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- Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Serie: Key Concepts in Philosophy
- Sprache: Englisch
What is a virtue, and how are virtues different from vices? Do people with virtues lead better lives than the rest of us? Do they know more? Can we acquire virtues if so, how?
In this lively and engaging introduction to this core topic, Heather Battaly argues that there is more than one kind of virtue. Some virtues make the world a better place, or help us to attain knowledge. Other virtues are dependent upon good intentions like caring about other people or about truth. Virtue is an original approach to the topic, which carefully situates the fields of virtue ethics and virtue epistemology within a general theory of virtue. It argues that there are good reasons to acquire moral and intellectual virtues virtuous people often attain greater knowledge and lead better lives. As well as approaching virtue in a novel and illuminating way, Battaly ably guides the reader through the dense literature surrounding the topic, deftly moving from important specific and technical points to more general issues and questions. The final chapter proposes strategies for helping university students acquire intellectual virtues. Battaly’s insights are complemented by entertaining examples from popular culture, literature, and film, really bringing this topic to life for readers.
Virtue is the ideal introduction to the topic. It will be an equally vital resource for students who are encountering the topic for the first time, and for scholars who are deeply engaged in virtue theory.
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Seitenzahl: 358
Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2015
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Table of Contents
Series page
Title page
Copyright page
Acknowledgments
Dedication
1: What Are the Virtues?
1.1 A Working Definition of Virtue
1.2 Two Key Concepts of Virtue
1.3 Must We Choose between the Two Key Concepts?
1.4 Why Should We Care about the Virtues?
Notes
2: Ends Matter: Virtues Attain Good Ends or Effects
2.1 Virtues Attain Good Ends: The Teleological Variety
2.2 Virtues Attain Good Effects: The Nonteleological Variety
2.3 Luck in Getting Ends or Effects
Notes
3: Motives Matter: Virtues Require Good Motives
3.1 Virtues Require Good Motives-and-Actions, but Attaining Good Ends?
3.2 Virtues Require Good Motives-Actions-and-Attaining-Good-Ends: Linda Zagzebski
3.3 Virtues Require Good Motives-and-Actions-but-not-Attaining-Good-Ends: Montmarquet and Slote
3.4 Objections
Notes
4: Vice and Failures of Virtue
4.1 Ends Matter: Vices Attain Bad Ends or Effects
4.2 Motives Matter: Vices Require Bad Motives
4.3 Weakness of Will and Vice
4.4 Self-Control and Virtue
Notes
5: Virtue, Right Action, and Knowledge
5.1 Components of the Virtues
5.2 Are Components of Moral Virtue Necessary and Sufficient for Right Action?
5.3 Are Components of Intellectual Virtue Necessary and Sufficient for Knowledge?
Notes
6: Virtue and Living Well
6.1 Living Well: Some Parameters
6.2 Living Well: The Main Accounts
6.3 Is Virtue Sufficient for Living Well?
6.4 Is Virtue Necessary for Living Well?
Notes
7: How Can We Acquire the Virtues?
7.1 Habituation
7.2 Objections
7.3 Strategies for Acquiring Intellectual Virtues in University Classrooms
Notes
References
Index
Guide
Cover
Table of Contents
Start Reading
CHAPTER 1
Index
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Key Concepts in Philosophy Series
Lisa Bortolotti, Irrationality
Joseph Keim Campbell, Free Will
Roy T. Cook, Paradoxes
Douglas Edwards, Properties
Bryan Frances, Disagreement
Douglas Kutach, Causation
Carolyn Price, Emotion
Ian Evans and Nicolas D. Smith, Knowledge
Daniel Speak, The Problem of Evil
Deborah Perron Tollefsen, Groups as Agents
Joshua Weisberg, Consciousness
Chase Wrenn, Truth
Copyright © Heather D. Battaly 2015
The right of Heather D. Battaly to be identified as Author of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First published in 2015 by Polity Press
Polity Press
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Cambridge CB2 1UR, UK
Polity Press
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Malden, MA 02148, USA
All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purpose of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.
ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-4953-5
ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-4954-2(pb)
ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-8870-1(epub)
ISBN-13: 978-0-7456-8505-2(mobi)
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Battaly, Heather D., 1969-
Virtue / Heather D. Battaly.
pages cm. – (Key Concepts in Philosophy)
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 978-0-7456-4953-5 (hardcover) – ISBN 978-0-7456-4954-2 (papercover) 1. Virtues. I. Title.
