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- Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Sprache: Englisch
Winner of the 2018 Choice Award for Outstanding Academic Title!
PRAISE FOR PREVIOUS EDITIONS
"This is a brilliantly clear introduction (and indeed reframing) of the history and philosophy of science in terms of worldviews and their elements…. In addition, the book is incredibly well-informed from both a scientific and philosophical angle. Highly recommended."
Scientific and Medical Network
"Unlike many other introductions to philosophy of science, DeWitt's book is at once historically informative and philosophically thorough and rigorous. Chapter notes, suggested readings, and references enhance its value."
Choice
"Written in clear and comprehensible prose and supplemented by effective diagrams and examples, Worldviews is an ideal text for anyone new to the history and philosophy of science. As the reader will come to find out, DeWitt is a gifted writer with the unique ability to break down complex and technical concepts into digestible parts, making Worldviews a welcoming and not overwhelming book for the introductory reader."
History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, vol. 28(2)
Now in its third edition, Worldviews: An Introduction to the History and Philosophy of Science strengthens its reputation as the most accessible and teachable introduction to the history and philosophy of science on the market. Geared toward engaging undergraduates and those approaching the history and philosophy of science for the first time, this intellectually-provocative volume takes advantage of its author's extensive teaching experience, parsing complex ideas using straightforward and sensible examples drawn from the physical sciences.
Building on the foundations which earned the book its critical acclaim, author Richard DeWitt considers fundamental issues in the philosophy of science through the historical worldviews that influenced them, charting the evolution of Western science through the rise and fall of dominant systems of thought. Chapters have been updated to include discussion of recent findings in quantum theory, general relativity, and evolutionary theory, and two new chapters exclusive to the third edition enrich its engagement with radical developments in contemporary science.
At a time in modern history when the nature of truth, fact, and reality seem increasingly controversial, the third edition of Worldviews presents complex concepts with clarity and verve, and prepares inquisitive minds to engage critically with some of the most exciting questions in the philosophy of science.
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CONTENTS
Cover
Title Page
Copyright
Dedication
List of Figures
Acknowledgments
Introduction
Part I: Fundamental Issues
Chapter 1: Worldviews
Aristotle's Beliefs and the Aristotelian Worldview
The Newtonian Worldview
Concluding Remarks
Chapter 2: Truth
Preliminary Issues
Clarifying the Question
Correspondence Theories of Truth
Coherence Theories of Truth
Problems/Puzzles About Correspondence Theories of Truth
Problems/Puzzles for Coherence Theories of Truth
Philosophical Reflections: Descartes and the Cogito
Concluding Remarks
Chapter 3: Empirical Facts and Philosophical/Conceptual Facts
Preliminary Observations
A Note on Terminology
Concluding Remarks
Chapter 4: Confirming and Disconfirming Evidence and Reasoning
Confirmation Reasoning
Disconfirmation Reasoning
Inductive and Deductive Reasoning
Concluding Remarks
Chapter 5: The Quine–Duhem Thesis and Implications for Scientific Method
The Quine–Duhem Thesis
Implications for Scientific Method
Concluding Remarks
Chapter 6: A Philosophical Interlude: Problems and Puzzles of Induction
Hume's Problem of Induction
Hempel's Raven Paradox
Goodman's Gruesome Problem
Concluding Remarks
Chapter 7: Falsifiability
Basic Ideas
Complicating Factors
Concluding Remarks
Chapter 8: Instrumentalism and Realism
Prediction and Explanation
Instrumentalism and Realism
Concluding Remarks
Part II: The Transition from the Aristotelian Worldview to the Newtonian Worldview
Chapter 9: The Structure of the Universe on the Aristotelian Worldview
The Physical Structure of the Universe
Conceptual Beliefs about the Universe
Concluding Remarks
Chapter 10: The Preface to Ptolemy's Almagest: The Earth as Spherical, Stationary, and at the Center of the Universe
The Earth as Spherical
The Earth as Stationary
The Earth as the Center of the Universe
Concluding Remarks
Chapter 11: Astronomical Data: The Empirical Facts
The Movement of the Stars
The Movement of the Sun
The Movement of the Moon
The Movement of the Planets
Concluding Remarks
Chapter 12: Astronomical Data: The Philosophical/Conceptual Facts
A Scientific Problem with the Motion of the Heavenly Bodies
Could This Account Be Used for a Moving Earth?
Concluding Remarks
Chapter 13: The Ptolemaic System
Background Information
A Brief Description of the Components of Ptolemy's Treatment of Mars
The Rationale behind These Components
Concluding Remarks
Chapter 14: The Copernican System
Background Information
Overview of the Copernican System
Comparison of the Ptolemaic and Copernican Systems
What Motivated Copernicus?
The Reception of the Copernican Theory
Concluding Remarks
Chapter 15: The Tychonic System
Chapter 16: Kepler's System
Background Information
Kepler's System
What Motivated Kepler?
Concluding Remarks
Chapter 17: Galileo and the Evidence from the Telescope
Background Information
Galileo's Evidence from the Telescope
The Reception of Galileo's Discoveries
Concluding Remarks
Chapter 18: A Summary of Problems Facing the Aristotelian Worldview
Problems for the Aristotelian Worldview
The Need for a New Science
Concluding Remarks
Chapter 19: Philosophical and Conceptual Connections in the Development of the New Science
The Size of the Universe
Concluding Remarks
Chapter 20: Overview of the New Science and the Newtonian Worldview
The New Science
Overview of the Newtonian Worldview
Philosophical Reflections: Instrumentalist and Realist Attitudes Toward Newton's Concept of Gravity
Concluding Remarks
Chapter 21: Philosophical Interlude: What Is a Scientific Law?
