Britain's Black Regiments E-Book

Barry Renfrew

• Herausgeber: The History Press
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 385

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2020

Beschreibung

In three global conflicts and countless colonial campaigns, tens of thousands of black West Indian soldiers fought and died for Britain, first as slaves and then as volunteers. These all but forgotten regiments were unique because they were part of the British Army rather than colonial formations. All were stepchild units, despised by an army that was loath to number black soldiers in its ranks and yet unable to do without them; their courage, endurance and loyalty were repaid with bigotry and abuse. In Britain's Black Regiments, Barry Renfrew shines a light on the experiences of these overlooked soldiers who had travelled thousands of miles to serve the empire but were denied recognition in their lifetimes. From British campaigns in the Caribbean to the Second World War, this is a saga of war, bondage, hardship, mutiny, forlorn outposts and remarkable fortitude.

Leseprobe

Also by Barry Renfrew

Agincourt 1415: Field of Blood

Wings of Empire: The Forgotten Wars of theRoyal Air Force, 1919–1939

Forgotten Regiments: Regular and Volunteer Unitsof the British Far East

British Colonial Badges Vols. 1 and 2(with Margaret Renfrew and Bill Cranston)

Chechnya: Crimes of War

First published 2020

This paperback edition first published 2022

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© Barry Renfrew, 2020, 2022

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For Margaret

CONTENTS

Prologue  The Strangest Cargo

Acknowledgements

Part I      The Wars of Empire

1 The Graveyard of the British Army

2 An Army of Slaves

3 The Equal of Any Soldiers in the World

4 Return to Africa

5 Guardians of the West

6 Black and Not Black Enough

7 Clash of Empires

Part II     The First World War

8 Patriotic Britons All

9 Raising the British West Indies Regiment

10 Pyramids and Prejudice

11 Bait for the Germans

12 ‘Slightly Coloured’ Officers

13 On the Banks of the Jordan

14 Mutiny

15 Death of a Regiment

Part III    The Second World War

16 Let Us Fight Like Men

17 An American Lake

18 Not Wanted Here

Epilogue ‘And to All the Forgotten’

Bibliography

PROLOGUE

THE STRANGEST CARGO

The arrival in Jamaica of a slave ship sometime in 1797 was unlikely to have attracted much attention from the merchants, clerks and labourers thronging the docks. Such vessels with their human cargoes from Africa for the island’s plantations were a humdrum part of life in the thriving British colony. And yet this vessel had caused a political storm at the highest levels of power because it carried the first recruits for an army of slave soldiers. Clad in the red tunics of the British infantry, these captives would be formed into black regiments of the regular army to fight the king’s enemies and guard his far-flung colonies. It was the start of one of the most remarkable and unlikely chapters in the long history of the British Empire.

In three global conflicts and countless campaigns between 1795 and 1945, tens of thousands of black West Indians fought and died for Britain and its empire. Their story is unique in that, unlike the Indian Army and other colonial forces, these formations were part of the British Army. For almost a century and a half, the West India Regiment, which began as a slave formation, was a regular regiment composed of West Indian and African troops. The British West Indies Regiment, which served in Europe, the Middle East and Africa during the First World War, and the 1st Caribbean Infantry, which served in Italy and the Middle East during the Second World War, were also part of the British Army rather than colonial formations. All were stepchild units, unloved and unwanted, an embarrassment to an army that was loath to number blacks in its ranks, and yet unable to do without them: their courage, endurance and loyalty were all too often repaid with prejudice, mistreatment and imperial ingratitude. Denied their due recognition in their lifetimes, the story of Britain’s black soldiers is all but forgotten.

For many years, the West Indies rather than India was the heart of the British Empire. Control of the Caribbean and its riches dominated British colonial policy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Britain fought a long series of wars against France and other European powers for mastery of the West Indies: islands encompassing a few square miles became some of the most fought over real estate in history.

Entire British armies were annihilated in these conflicts, not by enemy bullets and blades, but by disease and the climate. The military’s losses were often far greater than anything it endured on the battlefields of Europe, earning the West Indies a morbid reputation as ‘the graveyard of the British Army’. Despairing British generals concluded that the only way to avoid defeat was by raising regiments of black slaves who could withstand the local conditions far better than white troops.

Slave troops under white officers would help save British fortunes in the Napoleonic Wars, and later serve against the young United States in the War of 1812. After the abolition of slavery, the West India Regiment would serve in Africa and Latin America, battling slave raiders, Islamic war lords and even the French Army. West Indian soldiers were often the only regular British troops in the most remote and pestilential imperial outposts, places deemed lethal for white men. They were also the first black soldiers to win the Victoria Cross and other awards for exceptional bravery. And all the time, these men faced mounting discrimination and disdain as the British military immersed itself in pseudo-scientific notions of white supremacy. Many of their own officers despised and mistreated the West Indians, and yet they showed unswerving loyalty.