BJ1521.B38 2014
179′.9–dc23
2014016882
The publisher has used its best endeavours to ensure that the URLs for external websites referred to in this book are correct and active at the time of going to press. However, the publisher has no responsibility for the websites and can make no guarantee that a site will remain live or that the content is or will remain appropriate.
Every effort has been made to trace all copyright holders, but if any have been inadvertently overlooked the publisher will be pleased to include any necessary credits in any subsequent reprint or edition.
For further information on Polity, visit our website: politybooks.com
Acknowledgments
I am deeply grateful for the support and encouragement of my colleagues, my students, and my friends and family, both inside and outside the discipline of philosophy. I would like to thank Emma Hutchinson, the editor of the Key Concepts in Philosophy Series at Polity, who has been a tremendous source of support. I have greatly benefited from her vision, enthusiasm, patience, and levity. Better editors are not to be had. Several referees for Polity made excellent suggestions about the book proposal for Virtue, which shaped the manuscript. I am grateful for their thoughts. Two referees read the manuscript in full. I am deeply indebted to them for their time and effort, their terrific comments, and their support of this project.
Chapter 1 benefited from the brilliant comments of the participants in the Intellectual Virtues and Education Project Seminar at Loyola Marymount University (2012). I am especially grateful to Jason Baehr; and to Mindy Beier, Karen Bohlin, Kate Elgin, Steve Porter, Ron Ritchhart, Wayne Riggs, Emily Robertson, Stephen Sherblom, and Harvey Siegel. Thank you all for your comments and encouragement.
My colleagues and students at Cal State Fullerton have been wonderfully supportive. Special thanks to my colleagues Merrill Ring and Craig Ihara, and my students Nahal Bahri and Martha Matlock, all of whom sent me comments on chapters. I am also thankful to Cal State Fullerton for supporting this project with a grant and a sabbatical leave. In addition, I am honored to have received a grant from the Spencer Foundation's Initiative on Philosophy in Educational Policy and Practice (2011), which supported research on Chapter 7.
I am deeply grateful to my philosophical heroes: Neera Badhwar, Kate Elgin, Christine Swanton, Liezl van Zyl, and especially Linda Zagzebski. Thank you for your conversations and comments on chapters, your enthusiasm and support, and your general awesomeness. My debt to Linda is especially deep. She has helped to form my identity as a philosopher, and I feel privileged and lucky to count her among my philosophical family. I am also indebted to my philosophical siblings – Amy Coplan, Jason Baehr, and Wayne Riggs – who are constant sources of inspiration, admiration, and encouragement. I continue to learn from their work and their ways of doing philosophy. It has been an honor to grow up in the discipline alongside the three of them. William Alston and Michael Stocker, my mentors in graduate school, have shaped the kind of philosophy that I do, and the way that I do it. Here, no amount, degree, or sort of gratitude is enough. My hope is that this book does philosophy in a way that would make them proud.
Finally, I am grateful for encouragement from my friends and family. Thank you for taking pride in what I do. Thanks especially to Jessica Klingsberg and Katie Kruse, who shared their thoughts about Chapter 4. My deepest thanks go to Clifford Roth, who read every line of the book, served as a sounding board for examples, and who has made it possible for me to flourish as a philosopher, and as a human being, in so many ways. I am lucky to have him in my life.
For Clifford Samuel Roth, with love, admiration, and gratitude
1What Are the Virtues?
1.1 A Working Definition of Virtue
What is a virtue, and how are virtues different from vices? To get started on a definition of virtue, let's think about the people we know well – our friends. Which of their qualities count as virtues? What qualities do they have – not just as friends, but as people in general – that we would classify as obvious examples of virtues?
We might reasonably reply that our friends are, for instance: honest, smart, fair, dependable, brave, generous, open-minded, or funny. Or that they: enjoy life, do not give up easily, care about others, stand up for themselves and others, have good judgment, offer good advice, or know when others are upset and how to make them feel better. Philosophers have, at one time or another, counted all these qualities as virtues. Several of these qualities – courage (bravery), justice (fairness), temperance (enjoying life), and wisdom (which is connected to having good judgment and giving good advice) – are widely thought to be virtues. They appear on the lists of virtues generated by ancient philosophers, like Plato and Aristotle, early modern philosophers, like David Hume, and contemporary philosophers, like Rosalind Hursthouse and Linda Zagzebski. Other qualities – like wit (being funny) – appear on some lists (Aristotle's and Hume's), but not others. Likewise, being open-minded appears on some lists (Zagzebski's), but not others. Any initial definition of virtue – one whose primary job is to distinguish virtue from vice – should be broad enough to include all of the above qualities. Finer distinctions among different sorts of virtues can be made after we have generated a working definition of virtue in general.
