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- Herausgeber: Biteback Publishing
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Sprache: Englisch
As the party that has held power more times than any other, the Conservatives have played a crucial role in the shaping of British society. And yet the leaders who have stood at its helm – from Sir Robert Peel to Rishi Sunak, via Winston Churchill and Margaret Thatcher – have steered the party vessel with enormously varying degrees of success, particularly latterly, when the short but destructive tenures of Boris Johnson and Liz Truss did much to damage the party's reputation for competence. The requirements, techniques and goals of Conservative leadership since the party's nineteenth-century factional breakaway have been forced to evolve almost beyond recognition – and not all its leaders have managed to keep up. This comprehensive and enlightening book – now fully updated with chapters on all Conservative leaders up to Rishi Sunak and an assessment of the party's leadership in relation to Brexit – considers the attributes and achievements of each leader in the context of their respective time and diplomatic landscape. Offering a compelling analytical framework by which they may be judged, it also provides detailed personal biographies from some of the country's foremost political critics and exclusive interviews with former leaders themselves. An indispensable contribution to the study of party leadership, British Conservative Leaders is the essential guide to understanding British political history and governance.
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BRITISH CONSERVATIVE LEADERS
EDITED BY
Charles Clarke, Toby S. James, Tim Bale & Patrick Diamond
Contents
PREFACE
This book arises from a collaboration between the University of East Anglia and Queen Mary University of London, designed to focus upon issues in political leadership. The project has been supported by the political leadership sub-group of the Political Studies Association.
It began with a seminar at UEA on 17 January 2014, entitled ‘Political Leadership and Statecraft in Challenging Times’. This was then followed by a seminar on Labour leaders, from Keir Hardie to Gordon Brown, on 28 June 2014 at UEA London, and then by a symposium on Conservative leaders, from Stanley Baldwin to David Cameron, on 5 December 2014 at Queen Mary’s east London campus.
The purpose of all these was to think about how we can assess party leaders and what it takes to be a successful leader, and then to evaluate who has been more, or less, successful. The seminars were an essential part of the background to this book and we are grateful to Hussein Kassim, Lee Marsden, Nansata Yakubu, Catrina Laskey and Natalie Mitchell for helping to make them a success. The assistance of Marlon Gomes and Mark Byrne at Queen Mary is greatly appreciated, along with all who came along and contributed to what was a stimulating event on Conservative leadership in December. Alan Wager acted as the principal researcher on the project, demonstrating diligence and commitment throughout. His contribution to the book has simply been enormous.
We would particularly like to thank the biographers and chroniclers of the political leaders, who contributed to the seminars and who have written the chapters in this book. Their commitment has made the whole project possible and the standard of their contribution has been outstanding. Equally, the thoughts, reflections and time of William Hague and Lord Howard were greatly appreciated. Bringing the transcripts of their interviews together would not have been possible without the help of Josh Gray and Sophie Moxon.
This book, British Conservative Leaders, has a companion, British Labour Leaders, which has been edited by Charles Clarke and Toby James. Duncan Brack and colleagues from the Liberal History Group have edited a further volume, British Liberal Leaders, with contributions from Charles and Toby that set out a similar path towards understanding statecraft. We believe that the three books together make an important contribution to the study of political leadership in Britain.
We would like to thank Iain Dale and Olivia Beattie at Biteback, who have been a pleasure to work with as we have brought this book towards publication.
Charles Clarke, Toby S. James, Tim Bale and Patrick Diamond
London and Norwich, June 2015
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES
Figure 2.1: The Conservative Party’s vote share and seat share in the House of Commons at general elections, 1832–2015.
Table 2.1: Contextual factors to be considered when assessing leaders.
Table 3.1: Conservative performances in each of the forty-five general elections, 1835–2015.
Table 3.2: Conservative performances in each of the forty-five general elections, 1835–2015, ranked by seats gained or lost.
Table 3.3: Conservative performances in each of the forty-five general elections, 1835–2015, ranked by share of vote gained or lost.
Table 3.4: Overall cumulative Conservative leaders’ performances in the forty-five general elections, 1835–2015, ranked by seats.
Table 3.5: Overall cumulative Conservative leaders’ performances in the forty-five general elections, 1835–2015, ranked by share of vote gained or lost.
Table 3.6: Leaders’ ‘league table’, ranked by seats.
Table 3.7: Conservative performances in votes gained or lost in the forty-five general elections, 1835–2015.
Table 3.8: Overall cumulative Conservative leaders’ performances in the forty-five general elections, 1835–2015, ranked by votes gained or lost.
Table 3.9: Conservative leaders in previous rankings of British prime ministers.
AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES
MATTHEW D’ANCONA is an award-winning journalist and influential political commentator. Formerly editor of The Spectator and deputy editor of the Sunday Telegraph, he is a columnist for The Guardian, the Evening Standard, the International New York Times and GQ. His recent book In It Together: The Inside Story of Coalition Government described the politics of the coalition government, with unrivalled access to many of the key players. He is a visiting research fellow at Queen Mary University of London, chair of Bright Blue (the independent think tank that promotes liberal conservatism), and a trustee of the Science Museum.
