Thirty Years of ProtoSociology - Three Decades Between Disciplines E-Book

Georg Peter

• Herausgeber: Books on Demand
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Serie: ProtoSociology - An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 610

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2022

Beschreibung

The contributions to the "Thirty Years Volume" represented in this volume reflect the historical focus of the ProtoSociology project. Colleagues are represented who contributed to the focus. This is also true thematically, as contributions on language theory, the philosophy of the mental, and the sociology of contemporary societies are represented. The contributions to the "Thirty Years Volume" are definitely evidence that they address central research problems of ProtoSociology, regardless of their particular epistemological interests.

Leseprobe

CONTENTS

Editorial: After Thirty Years

PHILOSOPHY ACQUAINTANCE, PHENOMENAL INTENTIONALITY, PRE-REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS

The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Acquaintance

Joseph Levine

Chromatic Illumination: Conscious Intentionality without Conscious Representation

David Henderson, Terry Horgan, Matjaž Potrč, and Vojko Strahovnik

A Methodological Objection to a Phenomenological Justification of the Ubiquity of Inner Awareness

Stefan Lang

REFERENCE OF NAMES, SEMANTIC VALUES, SPEAKER INTENTION, PRACTICAL SENTENCES

Names and Naming

Una Stojnić and Ernie Lepore

Transparent and Opaque Contextual Sensitivity

Jeffrey C. King

Practical Sentences, Their Meaning and Their Validity

Gerhard Seel

SOCIOLOGY, MULTIPLE MODERNITIES, AND CONCEPTS OF GLOBALIZATION

Globalization, Secularization and Collective Identities: Encounters and Dilemmas of Multiple Modernities

Judit Bokser Liwerant

Globalization Discourse: Classification and Transdisciplinarity

Roland Robertson

Picking over the Bones: Some Reflections on the State of Global Scholarship, and two Case Studies

Barrie Axford

STUDIES ABOUT CONTEMPORARY SOCIETIES

Learning from Covid: Three Key Variables

Jan Nederveen Pieterse

Contesting Liberal Citizenship: The Populist Challenge

Luis Roniger

The Transcendental and the Immanent as Liturgical Experience – the Greek Orthodox Case

Manussos Marangudakis and Theodoros Chadjipadelis

THE NEXT SOCIETY

The New Shape of the World: Note on “Sociology of the Next Society: Multiple Modernities, Glocalization and Membership Order”

Vittorio Cotesta

On Problem-References: Review Essay on “Sociology of the Next Society: Multiple Modernities, Glocalization and Membership Order”

Athanasios Gromitsaris

Contributing to Next-Society Sociology: Discussing Kibbutz’ Metamorphosis

Eliezer Ben-Rafael

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EDITORIAL AFTER THIRTY YEARS

Every past is transformed into a more-past, and againEdmund Husserl

1. Initial situation

When imagining long periods of time, we are overwhelmed with our current experience and they elude us. The past experience cannot be repeated in the present as a real event and the projective protentions can only be realized in the present. Thus, the present is the way to the future. This confronts us with the problem reference of time consciousness and time especially because the duration of thirty years of our project and journal Protosociology cannot be an object of a linear time consciousness.

The term “ProtoSociology” goes back to Jürgen Habermas. He thus classifies phenomenological sociology, which goes back to Alfred Schütz and is inspired by Edmund Husserl. However, the term is not placed in this tradition. The term “ProtoSociology” is inspired in part by Paul Lorenzen’s constructive theory of language and science, which encouraged the project in its initial phase to establish a proto-theoretical approach in sociology. But the research program does not follow his epistemological fundamentalism of instrumental actions of measuring operations and his justification of intuitive logic. Therefor it is advisable to sketchily deal with the language-theoretical and sociological problems of ProtoSociology in the following. Another reason for these two branches, which seems to be rather separated nowadays, are found in the historical and biographical situation of the editor.

So, the journal and the research project of ProtoSociology is motivated by the teaching activities of Gerhard Preyer in the second half of the 1980s. Its research program reflects the changing situation in philosophy and sociology at that time. Preyer’s sensitization for the treatment of philosophical problem references goes back to the teaching activities of Herbert Schnädelbach, with whom he studied after his first study of philosophy and sociology in the second half of the 1960s and in the first half of the 1970s. He also attended lectures and seminars in Heidelberg under Dieter Henrich and Ernst Tugendhat.

In a collaboration with Michael Roth at the beginning of the 1980s, a first version of the problem situation of analytic philosophy was drafted, which was later further elaborated and somewhat varied. This was preceded by the treatment of the problem situation of the analytic theory of action with its peak in German philosophy in the 1970s. Rüdiger Bubner, Jürgen Habermas and Herbert Schnädelbach gave lectures on this topic. Analytic action theory was relevant to the project because the notion of logical form is a link between it, theory of action, language theory, sociological theory, and ontology. This is worth mentioning especially because the analytic theory of action was not adequately dealt with by sociologists working in the segment of sociological theory of action. It was the connecting element between the sociological and the philosophical aspects of our project.

2. The philosophical branch: from action theory to philosophy of mind and language

In the beginning, the language-theoretical part of ProtoSociology was to characterize the sociological subject area by prototypical illocutionary acts, their conditions of interaction, and the privileged performance of illocutionary and propositionally differentiated language. The differentiation of illocutionary and propositional languages is the analysis instance of the structural extension of the society-internal communication. While this approach has taken a back seat to the substantive sociological research program of contemporary societies, it has not been abandoned. The language theory/philosophy projects have been pursued on an ongoing basis. The linguistic and speech act theoretical approach has been further supported by John Searle’s social ontology, but also by Noam Chomsky’s concept of language in the course of his turn to evolutionary theory and by insensitive semantics of Herman Cappelen, Ernest Lepore, and Emma Borg. However, it must be emphasized that no linguistic (ontological) idealism follows from this with regard to the social dimension and epistemology and ontology. A linguistic idealism was also not advocated in the language theory research program of ProtoSociology.