Since we do not know one another's friends, let's examine some familiar illustrations of four of the above qualities: being smart, empathy (which is connected to caring about others and knowing when they are upset), open-mindedness, and courage.
First, Hermione Granger, one of the characters in J. K. Rowling's Harry Potter series, is by all accounts smart. Hermione is smart in the sense that she knows a pile of facts, in her case “facts” about spells and the history of magic. But more importantly for present purposes, she is also smart in the sense that she has reliable intellectual capacities and skills. For instance, she has an excellent memory, and is skilled at logical problem solving. Hermione is so good at remembering magical facts that she annoys her classmates (whose memories are not as good) and even some of her teachers (who grow tired of calling on her). Hermione's memory contributes to her success as a student – she scores high marks on her exams. Outside the classroom, her memory saves her friends' lives on more than one occasion. For example, in Harry Potter and the Sorcerer's Stone, Hermione saves Ron Weasley by remembering which spell to use against Devil's Snare. Hermione uses her skills in logic to figure out that the creature guarding the chamber of secrets is a basilisk (Harry Potter and the Chamber of Secrets) and that Professor Lupin is a werewolf (Harry Potter and the Prisoner of Azkaban). Qualities like reliable memory and logical skills are featured on Ernest Sosa's list of intellectual virtues. According to Sosa, these qualities count as virtues because they reliably produce true beliefs. Sosa's theory is addressed in Chapter 2.
Second, television character Deanna Troi, therapist to the crew of the Enterprise on Star Trek: The Next Generation (1987–94), is clearly empathic. She excels at knowing others' emotions: for instance, she knows when others are upset, happy, angry, afraid, despairing, or in love. As a member of a species of “empaths” (Troi is part Betazoid), she has the ability to directly feel what others in the vicinity are feeling. Her empathic ability to detect the emotions of aliens extricates the Enterprise from several dangerous situations, and proves vital in diplomatic negotiations. Troi can also feel the emotions of the Enterprise crew as a whole (she can gauge the overall mood of the crew), and can detect specific emotions in individual crew members. For example, she recognizes that Dr. Beverly Crusher is in love (“The Host”), and that Captain Jean-Luc Picard is grieving (Generations, 1994), though each emotion is meant to be secret. Troi even uses her empathic abilities to discover and solve a murder (“Eye of the Beholder”). She also cares about her crewmates, and counsels them through their troubles – she knows how to make them feel better, and get better. Of course, we do not have the advantages of Troi's Betazoid physiology – her empathic abilities far exceed our own. But we do still succeed in sharing the emotions of others and caring about their well-being. In contrast with Troi, this sometimes requires effort on our part: we must actively imagine the emotions of a person who is a different gender or race, or who lives in a culture that is different from our own – their emotions do not simply pop into our heads. Our ability to empathize likely relies both on our voluntary efforts to take another person's perspective, and on our hard-wired capacities for mimicking and mirroring others. Empathy plays a central role in Michael Slote's virtue ethics. Slote thinks that qualities like empathy and empathic caring count as virtues because they involve morally valuable motives. Slote's theory is addressed in Chapter 3.