TIM BALE graduated from Gonville & Caius College, Cambridge, completed a Master’s at Northwestern University and earned his PhD from Sheffield. He specialises in political parties and elections in the UK and Europe. Tim’s media work includes writing for the Financial Times, The Guardian, the Telegraph and The Observer. He has also appeared on various radio and television programmes to talk about politics. In 2011, he received the Political Studies Association’s W. J. M. Mackenzie Book Prize for The Conservative Party from Thatcher to Cameron. He has since published The Conservatives Since 1945: The Drivers of Party Change, the third edition of European Politics: A Comparative Introduction, and Five-Year Mission: The Labour Party Under Ed Miliband.
STUART BALL is professor of modern British history at the University of Leicester. He has published extensively on the history of the Conservative Party in the twentieth century, and his most recent books are Dole Queues and Demons: British Election Posters from the Conservative Party Archive, Portrait of a Party: The Conservative Party in Britain 1918–1945, and ConservativePolitics in National and Imperial Crisis: Letters from Britain to the Viceroy of India 1926–1931. He has also edited, with Anthony Seldon, Conservative Century: The Conservative Party since 1900 and Recovering Power: The Conservatives in Opposition since 1867.
JIM BULLER is a senior lecturer in politics at the University of York. He has a PhD from the University of Sheffield and has previously worked in the department of political science and international studies at the University of Birmingham. He has written widely on the subject of British politics and public policy, including recent articles in the New Political Economy, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, West European Politics, Contemporary European Politics and British Politics. He has recently co-edited a special issue of Parliamentary Affairs on ‘Assessing Political Leadership in Context – British Party Leadership During Austerity’. He is also chair of the PSA Anti-Politics and Depoliticisation Specialist Group.
JOHN CAMPBELL is a British political writer and biographer. He is a graduate of the University of Edinburgh. His works include biographies of F. E. Smith, Aneurin Bevan, Edward Heath and Margaret Thatcher – the last consisting of two volumes, The Grocer’s Daughter and The Iron Lady. He was awarded the NCR Book Award for his biography of Heath in 1994. He has also written If Love Were All … The Story of Frances Stevenson & David Lloyd George and Pistols At Dawn: Two Hundred Years of Political Rivalry from Pitt & Fox to Blair & Brown. His most recent book is the official biography Roy Jenkins: A Well-Rounded Life, which won Political Biography of the Year at the Political Book Awards, and was shortlisted for the 2014 Samuel Johnson Prize.
JOHN CHARMLEY is professor of history at the University of East Anglia, where he is head of the Interdisciplinary Institute for the Humanities. He is the author of nine books, including Churchill: The End of Glory and A History of Conservative Politics since 1832.
CHARLES CLARKE was Member of Parliament for Norwich South from 1997 to 2010. He served as Education Minister from 1998 and then in the Home Office from 1999 to 2001, before joining the Cabinet as Minister without Portfolio and Labour Party chair. From 2002 to 2004, he was Secretary of State for Education and Skills, and then Home Secretary until 2006. Charles was previously chief of staff to Leader of the Opposition Neil Kinnock. He now holds visiting professorships at the University of East Anglia, Lancaster University and King’s College London, and works with educational organisations internationally. He edited The ‘Too Difficult’ Box and co-edited British Labour Leaders.
MARK DAVIES holds a Master’s degree in history from Cambridge University, and a Master’s degree in law from University College London.
PATRICK DIAMOND is a public policy lecturer at Queen Mary University of London, a visiting fellow at Kellogg College, Oxford, and an associate member of Nuffield College. He is also a local councillor in the London Borough of Southwark, and vice-chair of the think tank Policy Network. He is the former head of policy planning at 10 Downing Street. His recent books include After the Third Way and Governing Britain: Power, Politics and the Prime Minister.
DAVID DUTTON spent his entire teaching career at the University of Liverpool, from where he retired in 2009 as professor of modern history. His research interests focused on British political history in the twentieth century, with particular reference to the Conservative and Liberal parties. He has also written biographies of, among others, Austen Chamberlain, John Simon and Anthony Eden. While now enjoying his garden and playing squash, he continues to write in his retirement, but, without the constraints of the Research Excellence Framework, can explore pastures new. His most recent book, Tales From the Baseline: A History of Dumfries Lawn Tennis Club, was published in 2014.
DR MARK GARNETT is a senior lecturer in politics and international relations at Lancaster University. He is the sole or joint author of numerous books and articles on UK politics, focusing mainly on the post-war Conservative Party. Among his jointly authored books are Whatever Happened to the Tories? (with Ian Gilmour), Keith Joseph: A Life (with Andrew Denham), and Splendid! Splendid! The Authorised Biography of Willie Whitelaw (with Ian Aitken). His most recent book is British General Elections since 1964 (with David Denver). He also assisted Sir Edward Heath in the production of his memoir The Course of My Life.