The initial situation concerned language theory, for example, the semantic analysis of illocutionary acts and their typification and placement in an integrated theory of interpretation. It took up motives of the unified theory of thoughts, meaning, action, and evaluations von Donald Davidson. In the process, however, an intersection of the great debate in epistemology about “stimulus meaning versus distal meaning” (Quine, Davidson) of the 1980s, extending into the 1990s, also emerged. From this the conclusion was drawn to mark the link between the language theory and the sociological theory by the rationality assumptions. This motivated, for example, a project on concepts and theories of rationality. In the course of the work, however, it was concluded that the assumptions of rationality cannot guarantee the adequacy of the linguistic description of speech acts, inscriptions, actions, and communications. Jerry Fodor, Ernest Lepore, and Kirk Ludwig also came to this conclusion. However, the semantic systematization of the distinction of prototypical illocutionary act is not affected. Gerhard Preyer carried his criticism of the speech act theory once more at a conference at Rudgers University in September 2019.

As a consequence of the reinterpretation of the unified theory, on which the projects of the ProtoSociology were pursued, it was obvious to reformulate continuously the problem reference of the link between mental, language, social and the rest of nature. The project was aided by the interpretation of Davidson and the critique by Ernest Lepore and Kirk Ludwig, and the reshuffling of traditional semantics to insensitive semantics by Cappelen and Lepore, and Borg. A conclusion from the projects was that the autonomy of meaning (Davidson) is not to be circumvented, and that one has to distinguish the theory of meaning from the theory of action and communication. Thus, the Grice mechanism and meaning nominalism cannot claim a central placement in language theory. A particular problem is how we analyse, for example, irony, metaphors, and insults in language theory and linguistics. Georg Peter has a special study on the problem of metaphor. The analyses of this problem continue to be of interest in the present discussion.

3. The sociological branch

The sociological projects of ProtoSociology were motivated by the initial situation of the 1980s with its research program on the structural evolution of societal communication and societies. This concerned the confrontation with the tradition of systems theory, for example, Talcott Parsons, Niklas Luhmann, Richard Münch, and the debate between the approaches that place contemporary society in a development of modern society and the approaches, postmodernism, which diagnosed an incision and transition to a postmodern society in the history of modern society. Based on this, the sociological focal points were investigations and publications on globalization and the demands on corporate organization triggered by the transnational expansion of the economic system (economic globalization). In addition, there was research done on Weber’s sociology of religion, and the sociology of law. In contrast to the classical modernization theories of structural evolution the studies of Shmuel N. Eisenstadt show a relativization of the claim of Western modernization and a re-systematization of sociological theory as well. One application of the continuation of the Multiple Modernities research program has been our studies of Chinese modernization since the 1990s. Beside our two issues explicitly on China – and one on Japan – also five books have been published. It is evident that the institutional innovations and their order Western modernization have no generality. Eisenstadt’s general sociology is also informative for recasting social integration theory. This remains to be addressed.

Reframing social integration theory is a focus of ProtoSociology’s research program, to which it has returned repeatedly. It is certainly one of the most difficult problem references, whose view in the publications of Gerhard Preyer and Preyer and Reuss-Markus Krausse are treated by many colleagues as very critical. Depending on the sociological point of view, this may be obvious. In the research program of recasting social integration, people kept coming back to the function, performance, and self-description of ascriptive solidarity. This is a problem that Gerhard Preyer already dealt with in his habilitation thesis (inaugural lecture 1984). In the course of the rewriting, a distancing from normatively oriented and universalistic approaches in the sociological tradition became increasingly apparent. With regard to this problem reference, Niklas Luhmann’s new version of the conflict theory through a social immunology should also be mentioned. This encouraged a conceptualization of social integration theory that was unusual in the history of sociological theory.

Within sociological theory, we have observed widespread shifts over the past thirty years. They have been triggered by the structural change of contemporary societies. From the point of view of the different research programs in sociological theory, relevant publications have been made on this. They addressed the question of the sociology of the Next Society (Dirk Baecker, Peter F. Drucker, Preyer and Krausse), a reanalysis of the concept of globalization. It is also worth mentioning the continuation of the research program of Multiple Modernities of Eisenstadt by a transnational group of researchers, for example, by participants Ben-Rafael, Bokser Liwerant, Grommitsaris, Krausse, Krawietz, Marangudakis, and Preyer.

4. Extensions

Besides these two different proceedings in social studies and philosophy, there is another point to be made in retrospect. Above all, Gerhard Preyer also turned since the 1990s to the philosophy of mind better of the mental, and philosophy in general in a sympoetic exchange with Erwin Rogler (1927-2013). Out of this exchange several publications have been carried out, both jointly but also individually, which turned to the subject of supervenience, the critique of constructivism in the philosophy of the mental, and the phenomenal consciousness. This was accompanied by Gerhard Preyer’s confrontation with the Heidelberg School of Dieter Henrich, which was renewed by Manfred Frank. In the meantime, one speaks of the New Heidelbergers, who are dedicated to the problem reference of the anonymous consciousness of Henrich’s writings from the 1970s, the de se constraint of the analytical theory of self-consciousness, and Sartre’s lasting insight of the pre-reflective consciousness, which was recalled in particular by Frank. In this tradition, the linguistic turn in philosophy is challenged by the fact that phenomenal consciousness, consciousness as an anonymous field, and intentionality, are not a component of linguistic competence.

Another cooperation was carried out by Gerhard Preyer and Georg Peter with Raimo Tuomela on social ontology. Within this framework, two issues of ProtoSociology and a volume on Tuomela’s social ontology are published. It was a special experience to participate in Tuomela’s excellent professionalism in the exchange with him and to pass it on to others. The publications on contemporary social ontology and theory of society were complemented by an investigation on Margaret Gilbert’s collective subject/commitment and on the ongoing analysis on collective intentionality and on a critique of the socalled “rejectionists” (Sara Rachel Chant, Margaret Gilbert, Frank Hindriks, Gerhard Preyer).

ProtoSociology: a special kind of discourse

A broad interpretation of the reading of “ProtoSociology” states that it is a “medium of discourse.” Here, “discourse” in its original reading is to be interpreted as a “back-and-forth conversation” or “debating lecture”. It is not simply a place where to publish an article. The publication as the conclusion of a project is the result of an extensive scientific work and scientific exchange. This is also one of the reasons why ProtoSociology has established itself as a project and a scientific journal, which has been the practical conclusion since the triggering situation in the 1980s. As mentioned, for the hard core of the project’s supporters there was in continuation no commitment to a specific research program. Rather, membership was also intended to promote individual creativity and ideas. In retrospect, this proved to be successful and beneficial: We had and will reinvent ourselves steadily.