Third, Dr. Gregory House, protagonist of the medical drama House M.D. (Fox, 2004–12), is clearly a brilliant diagnostician – he reliably succeeds in diagnosing patients whom no one else can diagnose. He is also a spectacular misanthrope. He is frequently cruel to his patients and colleagues, and often lies to get what he wants. House is neither caring, honest, just, nor temperate (he is addicted to Vicodin). But, arguably, he is open-minded. In nearly every episode, House elicits possible diagnoses from his team, and considers whether those diagnoses are true. He is simultaneously alive to the possibility that his own diagnoses might be false. To illustrate: in “Occam's Razor” (2004), House and his team consider multiple conditions that their patient might have, including: a viral heart infection (Dr. Foreman), a carcinoid tumor (Dr. Chase), an allergy (Dr. Cameron), and a combination of sinusitis and hypothyroidism (Dr. House). When all of their hypotheses – including his own – are proven false, House considers yet another alternative: that the patient, whose first symptom was coughing, accidentally received the wrong medication for his cough. (The team discovers that House is correct – the patient was given gout medication, which caused the rest of his symptoms.) Considering alternative hypotheses helps House get to the truth. In fact, House is so dependent on this process that when his team quits, he relies on other people – like the hospital's janitor – to help him evaluate alternative diagnoses and solve his case. House also cares about the truth. He is not motivated by money or fame, or even because he cares about his patients; he doesn't. He only cares about one thing: getting the truth. Dr. House is clearly not morally virtuous. But, given that it is possible to have some virtues but not others, House is not precluded from being open-minded. Open-mindedness is one of the key intellectual virtues identified by Linda Zagzebski. She argues that open-mindedness is a virtue both because it reliably produces true beliefs and because it involves a valuable motivation for truth. Zagzebski's view is addressed in Chapter 3.
Fourth, Alice Paul (1885–1977) fought for and helped to achieve women's suffrage in the United States, and (to a lesser extent) in Britain. In both the US and Britain, Paul risked her health, and even her life, to get women the right to vote. Though it is more difficult to identify virtues in real people than in fictional characters, Alice Paul had the virtue of courage if anyone did. As the leader of the Congressional Union of the National American Woman Suffrage Association, and founder of the National Woman's Party (NWP), Paul fought for and attained an amendment to the US Constitution that guaranteed women the right to vote. This achievement came at great risk. Paul argued for suffrage in speeches and in writing, organized and marched in suffrage parades, and picketed the Woodrow Wilson White House.1 Suffragist speakers and marchers were subject to verbal derision and physical threats. White House picketers, who carried banners but were otherwise silent, were attacked by mobs and arrested for obstructing traffic. Paul, and other suffragists, continued picketing the White House even though they knew that they were risking physical harm, arrest, and jail-time. During the Fall of 1917, 168 suffragists were imprisoned, choosing to serve jail-time rather than pay fines (Adams and Keene 2008: 173). In October 1917, Paul was sentenced to seven months in jail. While in prison, she went on a hunger strike in order to demonstrate that she was willing to risk her health and life for suffrage. As a result of her disobedience, she was placed in solitary confinement, threatened with institutionalization, and physically restrained and force-fed. She did not give up: she continued her hunger strike until she was released from prison in November 1917. Less than two years later, the US Congress passed the 19th Amendment. Paul faced dangers, stood up for herself and others, and did so not for the sake of fame but because she believed that women should have the right to vote. Due in good part to the courage of Alice Paul and other suffragists like her, women in the US and the United Kingdom have been enfranchised for nearly 100 years. Courage is widely counted as a virtue, appearing on the lists of many philosophers, including Aristotle. Aristotle argues that courageous people face dangers that are worthwhile, and do so because of good motives. Arguably, he thinks that courage is a virtue because it both attains good ends or effects, and involves valuable motivations. Aristotle's account of the virtues is addressed in Chapter 3.
The qualities in the above examples are diverse. Some are (largely) hard-wired capacities, like reliable memory. Others are acquired skills, like the ability to solve logical puzzles. Still others are acquired character traits, like empathy, open-mindedness, and courage. So, what makes all of these qualities, and the other qualities we attributed to our friends, virtues? The answer is that they all make us better people. Virtues are qualities that make one an excellent person. A person can be excellent in a variety of ways: she can be excellent insofar as she has a good memory, or insofar as she is skilled at logical problem solving, or insofar as she is open-minded, just, or benevolent. In short, virtues are excellences.2In contrast, vices are defects. Vices are qualities that make us worse people. Analogously, a person can be defective in a variety of ways: she can be defective insofar as she has a bad memory, or insofar as she lacks logical skills, or insofar as she is dogmatic, unjust, or cruel. It is important to note that according to these working definitions, virtues are qualities that make us excellent as people in general, rather than merely excellent in some specific occupation or role. Likewise, vices make us worse as people in general, rather than merely worse at some specific occupation or role. We do not all share the same occupations or roles – some of us are parents, others are not; some of us are teachers, others are students, still others are CEOs. But we are all people. Accordingly, the virtues and vices in these working definitions pertain to all of us, no matter what our specific jobs or roles. Sometimes the qualities that make us better at some specific occupation or role overlap with the qualities that make us better people in general. For instance, empathy arguably makes us better parents, teachers, and doctors; and also makes us better people. But these qualities do not always overlap. In fact, sometimes the qualities that make us better at a specific occupation or role make us worse as people in general. To illustrate: dishonesty arguably makes one better in the role of police interrogator, but it makes one worse as a person in general. (Jane Tennison, protagonist of the television series Prime Suspect [ITV, 1991–2006], is a superb interrogator partly because she misleads and manipulates the people she interviews.) Since dishonesty makes one worse as a person in general, it is a vice, not a virtue. Likewise, honesty arguably makes one worse as an interrogator, but better as a person in general. Accordingly, honesty is a virtue, not a vice.