DR MARK GARNETT is associate professor in modern British history at the University of Nottingham, where he has taught since 2000. A fellow of the Royal Historical Society and the Higher Education Academy, Dr Gaunt’s principal research interests are late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century British political and electoral history. Dr Gaunt’s study Sir Robert Peel: The Life and Legacy was published in 2010; his latest book Peel in Caricature: The ‘Political Sketches’ of John Doyle (‘HB’) reproduces 150 contemporary caricatures featuring Peel. He is currently working on a study of Conservative politics in the age of reform (1780–1850). Dr Gaunt is joint editor of the journal Parliamentary History.
WILLIAM HAGUE was Member of Parliament for Richmond, Yorkshire, from 1989 to 2015. He served as Leader of the Opposition and Conservative leader between 1997 and 2001. He was Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs from 2010 to 2014, before becoming Leader of the House of Commons from 2014, until his retirement from front-line politics at the 2015 general election. William was previously Secretary of State for Wales between 1995 and 1997, under John Major’s premiership, and also held the Foreign Affairs brief throughout David Cameron’s period as Leader of the Opposition.
ANGUS HAWKINS is professor of modern British history at Oxford University and a fellow of Keble College. He is a fellow of the Royal Historical Society and was awarded the Gladstone Memorial Prize for research on the party politics of the 1850s. He has published widely on Victorian politics, some of his recent publications including The Forgotten Prime Minister: The 14th Earl of Derby (two volumes) and Victorian Political Culture: ‘Habits of Heart and Mind’.
TIMOTHY HEPPELL is an associate professor of British politics at the University of Leeds, and is the treasurer of the PSA Political Leadership Specialist Group. He has written The Tories from Winston Churchill to David Cameron, and edited Leaders of the Opposition: From Churchill to Cameron and Cameron and the Conservatives: The Transition to Coalition Government. He is currently working on research projects on political rhetoric and manipulation, and books entitled Justifying Thatcherism: The Political Persona, Rhetoric and Oratory of Margaret Thatcher and Theorising Cameron.
ANDREW HOLT is a contemporary records specialist at The National Archives. He holds a PhD from the University of Nottingham and has previously worked at the University of Exeter and King’s College London. He has also been an archives by-fellow at Churchill College, Cambridge. He is the author of The Foreign Policy of the Douglas-Home Government: Britain, the United States and the End of Empire.
MICHAEL HOWARD is a politician and peer who served as Leader of the Opposition and Conservative leader between November 2003 and December 2005. He was Member of Parliament for Folkestone & Hythe from 1983 to 2010. During John Major’s time as Prime Minister, he served as Secretary of State for Employment and as Home Secretary, and held the posts of shadow Foreign Secretary and shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer during the Conservatives’ period in opposition after 1997.
TOBY S. JAMES is senior lecturer in British and comparative politics at the University of East Anglia. He has a PhD from the University of York and has previously worked at Swansea University and the Library of Congress, Washington, DC. He is the co-convenor of the PSA’s Political Leadership Group and has published on statecraft theory and political leadership in journals such as the British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Electoral Studies and Government and Opposition, including co-editing a special issue of Parliamentary Affairs on ‘Assessing Political Leadership in Context – British Party Leadership During Austerity’. He is the author of Elite Statecraft and Election Administration and co-edited British Labour Leaders.
NIGEL KEOHANE is the research director at the Social Market Foundation – an independent public policy think tank based in Westminster. His publications there include studies on welfare, public service reform and the history of housing policy. He has also written widely on the history of the Conservative Party, including work on the leadership of the party in the late nineteenth century, and his book The Party of Patriotism: The Conservative Party and the First World War. He studied for his BA and MA at the University of Exeter and for his PhD at Queen Mary University of London, where he also taught on the First World War.
JO-ANNE NADLER is a political writer and commentator with particular expertise in the Conservative Party. She was a spin doctor, alongside David Cameron, during the Major government, and has been a BBC political reporter and freelance author. She has published two commended books about the party – a biography of William Hague as leader, and the memoir Too Nice to be a Tory, which became a must-read among a generation of Conservatives concerned to revive their party. She has written for many newspapers and magazines and is a regular commentator across the BBC and on Sky News.
T. G. OTTE is a professor of diplomatic history at the University of East Anglia. Among his latest books is July Crisis: The World’s Descent into War, Summer 1914.
ANNE PERKINS is a journalist on The Guardian. She has written the authorised life of Barbara Castle (Red Queen), an account of the general strike 1926 (A Very British Strike), and a short life of Stanley Baldwin for the series ‘The 20 Prime Ministers of the 20th Century’.