Scientific Laws
Concluding Remarks
Chapter 22: The Development of the Newtonian Worldview, 1700–1900
Remarks on the Development of the Major Branches of Science, 1700–1900
Minor Clouds
Concluding Remarks
Part III: Recent Developments In Science and Worldviews
Chapter 23: The Special Theory of Relativity
Absolute Space and Absolute Time
Overview of the Special Theory of Relativity
The Irresistible Why Question
Is Special Relativity Self-Contradictory?
Spacetime, Invariants, and the Geometrical Approach to Relativity
Concluding Remarks
Chapter 24: The General Theory of Relativity
Basic Principles
The Einstein Field Equations and Predictions of General Relativity
Philosophical Reflections: General Relativity and Gravity
Concluding Remarks
Chapter 25: Philosophical Interlude: Are (Some) Scientific Theories Incommensurable?
Preliminary Considerations
Exploring Incommensurability
Discussion: Incommensurability and Scientific Progress
Concluding Remarks
Chapter 26: Introduction to Quantum Theory: Basic Empirical Facts and the Mathematics of Quantum Theory
Facts, Theory, and Interpretation
Some Quantum Facts
Overview of the Mathematics of Quantum Theory
Concluding Remarks
Chapter 27: The Reality Question: The Measurement Problem and Interpretations of Quantum Theory
The Measurement Problem
Interpretations of Quantum Theory
Concluding Remarks
Chapter 28: Quantum Theory and Locality: EPR, Bell's Theorem, and the Aspect Experiments
Background Information
The EPR Thought Experiment
Bell's Theorem
Aspect's Experiments
Locality, Nonlocality, and Spooky Action at a Distance
Concluding Remarks
Chapter 29: Overview of the Theory of Evolution
Overview of the Basics of Evolutionary Theory
Darwin's and Wallace's Paths to Natural Selection
Concluding Remarks
Chapter 30: Reflections on Evolution
Implications for Religion
Morality and Ethics
Empirical Studies
Concluding Remarks
Chapter 31: Worldviews: Concluding Thoughts
Overview
Reflections on Relativity Theory
Reflections on Quantum Theory
Reflections on Evolutionary Theory
Metaphors
Chapter Notes and Suggested Reading
References
Index
End User License Agreement
List of Tables
List of Illustrations
Figure 1.1
Figure 1.2
Figure 2.1
Figure 2.2
Figure 2.3
Figure 5.1
Figure 8.1
Figure 10.1
Figure 10.2
Figure 13.1
Figure 13.2
Figure 13.3
Figure 13.4
Figure 13.5
Figure 14.1
Figure 14.2
Figure 15.1
Figure 16.1
Figure 16.2
Figure 16.3
Figure 16.4
Figure 16.5
Figure 16.6
Figure 17.1
Figure 17.2
Figure 17.3
Figure 17.4
Figure 17.5
Figure 17.6
Figure 17.7
Figure 22.1
Figure 22.2
Figure 23.1
Figure 23.2
Figure 23.3
Figure 23.4
Figure 24.1
Figure 24.2
Figure 26.1
Figure 26.2
Figure 26.3
Figure 26.4
Figure 26.5
Figure 26.6
Figure 26.7
Figure 26.8
Figure 26.9
Figure 26.10
Figure 26.11
Figure 26.12
Figure 26.13
Figure 26.14
Figure 27.1
Figure 27.2
Figure 28.1
Figure 28.2
Figure 28.3
Figure 29.1
Figure 30.1
Figure 30.2
Figure 30.3
Guide
Cover
Table of Contents
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Part 1
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Worldviews
An Introduction to the History and Philosophy of Science
Third Edition
Richard DeWitt
This edition first published 2018
© 2018 Richard DeWitt
Edition History: 1e: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, (1e, 2003); John Wiley & Sons Ltd, (2e, 2010)
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by law. Advice on how to obtain permission to reuse material from this title is available at http://www.wiley.com/go/permissions.
The right of Richard DeWitt to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted in accordance with law.
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this title
Names: DeWitt, Richard, author.
Title: Worldviews : an introduction to the history and philosophy of science / Richard DeWitt.
Other titles: World views
Description: Third edition. | Hoboken : Wiley, 2018. | Includes bibliographical references and index. |
Identifiers: LCCN 2017049915 (print) | LCCN 2017059375 (ebook) | ISBN 9781119118985 (pdf) | ISBN 9781119118992 (epub) | ISBN 9781119118893 (pbk.)
Subjects: LCSH: Science–History. | Science–Philosophy.
Classification: LCC Q125 (ebook) | LCC Q125 .D38 2018 (print) | DDC 509–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017049915
Cover images: (Vitruvian Man by Leonardo da Vinci) © Vaara / iStockphoto; (Night Sky) © Misha Kaminsky / iStockphoto
Cover design by Wiley
For Susie
List of Figures
1.1
A “grocery list” of Aristotle's beliefs
1.2
Aristotle's “jigsaw puzzle” of beliefs
2.1
A peek into Sara's consciousness
2.2
Sara's conscious experience
2.3
The
Total Recall
scenario
5.1
Illustration of Euclidean axiom
8.1
Mars' motion on the Ptolemaic system
10.1
Does the ball follow this path?
10.2
Or does the ball follow this path?