These working definitions of virtue and vice are broad. They include moral qualities – like benevolence and cruelty – but they also include intellectual qualities – like open-mindedness and dogmatism. They include qualities over whose acquisition we exercise considerable control, and for which we can clearly be praised (e.g., courage) or blamed (e.g., cowardice). But they also include qualities over which we exercise little control – like reliable memory – qualities which we find ourselves either with or without, due to no merit or fault of our own. David Hume famously includes all of these sorts of qualities – intellectual as well as moral, and involuntary as well as voluntary – on his lists of virtues and vices. In his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Hume argues that attempts to exclude intellectual qualities from the category of virtues will fail. For instance, he claims that if we were to “lay hold of the distinction between intellectual and moral endowments, and affirm the last alone to be real and genuine virtues, because they alone [led] to action” then we would quickly discover that “many of those qualities…called intellectual virtues, such as prudence, penetration, discernment, discretion, [have] also a considerable influence on conduct” (1966/1751: 156). In short, Hume's point is that intellectual virtues are no less real or genuine than moral virtues. In his Treatise of Human Nature, Hume argues that involuntary abilities cannot be excluded from the category of virtues, since some of them are “useful” to the people who have them; that is, some involuntary abilities enable the people who have them to attain good effects (1978/1738: 610). Accordingly, he thinks that virtues that are involuntary are no less real than virtues that are voluntary. Our working definitions agree with Hume on both these points. It is also worth noting that our working definitions are broad enough to be compatible with both theism and atheism – one need not be a theist to endorse our working definitions of virtue or vice. Here, too, they agree with Hume.3
In fact, our working definitions of virtue and vice are so broad that, as they stand, they are difficult to apply. To apply them, we need to be able to determine whether a quality is an excellence or a defect, and why it makes one a better person or a worse person. With this end in mind, we can distinguish between two key concepts of virtue, both of which are compatible with, but less vague than, our working definition of virtue.
1.2 Two Key Concepts of Virtue
Different qualities can make one a better person in different ways. The historical and contemporary literature on virtue emphasizes two key ways in which a quality can make one a better person. First, a quality might enable one to reliably attain good ends or effects – like true beliefs, or the welfare of others. These goods are often external to us. Second, a quality might involve good motives – like caring about truths, or about the welfare of others. Motives are internal to us. According to the first key concept, reliable success in attaining good ends or effects is what makes a quality a virtue. To be virtuous, one need only be reliably successful at attaining good ends or effects – at producing external goods. So, if a venture capitalist reliably succeeds in helping others by donating money to a hospital, then he is (to that extent) virtuous. But according to the second key concept, being consistently successful at attaining good ends or effects is not enough, and might not even be required, for virtue. What is required, and what makes a quality a virtue, are good motives, which are internal. So, if the venture capitalist reliably succeeds in helping others but his motives are selfish – he donates money because he wants to get his name on a building or get tax write-offs – then he is not virtuous.4
1.2.1 Ends Matter: Virtues Attain Good Ends or Effects
According to the first key concept of virtue, what makes a quality a virtue, as opposed to a vice, is its success in attaining good ends or effects, many of which are external to us. This success need not be perfect, but it must be reliable. Hence, qualities that rarely, but occasionally, fail to attain good ends or effects can still be virtues; but qualities that reliably fail to attain good ends or effects cannot. This means that people who try, but consistently fail, to help others (like the character Mr. Bean) do not have the virtue of benevolence. They may want to help others – they may have good motives – but if they consistently bungle the job, they are not virtuous. Likewise, people who try, but consistently fail, to get true beliefs do not have intellectual virtues. They may want to get truths – they may have good motives – but if they consistently botch the job, they are not virtuous either. According to this concept, bad luck can prevent us from having virtues. People who have the bad luck of being in a demon-world, in which all their beliefs turn out to be false, or in an oppressive society, in which all or most of their actions turn out to produce harm, do not have virtues. In other words, reliably attaining good ends or effects is necessary for a quality to be a virtue.