ROBERT SAUNDERS is a lecturer in modern British history at Queen Mary University of London. He is the author of Democracy and the Vote in British Politics, 1848–1867: The Making of the Second Reform Act, and the co-editor, with Ben Jackson, of Making Thatcher’s Britain. He is currently writing a history of the 1975 Britain and Europe referendum.
ANTHONY SELDON is a political historian and commentator on British political leadership, as well as on education and contemporary Britain. He is also vice-chancellor of the University of Buckingham, and was co-founder and first director of the Institute of Contemporary British History. He is author or editor of some twenty-five books, including The Coalition Effect, Cameron at 10, The Major Effect and The Powers Behind the Prime Minister: The Hidden Influence of Number Ten.
ANDREW TAYLOR is professor of politics at the University of Sheffield. He has written on British trade unionism, state theory, political oratory, and the EU and south-eastern Europe, as well as on the Conservative Party. He is currently working on blue-collar conservatism in the United States and the United Kingdom.
D. R. THORPE is a senior member of Brasenose College, Oxford, and an acclaimed historian and biographer who has written biographies of three British prime ministers of the mid-twentieth century: Sir Anthony Eden, Sir Alec Douglas-Home and Harold Macmillan. After completing Eden, Thorpe published Supermac: The Life of Harold Macmillan in 2010. The book was one of the six shortlisted books for the Orwell Prize for political writing in 2010, and was awarded the Biennial English-Speaking Union Marsh Biography Award.
ALAN WAGER is a postgraduate researcher at Queen Mary University of London, where he teaches politics. He is writing a PhD on coalitions and inter-party negotiations in the British context.
PART I
FRAMEWORKS FOR ASSESSING LEADERS
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE BOOK
TIM BALE, PATRICK DIAMOND AND ALAN WAGER
The exact formula for leadership success in British politics is inherently elusive. Even if it could be bottled, it is far from certain the leaders of political parties would, or could, follow the rational path to glory, rather than any number of other choices. Party leaders are among those who most desire immediate electoral reward and a high ranking in the league tables of effective leadership that shape perceptions of their historical legacy. Yet it is these same politicians, with most at stake, who often find it difficult, if not impossible, to stick to a rational strategy in the light of changing circumstances and unanticipated events. These have the potential to throw a government or party off course if effective political leadership is absent.
For those who take an active interest in probing the performance of political leaders in Britain, there is some agreement about what constitutes the most effective path to elected office and how to stay there. Pragmatic appeasement of your own party tribe must be matched by electoral dynamism that transcends conventional partisan alignment and excites popular appeal. This book examines the question of both what defines leadership success, and what attributes are required to achieve it. What separates leaders who battle and succumb to the political elements from those who harness and adapt them to their advantage to successfully ‘make the weather’ in British politics? And which leaders of the Conservative Party have a strong record of achievement when it comes to dragging the party to electability, and keeping it there?
For much of the twentieth century, the story of the Conservative Party was one of extraordinary success. The span of this volume encompasses almost 100 years in which the Conservative Party held elected office. The book begins in 1834, with the leadership of Robert Peel and the birth of the modern Conservative Party. It concludes with the five years of coalition government headed by David Cameron.
During that long period, the party has reacted with surprising dexterity to political challenges as diverse as mass enfranchisement and the rise of universal suffrage, alongside the demands of negotiating coalition government. The Conservatives have been dominant in a parliamentary system that has evolved from one largely sheltered from the electoral judgements of the population, through periods of fracture and fragmentation, to the situation in 2015 where one-party government at Westminster has been reasserted through a show of the party’s electoral strength that defied almost all predictions.
Nonetheless, anyone with a passing interest in the history of the Conservative Party will know that it has been far from plain sailing. Notably in the recent past, but also during periods in the nineteenth and the start of the twentieth century, the Conservative Party has often seemed uninterested, or profoundly incapable of, positioning itself as a prospective party of government. This is because what motivates parties is not only winning elections. A leader’s job is to channel and harness the myriad factors that determine political success, shaping an over-arching strategy that enables the party to hold on to the levers of governmental office for as long as possible. These factors can be as distinct as: the personal ambition and appetite for power of leaders and their contemporaries; the ownership of governing competence and the appeasement of ideological factions over issues such as Europe; and the political institutions and constitutional rules of the game, which dictate, at least partially, the route to power.
STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK
The assessment of political leadership in this volume is based on the distinctive criteria of electoral success, strategic skill and governing competence. Of course, political figures can operate successfully outside the arena of electoral and party politics and still be historically significant. The broad consensus about each leader discussed in this book is often attached to a wider historical debate in British politics – one that can be traced to success or failure during periods of national crisis or warfare. But whether a leader is capable of garnering and sustaining support and enhancing their party’s cause is certainly an important and valuable test of political vision, skill and communication. It is on these grounds that Toby James and Jim Buller, in Chapter 2, set out the framework for assessing leadership and statecraft in the Conservative Party. In Chapter 3, Charles Clarke undertakes an historical assessment of Conservative leaders, applying one of the most important criteria – their relative performances in general elections.