Patriotic fervour swept the British West Indies on the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. Thousands of young black West Indians, proud to be citizens of the British Empire, clamoured to fight alongside volunteers from Australia, Canada and other colonies. Government and military officials were horrified at the prospect of thousands of black men descending on Britain to fight in a ‘white man’s war’ and rejected the offers of the West Indies to raise troops for the war effort.

A few black men who were determined to fight stowed away on ships bound for Britain with the idea of enlisting in the army, only to be arrested, mocked and jailed as criminals. At the same time, white West Indians, many of them the sons of wealthy planters and businessmen, were welcomed by the British Army with open arms.

It took the direct intervention of King George V to overcome the military’s opposition to enlisting his black West Indian subjects. While the High Command had to bow to royal pressure, the generals waged a rearguard action to use the West Indians as labourers. Men who had volunteered and trained to fight were instead used to carry artillery shells up to the front line or build roads, despite the army’s dire need for infantry to replace its vast losses. West Indian troops suffered shocking mistreatment, with some forced to use unheated accommodation in winter or denied adequate medical care; their white officers complained that German prisoners were treated better.

Throughout the conflict, these men who had left their homes and families and travelled thousands of miles to serve the empire, endured official discrimination from the generals and insults and violence from some white troops. Resentment at the unfairness and humiliation finally exploded in 1919 in a mutiny that shook the British Army.

Even harsher treatment was meted out in the Second World War when West Indians once again volunteered in their droves to fight for Britain. The British Army did not want black troops in its ranks, especially West Indians, who saw themselves as British and expected to be treated the same as white troops. Not even Winston Churchill could shake the generals’ implacable resistance. The High Command found time during some of the darkest days of the war to wage a bureaucratic campaign against accepting black West Indian troops despite the army’s chronic manpower shortage. It was only towards the end of the war that a single, token West Indian regiment arrived in Italy to be almost immediately sent packing. British commanders snorted at the idea of such men fighting in a war proclaimed as a crusade for democracy.

While this book is intended as the first narrative history of the British Army’s black regiments, the 300-year story of the local West Indian defence forces during the colonial era is also touched on. These ranged from skilled fighting units to comic opera outfits with almost as many generals and officers as privates. Their history, which is wound up with that of the regular units, has been even more neglected.

In recent years, the non-white soldiers of the British Empire have started to receive at least a modicum of the attention they merit. The British Army, namely white troops from Great Britain and Ireland, was a small force that never remotely met the demands of a worldwide empire. Asian, African and West Indian soldiers were more numerous and indispensable to the conquest and garrisoning of the empire from its earliest beginnings to its last days; they made up one of the most remarkable armies the world has seen.

Much of the modern academic and popular interest in colonial troops focuses on the Indian Army, the largest and most powerful of the British imperial legions, followed by African forces. West Indian soldiers, by contrast, have received very little attention, despite their long and unique history. Perhaps this is because, at least in part, the history of European colonialism in the West Indies is especially uncomfortable for modern consciences. While slavery in the United States has received enormous attention, Britain’s role is all but ignored, and yet for every slave sent to North America, fifteen slaves were transported to the British West Indies where they laboured and died, often under unspeakable conditions.1

Well-intentioned efforts to correct the historical neglect of colonial soldiers tend to portray them either as unsung heroes or oppressed unfortunates: both approaches fall far short of the full story. The factors that motivated black West Indians to fight for Britain over the decades ranged from the mundane to the complex, some of them common to all armies, others unique to the West Indies. Some West Indians simply wanted a better or more bearable life, and being a soldier was far better than the back-breaking existence of a slave or landless peasant; some wanted excitement and adventure or to escape personal difficulties; some saw themselves as proud citizens of a global empire; some preferred to serve the colonial oppressor rather than be oppressed, and relished the power it gave them over other black people; others saw fighting for the empire as a way to earn greater freedoms and rights for themselves and their kin.

Recounting the story of the West Indian soldier presents particular challenges because of modern controversies over race and colonialism. Some readers will find it inexplicable that black soldiers fought and died for an empire that condemned millions of black men, women and children to slavery and subsequent oppression following abolition; they will be particularly uncomfortable with the fact that most black West Indian soldiers believed in the British Empire as a great and largely benevolent force and were proud to serve it. Other readers may dismiss such qualms as political correctness and insist that it holds no place in the study of military history.