Reliably attaining good ends or effects is also sufficient for a quality to be a virtue. Philosophers who endorse this concept argue that since good ends or effects are what matters (since good ends or effects are valuable), any quality that reliably succeeds in getting good ends or effects will also be valuable – it will be a virtue. This means that any quality – whether it is a natural capacity, an acquired skill, or an acquired character trait – will count as a virtue as long as it consistently produces good ends or effects. Accordingly, venture capitalists who consistently succeed in helping others via charitable donations have the virtue of benevolence, even if they do not care about others and are solely motivated by fame or tax write-offs. Likewise, students who reliably arrive at true beliefs as a result of their logical skills have intellectual virtues, even if they do not care about truth and are solely motivated to get good grades or make money (some websites pay students to get good grades). In short, one need only be successful at getting good ends or effects to be virtuous; one need not have good motives.5 Getting good ends or effects is the only thing that matters for virtue.
Are the virtues intrinsically, constitutively, or instrumentally valuable?
According to the first key concept, good ends or effects are what matter – they are intrinsically valuable. In other words, they are valuable for their own sakes – they are valuable even if they do not produce, or are not part of, anything else of value. It is notoriously difficult to determine what (if anything) has intrinsic value, but health, true beliefs, knowledge, and the well-being of oneself and others have all been top candidates. In contrast, something has instrumental value if it is valuable as a means to producing something else of value. For instance, medication is valuable as a means to producing health, but not valuable for its own sake – if it failed to produce health, it would not be valuable. Finally, something has constitutive value if it is part of something that is valuable. For instance, the piece of oilcloth in Picasso's 1912 collage, Still Life with Chair Caning, is valuable because it is part of the (presumably) valuable collage. The piece of oilcloth is not valuable for its own sake, nor is it instrumentally valuable in this case since it does not produce the collage; rather, it is valuable because it is part of the collage.
These examples demonstrate that some things, like medication, are only valuable in one of the above ways. Medication is only instrumentally valuable; it is neither intrinsically nor constitutively valuable. But, this does not mean that all things are only valuable in one of the above ways. These three sorts of value do not necessarily exclude one another. Hence, it is possible that some things – like friendship – are valuable in more than one of these ways, or even in all three ways. Friendship might be (intrinsically) valuable for its own sake, (instrumentally) valuable because it produces something else of value like joy, and (constitutively) valuable because it is part of something that is valuable like living a good life.
Philosophers who defend this first key concept of virtue argue that the virtues are either instrumentally or constitutively valuable (or both). The virtues will be instrumentally valuable if they produce good ends – if they produce something of intrinsic value, like well-being or true beliefs. The virtues will be constitutively valuable if they are part of a good end – if they are part of something that is intrinsically valuable, like living a good life. In contrast, philosophers who defend the second key concept think that the virtues are intrinsically valuable (see section 1.2.2).
Are the virtues teleological or nonteleological?
Philosophers who endorse the first key concept all agree that good ends or effects are intrinsically valuable. But some of them focus on ends; others on effects. So, this first key concept of virtue comes in two different varieties: a teleological variety that focuses on ends, and a nonteleological variety that focuses on effects. Generally speaking, teleology is the view that things and people have built-in ends or functions. For instance, Plato and Aristotle argue that eyes, knives, workhorses, sculptors, and people in general all have such ends or functions. They argue that the function (end) of an eye is to see, of a knife is to cut, of a workhorse is to haul, and of a sculptor is to sculpt. Of course, determining the function (end) of a person in general is no easy task.