However, Charles Clarke, along with admirers of Conservative leaders past and present, is right to acknowledge that balanced judgement requires an analysis of the strategic context in which leaders operate. According to the historian Peter Clarke, ‘If leadership is partly a question of vision about the direction in which policy ought to be developed, it is also a matter of projecting electoral appeal and putting together a winning coalition of effective support.’ Each leader is inevitably faced with a different set of electoral, political and economic circumstances. Each has a personal story and a political personality that help explain their potential flaws as well as the unique characteristics that led them to secure the leadership of their party. Some figures have led the Conservatives for a generation; others never faced the electorate as leader. At times, leadership strategies were built, above all else, on the pursuit of consensus and a conciliatory approach to party management. Other leaders were unable to take fellow Conservatives with them, or lost them along the way. Certain leaders of the party have been more doctrinaire, having defined significant economic and political developments and creeds such as Thatcherism. Other politicians who appeared to display little direction or over-arching purpose have also led the Conservative Party at regular intervals. By drawing together the foremost experts on Conservative leadership – biographers, academics, journalists and practitioners – we aim to assess which Tory leaders have been most successful, and which leaders have failed to live up to the expectations of their supporters and parliamentary colleagues.
THE PARTY LEADERS — A BRIEF OVERVIEW
1832–1902
The burning questions for Conservative leaders of the nineteenth century were economic and constitutional – principally, whether to pursue protectionism over trade and how to manage the steady movement towards mass democracy. The re-christening of the Tory Party as the ‘Conservatives’ occurred almost simultaneously with the Great Reform Act of 1832. Robert Peel’s response, outlined in Richard Gaunt’s chapter, straddled the demands of the ‘ultras’, who resisted all attempts at democratic reform, and the ‘radicals’, who were impatient for more reform. Ultimately, divisions in the party over the repeal of the Corn Laws led to Peel’s downfall. This, along with the repeal of the laws themselves, largely set the tone for the cautious piecemeal change pursued by Lord Derby – a period of leadership Angus Hawkins paints as conservative in strategy and outlook, but one that, despite a weak electoral record, consolidated a divided party and brought about gradual change that made for a united front.
Benjamin Disraeli, who Robert Saunders describes as a skilful parliamentary operator, succeeded Derby as leader, and heralded the arrival of, for many, the modern Conservatism of the twentieth century. Disraeli was able, following electoral defeat and a spell out of office, to divide the opposition and rebrand the Conservatives as a popular and natural party of government. Thomas Otte examines Lord Salisbury’s tenure as the longest-serving Tory Party leader at the turn of the century, and concludes that his period as leader was underpinned by electoral and tactical flexibility, combined with a long-held belief in much of the essential tenets of conservatism – a railing against reform and a distrust of democracy – and the successful use of Irish home rule as a dividing line against Gladstone’s Liberals.
1902–40
Salisbury’s successor, his nephew Arthur Balfour, was symptomatic of the challenges of reorientation and transition the Conservatives faced in the new century. Nigel Keohane points to a detached, aloof style that damaged party relations and led to three successive defeats to a rejuvenated Liberal Party (and a fractious, frustrating spell in opposition). Bonar Law was a more astute manager of his party, and Andrew Taylor’s chapter describes his role in the movement towards class-based, anti-socialist politics, later pursued to considerable effect. Bonar Law’s junior position in electoral alliance with Lloyd George in 1918 (and the 1922 election, which he fought independently), saw the Conservative Party comfortably returned to government. But, in truth, Bonar Law was little more than a safe pair of hands. In contrast, Austen Chamberlain, who took over from Bonar Law for a brief, tumultuous period as leader, was, in the view of David Dutton, a disaster in terms of party management, and is now largely – perhaps best – forgotten.
Anne Perkins’s portrait of the dominance of Stanley Baldwin during the inter-war period tells us he was a particularly effective Conservative leader: Baldwin drove a change in direction towards moderately reforming and interventionist governments, with an explicitly cross-class appeal. This meant Baldwin was able to create a united front between protectionists and tariff-reformers, alongside a new alliance between working-class and middle-class supporters. Neville Chamberlain’s period as leader looked set to be similarly fruitful, before he lost the support of a significant section of his parliamentary party. Stuart Ball argues that our assessment of Neville Chamberlain ought to be revised: his strengths as a party leader have been too easily lost given his infamously disastrous pursuit of appeasement preceding the Second World War.