13.1
Treatment of Mars on the Ptolemaic system
13.2
The flexibility of epicycle–deferent systems
13.3
Position of Mars against the backdrop of the fixed stars
13.4
Explanation of retrograde motion on the Ptolemaic system
13.5
Minor and major epicycles
14.1
The treatment of Mars on the Copernican system
14.2
Explanation of retrograde motion on the Copernican system
15.1
The Tychonic system
16.1
An ellipse
16.2
Orbit of Mars on Kepler's system
16.3
Illustration of Kepler's second law
16.4
Nested sphere, cube, and sphere
16.5
Kepler's construction
16.6
Kepler's construction with the solids removed
17.1
“Photograph” of sun and planets
17.2
Sun-centered interpretation of “photograph”
17.3
Earth-centered interpretation of “photograph”
17.4
Phases of Venus
17.5
Phases of the moon
17.6
Sun, Venus, and Earth on the Ptolemaic system
17.7
Sun, Venus, and Earth on a sun-centered system
22.1
Boat and swimmer analogy
22.2
The swimmers return at different times
23.1
Illustration for special relativity
23.2
Snapshot A
23.3
Snapshot B
23.4
A typical Cartesian coordinate system
24.1
Magnetic field lines
24.2
Typical field lines in general relativity
26.1
Electrons as particles
26.2
Electrons as waves
26.3
The particle effect and the wave effect
26.4
Two slit experiment with electron detectors
26.5
Beam splitter experiment
26.6
Families of wave mathematics
26.7
Representation of a wave equation
26.8
Adding family members to produce a particular wave
26.9
Members of another family can produce the same wave
26.10
Representation of the wave function for an electron in a particular setting
26.11
Families associated with measurements
26.12
Wave function for electron
26.13
Family P associated with measurements of position
26.14
Wave function decomposed into members of family P
27.1
Beam splitter arrangement
27.2
Schrödinger's cat
28.1
A typical EPR setup
28.2
Coke machine analogy
28.3
Modified EPR scenario
29.1
Results of genetic drift simulation
30.1
Prisoner's dilemma payoff matrix
30.2
Ultimatum game payoff matrix
30.3
Trust game payoff matrix
Acknowledgments
Countless people made contributions to the various editions of this work. Some contributions were large, some small, but all of them were important. For the various editions I have received invaluable feedback from numerous anonymous reviewers, sometimes catching outright mistakes and sometimes providing good suggestions for clarifying discussions. Although I do not know who these reviewers are, I would like to thank them for their important contributions. From the time this book project began, when the manuscript existed only as a rough draft, and continuing through drafts of the current edition, my philosophy of science students have provided excellent feedback on which ideas worked and which did not, which explanations were clear and which not so clear, and more. There are too many of them to name, but I would like to thank them as a whole for their help. I likewise cannot begin to name, but I do appreciate, all of the colleagues who over the years have discussed these issues with me, read portions of manuscripts, and helped me clarify and oftentimes correct my thinking on various issues. I would like to note that in spring 2016 I had the honor of leading a small group of exceptional students in a seminar in cognitive science and the philosophy of mind. Together we thought through a variety of issues in current science, history of science, and philosophy of science, and this group forced me to expand upon, clarify, and sometimes rethink a variety of views related to the history and philosophy of science. For this I'd like to acknowledge the contributions of Dan Boley, Chris Cardillo, Alex Clinton, Chris Fazekas, Aidan Grealish, Tom Greenwood, Tess McMahon, Elliot Neski, Justin Paton, Kali Schlegel, Andrew Schmidt, and John Simon. I would like again to note the contributions of Charles Ess of the University of Oslo, and Marc Lange of the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, both of whom read drafts of the entire first edition, most of which is included in both the second edition and this edition. Each provided lengthy, detailed, and helpful comments and suggestions (not to mention saving me from several embarrassing mistakes). In addition, I'd like to thank Todd Disotell and Shara Bailey of the Center for the Study of Human Origins, New York University, for an invigorating 2009 seminar on evolution, and the Faculty Resource Network for their financial support for that seminar. Regarding the material on evolution, I would like to acknowledge Richard Gawne, whose observations were largely responsible for me rethinking the way that material was presented in the previous edition. I wish also to recognize Helen Lang, who unfortunately passed away not long ago. Conversations with her were exceptionally valuable in helping me clarify certain aspects of Aristotle's physics and general philosophy of nature. Thanks also to Giles Flitney for his excellent work as copy-editor for this latest edition. Finally, I would again like to thank my original editor on this project, Jeff Dean, whose feedback was invaluable in the original organization and presentation of this manuscript.
RD
Introduction
This book is intended primarily for those coming to the history and philosophy of science for the first time. If this description fits you, welcome to a fascinating territory to explore. This field involves some of the deepest, most difficult, and most fundamental questions there are. But at the same time, the “lens of science,” so to speak, focuses these questions more sharply than they are often otherwise focused. I hope you enjoy this field as much as I do, and I especially hope your appetite is whetted to the point where you will want to return to explore these subjects in more depth.
This sort of introductory work provides special challenges. On the one hand, I want to be accurate with the history, the philosophy, and the interconnections between the two. On the other hand, I want to avoid the level of detail and minutiae that might swamp one approaching this subject for the first time. Those of us who do history and philosophy of science full-time – most of us are academics – tend to get caught up in the details of our disciplines, and I think we often lose sight of what such detail must look like to one new to the subject. When faced with these minutiae, newcomers often come away with the sense “Why would anyone care about that?”
The question is an understandable one. The details and minutiae are important, but their importance can only be understood in the context of a broader picture. So I hope, in this text, to paint one such broader picture. But although this text provides a rather broad-brushstroke picture, to the best of my knowledge what I say is accurate, though it admittedly leaves out a good deal of detail.
The connections between history, science, and philosophy are endlessly complex and fascinating. As mentioned, I hope to whet your appetite, to make you want to explore these issues in more detail, and perhaps even come to appreciate and enjoy the minutiae. Nothing would please me more than if, at the end of this book, you visit your bookstore, or fire up your web browser, and order works that will enable you to explore these topics further.
