2017030690 (print) | LCCN 2017036805 (ebook) | ISBN 9781118954744 (epub) | ISBN 9781118952436 (pdf) | ISBN 9781118951873 (cloth) | ISBN 9781119440468 (pbk.)Subjects: LCSH: Emotions (Philosophy) | Philosophical anthropology.Classification: LCC B815 (ebook) | LCC B815 .H33 2017 (print) | DDC 128/.37–dc23LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017030690
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Preface
The subject of the human passions has excited the imagination and attracted the attention of philosophers since the pre‐Socratics. That is hardly surprising, given the role that emotions play in our lives. We are all subject to joy and delight, to anger and fear, to sadness and grief. That is an intrinsic part of the human condition – for we are purposive, self‐conscious, goal‐seeking creatures and can recognize what frustrates or facilitates our purposes, and can respond affectively to and reflect upon the achievement of our goals and the maintenance or loss of what we value. We are mammals whose offspring require years to achieve biological maturity, and we are by nature social creatures with an innate capacity for bonding. So we are given to love, loyalty, and affection, and hence also subject to grief and sorrow. We express our emotions in what we do, how we act, and what we say, and we recognize the passions of our fellow human beings in their verbal expressions and behavioural manifestations of emotion. Having a natural propensity to sympathy and empathy, we can share our emotions with others and respond sympathetically to their feelings. Any study of human nature has to investigate the passions, to elucidate our concepts of emotions, and to describe our rich affective vocabulary. For the passions and emotions, collectively and severally, present manifold conceptual problems and provide fertile terrain for conceptual confusion among both philosophers and psychologists. Our problems are not merely intellectual. Human beings are often guided by their emotions, sometimes for good and sometimes for ill. They may be masters of their emotions or in bondage to them. Clarity about the concepts of the emotions is not only a contribution to the better understanding of human nature; it also facilitates deeper reflection upon our lives and the emotions that beset us. Accordingly this book is not aimed solely at philosophers, who are concerned with the conceptual problems examined here. It is also aimed at psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists, whose conceptual confusions and unclarities are subjected to detailed analysis here. And it is equally aimed at educated readers, who are interested in understanding the nature of the emotions, and in attaining a clearer understanding of the place of emotion in their own lives.
The emotions have an immediate and patent connection with (or with what is thought to be) the beneficial and the detrimental. For we fear and seek to avoid what we perceive as harmful to us or to those whom we cherish. We feel trepidation and anxiety, or anger, at the prospect of anything that threatens our welfare and endangers the good of those to whom we are attached. So the emotions are also perspicuously connected with what is, or is thought to be, good and bad. Our emotional pronenesses and liabilities are partly constitutive of our temperament and personality. Our ability to control our emotions, to keep their manifestations and their motivating force within the bounds of reason, is constitutive of our character as moral agents. So the investigation of the emotions is a fruitful prolegomenon to the philosophical study of morality. It provides a point of access to the elucidation of right and wrong, good and evil, virtue and vice, that skirts the morass of deontological and consequentialist approaches to ethics without neglecting the roles of duties and obligations, or the role of the consequences of our actions in our practical reasoning. Unlike deontology and consequentialism, such an approach highlights the context‐bound and ideographic character of much normal moral experience and decision without obscuring the role of principle in the lives of people of integrity. So this book paves the way for a subsequent investigation into axiology and morality.
Because the understanding of the role of the emotions in human life is ideographic rather than nomothetic, the deepest students of the passions are not psychologists, physiological psychologists, or cognitive neuroscientists. Science may study the endless forms of emotional abnormality and aberration, and strive to ameliorate the suffering of those subject to them. It may also investigate, as Darwin and his successors have, the expression of the emotions in animals and man, and explain, in so far as is possible, the evolutionary selection for one emotional propensity as opposed to another. But it can shed relatively little light on the diverse patterns of socialization of emotions in human communities, let alone upon the shifting history of the emotions in human cultures. For, once mankind acquired sophisticated languages, the nature and scope of emotions and their objects changed beyond anything that could be ascribed to, let alone rendered intelligible to, non‐human animals. Mastery of a language made possible second‐order emotions (e.g. regret for one’s anger, pride in one’s fearlessness), as well as objects of emotion that lie in the dated past or future, and abstract and universal objects of emotion (e.g. love of nature, hatred of injustice, compassion for mankind). Mastery of a language not only made man into a rational animal; it also brought human emotions within the scope of reason. For human emotions are normally supported by reasons, are capable of evaluation by the exercise of the faculty of reason, and are subject to control by means of the power of reason.