The aim of this work is to neither champion nor castigate, but rather to give some sense of these men, their circumstances and motivations, and how these shaped their actions and outlooks on and off the battlefield. It is a challenging, not always comfortable story, and yet it is the only way we can begin to understand why they acted as they did. If black West Indian soldiers are to be judged, their story should at least be told as fully as possible, just as an abhorrence of racism and prejudice should not prevent or distort the telling of a remarkable saga.

The West Indies are the most neglected facet of the military history of the British Empire, given their importance. With a few notable exceptions, such as the pioneering work of Norman Buckley, Brian Dyde and Glenford Howe, little has been written about the military forces of the region.

This book is based, as far as possible, on original records and accounts. Regrettably, all too little evidence survives for many of these formations, especially in the early decades: few records were kept, and the ravages of time and climate have destroyed much of what was compiled. Most frustrating is the lack of accounts from the ranks that give voice to the experiences, thoughts and feelings of the ordinary soldiers.

_______________

1 James Walvin, Black Ivory: A History of British Slavery, p.318.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many helped, knowingly and otherwise, in the creation of this book. Much of the research was done at the National Archives, the Imperial War Museum and the National Army Museum and I am greatly indebted to their knowledgeable and helpful staffs.

I drew insight from the work of three eminent historians, Roger Buckley, Brian Dyde and Glenford Howe, especially on the earlier decades.

Numerous friends provided help and encouragement, including Mark Shields, Geoff and Moira Newman, Wendell Hollis, Rob Taggart and Jim Donna. Bill Cranston, who devoted much of his life to the study of British colonial forces, unfortunately did not live to see its final completion. I am also indebted to Field Marshal Sir John Chapple who has selflessly given of his time and wisdom whenever asked.

My thanks to The History Press and Amy Rigg for taking on the book at a particularly difficult time, and to Alex Waite and her colleagues for their skilled and sympathetic editing which saved me from far too many slips. Evgenia North provided her usual brilliant and unflappable assistance with images. Sarah Renfrew did valuable research and rescued a befuddled father from the mysteries of computers and their programs. I am also indebted to Jo and her colleagues at our local Waterstones who tracked down innumerable obscure titles with cheerful skill.

My wife Margaret inspired and aided me throughout; whatever is good in these pages is largely due to her. We hope the book will bring some small measure of honour and homage to that forgotten army of West Indian and African men who endured so much only to be repaid with scorn and cruelty by those they fought for.

PART I

THE WARS OF EMPIRE

1

THE GRAVEYARD OF THE BRITISH ARMY

Almost nothing is known about the little band of settlers who founded England’s first permanent colony in the West Indies on the tear-shaped island of St Christopher around 1624; records do not even agree on their number, putting it at somewhere between thirteen and nineteen.1 This seemingly insignificant event was the start of an extraordinary era of power, wealth and conflict that would ensnare millions of people from Europe, Africa and the Americas over the coming centuries.

Most of the men, women and children who sailed to the West Indies from the British Isles in the seventeenth century were lured by hopes of a better life. Most found only gruelling hardship and early deaths in the seemingly idyllic green islands ringed by sparkling blue seas. Malaria, yellow fever and other diseases killed countless numbers, often within weeks or months of stepping ashore: two-thirds of the first 12,000 settlers in Jamaica were dead within six years.2 The climate was a torment; heat and humidity made life unbearable and terrifying hurricanes flattened homes, devastated fields and hurled the unwary to their deaths. And then there were the human threats: fierce local tribes called Caribs decimated some of the English settlements, carrying off the hapless survivors. Conflicts with rival French, Spanish and other European settlers claimed more lives and pirates murdered and pillaged indiscriminately.

Those who survived rarely found the riches or easy lives that the settlers had imagined would be theirs for the taking. When Captain Ketteridge, one of the leading men in Barbados, died in 1635, his earthly possessions comprised a chest, six hammocks, a broken kettle, a sieve, a few pewter dishes, three napkins and three books.

The first descriptions of the West Indies as an earthly paradise soon gave way to accounts of a living inferno: ‘As Sickly as an Hospital, as Dangerous as the Plague, as Hot as Hell, and as Wicked as the Devil,’ wrote one traveller.3 The islands became a dumping ground for criminals, rebels, paupers and the rest of England’s human waste. Henry Whistler, a visitor to Barbados, complained in 1655, ‘This Illand is the Dunghill warone England doth cast its rbidg: Rodgs and hors and such like people are those were generally Broght here [this island is the dunghill where on England doth cast its rubbish: rogues and whores and such like people are those who were generally brought here].’4

And then it was discovered that one of the world’s most precious commodities flourished in the West Indian soil and climate. Sugar had been a prized luxury for centuries in Europe, only available in minute quantities and enjoyed by the wealthiest. Soon the English, French and other islands were flooding Europe with the sweet delight: sugar mania swept the continent as people gorged on sweet beverages, puddings and other sickly treats. Almost overnight the islands became the most valuable acreage on the planet as the sugar boom created enormous wealth. Britain now gloried in its West Indian empire. Pineapples, a symbol of the islands and their exotic wealth, were etched on the swords of army officers alongside the traditional figures of Britannia and the royal coat of arms.