Notes on the Third Edition
Since this new edition contains a fair amount of new material, some brief notes on these additions are in order. Various scientific traditions (Aristotelian, Newtonian, current sciences) have always been a central theme in the book, and given this, questions surrounding the possible incommensurability of such scientific traditions (roughly, the question of whether one tradition can be properly understood from the point of view of a different tradition) have always been sort of lurking in the background of previous editions. For this edition, and following the suggestions of several reviewers of earlier editions, I've added a chapter explicitly discussing issues surrounding incommensurability. This chapter comes relatively late in the book (Chapter 25), which allows the discussion to use, as examples, scientific traditions discussed earlier in the book.
In addition, I've added a chapter on the measurement problem in quantum theory. The measurement problem is widely viewed as a major (perhaps the major) issue with the standard approach to quantum theory (at least, quantum theory taken realistically). Most, perhaps all, of the discussions of the measurement problem I am familiar with are not geared toward someone who might be encountering these topics for the first time. For this chapter, I took pains to try to describe the measurement problem, especially why it is a problem, in a way that will work for someone who has not encountered such issues before.
Regarding evolutionary theory: since the publication of the second edition, I've become less than happy with the way I presented the basics of evolutionary theory in that edition. It's not that what was said was mistaken; rather, I think it was overly simplistic. For this edition, I took the previous material, tossed it in the bin, and started from scratch. So while the title of the chapter is the same, the material on the basics of evolutionary theory is entirely new, and substantially more extensive than what was in the second edition. I think it works much better. (The historical material toward the end of that chapter, on Darwin's and Wallace's routes to discovering natural selection, has been cleaned up and condensed, but is basically the same.)
I might note that I do not anticipate there being another edition beyond this one. The main reasons are (i) practical considerations mean that books of this sort can only be so long, and with this edition we are at the point where it would be difficult to add new material without exceeding these practical limits, and (ii) I do not believe in putting out new and only slightly modified editions mainly aimed at killing off sales of previous editions. As such, for this edition I've taken a good amount of time to carefully review every chapter. For some chapters only minor changes were made, for example, rewriting sentences for greater clarity. For other chapters I made much more substantial changes.
Finally, for the chapters in the final section concerning recent developments, I have added references to some interesting experiments that have been conducted since the publication of the second edition. Mainly these involve relativity (for example, the recent detection of gravitational waves predicted by Einstein's general relativity), and recent experiments in quantum theory (for example, involving further tests of Bell's theorem).
Suggested Primary Sources to Accompany the Book
Much of the material in the book can be usefully accompanied by primary sources. A wide variety of additional primary sources could be used, and below is a list, I think of manageable length, of primary sources I would recommend. All of the sources below have the advantage of being available online, and from sources in the public domain such that copyright issues do not arise.
Descartes'
Meditations
I and II
Hume's
Enquiry
, Section IV, Part II
Aristotle's
On the Heavens
, Book II,
Chapter 14
Osiander's forward to Copernicus'
On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres
Letter from Schonberg to Copernicus (as included in Copernicus'
On the Revolutions
)
Galileo's
Letter to Castelli
Bellarmine's
Letter to Foscarini
Galileo's
Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina
The Inquisition's Indictment of Galileo
The Inquisition's Sentencing of Galileo
Galileo's Abjuration
Einstein's “On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies”
Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen's “Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete?”
Bell's “On the Einstein Podolsky Rosen Paradox”
A Note on the Structure of the Book
In the barest of outlines, my approach in this book is (i) to introduce some fundamental issues in the history and philosophy of science; (ii) to explore the transition from the Aristotelian worldview to the Newtonian worldview; and (iii) to explore challenges to our own western worldview brought on by recent developments, most notably relativity theory, quantum theory, and evolutionary theory.
To accomplish these goals, the book is divided into three parts. Part I provides an introduction to some fundamental issues in the history and philosophy of science. Such issues include the notion of worldviews, scientific method and reasoning, truth, evidence, the contrast between empirical facts and philosophical/conceptual facts, falsifiability, and instrumentalism and realism. The relevance of and interconnections between these topics are illustrated throughout Parts II and III.
In Part II, we explore the change from the Aristotelian worldview to the Newtonian worldview, noting the role played by some of the philosophical/conceptual issues involved in this change. Of particular interest is the role played by certain philosophical/conceptual “facts” that are central to the Aristotelian worldview. Discussion of these beliefs serves to illustrate many of the issues from Part I, and also sets the stage for the discussion, in Part III, of some of our own philosophical/conceptual “facts” that we must abandon in light of recent discoveries.
Part III provides an introduction to recent discoveries and developments, most notably relativity theory, quantum theory, and evolutionary theory. As we explore these, we will see that these new discoveries and developments require substantial changes in some of the key beliefs that almost everyone in the western world was raised with. And having emphasized, in Part II, the role played by philosophical/conceptual beliefs in the Aristotelian worldview, we now see that some of the beliefs we have long taken as obvious empirical facts turn out, in light of recent developments, to be mistaken philosophical/conceptual “facts.”
At this point in time it is clear that changes in our overall view of the world will be required as recognition of these mistaken philosophical/conceptual beliefs becomes more widespread. It is difficult to say at this point just what shape these changes will take, but it is becoming increasingly likely that our grandchildren will inherit a view of the world substantially different from our own. I hope you enjoy exploring and thinking about not only the changes that have taken place in the past, but also the changes we find ourselves in the midst of.
At the end of the book, in the Chapter Notes and Suggested Reading, I provide further information on some of the topics discussed, as well as suggestions for where to find additional information on these topics. As mentioned, nothing would please me more than if, at the end of this work, you find yourself interested in further investigating these issues.