The deepest students of the role of the emotions in human life are the novelists, dramatists, and poets of our culture. The great novelists depict, in the most profound ways, emotional possibilities in human life, contextualized to a social and cultural form of life, and individualized to fictional characters portrayed in the round with consummate skill. The great dramatists manifest in the dialogues of their plays the roles different emotions may play in human life, the manner in which human beings may be victims of their passions and motivated by them. The great poets give refined articulate form to emotions we all feel but are incapable of crystallizing in such subtle expression. It is for this reason that I decided to illustrate my cultural and conceptual observations by reference to novels, plays, and poems, and to draw on numerous quotations from Western literature. I have not made use of the rich fund of Eastern literature, partly through ignorance, and partly because the conceptions of individual emotions that I chose to examine are conceptions manifest in Western culture, problematized in Western philosophy, and described and articulated in the literature of the West.
It does not require a great deal of reading in the extensive writings on the emotions in antiquity, in Jerusalem, Athens, and Rome (the three roots of Western civilization), to realize that the emotions have a history. They are commonly differently conceived and differently evaluated in different times and places. The extensions of ahava, eros, philia, agape, amor, and concupiscentia are not the same, nor do these terms coincide exactly with our concept of love, let alone with our conception of it (see chapter 10 and Appendix). Pride is a meritorious emotion and attitude of the Aristotelian great‐souled man, but the deadliest of sins for the Christian (chapter 5). Shame, but not guilt, is a dominant emotion in the heroic warrior cultures depicted in the Iliad and in the Norse sagas, but the role of guilt, repentance, and redemption dominate Jewish and Christian cultures (chapter 6). It is, I believe, important to view the concepts of our various emotions, and indeed our emotions as we conceive them, as features of our culture and products of history. For we shall then realize that emotional phenomena may be, have been, and are differently conceived and understood in different cultures and different times. Very different forms of life rest upon the biological substrate of animal emotion. Consequently, cultural history, in addition to the history of philosophy, plays a far greater role in this book than in its predecessors.
Part I of this volume ‘Sketching the Landscape’ prepares the ground for the investigation of individual emotions. It presents a distinct idea of the emotions in chapter 1 by differentiating them from passions in general, affections, and appetites, as well as from agitations, moods, and sentiments. It delineates a clear idea of the emotions in chapters 2 and 3, which advance a detailed connective analysis of the concept of emotion. The fourth chapter, ‘The Dialectic of the Emotions’, investigates and rectifies salient misconceptions, misunderstandings, and misconstruals of the emotions by philosophers, psychologists, and cognitive neuroscientists. Part II, ‘Human, All Too Human’, examines a selection of individual emotions: pride, arrogance, and humility; shame, embarrassment, and guilt; envy and jealousy; and anger. Part III, ‘The Saving Graces’, investigates love, friendship, sympathy, and empathy. Why just this selection? It was obviously impossible to examine the whole range, or even the larger part of the range, of human emotions in one book. So selection was unavoidable. It was guided partly by philosophical considerations, and partly by my own puzzlement and curiosity. Pride, arrogance, humility, shame, embarrassment, and guilt are distinctively human emotions of self‐assessment. They have been the subject of moralizing and philosophical reflection for more than two thousand years and are intrinsic features of human nature. Their discussion in a work of philosophical anthropology was imperative, and they enabled me to at least touch on a battery of related emotions, such as contempt, regret, remorse, and repentance. Envy and jealousy seemed to me to be two terrible emotions to which human beings are subject. Like arrogance, they destroy the soul of those they hold in their grip. Their differentiation appears to be increasingly difficult for the younger generation today – and so they seemed good candidates to exemplify what is, alas, human, all too human. Anger, and its cousins, rage and annoyance, are the most ‘animal’ of the emotions I chose to examine. I could equally well have chosen fear (and its cousins, terror, trepidation, and anxiety). Love, feelings of friendship, sympathy, and empathy are investigated in chapters 10 to 12. They are indeed the saving graces of human nature, mitigating our savagery and selfishness. They are sources of absolute value, and provide the roots of morality. Their investigation is necessary for any comprehensive study of human nature. There are many other emotions I should have liked to examine, but considerations of length were a constraint. I hope that the methods of investigation evident in this book will help others to explore, describe, and disentangle the networks of emotions that I have not discussed. Pleasure and happiness are marked by their absence. But they are not emotions. So they will be examined only in the sequel.
This book, The Passions: A Study of Human Nature, as its title intimates, is a study in philosophical anthropology. The latter term, known to anyone who has studied Kant, is not common in Anglo‐Saxon philosophy. That is unfortunate, since it is needed. The subjects studied here and in the previous two volumes of this sequence of essays on human nature encompass much more than can be subsumed under the heading of philosophy of mind or philosophical psychology. The current book is the third in the series that began with the publication in 2007 of Human Nature: The Categorial Framework. That examined the most general categorial concepts in terms of which we conceive of ourselves and of the world in which we live: substance, causation, powers and abilities, agency, teleology and teleological explanation, reasons and rational explanation of action, mind, self, body, and person. The second volume, The Intellectual Powers: A Study of Human Nature, was published in 2013. It presupposed the results of the first volume, but was designed to be read quite independently of it. In the prolegomenon, it investigated the concepts of consciousness, intentionality, and mastery of a language, which completed the stage‐setting for the examination of human cognitive powers – knowledge and belief, sensation and perception, and memory – which was followed by investigations of our cogitative powers, namely thought and imagination. It was my intention to complete the task I had set myself in a third volume, which I prematurely announced as The Moral Powers: A Study of Human Nature. It was to fall into three parts: the passions; axiology and human identity, i.e. the roots of value and the nature of good and evil, character, temperament, and personality; the summum bonum – happiness and the meaningful life, and the place of death in life. As I began my work on the emotions, it rapidly became clear that this plan was unrealistic if the project was to be implemented in the manner I wished. So what was intended to be a trilogy would have to be a tetralogy.