Sugar transformed the physical and human geography of the West Indies. Every possible scrap of land was given over to sugar production. Cane cultivation required vast amounts of intensive labour, and the white settlers were too few and generally disinclined to do the necessary back-breaking work. Black slaves purchased on the west coast of Africa solved the planters’ dilemma. The populations of the British and other European sugar islands rocketed with the influx of slaves. Census records show Jamaica in 1673 had a population of 7,700 whites and 9,500 blacks, the latter nearly all slaves; fifty years later, the number of whites was virtually unchanged while the black population had soared to 74,000, again, mostly slaves.5

A debauched and garish society sprang up with a tiny and fabulously wealthy planter caste ruling over legions of brutalised slaves: the West had seen nothing like it since the days of the Roman Empire. The humble cottages, patched hammocks and wooden dishes of the early settlers were replaced by planters’ mansions, regiments of liveried slave servants, gleaming gold and silver tableware, the finest fashions, and endless dinners and entertainments. Planters were obsessed with getting rich fast, living well and escaping to Europe before the climate or disease claimed them.

Slavery also brought new dangers as the islands were transformed into the equivalent of vast labour camps where tens of thousands of black captives were brutalised and worked to death. Such harsh treatment stoked defiance that led to periodic slave revolts. The tiny white minority lived in dread of being slaughtered by their own field hands and servants.

Hundreds of slaves rebelled in 1673 in Jamaica in one of the first revolts, killing dozens of whites. Subsequent rebellions grew in both size and the degree of carnage and cruelty. Governor James Kendall of Barbados wrote at the end of the seventeenth century, ‘Our most dangerous enemies [are] our black slaves.’6

Risings were suppressed with murderous ferocity. Six slaves were burned alive and eleven beheaded in Barbados in 1675 just for planning an uprising. A 1692 plot on the island provoked even more horrific reprisals. Dozens of slaves were hanged, burned or starved to death in cages, and a slave woman was paid to castrate forty-two men.

The wealth of the West Indies, and the desire to monopolise it, became a major factor in the protracted European wars of the eighteenth century. Vast armies and fleets battled for tiny Caribbean islands that were deemed more valuable than entire provinces or great cities in Europe. British soldiers who fought for the sugar islands knew no deadlier place, except that it was disease which wiped out regiment after regiment rather than battles and sieges. Doctors had little or no idea what caused the pestilences that scythed down the troops. Men frequently perished within hours of being stricken, often dying in agony as they choked on black bile or were convulsed by fever. ‘If you sup with a man at night and enquire for him the next day he is ill or dead,’ lamented Major Frederick Johnson.7

Almost every aspect of army life made the soldiers more vulnerable to sickness, not that anyone realised it at the time. Most men were recruited from the poorest depths of society, where they had known only hunger and deprivation, and were often weak, emaciated and chronically ill when they arrived in the West Indies. Many barracks were built in low-lying areas or near swamps where land was cheapest, and where mosquitoes, responsible for the deadliest diseases, thrived. The men’s quarters were filthy, and they rarely washed despite the heat; their thick woollen uniforms, intended for European climates, bred pests, inflicted sun stroke and drained their strength; and staple rations of salted meat and rotting biscuit, utterly unsuited for a tropical climate, further weakened them. Officers and soldiers sought protection or solace from these afflictions in copious amounts of alcohol, but the crude local rum, a cheap by-product of the sugar industry, was laced with deadly lead and fusel oil which inflicted lingering and painful deaths. It was hardly surprising that the West Indies became known as the graveyard of the British Army.

British campaigns in the Caribbean frequently ended in disaster. The concentration of thousands of troops in camps and siege works bred deadly epidemics that wiped out armies, and there were always shortages of food, medicine and other necessities. It did not help that in an age when the army had more than its share of miscreants and outcasts, it was often the worst men who were sent to the West Indies. Governor Valentine Morris of St Vincent complained in 1777 that newly arrived troops had the look of men reprieved from the gallows:

[They] are in general the very scum of the Earth. The Streets of London must have been swept of their refuse, the Gaols emptied … I should say the very Gibbets had been robbed to furnish such Recruits, literally most of them fit only … to fill a pit with.8

Morris was not far wrong; the London Magazine reported in 1762 that eight criminals sentenced to hang were spared the noose after agreeing to enlist in a regiment bound for the West Indies.