As a final note on the structure of the book, although this book is intended to be read as a whole, and its three main parts are connected in the ways described above, it is possible to read Parts I, II, and III more or less independently of each other. For example, those more interested in the scientific revolution of the 1600s and the development of Newtonian science and the Newtonian worldview, and less interested in related issues in the philosophy of science, could largely start with Chapter 9, at the beginning of Part II. I would, however, encourage such readers to take at least a quick pass through Chapters 1, 3, 4, and 8. Likewise, readers interested primarily in more recent developments in science, especially relativity theory, quantum theory, and evolutionary theory, could jump immediately to Chapter 23, at the beginning of Part III. I would encourage such readers to take at least a quick look at Chapters 3 and 8.
Once again, I hope you enjoy your exploration.
Part IFundamental Issues
In Part I, we explore some preliminary and basic issues involved in the history and philosophy of science. In particular, we will discuss the notion of worldviews, truth, evidence, empirical facts versus philosophical/conceptual facts, common types of reasoning, falsifiability, and instrumentalism and realism. These topics provide the necessary background for our exploration, in Part II, of the transition from the Aristotelian worldview to the Newtonian worldview, and also for our exploration, in Part III, of recent developments that challenge our own view of the world.
1Worldviews
The main goal of this chapter is to introduce the notion of a worldview. As with most of the topics we will explore in this book, the notion of a worldview turns out to be substantially more complex than it at first appears. We will begin, though, with a relatively straightforward characterization of this notion. Then as the book progresses, and we come to appreciate more about the Aristotelian worldview and about our own worldview, we will come to a better appreciation of some of the complexities involved.
Although the term “worldview” has been used fairly widely for over 100 years, it is not a term that carries a standard definition. So it is worth taking a moment to clarify how I will be using the term. In the shortest of descriptions, I will use “worldview” to refer to a system of beliefs that are interconnected in something like the way the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle are interconnected. That is, a worldview is not merely a collection of separate, independent, unrelated beliefs, but is instead an intertwined, interrelated, interconnected system of beliefs.
Often, the best way to understand a new concept is by way of an example. With this in mind, let's begin with a look at the Aristotelian worldview.
Aristotle's Beliefs and the Aristotelian Worldview
In the western world, what I am calling the Aristotelian worldview was the dominant system of beliefs from about 300 BCE to about 1600 CE. This worldview was based on a set of beliefs articulated most clearly and thoroughly by Aristotle (384–322 BCE). It is worth noting that the term “Aristotelian worldview” refers not so much to the collection of beliefs held specifically by Aristotle himself, but rather to a set of beliefs shared by a large segment of western culture after his death and that were, as noted, largely based on the beliefs of Aristotle.
To understand the Aristotelian worldview, it will be easier to begin with Aristotle's own beliefs. Following this, we will discuss some of the ways these beliefs evolved in the centuries after the death of Aristotle.
Aristotle's Beliefs
Aristotle held a large number of beliefs that are radically different from the beliefs we hold. Here are a few examples:
The Earth is located at the center of the universe.
The Earth is stationary, that is, it neither orbits any other body such as the sun, nor spins on its axis.
The moon, the planets, and the sun revolve around the Earth, completing a revolution about every 24 hours.
In the sublunar region, that is, the region between the Earth and the moon (including the Earth itself) there are four basic elements, these being earth, water, air, and fire.
Objects in the superlunar region, that is, the region beyond the moon including the moon, sun, planets, and stars, are composed of a fifth basic element, ether.
Each of the basic elements has an essential nature, and this essential nature is the reason why the element behaves as it does.
The essential nature of each of the basic elements is reflected in the way that element tends to move.
The element earth has a natural tendency to move toward the center of the universe. (That's why rocks fall straight down, since the center of the Earth is the center of the universe.)
The element water also has a natural tendency to move toward the center of the universe, but its tendency is not as strong as that of the earth element. (That's why, when dirt and water are mixed, both tend to move downward, but the water will eventually end up above the dirt.)
The element air naturally moves toward a region that is above earth and water, but below fire. (That's why air, when blown into water, bubbles up through the water.)
The element fire has a natural tendency to move away from the center of the universe. (That's why fire burns upward, through air.)
The element ether, which composes objects such as the planets and stars, has a natural tendency toward perfectly circular movement. (That's why the planets and stars continuously move in circles about the Earth, that is, about the center of the universe.)
In the sublunar region, an object in motion will naturally tend to come to a halt, either because the elements composing it have reached their natural place in the universe, or far more often because something (for example, the surface of the Earth) prevents them from continuing toward their natural place.
An object that is stationary will remain stationary, unless there is some source of motion (either self-motion, as when an object moves toward its natural place in the universe, or an external source of motion, as when I push my pen across my desk).
The beliefs just mentioned are only a small, small handful of Aristotle's views. He also had extensive views on ethics, politics, biology, psychology, the proper method for conducting scientific investigations, and so on. Like most of us, Aristotle held thousands of beliefs. But most of his beliefs were quite different from ours.
Importantly, Aristotle's beliefs were anything but a random collection of beliefs. When I say that the beliefs were not random, part of what I mean is that he had good reason to believe most of them, and the beliefs were far from naive. Every single one of the beliefs listed above turned out to be wrong, but given the data available at the time, every one of those beliefs was quite justified. To take just one example, the best scientific data of Aristotle's time strongly indicated that the Earth was at the center of the universe. The belief turned out to be wrong, but naive it was not.
By saying the beliefs were not random, I also mean that they form an interrelated, interlocking system of beliefs. To illustrate the ways in which Aristotle's beliefs were interrelated and interlocking, consider a wrong way and a right way of picturing them.