This volume, like the previous one, can be read independently of its predecessors. There is nothing here that is unintelligible without knowledge of the first two books. But the results of the previous investigations are presupposed. If a reader wishes to find the reasoning that underpins any controversial claim that is here taken for granted, cross‐references to the first and second volumes are given. As in the previous volumes, I have supplied many tables, lists, and diagrams to illustrate the conceptual networks that I trace. The diagrams are not substitutes for the argument of my text, but rather offer rough pictorial representations of distinctions drawn and connective analyses elaborated. They have the merit that they can be taken in at a glance, but they do not aspire to the accuracy of the analyses they illustrate. As in the second volume of the series, I have inserted italicized marginalia to facilitate surveyability, to make it easier to follow the argument, and to assist the reader in locating topics discussed.
I hope to be able to complete this tetralogy on human nature. It was planned as a very large fresco, and I should be sorry to leave it unfinished. But only time will tell whether I shall be able to do so, or whether I have left things too late.
P. M. S. HackerNovember, 2016
Acknowledgements
Friends, colleagues, acquaintances, and ex‐students have aided and encouraged me in writing this book. Conversations with them were wonderful, blending acute criticism and helpful advice, with frequent digressions, all punctuated with much laughter and merriment.
I am grateful to Hanoch Ben‐Yami, Aaron Ben‐Ze’ev, John Cottingham, David Ellis, Alessandra Fussi, Edward Greenwood, Anselm Mueller, Stephen Mulhall, Dennis Patterson, Amit Sa’ad, and Joachim Schulte, who all read one or more draft chapters and gave me comments, corrections, literary references, and suggestions for improvement. They saved me from numerous mistakes. Edward Greenwood generously permitted me to print three of his philosophical poems.
I am indebted to George Barton, Anthony Kenny, Iddo Landau, Parashkev Nachev, Thomas Oehl, Herman Philipse, Dan Robinson, and David Wiggins, who read many if not all of the chapters and gave me copious comments and criticisms. I benefited greatly from their acumen and scholarship, and their encouragement helped me more than I can say. Their questions steered me down pathways that I should otherwise not have trodden and these led me to insights I should otherwise not have attained.
Hans Oberdiek read the whole book as it was being written. His criticisms and advice were invaluable. I enjoyed many dozens of hours of conversation with him, which were not only instructive and constructive, but also wonderfully entertaining and heart‐warming. Discussions with Hans always replaced puzzlement by enlightenment and confusion by clarity.
I am deeply grateful to the doyenne of students of the emotions, Gabriele Taylor. She read many of the chapters of the book and discussed them with me over delightful lunches. Her comments upon my drafts displayed the subtlety and sensitivity evident in her books, as well as the wisdom of her years.
A fragment of chapter 6 on shame and guilt was presented at the meeting of the European Philosophical Society for the Study of the Emotions in Edinburgh in July 2015. I benefited from the questions of the audience and from discussions with the participants. A greatly compressed version of a part of chapter 10 on love was presented at the University of East Anglia. A selection of material was presented in a series of graduate seminars at the University of Kent at Canterbury. I am grateful to the audiences for their queries and objections.
P. M. S. H.
Philosophy
The table shining in the sun Against dark foliage, called you and me To talk of what it means to beWhat we should do, what we should leave undone.
We talked till dusk made contours blurred. At last our meditations reached The bounds of sense that can’t be breached, And still we tried to find the saving word.
The word to dissipate the weight That lies upon one’s consciousness To lift the burdensome distress By making all that was entangled straight.
Once the mind’s idols are destroyed Without creating any new, Then all is open to our view The power of illusion rendered void.
Edward Greenwood
PART ISketching the Landscape
1The Place of the Emotions among the Passions
1. Passions, affections, and appetites
Emotions and what we care about
Emotions and moods are the pulse of the human spirit. They are both determinants and expressions of our temperament and character. They are tokens of our modes of engagement with the world and with our fellow human beings. Our frame of mind is moulded by our moods, which wash our experience with their pink, grey, or black colours. Our emotions reflect what we care about and what we are averse to, what is important to us and what does not matter to us. A life bereft of emotion would not be worth living, for it would be a life without love or affection, lacking joy and delight, wanting enthusiasm and excitement. It would be driven by arbitrary wants, inclinations, and natural appetites. It would be a life in which we encountered the works of nature and of man without awe or wonder, without curiosity or admiration. There can be no happiness without such emotions. It would also be a life without pity and compassion, grief and sorrow – a life immune to empathy and to human fraternity, and to recognition of the human condition.