Despite their vast wealth, the defences of the British settlements were frequently inadequate or virtually non-existent. Government penny-pinching routinely stinted the regular garrisons of money and supplies, except in war time. William Stapleton, the Governor of Nevis, pleaded with London in 1675 to send back pay for the island’s two companies of starving, ragged infantry. ‘They live in a most miserable condition … it is a disparagement rather than an honour to the nation to have soldiers naked and starving,’ he wrote.9 Bermuda’s10 garrison complained in 1739 that it had not received any supplies since 1696.11

Officials in London tried to shrug off the woeful state of the West Indian defences, arguing it was the duty of the colonists to protect their wealthy settlements. Each island had its own militia, and service was compulsory for most white men, but they were not always willing to fight. Some settlers put up fierce resistance when attacked, while others allowed French or Spanish invaders to wade ashore unopposed so as to avoid the destruction of their homes and businesses. When a French fleet raided Nevis in 1783, the council opted not to resist, and the enemy commander allowed the islanders to pose as neutrals to save their property.

Many of the poor whites who made up the bulk of the militias saw little point in dying to protect the property of the rich planters who looked down on them. When Spanish ships raided Nevis, most of the defenders tossed away their arms and deserted to the enemy, shouting, ‘Liberty, joyful Liberty!’12 In 1734 Governor William Mathew of the Leeward Islands conceded such men had little reason to fight while still damning them as human vermin:

Such unwilling, Worthless, Idle Vagabonds, as from whom but Little Service can be hop’d for on Military Emergencies. Most of these Serve for a Term of Years, without wages, poorly Cladd, hard fedd … Are these the Men that are to Die in Our Defence? My Lords we must have a recruit of a better Sort or better none at all.13

Not that the white elite was much better. Many of the militias’ shortcomings reflected the nature of white West Indian society, particularly its maniacal obsession with wealth and status. Every white man with more than a few pounds expected to be an officer in the militia and wealthy planters and businessmen insisted on being colonels and generals in units barely big enough to warrant a single subaltern. Militias were absurdly top heavy with officers and NCOs: some Jamaican regiments had fifty officers, fifty NCOs and 300 privates.

Contemporary observers never tired of parodying the West Indian militias and their shortcomings. Among the most perceptive was Lady Maria Nugent, wife of the general in command of British troops in Jamaica around 1800. Lady Nugent, who accompanied her husband when he reviewed the local militia, wrote of seeing sweating, portly planters trailed by slave boys carrying their masters’ muskets, the 6ft weapons towering over the young bearers, and geriatric generals and colonels too doddery to leave their carriages.

‘The whole review, in fact,’ she wrote after one inspection:

… was most funny. Not one of the officers, nor their men, knew at all what they were about, and each had displayed his own taste, in the ornamental part of his dress. They were indeed a motley crew, and the Colonel whispered me – ‘Ah, ma’am, if the General did not know half the trouble I have had to draw up the men as you see them, he would not ask me to change their position; for what they will do next I don’t know. You see I have drawn a line with my cane for them to stand by, and it is a pity to remove them from it.’ Poor man! I did pity him, for at the first word of command they stared, and then moved in every direction, and such a sense of confusion at any review I believe was never beheld.14

Free black and mixed-race men were obligated to serve in many of the militias: in fact, they became increasingly indispensable as plantations took over much of the arable land, forcing poorer whites to emigrate because they could no longer make a living. In 1764, Jamaica’s militia had some 4,000 whites and 830 black and mixed-race men: by 1817 the ratio was much altered with 5,644 whites and 3,265 black and mixed-race men under arms. Not that service in the militia and risking death on the battlefield conferred equal rights. Non-whites were banned from being officers and had to serve in segregated units, which were often based on racial gradations: the Kingston Militia Regiment in Jamaica had separate companies of whites, blacks, ‘mulattos’ (half black) and ‘quadroons’ (one-quarter black).

The long struggle of the European powers for control of the West Indies peaked with the French Revolution and the ensuing Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Some of the largest armies ever to leave Britain’s shores set out for the Caribbean in the 1790s with orders to turn it into a British lake. Initially, all went well, with the capture of several French islands: the defenders were outnumbered, Paris could send little aid, and civil war raged between local royalists and revolutionaries.