First, the wrong picture, which I will illustrate by an analogy with grocery lists. When most of us make grocery lists, we end up with a haphazard collection of items related only by the fact that we can, we hope, find them when we get to the grocery store. We could organize our grocery lists – with the dairy items in this part of the list, the bakery items in that part, and so on – but most of us simply do not bother. And the result, as mentioned, is a haphazard list with no particular relation between the items on it.
When you think of Aristotle's beliefs, do not think of them as like a grocery list of unrelated items. That is, do not picture the collection of beliefs as like the somewhat haphazard list in Figure 1.1. Instead, here is a better picture. Think of the collection of beliefs as like a jigsaw puzzle. Each piece of the puzzle is a particular belief, with the pieces fitting together in a coherent, consistent, interrelated, interlocking fashion, as the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle fit together. That is, picture Aristotle's system of beliefs more as it appears in Figure 1.2.
Figure 1.1 A “grocery list” of Aristotle's beliefs.
Figure 1.2 Aristotle's “jigsaw puzzle” of beliefs.
The jigsaw puzzle metaphor illustrates the key features of the way I am using the notion of a worldview. First, pieces of a jigsaw puzzle are not independent and isolated; rather, puzzle pieces are interconnected. Each piece of a puzzle fits with the piece next to it, and that piece fits with the pieces next to it, and so on. All the pieces are interconnected and interrelated, and the overall result is a system in which the individual pieces fit together into an interlocking, interconnected, coherent, and consistent whole.
Likewise, Aristotle's beliefs fit together, forming an interlocking, consistent system. Each belief is closely tied with the beliefs around it, and those beliefs in turn are closely tied to their surrounding beliefs, and so on.
To take just one example of how Aristotle's beliefs fit together, consider the belief that the Earth is the center of the universe. This belief is closely interconnected with the belief that the element earth has a natural tendency to move toward the center of the universe. After all, the Earth itself is composed primarily of the earthy element, so the belief that the earthy element naturally goes toward the center of the universe, and the belief that the Earth itself is at the center of the universe, fit together nicely. Likewise, both of these beliefs are closely tied to the belief that an object will only move if there is a source of motion. Just as my pen will remain stationary unless something moves it, so too with the Earth. Having long ago moved to the center of the universe, or as close to the center as they could, the heavy elements comprising the Earth will now remain stationary, because there is nothing powerful enough to move an object as massive as the Earth. All of these beliefs are, in turn, closely connected to the belief that the basic elements have essential natures, and the belief that objects behave as they do largely because of their natures. Again, the general point is that Aristotle's beliefs are interconnected like the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle are interconnected.
In addition, notice that in a jigsaw puzzle there are differences between the core pieces of the puzzle and the peripheral pieces. Because of the interconnections, a central, core piece cannot be replaced with a different-shaped piece without replacing almost the entire puzzle. A piece near the periphery, however, can be replaced with relatively little alteration in the rest of the puzzle.
In a similar vein, among Aristotle's beliefs we can distinguish between core and peripheral beliefs. Peripheral beliefs can be replaced without much alteration in the overall worldview. For example, Aristotle believed there were five planets (not counting the sun, moon, and Earth). Five planets are all that can be distinguished without the technology of recent years. But had there arisen evidence, say, of a sixth planet, Aristotle could easily have accommodated this new belief without much alteration in his overall system of beliefs. This ability of a belief to change without substantially altering the overall system of beliefs is typical of a peripheral belief.
In contrast, consider the belief that the Earth was stationary and at the center of the universe. In Aristotle's system of beliefs, this is a core belief. Importantly, this is a core belief not because of the depth of conviction Aristotle had in it, but rather because, like a puzzle piece near the center, it cannot be removed and replaced without dramatically altering the beliefs to which it is connected, which in turn would require altering almost his entire system of beliefs.
To illustrate this, suppose Aristotle tried to take his belief that the Earth was the center of the universe and replace it with, say, the belief that the sun was the center. Could Aristotle simply remove this belief, this piece of the puzzle, and replace it with a new belief that the sun is the center, and do so while still keeping most of the rest of the jigsaw puzzle intact?
The answer is no, because the new belief, that the sun is the center of the universe, would not fit into the rest of the jigsaw puzzle. For example, heavy objects clearly fall toward the center of the Earth. If the center of the Earth is not the center of the universe, then Aristotle's belief that heavy objects (those composed mainly of the heavy elements earth and water) have a natural tendency to move toward the center of the universe has to be replaced as well. This in turn requires replacing a multitude of other interconnected beliefs, such as the belief that objects have essential natures that cause them to behave as they do. In short, trying to replace just the one belief requires replacement of all the beliefs to which it is interconnected, and in general, it would require building an entirely new jigsaw puzzle of beliefs.
Again, this is all to reinforce the idea that Aristotle's beliefs were not a random, haphazard collection of beliefs, but were rather an interconnected, jigsaw puzzle-like system of beliefs. This notion that individual beliefs fit together to form an interlocking, consistent system of beliefs is the key idea behind the way I will use the notion of a worldview. In short, when I speak of a worldview, think of the jigsaw puzzle analogy.
The Aristotelian Worldview
Thus far, we have primarily discussed Aristotle's own beliefs, and one might get the impression that a worldview involves a particular individual's jigsaw puzzle of beliefs. People do sometimes speak this way. There is a sense in which each of us has a somewhat different system of beliefs, a slightly different worldview, from everyone else. And our individual systems of beliefs, of course, are part of what makes us the individuals we are.
But a more important sense of “worldview,” for this book, is a more generalized notion. For example, much of the western world, from the death of Aristotle to the 1600s, shared a more or less Aristotelian way of looking at the world. This certainly does not mean that everyone believed exactly what Aristotle did, or that the system of beliefs was not added to or modified during this period.