The success of the project is due to its participants to a greater extent than is normally the case for publishers, magazines, and journals. The contributions to the “Thirty Years Volume” represented in this volume reflect the historical focus of the ProtoSociology project. Colleagues are represented who contributed to the focus. This is also true thematically, as contributions on language theory, the philosophy of the mental, and the sociology of contemporary societies are represented. The contributions to the “Thirty Years Volume” are definitely evidence that they address central research problems of ProtoSociology, regardless of their particular epistemological interests. We would like to sincerely thank all of our authors for their willingness to contribute an article to our project and our “Thirty Years Volume”. This is a great honour for us and encourages us to further projects.

Gerhard Preyer, Georg Peter, Reuss-Markus Krausse

Frankfurt am Main, March 2022

Philosophy Acquaintance, Phenomenal Intentionality, Pre-reflective Consciousness

THE METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY OF ACQUAINTANCE

Joseph Levine

Abstract

Phenomenal consciousness comprises both qualitative character and subjectivity. The former provides the proprietary contents of conscious experiences – determining what they are like – and the latter is that feature that renders those contents “for the subject”, so there is something it is like at all. I have developed a theory of consciousness as “acquaintance” which I dub the “Cartesian Theater” model, on which there is a fundamental psycho-physical law that takes the output of cognitive and perceptual systems as input and yields overall conscious experience as output. This model entails epiphenomenalism regarding phenomenal properties, which, I argue, presents a specific problem regarding our epistemic position with respect to this very theory. I develop a line of thought that seeks to disarm this challenge, relying to a large extent on a certain way of understanding both subjectivity itself and also cognitive phenomenology.

1.

As I have always seen the issue, the puzzle of phenomenal consciousness breaks down into two interrelated problems: the qualia problem and the subjectivity problem. The subjectivity problem concerns the kind of relation that obtains between a subject and the contents of her conscious experience. The qualia problem concerns the nature of those contents. Qualia are the properties we encounter in experience, such as color, sound, pain, and the like, that don’t seem to be realizable in the basic physical properties of the world. But aside from the problem of “locating” (to use Frank Jackson’s term) qualia within the metaphysical fabric of the world, there seems to be something special about the consciousness relation itself. What is it for a subject to be conscious of something, like the color of a ripe tomato?

I said above that the two problems are interrelated. In a way this is obvious, since one of the two problems concerns one of the relata of the relation that constitutes the other problem; one can’t really understand the nature of the relation without understanding the nature of the relata. But I think the interrelatedness goes deeper. It seems to me that qualia, the entities of which we are conscious, are essentially objects of consciousness; they are, as I put it in other papers, “ways of appearing”, where “appearing” just is the consciousness (or “conscious-of ”) relation (Levine 2006).

I won’t try to reconstruct all the relevant arguments for this view of subjectivity and qualia, but let me briefly summarize the overall picture I have come to endorse (very tentatively and humbly). That will be the topic of section 2. In section 3 I will present what I take to be the most serious challenge to this picture of conscious experience (aside from the standard “incredulous stare”). In section 4 I will present my latest thoughts on how to address this challenge.

2.

After decades of considering, and arguing against, various materialist theories of qualia (or phenomenal properties), I have come to the conclusion that qualia are not physically reducible (that is, realizable) properties (Levine 2001; 2018, chapter 9). The color we encounter in conscious experience, the sounds we hear, and all the bodily sensations we feel, are not metaphysically constructible out of the basic properties of physics. But it’s not just that a property like the reddish qualitative character of a visual experience isn’t physically realizable. It also seems to be epistemically accessible to the conscious subject in a way that materialist accounts of epistemic access, based on the idea of computational relations to physically embodied representations, don’t adequately explain. So aside from these non-physical properties, there seems also to be a non-physical relation to them.

In fact, the dialectic of the debate over materialist theories of qualia brings one face to face with the peculiar nature (from a materialist point of view) of the relation involved in experiencing qualia. When one considers various materialist reductions – physicalist type-reduction, functionalism, representationalism – the standard counter move on the part of the anti-materialist is to appeal to the conceivability of the reducer without the reduced, or vice versa. Materialists then respond by appealing to cognitive models that purportedly explain the persistence of the anti-materialist conceivability intuitions (Balog 1999, Papineau 1995). The “phenomenal concepts strategy” (Stoljar 2005) is the main example of this line of argument. According to this view, it’s because we possess a first-person kind of representation of qualitative properties that is cognitively insulated from the kind of concept we wield from the third-person point of view that we can’t see how the very same property could be represented by both sorts of concept. Thus, materialism is true, but our cognitive architecture makes us perennially subject to the explanatory gap – the “cognitive illusion” that it couldn’t be true.

As I (and others) have argued (Levine 2018, chapter 1; Chalmers 2007), however, the problem with the phenomenal concepts strategy is that it doesn’t really do the explanatory work it’s supposed to do. What it is supposed to explain is why, despite excellent scientific evidence that conscious experience is ultimately a physical-functional process carried out by the brain, we still find it puzzling how this could be true. When we look deeply into this puzzlement, we see that it only makes sense on the assumption that our epistemic access to the contents of our own conscious experiences displays a unique form of immediacy and directness, providing what I have dubbed a “substantive and determinate conception” of the qualia experienced. This points to a kind of “acquaintance” relation we bear to those contents. I go on to identify acquaintance as the essence of conscious experience – so to be conscious of something just is to be acquainted with it (Levine 2019). Acquaintance, as we see from the critique of the phenomenal concepts strategy, does not appear to be a relation that is any more metaphysically constructible from physical relations than qualia are from physical properties.

The interdependence between the acquaintance relation and qualia thus emerges from the very dialectic driving the anti-materialist position. Qualia do not seem to be the sort of property that can be reduced to the physical, and the very fact of their so seeming is best explained by the fact that our awareness of qualia itself is a relation that isn’t capable of physicalist reduction. Qualia, then, are the special relata of the special acquaintance relation that constitutes consciousness.