While news of the successes was welcomed in Britain, the army endured some of the highest losses in its history. Sir John Fortescue, the epic historian of the British Army, estimated that it suffered 100,000 casualties in the West Indies between 1793 and 1799, half of them fatalities and nearly all from disease.15 Soldiers saw a posting to the West Indies as a death sentence. Typical was the experience of the 31st Regiment: leaving England with 986 officers and men in 1794, it suffered 719 deaths over the next two years, of which just fifty-five were on the battlefield. Britain was soon facing calamity in the Caribbean, her forces decimated by sickness, and the French rebounding from their early defeats.

Despairing British generals said the army must do the seemingly unthinkable and raise an army of slave soldiers to fight for the country and the plantation system that oppressed them and their families. Only the vast slave population could provide the replacements the army desperately needed, and the slaves were far less vulnerable to disease and the climate than whites, especially the troops fresh from Britain. Lieutenant General Sir John Vaughan, the senior army commander in the Caribbean, told his superiors in London that without slave troops Britain could lose its West Indian empire. ‘I cannot hesitate to declare that unless His Majesty will be graciously pleased to sanction and promote the measure of forming Negroe men into Regiments commanded by British officers’, the sugar islands would be lost, he wrote.16 If not, he warned, the British Army would be destroyed unless the ruinous cycle of dispatching white regiments to perish in the fever-ridden islands was not broken.

Nor did Vaughan see slave troops as just a temporary, wartime measure. He said slave regiments must be a permanent part of the regular army, imbued with its high professional standards, and no different from its white regiments. The slave regiments would be paid, armed and clothed like the rest of the army, and housed in the same barracks as white troops; in short, they would be treated in virtually the same way as white regulars except for the fact the men would not be free. Once the French were defeated, slave soldiers would garrison the West Indies, permitting sharp cuts in the number of white troops stationed in the region. Otherwise, Vaughan said, ‘the whole army of Great Britain would not suffice to defend the Windward Islands’, let alone the entire West Indies.17 Thousands of slaves must be enlisted at once, he insisted, with every colony providing a quota of their fittest and strongest bondmen.

Vaughan’s plan was not the lunacy it might have seemed at first glance. Slaves had fought and died for their white owners since the early days of European settlement. Nor was it a secret that black West Indians made fine soldiers: they were generally fitter and stronger than whites and their expert knowledge of the terrain meant they excelled at the bush fighting that typified local warfare. Some British commanders said experience had shown that one black soldier was worth three white soldiers in the West Indies.

The regular army had sometimes used slaves and free blacks in the West Indies as labour troops and artisans: called the ‘King’s Negroes’, they built roads and forts and did other work regarded as too gruelling for white soldiers. Some of the West Indian militias had slave units, which occasionally served as fighting troops, but more often acted as pioneers and labourers.

The St Kitts Corps of Embodied Slaves was outfitted with uniforms, pikes and cutlasses, and trained weekly. Barbados appears to have raised the first slave unit when threatened by a Dutch invasion in 1666; the governor ordered that every white soldier be backed by ‘two able-Negro-men, well armed’.18 Slaves who served in the militias often received better treatment and sometimes pay, although their owners might pocket up to two-thirds of the money. Barbados rewarded slaves who did military service with an annual gift of a coat and a hat from official funds, and their owners were expected to give them the same amount of food as white servants.

Slaves sometimes put up the fiercest resistance when settlements were attacked because they faced the greatest danger. A key aim in West Indian warfare was to destroy an enemy colony’s sugar industry, thereby reducing competition. Invading troops burned cane fields, refineries and, above all, abducted the slaves on whose labour the plantation system depended. Slaves were shipped off to be sold in some strange new place with the loss of homes, families, friends and whatever little they might possess. Free black and mixed-race people were also rounded up and sold into slavery.

After a French fleet invaded Nevis in 1706, the white militia surrendered immediately while some of their slaves fought to the bitter end. Eventually the French rounded up 3,000 slaves to ship to their islands, and the British settlers turned over another 1,400 slaves as part of a deal to end hostilities. William Dickson, a government official in Barbados, wrote that the French might capture the island, but they would never be able to hold it, ‘and one reason always assigned was the Negroes would cut their garrisons to pieces, which I verily believe would be the case’.19

Not that the whites necessarily returned such loyalty. Some slaves who fought for Britain in the 1790s were sent back to the hard labour of the plantations despite loyal and excellent service.

Any attempt to explain why slaves would loyally serve in the British Army is likely to be both complex and imperfect. The earlier use of slaves for military service in the West Indies was always on a small scale and tightly controlled to ensure they did not become a threat to white power. And yet Vaughan wanted to raise a fighting force that would be more formidable and numerous than anything the white colonists were likely to field. Nor was he suggesting that only slaves willing to serve should be enlisted or that they would be granted their freedom. It was made clear from the start that slave soldiers would never be liberated and would have no more say over their fate than the slaves who laboured in the sugar fields.