For example, at various times during this period, Judaic, Christian, and Islamic philosopher-theologians mixed Aristotelian beliefs with religious beliefs, and these sorts of mixtures illustrate some of the ways in which Aristotelian beliefs were modified in the centuries after his death. There were also groups who took a distinctly non-Aristotelian view of the universe. For example, there were groups whose beliefs were based more closely on the ideas of Plato (428–348 BCE) rather than Aristotle, and such Platonic-based belief systems provided an alternative to the Aristotelian worldview. (Plato, incidentally, was Aristotle's teacher, though Aristotle's views would eventually diverge substantially from those of Plato.)
In spite of such modifications to Aristotle's beliefs, and in spite of the existence of groups taking a non-Aristotelian view of the world, the belief systems of large segments of the western world, from about 300 BCE to about 1600, were very much in the Aristotelian spirit. The belief that the Earth was the center of the universe, that objects had essential natures and natural tendencies, that the sublunar region was a place of imperfection and the superlunar region a place of perfection, and so on, were part of the consensus of most of the western world. And these group beliefs fit together much like the beliefs of an individual fit together – into an interlocking, consistent, coherent system of beliefs. And it is this group jigsaw puzzle of beliefs, very much in the spirit of Aristotle's beliefs, that I will have in mind when I speak of the Aristotelian worldview.
The Newtonian Worldview
As an example to contrast with the Aristotelian worldview, let's look briefly at a different system of beliefs. Early in the 1600s, new evidence (largely from the newly invented telescope) arose that indicated the Earth moved about the sun. As discussed above, one cannot simply replace the Earth-centered piece of the Aristotelian jigsaw puzzle without replacing virtually all of the pieces of that puzzle. As such, the Aristotelian worldview was no longer viable. The story is fascinating and complex, and we will explore it more later in the book, but for now, suffice it to say that eventually a new system of beliefs emerged. And in particular, the new system was one that included a belief in a moving Earth.
Call the worldview that eventually replaced the Aristotelian worldview the Newtonian worldview. This worldview has as its foundation the work of Isaac Newton (1642–1727) and his contemporaries, but it has been added to considerably over the years. As with the Aristotelian view, the Newtonian worldview has associated with it a large number of beliefs. Here are some examples:
The Earth revolves on its axis, completing a revolution approximately every 24 hours.
The Earth and planets move in elliptical orbits around the sun.
There are slightly more than 100 basic elements in the universe.
Objects behave as they do largely because of the influence of external forces. (For example, gravity, which is why rocks fall.)
Objects such as planets and stars are composed of the same basic elements as objects on Earth.
The same laws that describe the behavior of objects on Earth (for example, that an object in motion tends to remain in motion) also apply to objects such as planets and stars.
And so on for the other thousands of beliefs that compose the Newtonian worldview.
This is the worldview that most of us in the western world have been raised on. And the exact same story applies to the beliefs that compose the Newtonian worldview as applies to the Aristotelian worldview. In particular, the Newtonian worldview comprises a system of beliefs that tie together as the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle tie together, forming a coherent, consistent, interlocking system of beliefs. While both systems of beliefs, the Aristotelian and the Newtonian, are coherent and consistent, they are very different jigsaw puzzles, with quite different core beliefs.
The change from the Aristotelian to the Newtonian worldview was a dramatic change, and much of the story of Part II of this book involves this transition. As we will see, this transition was spurred, in large part, by new discoveries in the early 1600s. Later, in Part III, we will explore some rather surprising recent discoveries. In something like the way the new discoveries in the 1600s required a change in the existing jigsaw puzzle of beliefs, so too the discoveries of recent decades require a change in our jigsaw puzzle of beliefs.
Concluding Remarks
Before concluding this introduction to the notion of worldviews, I want to make two quick observations. The first deals with the evidence we have for the beliefs that comprise our worldview, and the second concerns the apparent common-sense nature of many of the beliefs comprising our worldview.
Evidence
We have been speaking a great deal about beliefs, and presumably, people have reasons for holding the beliefs they do. That is, we would seem to have some sort of evidence for the beliefs we hold.
For example, presumably you believe Aristotle was wrong, and that the Earth is not the center of the universe. Instead, you most likely believe that the sun is the center of our solar system, and the Earth and other planets move around the sun. I suspect you have good evidence for this belief. But I also suspect that your evidence is not what you think it is. Pause for a few seconds and ask “Why do I believe the Earth moves around the sun? What is the evidence I have?” Seriously, put this book down for a few seconds and ponder these questions.
Ready? First, consider whether you have any direct evidence for your belief that the Earth moves around the sun. When I say “direct evidence,” this is what I have in mind: when I ride my bicycle, I have direct evidence that I am moving. I feel the movement of the bike, I feel the wind in my face, I see myself moving past other objects, and so on. Do you have any direct evidence of this sort that the Earth is moving around the sun? It seems not. We do not feel like we are moving, nor do we feel constant high winds in our face. In fact, when you look out the window, it looks for all the world as if the Earth is stationary.
If you think about your reasons for your belief in a moving Earth, I think you will find you have no direct evidence – none at all – that the Earth is moving around the sun. Yet your belief is certainly a reasonable belief, and you certainly have some sort of evidence for it. But rather than direct evidence, the evidence you have is more like this: try for a moment to believe that the Earth does not move around the sun. Do you see that that belief does not fit in with your other beliefs? For example, the belief does not fit with your belief that your teachers, for the most part, have told you the truth. It does not fit with your belief that, for the most part, what you read in authoritative books is accurate. It does not fit with your belief that the experts in our society could not possibly be that wrong about something so basic. And so on.