There can be no creature with sensibility, desire, and a modicum of cognitive powers, a fortiori, no creature with powers of intellect and will, that is immune to emotions. For emotions are corollaries of vulnerability (fear and anxiety, hope and relief), of success and failure in the pursuit of goals (triumph and delight, frustration and disappointment), and of conflict (rage, anger, hostility). There could hardly be creatures that reproduce sexually and whose young require prolonged care that do not feel maternal and filial bonding and affection. Nor could there be social creatures with knowledge of good and evil that were not susceptible to such emotions as shame, guilt, and remorse.
Animal emotions
We share both appetites and emotions with beasts. But the emotions that can intelligibly be ascribed to beasts, both in their nature and in their objects, are limited by the expressive constraints of the animal’s physiognomy and physique, and by lack of a language. Without either a tensed language or a language with means of temporal reference, there can be no current emotions conceptually and cognitively linked to the past (such as present remorse for a past misdeed) or to a specific time in the future (current fear of tomorrow’s danger). Without a vocabulary of emotions and the apparatus of pronouns, there can be no consciousness of one’s emotions, that is, realizing what emotions beset one – that one is irritated, is becoming increasingly excited, is ashamed. And, without that, the possibility of self‐conscious assessment and control of one’s emotions is beyond one’s reach. There could be no second‐order emotions, such as anger at one’s humiliation, shame for one’s fear, or embarrassment for one’s ill‐judged curiosity. Nor could there be any emotions of self‐assessment, such as pride in one’s achievements, guilt for one’s sins, remorse for the wrongs one has done to others. In the domain of the emotions, as with all the faculties of man, mastery of a rich language distances the horizon of what is humanly possible far beyond anything that lies within the reach of other animals. It opens the doors of felicity – and of suffering unknown to other animals.
Feelings
Emotions are feelings. The things we call feelings constitute a curious melange of categorially disparate phenomena.1 Feelings include physical sensations – feeling pain, itches, and tickles as well as sensations of overall bodily condition, such as feeling well or ill, and somatic sensations, such as the feeling of a distended belly, of creaking joints, and of shortness of breath. The concept of feeling subsumes tactile perception, such as feeling the roughness of a surface, the warmth of a fire, the shape of an object. Hedonic feelings are feelings of pleasure and displeasure. There are cogitative feelings, namely feeling – that is, opining, having a hunch or intuition – thatthings are thus‐and‐so. There are deontic feelings, as when one feels that one must act thus‐and‐so. None of these will be discussed here.2 What concerns us are the feelings associated with what were traditionally conceived to be the passions of the soul – a category that includes the emotions and much else besides.
Passions of the soul
This term of art has been used to signify all that can be contrasted with the ‘actions of the soul’.3 In early modern philosophy, it was understood to encompass all receptive, rather than active, psychological attributes. These were held to include the powers of perception, taken to be no more than forms of sensible receptivity. This both distorts many of the concepts of perception and the two‐way powers exercised in voluntary perceptual activities (intentionally feeling shapes, textures, warmth and cold, as well as listening to and listening for, scrutinizing, observing, watching, examining, looking for, etc.)4 and imposes too crude a dichotomy upon the psychological attributes of living creatures. It is more fruitful and illuminating to employ the word ‘passions’ as a quasi‐technical term to subsume the appetites (hunger, thirst, lust, and addictions); felt desires, such as urges, cravings, and impulses; some obsessions (obsessive emotions and compulsive obsessions); and the affections (agitations, moods, and emotions) of a living being.5 These are indeed passions rather than actions: we cannot voluntarily, intentionally, or deliberately feel hungry or thirsty, feel an urge or an impulse, be compulsively obsessed with something; nor can we recklessly, negligently, or inadvertently feel excited or amazed (agitations), cheerful or depressed (moods), angry or frightened (emotions). At the same time, it is true that we can sometimes suppress our passions or bring them under control by an effort of will and self‐restraint. We can moderate or even eradicate them through the exercise of reason. Sometimes we can enhance them or even engender them indirectly by voluntary thought or action. We can also cultivate, refine, and educate our sentiments and emotions. We shall discuss the relationship between the emotions and the will in chapters 2 and 3. Note that, while sensibility, intellect, and will are faculties of human beings, there is no faculty of the passions. That is no coincidence, since ‘faculty’ derives from the Latin facultas, meaning a power to do, which does not subsume susceptibilities, liabilities, passivities, or passions.