Slaves were not a vast homogenous group. Individuals had differing, often conflicting, circumstances and attitudes. Some slaves had key roles in the plantation system as overseers and servants, and others wanted to join their ranks in the hope of an easier life and other privileges. Military service was a way to escape from the harsh existence endured by most slaves as slave soldiers were paid and received much the same treatment and rations as white regulars. And there was always the hope that military service could earn a slave freedom no matter what the rules for the new regiments stipulated; a 1707 Barbados Act liberated any slave who killed an enemy soldier. Moreover, the methods the army used to control white troops would prove remarkably adept at turning slaves into loyal soldiers.

The mere idea of raising regiments of slave soldiers for the regular army provoked consternation and fury. Astonished government officials in Britain rejected the scheme as unworkable. West Indian colonists denounced the notion as monstrous, insisting the slave soldiers would run amok at the first opportunity, slaughtering every white man, woman and child.

However, mounting problems soon forced the government to reconsider. The military situation in Europe and elsewhere was worsening, the West Indian whites would never be able or willing to play a major role in their own defence, and the generals had strengthened the case for slave troops by showing they would be cheaper than white regulars. Above all, no one could see any other way to stem the losses in the West Indies that were bleeding the British Army dry at a time when troops were desperately needed in other theatres.

In April 1795, London gave approval to raise the first slave regiments. The British Army was about to become the largest owner of slaves in the West Indies, and possibly the world.

_______________

1 J.H. Parry & J.M. Sherlock, A Short History of the West Indies, p.48.

2 Richard Dunn, Sugar & Slaves, p.153.

3 Quoted in Julian Hoppit, A Land of Liberty? p.266.

4 Quoted in Frank Pitman, The Development of the British West Indies 1700–1763, p.6.

5 Walvin, Black Ivory, p.69.

6 Quoted in Matthew Parker, The Sugar Barons, p.160.

7 Quoted in O’Shaughnessy, Redcoats, p.110.

8 Quoted in L.J. Ragatz, The Fall of the Planter Class in the British Caribbean 1700–1763, p.31.

9 Quoted in Brian Dyde, The Empty Sleeve, p.68.

10 While Bermuda is not geographically part of the West Indies it was regarded as part of the region under the British Empire, and the two retain close ties to this day.

11 J.W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army, Vol. 2, p.44.

12 Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, p.120.

13 Quoted in Pitman, p.57.

14 Lady Maria Nugent, Lady Nugent’s Journal, p.78.

15 Fortescue, A History of the British Army, various references.

16 TNA/PRO WO 1/82.

17 Quoted in Fortescue, Vol. 3, p.425.

18 Jerome Handler, Freedmen and Slaves in the Barbados Militia, p.8.

19 Quoted in Handler, p.16.

2

AN ARMY OF SLAVES

Sir John Vaughan never saw the creation of the first slave regiments. He died in the Caribbean in June 1795, two months after London consented to the scheme, cut down by the pestilential climate that had killed so many of his white troops.

Vaughan had proposed starting with two slave regiments, each with 1,100 men in ten companies under white officers and NCOs. It seemed a sensible beginning since the army would be faced with training and controlling soldiers of a type it had never known before. Only now London insisted on a dramatic expansion in the number of regiments because of the desperate need for fresh troops everywhere. Four additional regiments were authorised in May 1795 and a further two in September. A total of twelve regiments would be raised by 1798 – a breakneck pace for what even its advocates acknowledged was a daunting experiment. The first two formations were named Whyte’s Regiment of Foot and Myers’ Regiment of Foot in honour of their colonels. It was decided to rename them the 1st and 2nd West India Regiments (WIR) in 1796 with the subsequent regiments numbered by seniority.

Every West Indian colony was asked to donate a quota of their strongest, most able male slaves to fill the ranks of the new formations. Free black and mixed-race volunteers would also be enlisted. If these measures did not raise enough recruits, slaves would be purchased on the open market – not that the military thought this would be necessary. Army commanders were expressly told not to promise the slaves freedom under any circumstances: the government did not want to alienate the white settlers by doing anything that might suggest slavery would ever end. It was assumed the colonists would eagerly support the scheme and not expect payment for their slaves, after all, the new regiments would be defending their power and prosperity. Such expectations proved to be utterly deluded.