There is another route to the interdependency that holds between acquaintance and qualia, which I alluded to when characterizing qualia above as “ways of appearing”. I have argued in several papers (Levine 2018, chapters 10–12) that secondary qualities – colors, sounds, and the like – are only instantiated in the context of a conscious subject’s awareness of them. That is what I mean by calling them “ways of appearing”. While there is clearly a sense in which the fire truck is red even when no one sees it, I claim that this is a derivative sense of being red. What it means for the fire truck to be red when no one is looking at it is for the truck to have a spectral reflectance of the sort that, when viewed in appropriate light by a subject with the appropriate visual system, it will appear red to the subject. But the primary sense of being red here is what happens to the subject when viewing the fire truck, not what’s going on with the fire truck on its own. In other words, I adopt a version of the esse et percipi principle of Berkeley.

The idea is this. Acquaintance is a relation between a subject and qualia. Acquaintance is a basic, non-physically-realized relation, and qualia are nonphysically-realized properties that are only instantiated in objects of acquaintance. Colors, sounds, bodily sensations – the contents of experience – only exist as objects of experience, and experience only provides access to these special objects and properties. As I have characterized it, conscious experience really is a kind of Cartesian theater, with the conscious subject as the lone member of the audience.

While I deny that conscious experience can be reduced to the physicalfunctional, it is obvious, as anti-materialists have always acknowledged, that there is an at least causal dependence of experience on the physical-functional. The physical process of light waves bouncing off of objects, entering the eye and stimulating receptor cells in the retina, giving rise to complex processing in visual cortex, is causally responsible for the visual scenes we consciously experience. Lesions in visual cortex, or damage to the retina, causes blindness, an inability to have visual experience. Furthermore, what happens in experience certainly seems to cause events in the physical world. It’s the painfulness of the burn on my hand that causes me to remove it from the stove after accidentally touching it while too hot.

So how does the anti-materialist characterize the causal relation between what’s going on in the brain and experience? Anti-reductionists have typically gone in two directions on this question. Traditional dualists usually speak of causal relations that obtain between neurological states and phenomenal states. C-fiber firings, say, cause pains. The point is that the physiological properties instantiated in the brain bear certain basic causal relations to the instantiation of phenomenal properties in experience. Just which such causal relations obtain is a straightforwardly empirical question, to be discovered by identifying the relevant correlations between neurological and experiential properties.

A number of philosophers in recent years have rejected this model. Their main objection is that it entails the existence of what they consider an implausible form of “emergence” in nature (Bruntrup & Jaskolla, 2017). (Of course, this reasoning would support materialist reductions as well, but they oppose those for largely the same reasons dualists do.) The problem is that the very same basic physical properties, when not organized into the particular complex formations constituting brains, do not cause any conscious experiences, but when organized in this particular way they do. If, as the reductionist proposes, we could explain this difference between brains and other objects by appeal to the particular forms of organization present in the brain but absent elsewhere, then no illegitimate kind of emergence would be involved. This is in effect what functionalists do. But if one doesn’t accept functionalist reductions of consciousness, then the causal relations between brain states and phenomenal states appear brute and basic. While one can reasonably accept such basic causal relations at the most fundamental levels of nature, as in microphysics, they argue that it seems wildly implausible to posit such basic causal relations at the level of aggregation at which brains are located.

Instead of positing basic brain state-phenomenal state causal relations, philosophers who object to the emergence of such relations have opted instead for some version or other of “panpsychism”, the view that phenomenal properties are found at the most fundamental level of nature, in elementary particles, or space-time regions. There are a number of different panpsychist proposals, and they all try to address in one way or another the so-called “combination problem” that attends this idea: the problem of how to explain the phenomenal experiences of human (and many animal) subjects of experience in terms of the phenomenal properties instantiated in their most fundamental parts. This is a daunting challenge to panpsychism, and in my opinion no proposal that I’ve seen adequately addresses it.

However, aside from the combination problem, I think panpsychism suffers from a defect that is also found in the neurological-to-phenomenal basic causal relations posited by the traditional dualist (Levine 2017). The problem is that computational cognitive-perceptual psychology – cognitive science – seems to explain a whole lot about our conscious experience (among other aspects of our mental life) in terms of the representational structure realized in the brain. In particular, cognitive science seems very good at explaining the fine-tuned structure of experience in terms of the underlying computational processes. As an example, take the structure of the color wheel, with its four unique colors – red, green, blue, and yellow – and all the other binary hues that are combinations of the unique ones. In particular note that one can see a yellowish red (orange) as well as a bluish red (purple), but not a greenish red. The theory of “opponent processing”, which posits two chromatic channels, a red-green one and a blue-yellow one, can explain this aspect of the structure of color experience (Hardin 1988). Similar examples of how the structural and relational features of experience are explained in terms of the computational structure of the mechanisms causally responsible for the experience abound. Indeed, this ability to explain the fine-tuned structure of experience constitutes one of the most powerful arguments on behalf of the functionalist reductionist.

So how do we reconcile the strong conceivability/explanatory gap arguments that seem to favor treating acquaintance and qualia as irreducible features of reality with the acknowledgement of the tight connection between the computational mechanisms in the brain and the structure of conscious experience? My proposal, which does involve the sort of emergence to which panpsychists object, is that whatever basic law holds between the physical-functional and the phenomenal is not a matter of connections between this or that neurological state and this or that phenomenal state. Rather, the position that seems to make a place for the basic and irreducible character of consciousness while acknowledging the role of the computational mechanisms in determining fine-tuned structure is one that posits a basic lawful relation between the computational brain as a whole and conscious experience as a whole. In earlier work, relying on the Cartesian theater metaphor, I put it this way. Think of the computational mechanisms as constantly writing/updating a description of the world around us, and the contents of conscious experience as determined by these mechanisms in the way a movie is determined by its script. The computational brain writes a “script” – which is itself physically-functionally realized – and then somehow (and here is where the inexplicable brute causal law enters the scene) this is translated into the “movie” in the Cartesian theater “watched” (i.e. experienced) by its lone audience member, the subject.

3.

As mentioned above, anti-materialists readily acknowledge that there is a tight causal connection between events in the brain and conscious experiences. But it isn’t easy to see how to account for such connections, at least if one accepts the principle of the causal closure of the physical, as most philosophers do. According to this principle, all causal interactions, all lawfully governed state changes in objects, are governed (ultimately) by the laws of fundamental physics. While there are of course higher-level laws – of biology, chemistry, psychology, etc. – these are assumed to be realized in basic physical laws. The problem, then, is how to incorporate phenomenal events into the causal stream of physical events.