The goal: a distinct idea of emotion
The first task that must be undertaken in clarifying the concept of emotion is to locate it among the concepts of the passions thus construed, and to describe the differences between emotions and other passions. This will give us a distinct but not yet a clear idea of what an emotion is. We must describe the conceptual boundaries that distinguish the emotions from other affections, such as agitations and moods; from felt desires, such as urges and cravings; from obsessions and appetites; and also from attitudes (see fig. 1.1). Attitudes may be of different kinds. First, subjective axiological judgements of liking or disliking, approval or disapproval, being pleased or displeased. Secondly, sentiments, which are emotionally tinged beliefs or opinions. One may agree with the sentiments of another about the merits of an object, plan, or policy but not about the truth of a mathematical theorem or law of nature. Thirdly, emotional attitudes, such as feelings of admiration or contempt, which differ both from mere affective judgements and from sentiments.
Figure 1.1The passions of the soul and their relation to other feelings
Appetites
The term ‘appetite’ (from the Latin appertitus) has different uses. Most generally, it is used to signify a desire to attain an object or to fulfil a purpose. Somewhat more restricted is its use to indicate an inclination, preference, liking to do, or fancy for, something. By extension, we may speak of having no appetite to pursue a given course of action, meaning an aversion to doing something or a reluctance to act – finding a course of action distasteful or perhaps even fearful. Much more narrowly, ‘appetite’ signifies hunger or desire for food, as when we speak of having a good or poor appetite, of ‘working up an appetite before lunch’ (meaning engendering hunger by vigorous exercise), and of ‘loss of appetite’ (signifying a disinclination to eat). Anything that ‘whets one’s appetite’ stimulates one’s desire for food – and by extension therefrom also signifies anything that makes one eager to enjoy something. However, here the expression will be used in a quasi‐technical sense (sanctioned by usage) that is wider than mere hunger and narrower than a desire to attain a goal. Appetites – thus conceived – are common to both man and beast.
Natural and acquired appetites
Natural appetites are hunger, thirst, and – with qualifications – lust. Acquired appetites are material addictions – to alcohol and other depressants (opium, morphine), as well as to tobacco, caffeine, cocaine, and other stimulants.6 Appetites are blends of sensations and felt desires (such as inclinations, urges, or cravings). The sensations characteristic of natural appetites have specific locations. The sensation that is partly constitutive of hunger is located in the midriff – one could not have a feeling of hunger in one’s throat any more than one could have feelings of thirst in one’s midriff. Constitutive feelings of hunger must be distinguished from mere accompanying sensations, such as a headache and dizziness that may occur as a consequence of lack of food. The sensation characteristic of thirst is a feeling of a dry throat. Sensations characteristic of appetitive lust are of genital arousal. In general, the sensations associated with the appetites are forms of unease that dispose one to take action to satisfy the appetite and thereby to ameliorate the feeling of unease. (In the case of natural human appetites, the expectation of satisfaction of the appetite may be pleasurable. In this respect, they resemble human material addictions.) The intensification of appetitive sensations over time renders the appetite progressively more and more urgent and the craving more and more pronounced. Loss of appetites is associated with illness and old age.
Objects of appetites
The appetitive desire that is blended with sensation is specified or characterized by an infinitive grammatical object. To be hungry, thirsty, or lustful entails that one wants to eat, to drink, or to attain sexual release. To be hungry is to crave food, to be thirsty is to crave drink, and to be lustful is to crave copulation or sexual release. These are the formal objects of the appetites. The formal object of V‐ing is specified by a description which must apply if one V‐s at all.7 The connection between V‐ing and its formal object is logical, not empirical. Trivially, one can produce the formal object of V‐ing by modalizing the verb ‘to V’: only what is edible can safely be eaten, only what is perceptible can be perceived, and only what is imaginable can be imagined. Less trivially, only what is dirty can be cleaned, only what is damaged can be repaired, only what is liquid can be drunk.
What distinguishes desires characteristic of appetites from other kinds of desire or wanting is not merely the fact that they are blended with sensation, but also that they are fully specified by their formal object. One might say that they have no non‐formal, ‘material’, object. Or one might say that there is no distinction between their formal and their material object. The child who announces that he is not hungry for the main course but only for the pudding is inadvertently making a grammatical joke. The adult, who announces that he is thirsty for a gin and tonic but not for a cup of tea is intentionally making one. Lust, however, straddles the divide between appetites and desires. For, unlike hunger and thirst, lust may have a specific object (a man may lust after a specific woman, as David lusted after Bathsheba, and a woman after a specific man, as Potiphar’s wife lusted after Joseph). Here animal lust is transmuted into sexual desire directed at a particular person (see chapter 10).