1940–65
The same cannot be said of Winston Churchill, one of the most conventionally successful Conservative leaders. John Charmley believes that Churchill’s period as party leader was not altogether convincing – electorally or organisationally. A ‘light-touch’ approach to party management directly impacted on Churchill’s far-from-convincing electoral record, with his final (narrow) success in 1951 being the result of external forces, over which he had little control – notably, the exhaustion of the ageing Attlee government. Indeed, one of the key figures credited with revitalising the post-war Tory Party image was Anthony Eden, whose long, tortuous wait to take over the reins, David Dutton argues, directly impeded his leadership performance – notably, but not exclusively, during the lead-up to the Suez Crisis. Another key figure in reversing Labour’s 1945 landslide was Harold Macmillan, who took over the leadership at a time of deep crisis for the party. His electoral success was seen, in large part, as a personal triumph, and D. R. Thorpe portrays Macmillan’s time as leader as one of electoral dominance buoyed by economic prosperity. While Macmillan’s leadership is acknowledged as among the most significant and impressive in modern political history, Alec Douglas-Home’s period as leader is rarely considered to be of much historical importance. Andrew Holt shows why this broadly remains the case, with some caveats: the political winds Douglas-Home faced were highly constraining; organisationally, at least, he left the party in better shape than it was when he arrived; and, after all, Douglas-Home was only narrowly defeated by Harold Wilson in 1964.
1965–97
While attempting to overcome Wilson’s ascendency in the 1960s, Edward Heath was the first Tory leader to be elected by a secret ballot of his parliamentary contemporaries. Previously, leaders had ‘emerged’ through a patrician system, which was successfully abolished by Douglas-Home, whose own leadership had been damaged by a perception of impenetrable elitism reinforced by his path to the job. Heath’s securing of the backing of his MPs indicated he had a keen eye for forging internal alliances within the party, as a former Chief Whip. Mark Garnett infers that, although Heath lost touch with his parliamentary party, it was his failure to shape a winning electoral strategy that ultimately undermined his leadership during a period of economic and political crisis. Of this, Margaret Thatcher could hardly be accused. She epitomised the newly dominant creed of market liberalism and limited government. But Thatcher’s translation of this ideological commitment into winning political strategy meant her leadership rapidly became iconic. As is so often the case, however, the strengths that carry leaders to the top can work against them. John Campbell demonstrates that, as Thatcher’s leadership evolved, her momentum and political antennae weakened, leaving her vulnerable to being deposed once electoral success could no longer be guaranteed.
The party and country Thatcher bequeathed to her successor John Major were both characterised by stark divisions, which meant his subsequent victory in the 1992 election was a significant achievement. Major’s period as leader ought to be seen in this context. Anthony Seldon and Mark Davies argue that any assessment of Major’s leadership must account for the fact that, ultimately, the Conservative Party had become impossible to lead, and it would have been an extraordinary feat to remain in power in the face of the confident and assertive New Labour opposition under Tony Blair.
1997–2015
While the scale of Blair’s landslide in 1997 meant the process of recuperation in opposition would always be arduous, the quality of party leadership in this period partly explains why electoral success remained so elusive. The first to make the attempt was William Hague, and, while he was never likely to overturn the dominance of New Labour in one term, his leadership was evidently a failure on its own conditions. Jo-Anne Nadler’s chapter describes a worthy effort that ultimately failed due to an inability to enforce long-term, strategic thinking, alongside a lack of successful attempts to re-brand the Conservative Party’s ‘toxic’ image and electoral appeal. These same failures, somewhat remarkably, were also endemic to Iain Duncan Smith’s leadership of the Conservative Party. Tim Heppell describes an approach that showed Duncan Smith as unwilling, or unable, to substantially reform the party, while losing support from his parliamentary colleagues – twin failures that ultimately made his removal inevitable. That the Conservative Party had learned at least some lessons from those previous six years was clear when Michael Howard was chosen as leader, given the unanimous nature of his selection. Yet, as Tim Bale shows, it did not transpire to be the cathartic renewal required, and was instead a period that underlined the importance and limitations of managing your party and shoring up core support. That this must be supplemented by winning the political argument and broadening electoral support was something David Cameron understood, and he ran on that ticket as prospective leader. Cameron’s objective was to enhance the electoral appeal of the party, while retaining the support of party members and parliamentarians. However, the process of appeasement coupled with modernisation was an uneasy marriage. It ultimately meant that the renewal of the party was a job half-finished – a theme Matthew d’Ancona addresses in the final biographical chapter.
• • •
The book concludes with interviews undertaken with former Conservative leaders, namely William Hague and Michael Howard. The maverick former Conservative politician Enoch Powell’s infamous maxim was: ‘All political lives, unless they are cut off in midstream at a happy juncture, end in failure, because that is the nature of politics and of human affairs.’ However, any measured assessment of Conservative leaders past and present should not take Powell’s judgement for granted. To be sure, some leaders never managed to build momentum, and quickly lost legitimacy and support. Others combined early success with subsequent failure. It must be said that few leaders ended their careers on an upward trajectory. Nonetheless, we need to understand political leadership in the round, as this book seeks to do, in order to appreciate what makes for successful leaders in British politics.