For instance, take the example of removing one’s hand from a very hot object because of the pain. Removing one’s hand is a physical event that is caused by muscular contractions that are themselves caused by events in the motor nervous system (which are themselves caused by other nervous system events, and on and on). There doesn’t seem to be any gap in the physical causal stream leading from the hand’s touching the very hot surface to the hand’s removal that would be closed by appeal to the conscious experience of pain – unless, of course, as the materialist insists, this experience is itself realized in the nervous system. So, how can we honor what seems to be the obvious fact that the pain is causally responsible for the hand’s removal if the pain isn’t physically realized?

Notice that the argument based on the causal closure principle has bite in only one direction. That is, to use our example, the problem in the case of the hand’s removal from the hot surface is that there is no gap in the causal chain leading up to it. The causal closure principle assures us that any causes of this event must themselves be physical, or physically-realized, events. However, nothing in the causal closure principle rules out there being non-physical effects of physical events, so long as they do not then go on to cause other physical events. Hence, many dualists endorse epiphenomenalism (Jackson 1982), the position that while conscious experiences are themselves caused by physical events – and governed by the basic psycho-physical laws mentioned earlier – they are not themselves causes of physical events.

Of course, epiphenomenalism still leaves the pain outside the causal stream and this is unacceptable to many philosophers. On the other hand, many have massaged their intuitions sufficiently that they are able to live with this consequence (Chalmers 1996). After all, what direct evidence do we have that it’s the pain experience itself that is making the hand move? Empirical scientific evidence can only cover the physical causes and effects involved in this transaction. While we may seem to experience the causal connection directly, it isn’t at all clear how to interpret this aspect of experience. Yes, it feels like it’s the pain that’s causing the hand to move, but what tells me that this feeling is accurate, or that I’m interpreting it accurately? For many, myself included, this doubt about what’s really revealed about causal transactions in experience leaves sufficient wiggle room to allow in epiphenomenalism.

It’s important to emphasize that making the epiphenomenalist move here is not the same as denying that there is a phenomenology of causation. In the debate over so-called “cognitive phenomenology” (Bayne & Montague 2011), or the “rich” view (Siegel 2006) of perceptual phenomenology (two debates that have a complicated relationship), advocates of the richer view of phenomenology (whether classifying it as cognitive or perceptual) often appeal to experiences that seem to have a causal content to them. So, when I flick the light switch and the light goes on, in addition to the phenomenology associated with both feeling and seeing the flicking of the switch and seeing the light go on immediately afterward, many claim, contra Hume, that there is also an experience (an “impression”, as Hume might say) of the two being causally connected. The epiphenomenalist need not take a stand on this question; she can certainly accept this claim. The question is not what the content of our experience is, but what’s actually happening in the world. We would experience the same “impression” of a causal connection if in fact the two events weren’t causally connected but a matter of mere coincidence, as, for example, what would happen if one flicked the switch and then saw through a window another light go on immediately after in another building. So, it’s perfectly consistent to maintain that we experience the causal connection – in the sense that there being a causal connection is included in the content of our experience – without the phenomenal property of pain itself being a cause of the movement of the hand.

In fact, on my Cartesian theater view, I would say that in an important sense the “feeling” of a causal connection between the pain and the movement is accurate. It’s not that the phenomenal property is causing the physical movement; that is ruled out by the causal closure principle. Rather, the entire experiential sequence – feeling the pain, experiencing the movement of the hand, and experiencing the latter as an effect of the former – is the phenomenal reflection (the “movie”) of the actual causal sequence taking place in the body; a sequence that is itself governed by purely physical laws.

In general, then, the Cartesian theater model involves a holistic form of epiphenomenalism. The computational-representational mechanisms of the brain (from now on, the “CR” mechanisms and states), comprising the cognitive and perceptual systems, respond to what’s happening inside the body, in the outside world, and in the interaction between the two, according to the laws of cognitive science, which are ultimately realized in the fundamental laws of physics. The mind’s internal representations of causal transactions are themselves causal consequences of what they describe, and these representations, being physically realized states/events, have legitimate causal roles to play. So, my pain system detects damage, which sends a signal to the appropriate areas in the brain, which then initiate appropriate motor routines to remove my hand from the hot surface. All of this is a straightforward, physically-realized causal sequence. In consciousness, at the same time, is an experiential reflection of this sequence. I experience the detection of the damage, and also experience the initiation of the movement. The conscious experience is not doing the causal work, the subject is experiencing it.

Of course, I realize that many would find this form of epiphenomenalism unacceptable. I have no knock-down argument to refute this skepticism. My claim is that this picture of what’s going on with the connection between consciousness and the physical events in the brain is more acceptable to me than reductionism. Conscious experience – both qualia and subjectivity – are, as far as I can see, brute and inexplicable. If they constitute irreducible, basic phenomena in nature, then this bruteness makes sense. Explanation has to stop somewhere, and the level of basic facts and laws is the appropriate place for it to stop. But if conscious experience really is metaphysically constructed out of the physical in the way that the reductionist proposes, then this bruteness seems itself inexplicable. So, the choice, as I see it, is between the unpalatable consequences of reductionism versus the unpalatable consequences of epiphenomenalism, and the latter seem less unpalatable to me by far.

However, while I see no insurmountable problem arising from the pain-to-hand-movement issue, the epiphenomenalism of the Cartesian theater model (CT) does cause a serious problem when it comes to the epistemology of theorizing about conscious experience. Theorizing, after all, is a cognitive process. According to CT, cognitive processes are carried out by the physically-realized CR system. Therefore, CT itself, the theoretical model, is the result of reasoning that takes place within this computational system. All of the evidence on which CT is based, therefore, must be encoded in physically realized representations, and processed according to rules that are themselves realized in physical mechanisms. So, the entire process that begins with evidence for the model and ends with articulation of the model must be physically realizable.