Each of these functions – seeing, cutting, etc. – can be performed well or poorly. According to the teleological variety of our first key concept, virtues are whatever qualities enable a thing or person to perform its function well (to attain its end), and vices are whatever qualities explain why a thing or person is performing its function poorly (failing to attain its end). In Plato's words, “anything that has a function performs it well by means of its own…virtue, and badly by means of its vice” (Republic, Book I: 353c). Hence, the sharpness of a knife is one of its virtues since sharpness is responsible for its cutting well (attaining its end); the dullness of a knife is one of its vices since dullness is responsible for its cutting poorly (failing to attain its end). Analogously, the virtues and vices of a person will be whatever qualities are responsible for her performing her function well or poorly – for her success or failure in attaining her end. It then follows that to figure out which of our qualities are virtues – which of our qualities makes us better as people – we must figure out the function or end of a person. This function or end is meant to be intrinsically valuable.
Other philosophers reject the teleological variety of this concept. They doubt that things and people have built-in ends or functions. Instead, they provide an analysis of virtue that makes no mention of function. They define virtues and vices in terms of effects. Accordingly, a quality will count as a virtue if it consistently produces good effects. A quality will count as a vice if it consistently fails to produce good effects. Of course, the challenge for this variety of our first key concept is to figure out which effects are good – which are intrinsically valuable.
It should be noted that, in actual practice, it can be difficult to tell these two varieties of our first key concept apart. This is because they often end up agreeing about which ends, or effects, are good. For instance, both varieties standardly conclude that true beliefs and the welfare of others count among good ends or effects. When this happens, the difference between the two varieties amounts to a theoretical one – they agree in practice about which things count as good, but they disagree about why those things count as good. Arguably, the teleological variety has an extra step in its explanation: it ties intrinsic value to ends and functions; the nonteleological variety does not.
Preview of four theorists: Plato, Aristotle, Sosa, Driver
Each of the four theorists addressed in Chapter 2 – Plato, Aristotle, Ernest Sosa, and Julia Driver – employs the first key concept of virtue. Plato, Aristotle, and, to a lesser extent, Sosa endorse the teleological variety. Driver endorses the nonteleological variety. All four theorists think that the virtues are instrumentally valuable. (The distinctions above can cross-cut one another.) Arguably, Plato, Aristotle, and Sosa think that the virtues are also constitutively valuable. Let's begin with a preview of Plato's view.
Plato is famous for defining virtues teleologically – in terms of functions or ends. In Republic, he argues that the function of a person includes deliberating, ruling oneself, and, more broadly, living. He contends that virtues are qualities that enable a person to perform these functions well. In other words, he thinks that the virtues are qualities that enable us to deliberate well, rule ourselves well, and thereby live well.
Which qualities are these? To identify the virtues, Plato argues that each person has a soul that is divided into three parts – reason, spirit, and appetite. Each of these parts has its own particular function. Roughly, the function (end) of reason is to rule the soul and to know what is good for the whole person, including knowing which things she should fear, and which things she should desire.6 The function (end) of spirit is to enforce what reason says about which things should be feared; the function (end) of appetite is to accept what reason says about which things should be desired. Each of these functions can be performed well or poorly. Plato thinks that when one's reason, spirit, and appetite are all functioning well, one knows what is good and one puts this knowledge into practice – one fears all and only the things one should (to use contemporary examples, one fears combat but not mice), and desires all and only the things one should (one desires sex, but not sex with one's best friend's partner). On his view, the virtue of wisdom is what enables reason to function well, since the wise person knows what is good and deliberates well. Likewise, courage is what enables spirit to function well, since the courageous person fears what he should; and temperance is what enables appetite to function well, since the temperate person desires what he should. The virtue of justice is what enables the whole person to function well, and function without internal conflict – justice enables each part of the soul to do “its own work,” in harmony with the other parts (Republic, Book IV: 441d–e). Hence, justice, in concert with the other virtues, enables a person to deliberate well, rule herself well, and thereby live well. Arguably, Plato thinks that the virtues are instrumentally valuable – because they enable us to live well; and constitutively valuable – since being virtuous is part of what it is to live well.