The intensity and urgency of an appetite are typically proportional to the intensity of the sensations. Satisfying an appetite leads to its temporary satiation and so too to the disappearance of the sensation. Of course, the glutton may still want food but no longer because he is hungry, just as the drunkard may want a scotch but not to quench his thirst. Appetites are neither constant (as love may be) nor singular (as a desire such as wanting to see Naples before one dies perforce is). Rather, they are recurrent in the following sense: despite their satisfaction on a given occasion, they will, other things being equal, recur naturally some time later, when one becomes thirsty again, feels hungry or lustful again. Appetites are caused by physiological conditions that are typically concomitants of bodily needs (or, in the case of lust, by hormonally determined drives) consequent upon deprivation of food, drink, copulation, or sexual release. Nevertheless, the felt need for food, drink, or copulation is not the same as wanting it.8 Non‐natural appetites are similarly caused by physiological changes consequent upon habitual consumption of the addictive substance. When the agent successfully takes action to satisfy his appetite, the desire is sated and the sensation of hunger, thirst, or lust, or the craving for the addictive substance, ceases for a time, only to recur if deprivation is prolonged.
The teleology and evolutionary warrant of the natural appetites is obvious. Hunger and thirst have the patent purpose of driving the animal to eat and drink for its own preservation. Without animal lust for copulation the species could not survive. Human beings may be moved to eat, drink, and copulate from appetite alone – from hunger, thirst, and lust. But they may also be moved by regular habit, on the one hand, and by acquired tastes and preferences, on the other. In this way the appetites are transformed into ordinary desires with specific objects. Refinement of the natural appetites is characteristic of civilized societies, hence the cultivation of cuisine and culinary taste, of connoisseurship regarding artificial beverages, and of the transmutation of lust into sexual desire and erotic love, on the one hand, and into the erotic refinements of love‐making, on the other.
Criteria for an appetite
The criteria for being hungry, thirsty, or lustful, or for craving alcohol or an addictive drug do not lie in expressive behaviour, bodily mien, or facial expression. One does not jump with hunger, as one may jump for joy; cringe with thirst, as one may cringe in terror; or smile with lust, as one may smile with tender love. The criteria for having an appetite are the appropriate conative behaviour of trying to get. The criteria for being possessed by an appetite – being in a frenzy of hunger, thirst, or lust – are constituted by single‐minded conative behaviour to attain the object of one’s appetite, and distinctively greedy behaviour in satiating one’s appetite, as when one ravenously falls upon food, slakes one’s thirst without pause for breath, or sates one’s lust ‘like an animal’, as soldiers are prone to do in the sack of a city when on a rampage of rape. Satisfaction of an urgent appetite, unlike fulfilment of ordinary wants, is manifest by feelings and behavioural expressions of relief.
Obsessions
Being possessed by an appetite has an obvious kinship with obsessions. However, obsessions do not display the pattern of occurrence, satiation, and recurrence characteristic of the appetites. They are not bound up with bodily located sensations after the manner of the appetites. They have a non‐formal, material, object in addition to a formal one. Obsessions may be non‐emotional or emotional.
Obsessive collecting of Rembrandt prints, ancient Greek coins, or seashells is non‐emotional. Similarly, an interest in philosophy, poetry, or genetics may become, and then be, obsessive. Though not emotional obsessions, they are likely to be emotion‐involving, as is manifest in the excitement of the collector’s pursuit, the joys of displaying one’s collection, the delight in sharing one’s enthusiasm for a subject with others. The distinctive features of non‐emotional obsessions are the single‐mindedness of the obsessive pursuit, the intensity and extent of the preoccupation in thought and imagination, the strength of the desire to pursue the interest, and the lengths to which one will go to engage in the obsessive activity or to attain the goal of the obsession.
Obsessive hatred, jealousy, or guilt are emotional obsessions. An emotion becomes obsessive when the agent is invaded by recurrent thoughts, mental images, recollections, and fantasies concerning the object of his emotion. The obsessive emotion occupies one’s mind, driving out one’s customary concerns and projects. This is manifest, for example, by Othello’s crying out in his agony of obsessive jealousy:
O, now for ever
Farewell the tranquil mind! farewell content!
Farewell the plumed troops, and the big wars
That makes ambition virtue! O, farewell!
(III. 3)
Obsessions may be directed at a person (an obsessive preoccupation with an acquaintance, with a celebrity, or with a past historical figure), a class of persons (the Nazis’ obsessive anti‐Semitism), a topic (an obsession with ancient history, the philosophy of Kant, or the novels of Jane Austen or with the study of barnacles (Darwin) or fleas (Miriam Rothschild)), a pursuit (collecting stamps or memorabilia, balletomania, footballomania), or an activity (gambling, playing chess or golf, running, or mountain climbing). Obsessions may be harmless and even laudable, or irrational and deleterious (sometimes involving ingrained prejudices and stereotyped thought, understanding, and interpretation that guide and pervert one’s life). As obsessions become increasingly compulsive, they verge on the pathological. Carried to extremes, they involve obsessive–compulsive and ritualized behaviour, on the one hand, and pathological monomania, on the other. By and large, pathological obsessions are defects of intellect and will.