The problem then immediately rears its ugly head. What, after all, is the most important evidence I have for CT? According to my own arguments, it’s my own first-person conscious experience that provides me with evidence for both the rejection of reductive materialism and the articulation of CT. But if the causal closure principle holds, and this, remember, is the principal reason for endorsing epiphenomenalism in the first place, then how could the physical process that realizes the reasoning leading to CT be based on my own conscious experience if that experience is incapable of causally influencing any physical process at all, including the one leading to CT? It appears that CT is hoist by its own petard!

4.

To begin addressing the problem, it’s worth teasing apart two strands of the objection. On the one hand, there is the strictly causal dimension, a consequence of the epiphenomenalism, as described above. Here I am with a belief about the nature of conscious experience. This belief is embodied in a CR state of my brain. It seems plausible that, in general, some sort of causal chain must relate the subject matter of a belief to the belief itself if the belief is to count as justified. I believe right now that my computer screen is in front of me. Part of the account of the justification of this belief is undoubtedly the fact that the computer being in front of me is a crucial element in the causal chain leading to the belief. So, too, with the belief about the nature of conscious experience. If that belief is to be justified, then it seems, just as with the perceptual belief about the computer screen, the peculiar features of my experience about which the belief is concerned should be part of the causal chain leading to the belief. But if epiphenomenalism is true, and the belief is realized in a physical state, then it can’t be a cause of the belief. Therefore, it seems it can’t be justified.

But let’s put this consideration aside for a moment. After all, it’s not obvious that only evidence that plays a causal role in bringing about a belief can play a role in justifying it. I admit it’s highly plausible, but perhaps when it comes to conscious experience there is a way to justify an exception to the causal principle. Still, there is another strand to the problem; let’s call it the “zombie problem”. Most philosophers, on both sides of the materialism debate, assume that the supervenience of the mental on the physical is the crux of this issue. Anti-materialists insist that phenomenal consciousness does not supervene on the brain (or the brain plus external physical states), and therefore it is metaphysically possible for a zombie to exist. The possibility of a zombie is thus taken to be constitutive of the anti-materialist position. Materialists sign onto this assumption as well, and thus attempt to show that zombies aren’t possible, which then makes the world safe for materialism.

But here’s the problem, one made forcefully by Katalin Balog (1999) some years ago. A zombie, remember, is physically identical to a conscious person but without the conscious experience. So, if my beliefs about CT are indeed physically-realized CR states, these states are shared by the zombie. Thus, my zombie twin also believes in CT. But clearly CT is not true of my zombie twin. So, how do I know it’s true of me; that is, how do I know I’m not in fact my zombie twin?

This problem about zombie epistemology has been around for a while and responses have been proposed. Clearly what’s needed is to find a way to distinguish a conscious person’s epistemic situation from that of her zombie twin’s. In particular, what we’d like is a case for the claim that a conscious person’s epistemic situation with regard to her consciousness guarantees that she really is conscious, and thus that CT is true of her. One way to do that is to distinguish the content of the conscious person’s “phenomenal beliefs” (i.e., beliefs about her phenomenal states) from those of her zombie twin’s (Chalmers 2003). If the conscious person’s belief that she is currently having a reddish experience is indeed about a reddish experience, and her zombie twin’s belief is instead about some zombie-analogue non-phenomenal “reddish” quasi-experience, then the conscious person and the zombie twin are not in the same epistemic state. If this distinction in content between the two can be defended, then the question of the zombie’s alleged justification for believing she’s having phenomenal states won’t arise, as she doesn’t in fact have any such beliefs.

But how can one make this distinction in content between a conscious person’s phenomenal beliefs and a zombie’s pseudo-phenomenal beliefs? If causal transactions could flow from phenomenal states to physical states, then one could say the content difference is attributable to the difference in the typical causes of the two types of belief. (Even then, it’s not clear this gives us the sort of epistemic guarantee we want for this case.) But if we endorse epiphenomenalism, this basis for making the distinction doesn’t exist. Instead, what some have advocated is to fold the phenomenal state about which the phenomenal belief is held into the belief state itself. For example, when I am having a reddish experience and believe I’m having a reddish experience, rather than treating the experience and the belief about it as two distinct states, the belief state is characterized as incorporating the experience itself as part of its identity. This is what Chalmers (2003) calls a “pure phenomenal belief ”.

However, I don’t see that this move, at least in the form I just presented it, really addresses the zombie epistemology challenge. To me it’s a kind of accounting trick. I would compare it to the anti-skepticism move common to so-called “naive realists” in philosophy of perception (McDowell 2008). The traditional skepticism challenge about the external world begins from considering the possibility that one could be having the very perceptual experiences one is now having while in fact being fooled by a demon, or a computer engineer controlling your brain in a vat. The naive realist responds that experiences are individuated not just by the state of the subject, but also by external objects. So, two subjectively indistinguishable visual experiences of a ripe tomato might count as type-distinct psychological states if one is veridical and the other is hallucinatory. Thus, veridical experiences have the power to confer justification on our perceptual beliefs because no type-identical experience could be hallucinatory.

However, if skepticism is the problem, this just pushes it back to one’s knowledge that one is having genuine experiences, as opposed to pseudo-analogue-experiences. Since, from “inside”, I can’t tell if my tomato visual experience is veridical or not, it doesn’t help me that if it is then it justifies my belief. (Of course, reliabilists don’t worry about this, but then they have no need for the naive realist move in the first place. The naive realist response to skepticism is for epistemological internalists.) Similarly, when it comes to phenomenal beliefs, it seems to me that the worry about whether I could be a zombie is still there, except now it applies to whether or not my belief is a genuine phenomenal belief, as opposed to a pseudo-analogue-phenomenal belief.

So, the “inclusion” move – incorporating the relevant phenomenal state into the phenomenal belief – doesn’t itself respond to the skeptical challenge, as it just pushes it back a step, turning it into the mere “accounting trick” I accused it of above. The problem is that we require an epistemic guarantee of a sort that breaks the presumed subjective indistinguishability between veridical and hallucinatory experiences – or, in our case, between zombie pseudo-phenomenal beliefs and our genuine phenomenal beliefs. Instead of just drawing the individuation line for the phenomenal belief so that it takes in the phenomenal state it is about, change the nature of the belief state-content relation to reflect the acquaintance underlying the phenomenal state itself. To accomplish this task, I am inclined to appeal to the so-called “cognitive phenomenology” mentioned earlier.