CHAPTER 2
STATECRAFT: A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING CONSERVATIVE PARTY LEADERS
TOBY S. JAMES AND JIM BULLER
Assessing party leaders is not an easy task. In this chapter, Toby S. James and Jim Buller discuss the challenges that we face in trying to do so, and suggest a framework that can be used. Leaders can be assessed in terms of how well they practise statecraft – the art of winning elections and demonstrating a semblance of governing competence to the electorate. Practising statecraft involves delivering on five core tasks. They need to: devise a winning electoral strategy; establish a reputation for governing competence; govern their party effectively; win the battle of ideas over key policy issues; and manage the constitution so that their electoral prospects remain intact. This chapter outlines what these tasks involve and considers some of the contextual factors that might make them more or less difficult to achieve.
• • •
The British Conservative Party has seen many electoral highs and lows during its long history.
The landslide general election victory in 1931, based on the pure electoral mathematics, may stand out as one of its greatest moments. Nearly 44 per cent of the registered electorate voted Conservative, which won the party nearly 85 per cent of the seats in the House of Commons under the leadership of Stanley Baldwin.1The Times described it as an ‘unprecedented verdict’ that gave an ‘enormous and astounding majority for the National Government’, headed by Ramsay MacDonald.2 MacDonald, who had left the Labour Party, flew from his constituency in Seaham, County Durham, to be met by a crowd celebrating outside Downing Street, as many of his former Labour ministerial colleagues (including William Adamson, William Wedgwood Benn, William Graham and Christopher Addison) had lost their seats entirely.3 Stanley Baldwin, it was announced the following week, would become Lord President of the Council in a new Cabinet that included four Labour, eleven Unionist and five Liberal members in total. This was a major switch in the composition of power from the previous government, which had only four Unionist Cabinet members.4 Baldwin later became Prime Minister in June 1935 as Mac-Donald’s health failed, and he won another general election in the autumn of that year.
And the worst moment? William Hague attracted the lowest number of Conservative voters in modern times in 2001, with less than 19 per cent of registered citizens voting blue.5 The Tories would make up only a quarter of the House of Commons. True, Hague brought about an increase in the number of MPs. But this increase of just one was widely seen as a poor result, given 1997 was often described as a failure for the Conservatives. The party actually lost more than a million voters compared with the 1997 general election. The final defeat was no surprise. In 1997, Hague, elected as leader at the relatively young age of thirty-six, staged a publicity stunt on a visit to an amusement park, where he wore a baseball cap emblazoned with his name across it. Rather than looking like prime ministerial material, Simon Heffer described the Tory leader as looking ‘like a child molester on a day-release scheme’.6 By February 2001, 66 per cent of the public agreed that he came across as being ‘a bit of a wally’.7 More substantively, Hague made strategic campaign errors. As one political scientist noted, the Conservatives ‘banged on about the euro, asylum seekers, tax cuts and crime in a dialogue of the deaf, while the public remained more concerned about schools and hospitals’.8 Hague resigned on the morning of New Labour’s second electoral landslide.
As Figure 2.1 shows, there have been many other moments of euphoria and despair; peaks and troughs; victories and defeats. It shows a gradual decline in the Conservative vote since 1931, with a sharper drop after 1992, but a slight reversal of the trend towards the end of the New Labour governments, when David Cameron became leader.
FIGURE 2.1: THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY’S VOTE SHARE AND SEAT SHARE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AT GENERAL ELECTIONS, 1832–2015.
This shows the Conservative Party’s vote share (votes cast for the party as a proportion of registered voters) and seat share in the House of Commons at general elections 1832–2015. Data is author’s calculation based on information in Rallings and Thrasher, British Electoral Facts, London, Total Politics, 2009, Conservative vote (pp. 61–2), electorate (pp. .85–92), Conservative MPs (p. 59), total MPs (p. 3–58). Information for the 2010 and 2015 general elections is calculated from data provided by the BBC: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/election2010/results/ and http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2015/results. Includes Liberal Conservatives, 1847-59; Liberal Unionists, 1886-1910(D); National, National Liberal and National Labour 1931-45.
PARTY LEADERS MATTER
It is natural for observers to blame or credit the party leader of the time for changing fortunes. Britain has a parliamentary system of government in which citizens vote for a local parliamentary candidate to represent their constituency in the House of Commons. They do not directly vote for a president. Knowing little about their local candidates, however, voters commonly use the party leaders as cues for whom to vote for. Moreover, as time has passed, the powers of party leaders have grown. Whether as Prime Minister or Leader of the Opposition, party leaders have played an increasing role in shaping the direction of the party. They have become more important in shaping policy, making appointments within the party and articulating the party’s key message.
Assessing party leaders is therefore important. A party leader without the communication skills necessary to present their vision could mean vital public policies are never implemented. A leader who fails to end party divisions could leave their party out of power for a generation. A leader who makes key strategic errors could see national interest hindered or damaged.
THE DIFFICULTIES OF ASSESSING POLITICAL LEADERS
Assessing political leaders, however, is not easy. There are at least three problems that must be faced.