Appetites and cravings
Appetites have a kinship to cravings. A recurrent craving for a specific food or drink is akin to an appetite, save for the fact that it has a specific object. Like hunger and thirst, such intense desires invade one, plague one, intrude upon one – driving all else from one’s mind the more urgent they become. One is beset by longing for the object of the craving. Pregnant women are given to cravings. But, of course, one may crave for something non‐recurrently, in which case one’s craving is no more than an intensely felt desire.
One might wonder why the felt desire to sleep is not conceived to be an appetite. After all, it is marked by sensations of lassitude and weariness (which are sensations of overall bodily condition9), blended with an intense desire to rest, close one’s eyes, and fall asleep. Like appetites, the desire to sleep forces itself upon one. Like appetites, the constitutive desire (to sleep) is sated by its satisfaction, and the characteristic feeling (of weariness) evaporates. Like appetites, the desire to sleep is recurrent. For all that, it is not an appetite for two reasons. First, little if any conative behaviour of trying to get is involved (other than lying down or demanding quiet). Secondly, the desire to sleep involves no impulse to act but rather a desire to cease acting and to rest.
Urges
Similarly the felt desire to void one’s bladder or bowels, despite its pattern of onset, satisfaction, relief, and recurrence, is not an appetite but an urge. Urges are inhibited felt desires. An inhibited appetite, when it becomes intense, is experienced as an urge to drink or eat, or as an urge to copulate or find sexual release. But there are numerous non‐appetitive urges too. Some may be completely inhibited by self‐control (the urge to strike another who has insulted one) or may be inhibited for a while (the urge to void one’s bladder) or only for a few moments, as when one feels and finally succumbs to an urge to yawn. Sometimes they cannot be inhibited for more than a few moments despite one’s best efforts, as when one tries in vain to hold back a sneeze. For a schematic representation of the conceptual links of appetite, see figure 1.2.
Attitudes
Figure 1.2Conceptual links of appetite
Attitudes, as noted earlier, may be sentiments – emotionally tinged beliefs, subjective axiological judgements – such as liking or disliking, approving or disapproving, or may be emotional attitudes, such as respect or contempt. Like other passions, attitudes are felt. Unlike sensations, they are neither somatically located feelings nor feelings of overall bodily condition. Unlike tactile perceptions, they are neither the upshot of the exercise of a cognitive faculty nor the result of cognitive receptivity. They have a kinship with cogitative feelings (hunches, opinions, intuitions) inasmuch as they are kinds of judgement. Emotional attitudes are estimative judgements infused with emotion, as sentiments are beliefs tinged with emotion. Emotional attitudes include respect, admiration, and reverence for another, as well as disdain, contempt, and hostility. Their objects may be individual human beings or classes of individuals, living things, the natural world, the artefacts of man, institutions, or doctrines. Emotional attitudes lay a claim to objectivity in so far as their grounds are alleged attributes of their object that are conceived to warrant the attitude. They persist or endure for a time, but, lacking what Wittgenstein called genuine duration (as opposed to mere duration), they are not mental states or states of mind. In so far as dispositions, pronenesses, and tendencies are defined by reference to what they are dispositions, pronenesses, and tendencies to do, emotional attitudes are clearly not dispositions. They are logically linked with reasons for feeling respect or contempt, admiration or disdain, rather than with categories of acts or actions that manifest a disposition. Those reasons may also provide reasons for behaviour motivated by the emotional attitude. One’s contempt for someone may lead one to vote against that person, if he is running for an office for which one is an elector, but not voting for him is not contemptuous behaviour. One’s respect for another may underlie one’s trust in him, but trusting another is not the actualization of a disposition to respect.
Affections
Affections, like sensations, felt desires (urges, cravings, and impulses), and appetites, are felt. One feels love or hate (emotions), startled or astonished (agitations), cheerful or depressed (moods). Unlike localized physical sensations (pains, tickles, itches) and somatic sensations (of heartbeat, distended belly, tense muscles), affections do not have a bodily location and do not, save per accidens, inform one of the state of one’s body (or what has impacted on it), even though they are sometimes linked with sensations. One does not feel pride in one’s chest, although one’s chest may ‘swell with pride’ and one may be ‘bursting with pride’. One does not feel fear in one’s mouth, even though one’s mouth may feel dry with fear. If characteristic sensations are integrated with affections, then, unlike physical and somatic sensations, they do not, save per accidens, inform one of the state of one’s body. One’s blush of shame does not inform one of the state of one’s facial arteries, although it may inform one that one is more ashamed than one thought. One’s tears of grief do not inform one of the state of one’s lachrymal glands, although they may inform one that one loved the deceased more than one thought. Unlike feelings that are perceptions (tactile feelings), the affections do not inform one about the world around one. They are not sources of knowledge of our environment but presuppose, or incorporate, knowledge or belief concerning the world. They are forms of response to what we perceive, know, or believe about the world around us and about ourselves. As in the earlier examples, they can be sources of knowledge about ourselves. The form of knowledge, in such cases, is realization.