As a student of Plato's, Aristotle inherited the first key concept of virtue from him. Aristotle makes use of the teleological variety of this concept in Books I and VI of his Nicomachean Ethics (NE). (But he makes use of the second key concept of virtue in much of the rest of NE.) Let's begin with Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics. The goal of NE.VI is to explain the intellectual virtues. Here, Aristotle takes several cues from Plato. Like Plato, Aristotle thinks that there is a rational part of the soul, and that wisdom is what enables it to function well, since wisdom gets us knowledge. But, unlike Plato, Aristotle thinks that there are two types of wisdom and two types of knowledge. According to Aristotle, the rational part of the soul is itself subdivided into two further parts – the contemplative part and the calculative part. The function (end) of the contemplative part is to get theoretical knowledge, which, for Aristotle, included truths about geometry (e.g., every triangle has three sides). The function (end) of the calculative part is to get practical knowledge, like which action one should perform (e.g., I should finish the presentation that is due tomorrow instead of drinking lots of gin). Aristotle uses these functions to identify different virtues. He argues: “The work of both the intellectual parts…is truth. Therefore the states that are most strictly those in respect of which each of these parts will reach truth are the virtues of the two parts” (NE.1139b11–13). In other words, intellectual virtues are qualities that enable us to perform these functions well – they enable us to reliably attain practical or theoretical knowledge, respectively. Aristotle contends that practical wisdom (phronesis) and skill (techne) are the virtues of the calculative part – they get us practical truths and knowledge; while philosophical wisdom (sophia), intuitive reason (nous), and scientific knowledge (episteme) are the virtues of the contemplative part – they get us theoretical truths and knowledge. Arguably, in NE.VI, Aristotle is thinking of the intellectual virtues as instrumentally valuable – valuable because they produce knowledge, which is itself intrinsically valuable.
In Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle defines virtues, and the good life, in terms of functions. The overarching goal of NE.I is to define human flourishing (eudaimonia), or the good life. Aristotle contends that, contrary to popular belief, the good life does not consist solely in pleasure or wealth. Instead, he defines the good life in terms of the function (end) of a human being. He argues that the function of a human being is, roughly, rational activity. Rational activity is what makes us distinctive. Aristotle's notion of rational activity is broader than it might initially seem. It includes contemplating theories and calculating which actions to perform. But we also engage in rational activity when our appetites obey reason – when we fear, desire, and do what reason tells us. Of course, it is possible for us to perform our function as humans (rational activity) well or poorly. Here, as in NE.VI, Aristotle assumes that to perform any function well one must have the corresponding virtues. Accordingly, he identifies courage, temperance, justice, practical wisdom, and philosophical wisdom as virtues, since they all enable us to excel at rational activity. Aristotle concludes that since the good life consists in performing our function as humans (rational activity) well, and since virtues are what enable us to perform this function well (to excel at rational activity), the good life consists in virtuous rational activity. Arguably, in NE.I, Aristotle is thinking of the virtues as being both instrumentally and constitutively valuable: valuable both because they enable us to excel at rational activity, and because virtuous rational activity is itself part of the good life (which is intrinsically valuable).
It should be noted that though both Plato and Aristotle think that we must have good desires or motives in order to be morally virtuous, this is here purely a result of the rich notion of human function that they endorse. If they are correct – if virtues are whatever qualities enable us to excel at rational activity, excel at ruling ourselves, and excel at living in general – then it is no wonder that virtues require internal features like good desires and motives. If human function is partly internal, then we can expect the virtues to be partly internal. But if we instead endorse more modest ends or effects – like the external production of true beliefs or well-being – then we can expect motives to drop out of the picture. Sosa's and Driver's views each illustrate this point. Neither of them thinks that good motives are required for the virtues. In sum, there is nothing about the first key concept of virtue itself that forces virtues to require good motives. According to the first key concept, it is getting good ends that matters for virtue. If good motives end up being required, this is purely because of one's choice of an internal end.
Ernest Sosa, a contemporary epistemologist, applies the first key concept to intellectual virtues, like reliable memory and vision. Sosa straddles both varieties of the first key concept. When endorsing the teleological variety, he argues that “grasping the truth about one's environment” is one of the “proper ends of a human being” (1991: 271). So, like Plato and Aristotle, he thinks that one of our main functions as people is to get true beliefs. Sosa also uses Plato's Republic, and Book VI of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, to argue that “there is a…sense of ‘virtue’…in which anything with a function – natural or artificial – does have virtues” (1991: 271). Accordingly, Sosa construes the intellectual virtues as qualities that enable a person to perform her function of getting truths well. A person performs this function well when she reliably gets true beliefs – when she gets more true beliefs than false ones. A person performs this function poorly when she is unreliable – when she gets more false beliefs than true ones. Hence, Sosa thinks that intellectual virtues are whatever qualities reliably get us true beliefs.