For some time now there has been a debate about the range of mental states that possess phenomenal (or qualitative) character. In the early years of the qualia debate it was assumed that the kinds of mental states/properties at issue were sensory ones, involving what had been called the “secondary qualities” by early Modern philosophers. States that detected colors, sounds, odors, and also bodily sensations like pains, itches, and orgasms, were supposed to be the only ones there was something it is like to occupy. Purely cognitive states – beliefs and thoughts – were supposed not to have any phenomenology, and so therefore there is nothing it is like to have beliefs and thoughts. True, we do make a distinction between conscious and unconscious beliefs and thoughts, but this distinction, in contrast to the one that applies to perceptual states and bodily sensations, was assumed to be completely accounted for in terms of access, a functional notion (Block 1995). If a belief is accessible to certain central processes of deliberation, planning, and speech production, then it counts as a conscious belief. But if it is not accessible to these mechanisms, even though it might affect behavior in other ways, it counts as unconscious.

However, starting around the turn of the century, a number of philosophers started to argue that conscious cognitive states – particularly, occurrent thoughts – were conscious by virtue of possessing phenomenal character (Bayne & Montague 2011). When I think to myself, “Oh, today is Monday, so I don’t teach today”, there is something it’s like for me to think that thought. Of course, those who deny the reality of cognitive phenomenology admit that there is something it is like to experience the conscious episode that occurs when I think this thought. But they claim that all the phenomenology involved is attributable to the sensory-imagistic content of imaginatively “hearing” the sentence uttered, as well as any associated visual or other imagery. However, when it comes to the strictly cognitive state – the CR state with the content of that thought – there is no genuine experience of it.

I have weighed in on this debate in two other papers and don’t wish to rehearse the entire debate here (Bayne & Montague 2011, chapter 5; Levine forthcoming). So, let’s assume, that cognitive phenomenology (CogPhen) exists. Mightn’t appeal to this sort of conscious experience help address the zombie skepticism argument presented above? The idea is that it might provide just the sort of intimate, acquaintance-type connection between the subject and what she’s thinking that could overcome the skeptical challenge.

Let’s see how this argument might go. To begin, I need to elaborate somewhat on my position regarding CogPhen, and then also introduce an issue regarding the nature of acquaintance. I will then show how combining the two discussions can point the way to a solution to our problem. Regarding CogPhen then, the tentative conclusions I reached in the two aforementioned papers can be summarized as follows. Phenomenology is essentially acquaintance. This is the doctrine of CT. For a state to have phenomenal character is for the subject to be acquainted with various virtual objects and their properties. When it comes to sensory/perceptual states it’s not too hard to see how this works. A virtual world of Cartesian objects is presented to the subject who is acquainted with this world. All of the contents for these states – the objects of acquaintance – are particulars and their instantiated properties. So, the question arises with respect to CogPhen, with what are we acquainted if a conscious thought has phenomenology?

Some philosophers want to say that CogPhen makes us acquainted with the contents of our thoughts (Pitt 2011). However, I find it difficult to really make sense of this position, given how I view phenomenal character and acquaintance. Suppose I have a thought I’d express as “Today is Tuesday, so I have two classes to teach today.” How is the content of this statement/thought made manifest in my personal Cartesian theater? Do I experience the truth-conditions of this statement, the abstract propositional structure, the relevant set of possible worlds? None of these abstract candidates for the content seem appropriate as objects of acquaintance. Rather, on my view of CogPhen, it is not that it introduces new objects of acquaintance, but rather it contributes to the overall phenomenal scene, the “theater”, by creating distinctions in phenomenal character that go beyond those imposed by purely sensory dimensions of experience.

For example, take two parade cases favored by CogPhen advocates. First, consider the difference between the visual experience of a bird watcher who sees a bird she is familiar with and the visual experience of her companion who has no expertise in identifying birds. While we can imagine that the sensory dimensions of the two visual experiences are the same – same visual acuity, physical perspective, distance, and the like for the two viewers – still many would claim that the phenomenal characters would be different. What it would be like for the expert is different from what it would be like for the novice. The difference is induced by the cognitive states of the expert, particularly her ability to assign the object of her gaze to various categories, expressed by the relevant concepts she possesses.

Another case involves the difference in experience between two people who hear, read, or aurally imagine (as in “silent speech”) the very same sentence, where one understands it and the other doesn’t. (A similar case involves an ambiguous sentence that is interpreted one way by one of the subjects and the other way by the other subject; e.g. “Visiting relatives can be tiresome.”) Again, even if we stipulate that the purely sensory features of the experience are the same for both subjects, there is a strong intuition that the phenomenal character of the two experiences would differ as a function of the different interpretations assigned to the string by the two subjects. This difference is clearly a result of differences in the concepts deployed by them.

Now, given the CR account of cognitive processes, possessing a concept is a matter of possessing a particular symbol type in one’s internal vocabulary, and deploying a concept is a matter of tokening that symbol in the relevant circumstances. So, in the bird expert/novice case, what is responsible for the phenomenal difference between the two is the fact that, for the expert but not the novice, once the perceptual processing produces the perceptual representation of the visual stimulus, there is an extra ingredient, the application of the cognitive symbol representing the species to the perceptual representation. This results in a modification of the phenomenal character from what it would be without the tokening of that cognitive symbol, serving as a kind of experiential index, and reflection, of that extra processing. But it’s not that the property of being such-and-such a species is itself in some way an object of acquaintance – how could it be?

Similarly, consider the example of hearing an ambiguous sentence like “Visiting relatives can be tiresome.” The perceptual system produces a representation of the sensory features of the aural stimulus, and then the language system assigns it an interpretation by applying the CR representation of one of the two possible meanings to the aural representation (to oversimplify the processing story greatly). Depending on which of the two possible CR representations are applied the phenomenal character will be different – hearing the utterance will have a different “feel”. This difference is, again, an index, or reflection, of the two different CR representations. It is not a matter of acquaintance with an abstract content, like a propositional structure or a set of possible worlds; again, how could it be?

On the CT view, then, phenomenal consciousness is always a matter of acquaintance with particulars and their instantiated properties. I think of this view as very much in the spirit of Kant’s account of Sensibility as the receptive faculty that yields “intuitions” and “appearances”. The role of Understanding, or Cognition, is to frame and structure what might have seemed a buzzing confusion of sensory qualities into a structured, orderly world of objects, properties, and their dynamic interactions. On CT, CogPhen is constituted by this framing and structuring function.