The term ‘affection’ is here used as a term of art. Like ‘passions’, it has both a wide technical use and a variety of common or garden uses. Widely used, it coincides with the traditional wide use of ‘passion’ to signify the varieties of ways in which a human being (or beast) may be psychologically affected. In its common uses, it signifies a favourable or kindly disposition towards a person or thing, hence fondness, tenderness, and warmth of attachment. It will be used here in a narrow technical sense to signify a subcategory of the passions.
The feelings that are affections can be divided into agitations, moods, and emotions. The boundary lines between these are not sharp. Unlike perceptions, they often occur in blends: astonishment and joy, surprise and anger, and excitement and hope are common blends of agitation and emotion. Grief‐laden depression, guilt‐ridden gloom, and morose jealousy are blends of mood and emotion. Fear and anger, joy and love, hatred and rage, and shame and guilt are common blends of paired emotions. Moreover, a mood may transmute into an emotion, as when a vague anxiety is transformed into a determinate fear; an emotion into a mood, as when grief grows into depression; one emotion into another, as when affection grows into love; and an emotion into a persistent emotional attitude, for example anger with another into hostility, and disappointment in another’s lack of good faith into distrust. Nevertheless, the distinctions are useful, even though they often have to be qualified by ‘may be’ and ‘for the most part’.
2. Agitations and moods
Agitations
Agitations are short‐term affective disturbances, typically caused by change, often by something unexpected. They include such affective responses as feeling thrilled, shocked, convulsed, amazed, surprised, startled, horrified, revolted, disgusted, or delighted. These too, like appetites, are commonly, but injudiciously, assimilated to emotions. Agitations are immediate consequences of what we perceive, come to know, or realize (or think we do). Because they are disturbances – often unanticipated disruptions that intrude upon us – they do not involve motives for action, as many emotions do, but rather temporarily inhibit motivated action. One may behave in certain ways because one feels startled, thrilled, or shocked. But one does not act out of thrill, shock, or being startled as one acts out of love, compassion, or gratitude. One may be motivated by love or jealousy, by compassion or envy, but one cannot be motivated by horror, amazement, or delight. This requires a brief explanatory digression.
Motivating and adverbial emotions
Emotions are not themselves motives – motives are not felt, do not overcome one at a given time or place, and are not pleasant or unpleasant, as many emotions are. Nevertheless, some emotions involve motives for acting, for example gratitude, jealousy, hatred, fear, and love. They involve motives in so far as the reason for the emotion and the reason for action it furnishes fit a general pattern of backward‐ and forward‐looking reasons constitutive of a motive.10 The backward‐looking reason for gratitude is a benefit conferred upon one, which provides a forward‐looking reason for thanking the benefactor in order that he may recognize one’s gratitude – so ‘acting out of gratitude’ describes a motivated act. So too in cases of acting out of remorse (commission of an offence, wishing one had not committed it, acting to make good the evil done) or acting out of fear (something threatening and a good reason for avoiding or removing it). Similar patterns are displayed by jealousy, envy, and pity. However, emotions such as hope, despair, sadness, grief, shyness, and embarrassment do not provide motives, even though one may do something with hope, in despair, out of embarrassment – for in these cases there is no determinate pattern of backward‐ and forward‐looking reasons. Rather, these emotions are manifest in the manner of acting – and might be deemed adverbial emotions.
Criteria for agitations
Agitations are made manifest by distinctive modes of reaction: one cries out in horror or amazement, recoils with revulsion or in disgust, is convulsed with laughter or paralysed with shock. They have characteristic forms of behavioural manifestation. These may be facial expressions, such as the wide‐eyed look of alarm, amazement, surprise, wonder, the grimace of revulsion or disgust. They may be gestures – the open arms of delight, withdrawn arms of alarm, the open hands of surprise or amazement. They may be vocal exclamations, such as cries of delight and glee, and shrieks of excitement and thrill. They encompass more global behaviour, such as shrinking with revulsion or in disgust, jumping when startled, or prancing with delight. These various forms of affective reaction, in an appropriate context, constitute criteria for ascribing the agitation to a person. Of course, what in one context is a shriek of excitement or thrill (children on a helter‐skelter) may in another context be a shriek of alarm or fright. What corresponds among the emotions to agitations will be denominated ‘emotional perturbations’. Emotional perturbations are manifest in the clenched fists and frown of anger, the cries of joy, or the trembling of fear. We shall discuss emotional behaviour in chapter 2.
Agitations may transmute into long‐standing emotional attitudes and sentiments, for example, of finding something revolting or offensive, having previously been revolted or offended by it. One may have been awe‐struck by something sublime in nature, and this immediate response may give rise to the sentiment that it is awe‐inspiring. One’s palpable shock at encountering exceedingly shabby behaviour may yield to the sentiment that what shocked one is contemptible. Similarly, delight at good news commonly modulates into a mood of cheerfulness or into a feeling of gratitude. These are no longer agitations or disturbances.
Moods
Yet another form of affection that differs from emotion is a mood