The general point is that you believe the Earth moves around the sun largely because that belief fits in with the other pieces in your jigsaw puzzle of beliefs, and the opposite belief does not fit into that jigsaw puzzle. In other words, your evidence for that belief is closely tied with your jigsaw puzzle of beliefs, that is, with your worldview.
Incidentally, it would not be unreasonable to think that even if we ourselves do not have direct evidence that the Earth moves about the sun, surely experts in astronomy and related fields have such evidence. But as we will see in later chapters, even our experts do not have such direct evidence. This is not by any means to suggest that there is not good evidence that the Earth moves about the sun. There is good evidence. But that evidence is much more indirect than I think it is often assumed to be. And this is typical of many (probably most) of our beliefs.
In summary, we have direct evidence for a surprisingly small number of the beliefs we hold. For most of our beliefs (maybe almost all of them), we believe them largely because of the way they fit in with a large package of interconnecting beliefs. That is, we believe what we do largely because of the way our beliefs fit into our worldview.
Common Sense
Most of us were raised with the Newtonian worldview, and most of the beliefs mentioned in connection with the Newtonian worldview seem almost like common sense. But think about it a minute – such beliefs are anything but common sense. For example, it does not look as if the Earth moves around the sun. As mentioned above, if you look out the window, you will see that the Earth appears to be perfectly stationary. It also appears that the sun, stars, and planets move around the Earth approximately every 24 hours. And consider the belief that you likely learned at an earlier stage in your education, that objects in motion tend to remain in motion. Most people I know take this to be an obvious truth. But in our everyday experience, objects in motion do nothing of the sort. For example, thrown frisbees do not remain in motion. They soon hit the ground and stop. Thrown baseballs do not remain in motion. Even if they are not caught by someone else, they soon roll to a halt. In our everyday experience, nothing remains in motion.
My point is that, in general, the beliefs mentioned above as part of the Newtonian worldview, although most of us share those beliefs, are not the beliefs we arrive at by common sense or by common experience. But most of us were raised with the Newtonian worldview, and since these beliefs were taught to us from an early age, such beliefs now look to us to be the obviously correct beliefs. But think about it: if we had been raised with the Aristotelian worldview, then the Aristotelian beliefs would have seemed equally like common sense.
In short, from within the perspective of any worldview, the beliefs of that worldview will appear to be the obviously correct ones. So the fact that our basic beliefs seem to be correct, seem to be common sense, seem to be obviously right, is not particularly good evidence that those beliefs are correct.
This raises the following interesting issue: there is no doubt that the Aristotelian worldview turned out to be badly wrong. The Earth is not the center of the universe, objects do not behave the way they do because of internal “essential natures,” and so on. Importantly, it is not just that the individual beliefs were wrong; rather, the jigsaw puzzle formed by that system of beliefs turned out to be the wrong sort of jigsaw puzzle. The universe, we now think, is not anything like the way it was conceptualized from within the Aristotelian worldview. Nonetheless, although wrong, those beliefs formed a consistent system of beliefs, and a system whose beliefs seemed, for almost 2,000 years, to be obviously right and commonsensical.
Might our jigsaw puzzle, our worldview, turn out to be equally incorrect, even though our system of beliefs is consistent and seems to us to be obviously correct and commonsensical? There is no doubt that some of our individual beliefs will turn out to be wrong. But the question I am asking is whether our entire way of looking at the world might turn out to be the wrong way of looking at the world, in something like the way the Aristotelian worldview turned out to be the wrong sort of jigsaw puzzle.
Or to put the same question another way: when we look at the Aristotelian worldview, many of the beliefs of that worldview strike us as quaint and curious. If we think about our descendants, say hundreds of years in the future – or even if we think about our grandchildren or great grandchildren – might our own beliefs, those that seem to you and me to be so obviously correct and commonsensical, look to them to be equally quaint and curious?
These are interesting questions. Toward the end of the book, we will explore some recent discoveries that suggest that some parts of our worldview might indeed turn out to be the wrong sort of way of looking at the world. But for now, we will leave these as questions to ponder, and move on to our next topic.
2Truth
This chapter and the next focus on two related topics, truth on the one hand, and facts on the other. These topics are somewhat unusual for a book on the history and philosophy of science, but I think they are worth considering early on, largely to dispel some common misconceptions and oversimplifications.
It seems to be a fairly widespread belief that the accumulation of facts is a relatively straightforward process, and that science is, in large part at least, geared toward generating true theories that account for such facts. Both of these are largely misconceptions about facts, truth, and their relations to science. One of the goals of the next two chapters is to show that these issues are much more complex than is often appreciated. As we will begin to see in this chapter and the next, and as will become increasingly clear as the book progresses, the relationship between facts, truth, and science is complex and controversial.
Preliminary Issues
We think the belief that the Earth moves around the sun, which is part of our worldview, is true, and the belief that the Earth is stationary with the sun moving about it, which is common in the Aristotelian worldview, is false. Within our system of beliefs, it seems to us obviously true that the Earth moves about the sun, and it seems to us there are innumerable facts that prove this belief to be true. But within the Aristotelian worldview, it seemed equally obvious that the Earth was stationary, and within that system of beliefs there seemed to be equally many facts that proved the Earth did not move. What is the difference between our beliefs and their beliefs? If our belief about the Earth really is true, and their belief really is false, what makes the one belief true and the other false? More generally, what is truth?
A common reaction to this question is to say that facts are what make a belief true. For example, one commonly hears that there are facts that prove the Earth moves about the sun, and these facts are what make the belief true. Interestingly, facts and truth are often defined in terms of one another. People often answer the question “What is truth?” by saying true beliefs are those supported by facts. And the question “What is a fact?” is often answered by saying that facts are those