Far from being welcomed, the slave regiments triggered a political crisis in the West Indian settlements. Whites denounced the scheme as a threat to their lives and everything they stood for. Planters and other owners refused to give slaves to the army. Colonial legislatures did everything they could to undermine the plan. Lawmakers in Barbados predicted that the black troops would sack the island if they were ever permitted to step foot on it, while Jamaica’s assembly denounced the scheme as an assault on the white population’s rights and liberties as free-born Britons. Meetings were held across the Caribbean at which speakers thundered that arming slaves was utter madness that would lead to the end of white domination. Hellish pictures were conjured up of the slave troops overrunning the settlements and unleashing an orgy of carnage, destruction and looting.

Even more unexpected was the opposition of anti-slavery groups in Britain, which denounced the plan almost as sharply as the West Indian slave owners who normally were their most bitter foes. William Wilberforce and other leading abolitionists admitted the life of a soldier in the regular army might not be as bad as that of a slave on a sugar plantation but argued that it was still wrong and the need for thousands of recruits would boost the slave trade, causing greater misery and destruction in Africa.

Recruiting was a fiasco. A despairing officer predicted that the regiments would never be raised, ‘not a Man having been given by any one of the Islands towards completing them’.1 By 1797, the first four regiments had just 186 black and mixed-race soldiers between them, mostly men from irregular black formations raised earlier in the war: the 3rd WIR had just two drummers. The nominal strength of each regiment was cut to 600 rank and file, and a plan for companies of dragoons was dropped. It made no difference; the military could not find enough slaves to fill a single regiment.

Things went no better when the army tried to recruit volunteers from the free black and mixed-race population. Despite being mostly poor, these men were no keener than impoverished whites in Britain to exchange their liberty for the harsh existence of the regular army.

The army refused to abandon the plan despite opposition from the unholy alliance of slave owners and abolitionists. Black infantry, the generals insisted, must form a third of the regular forces in the Caribbean. Government ministers, exasperated with the colonists’ intransigence, agreed in October 1796 to purchase as many slaves as needed to bring the twelve regiments up to full strength. Major General Ralph Abercromby, commander-in-chief in the West Indies and a strong proponent of black troops, wanted to buy Creole or West Indian slaves rather than new captives from Africa. It was thought that West Indian slaves would be easier to train because they were acclimatised, understood at least some English, and knew local conditions. He envisaged a ratio of two Creoles for each African.

The colonists were almost as unwilling to sell slaves to the army as they had been to donate them; the few who were willing generally offered only the most truculent slaves or old and sickly men who could no longer work. It soon became clear that the only way to man the new regiments was to buy captives straight out of the slave ships as they arrived from Africa. Orders were placed through dealers, with the military expressing a preference for men from the most warlike tribes on the assumption they would make the best soldiers. It was further stipulated that the slaves be at least 16 years old, 5ft 3in tall, and unmarried. Such standards had to be frequently skirted because of the need to find thousands of men as quickly as possible. Skittish officials in London, nervous about criticism from colonists and abolitionists, shrouded the transactions in secrecy. Despite many difficulties, the army would buy some 13,000 slaves over the next decade.

Nothing in its long experience had seemingly prepared the British Army for the challenge of turning slaves into soldiers. Men, violently torn from their homes and all they knew, had to be moulded to fight for the people who had enslaved them, people of whose language, customs and values they knew little or nothing.

History is not without examples of slave troops. The Ottoman Empire had a long tradition of elite slave soldiers, albeit they were subjected from a very young age to intense religious and cultural indoctrination as well as military training. British soldiers were supposed to be proud, free-born volunteers and patriots. In reality, most recruits came from the very bottom of society – drunks, rogues, idiots, criminals, paupers, absconding husbands and the merely unfortunate. Long experience of controlling such men and turning them into some of the finest troops in the world meant the army was not entirely unprepared for the challenge of slave soldiers.

Slaves purchased by the army would have had little or no idea what faced them. They had been captured in wars or abducted in raids, marched to the coast in shackles, and held in slave pens. They then endured the arduous ocean crossing in the packed holds of slave ships, arriving in the West Indies in a state of shock, grief and fear. They faced further bewildering indignities as they were examined and prodded like livestock by army inspectors. Those who were accepted by the military were herded to the barracks by shouting NCOs and armed soldiers. Accustomed to the light, minimal dress of West Africa, the captives were forced into stifling, prickly and constricting uniforms – wool tunics, trousers, tight belts, leather neck stocks and headgear – all totally unsuited for the West Indian heat and humidity. Then came months of gruelling training and harsh discipline: of being forced to stand rigidly in ranks for hours; marching endlessly around a parade ground as NCOs bellowed and struck at them; being confined at night in dank and airless barracks; being herded to church services to worship a god they likely did not comprehend; and all with little or no idea of why.