What I’m calling the “structuring function” of CogPhen is manifest within experience in at least two ways: first, in the fact that what appears, what is presented in the “theater”, takes the form of persistent objects and properties experienced as independent, “outside” the mind; and second, relatedly, in the range of expectations and associations that form part of the experience of what is presented in the theater. Both of these manifestations differ in not providing new substantive content – as emphasized above, no acquaintance with properties independently of their instances in perceived particulars (objects or events) – the way that the sensory/perceptual representations do. Yet their effect on the nature of experience is profound, due to this structuring function.

Having described the role I see for CogPhen in overall conscious experience, let me turn to another issue that will play a role in my attempt to address the challenge posed in the last section. In the beginning of this section, I narrowed the challenge down to one of providing an internalist form of justification for believing that we do in fact have the kind of conscious experience characterized by CT. The problem really comes down to this. So long as zombies are coherently conceivable, which entails the conceivability of creatures that share all of the CR states that underlie our beliefs (including belief in CT itself, or the presence of particular conscious experiences), we seem to lack the kind of skepticism-resistant certainty regarding our conscious experience that our theory requires to overcome the epistemic challenge. It looks like only an acquaintance with our own experience can do the job. But is there not merely acquaintance with the world found within the Cartesian Theater, but also acquaintance with acquaintance and the Theater itself?

There is a debate in the literature between those who think that conscious awareness is inherently reflexive, in the sense that one’s conscious awareness of an object simultaneously involves an awareness of the awareness of the object as well, and those who maintain that consciousness does not inherently involve such a reflexive element (Dretske 1995, Kriegel 2009, Lycan 1997, Rosenthal 1997, and Siewert 2013). For the former, conscious experience always involves two states of awareness – the first-order state of awareness of the object and the second-order awareness of the first-order state. Higher Order theory is based on this premise, as it starts from what its advocates consider the truism that conscious states are those we are conscious of. The other side denies this, emphasizing that conscious states are those we are, as Dretske put it, “conscious with”. I (Levine 2015) have tried to split the difference and say that the conscious-with side is right that there aren’t, as it were, two awareness states occurring simultaneously within each conscious experience, but rather one state that is an awareness, or acquaintance relation between the subject and object. On the other hand, the conscious-of side is right in that what it is to be acquainted, consciously aware, of an object, as opposed to merely representing it, is for the object to be for the subject, and this means there is an inherent reflexivity to it, just not a feature that can be factored out into a separate awareness from the first-order awareness. This is what I called my “quasi-Sartrean” (QS) view.

So, suppose we adopt QS. It doesn’t seem that QS gives us an account of how we can actually think thoughts about conscious experiences, since the sense in which I am aware of my conscious states is inextricably embedded within those states, and doesn’t rise to the level of a free-standing state of awareness of the awareness. For instance, when I visually experience a ripe tomato on the kitchen counter, I am acquainted with the tomato and its reddish and roundish features (of course these are virtual objects possessing these features, but that’s irrelevant here). By virtue of my being acquainted with, and not merely representing, the tomato and its features, they are in the relevant sense for me, and so in that sense I am aware of being aware of them. But this doesn’t seem to provide the material for my forming thoughts about the state of awareness itself, seeing the state’s features, as opposed to those of the tomato, and then providing the evidentiary basis for a theory of such states. What could do that?

My hope is that by combining QS with CogPhen we can get what we need. Consider a straight first-order perceptual experience of a scene in the environment, say my seeing a ripe tomato on the kitchen counter. According to CT, this conscious experience involves the obtaining of an acquaintance relation between myself (the virtual subject) and the tomato (its virtual reflection in the Cartesian theater). That I am acquainted with the tomato and its properties, and therefore certain of it (again, not certain of the external physical configuration of the tomato, but of the virtual object of my conscious experience), is straightforward. But how is my knowledge of the experience itself, and the properties of the experience – that it involves acquaintance, etc. – secured?

Well first, remember that according to QS the apprehension of the tomato is not merely an apprehension of the tomato, but an apprehension of it that makes it an object for me. Of course, this isn’t yet a full-fledged cognitive apprehension of the experience, since no conceptualization of the experience is involved. But now suppose I judge – form an explicit thought to the effect – that I am having a visual experience of a ripe tomato on the kitchen counter. On the one hand, this involves the formation of the relevant CR state, a state I would share with my zombie twin, the sharing of which gives rise to the challenge in the first place. But, according to CogPhen, something else is involved when I make this judgment that is not involved with the zombie when he makes the corresponding non-conscious “judgment”, namely the associated cognitive phenomenology. So, given the account of CogPhen briefly described above, how is the phenomenal character of the CR state underlying the judgment manifested in experience, and how does it affect my epistemic state regarding that experience?

Well, according to the account of CogPhen above, what CR states contribute to one’s conscious experience is a structuring function, along with a set of implicit expectations and associations regarding the experience that reflect the internal functional role of the judgment. To experience the phenomenal character of my judgment that I’m seeing a ripe tomato on the kitchen counter is not only to see the tomato as an edible object standing in the resting-upon relation with the counter, but also to take this experience as an experience of acquaintance with an object. Just as applying the concept [edible object] to the percept creates a difference in the phenomenal character of perceiving the tomato, so too the application of the concept [experience of acquaintance] to the perceptual state makes a corresponding difference to its phenomenology. This differential phenomenology that emanates from the judgment, the way it affects my experience of the perceptually presented situation, also has the secondary character of being for me, as do all phenomenal experiences. In this way I am made intimately acquainted both with my thought and the experience it is about. This puts me in a fundamentally different epistemic position from that of my zombie twin, which is what we were after all along.

One might wonder, though, about the production of the CR states that are supposed to express my judgments concerning my current experience and its character. In section 3 I began my discussion of the challenge this way:

According to CT, cognitive processes are carried out by the physically-realized CR system. Therefore, CT itself, the theoretical model, is the result of reasoning that takes place within this computational system. All of the evidence on which CT is based, therefore, must be encoded in physically realized representations, and processed according to rules that are themselves realized in physical mechanisms. So, the entire process that begins with evidence for the model and ends with articulation of the model must be physically realizable.