Firstly, it is just a subjective process, in which we will all have our favourites. Can even the most detached observer really claim to make objective, scientific judgements about who was ‘best’, or will our own political views and values prevent us making a fair assessment? For example, could a left-leaning observer ever recognise Margaret Thatcher’s leadership qualities, or a right-leaning one acknowledge the achievements of Clement Attlee? The benchmarks for success and failure are not clear unless we nail down some criteria; ideological disagreement will always get in the way.
Secondly, who is the Conservative leader in question anyway? Thinking about leaders implies that the focus should be on assessing one single person. British party leaders rarely make substantive decisions on their own, even if they don’t consult their entire Cabinet/shadow Cabinet team on every matter. They will seek out and receive crucial guidance from their advisors, and the contribution of the latter needs to be taken into account when evaluating political leadership. So, who should be the focus of our analysis?’
Thirdly, aren’t leaders’ fortunes influenced by whether they have to govern in difficult or favourable times? The political scientist James MacGregor Burns claimed that some US presidents were capable of transformative leadership: a great President could redesign perceptions, values and aspirations within American politics.9 But is this always possible during times of economic crisis, party division or war? Do leaders really steer events or are they casualties of them? Are they like ships being crashed around on the waves during a storm? Or is the test of a leader their ability to successfully navigate through such waters? No two leaders are in power at the same time, so direct comparison is impossible. Context is important, however.
Certainly, closer analysis of the circumstances of the 1931 general election victory requires us to re-assess Stanley Baldwin, at least a little. The general election followed shortly after the collapse of the second Labour government. In August 1931, Ramsay MacDonald resigned and became leader of the all-party National Government, which included the Conservative leader Baldwin and the acting Liberal leader Sir Herbert Samuel. This was a response to the economic crisis that emerged following the Wall Street Crash and Great Depression. The aim was to balance the budget and restore confidence in the economy. Labour, however, fought against the National Government and expelled MacDonald from the party. When the 1931 election approached, which it was agreed would be fought on party lines, Labour crumbled. The Conservatives have been popularly portrayed by historians as being the beneficiaries of these circumstances.10
Closer analysis of the circumstances of Hague’s 2001 general election defeat requires us to re-assess him as well. Hague did not lose because of the theme park stunt with the hat. Arguably, more important was the fact that the Conservatives had long lost their reputation for competence on the economy, while Labour had established an image of credibility on this issue during the first Blair administration. The perceptions citizens had of the expertise of the parties for improving economic conditions in Britain was a key influence on party support in the 1997 parliament, and played a vitally important role in shaping the 2001 election defeat for Hague.11 Hague’s focus on other issues was therefore understandable. And while he could have challenged Blair on the issue of the economy, such a strategy would have probably had the effect simply of drawing attention to Labour’s strong record in this area. There was evidence that the electorate had swung to the left by 2001, compared with the Thatcherite ethos of the late 1970s and ’80s, and although Hague’s party may have misread that, it now needs to be carefully read and responded to.12 Hague faced a highly skilled public communicator in Tony Blair. Despite this, Hague was often praised for landing punches across the despatch box: his heavyweight criticisms of policy were famously laced with wisecracks. For example, of the Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott, who had been mocked in the press for owning two Jaguars, Hague quipped: ‘Motorists don’t want to be told they cannot drive their car by a Deputy Prime Minister, whose idea of a park-and-ride scheme is to park one Jaguar so that he can ride away with the other.’13
A STATECRAFT APPROACH
A clear framework is necessary to assess leaders. One way of providing an assessment is to evaluate Conservative leaders on whether or not they were successful in achieving statecraft, which is the art of winning elections and maintaining power.14
No doubt, many leaders will want to achieve more than this. They may be concerned about their legacy – how they are viewed by future generations – or driven by a desire to implement policies that they think will improve the good of their party and people. However, none of the latter is possible without first having office. Without office, they may not remain as party leader for long, due to the cut-throat nature of politics. General election defeats inevitably come with leadership challenges and expectations of resignation.
So how can we assess Conservative leaders’ success in winning office? The simplest approach would be to count the number of elections that they fought, the number they won and the number they lost. This is indicative, but only takes us so far. A more detailed approach involves looking at what things political leaders need to achieve in order to accomplish the goal, and then evaluating them by each of these functions. The statecraft approach argues that leaders need to achieve five tasks; each of them is outlined below.
Yet, as has already been alluded to, some leaders are gifted more fortunate circumstances than others when trying to win elections for their party. We have argued elsewhere that the context in which leaders find themselves must be factored into our assessments of them. This is not an easy task either, however. Can we realistically say, for example, that Thatcher’s circumstances were easier than Lord Derby’s? Or Hague’s twice as hard as Baldwin’s? Given that leaders operate in different historical moments, qualitatively different in kind, quantitative measurement is difficult. The circumstances that leaders face are also different for each individual. In-depth historical studies are therefore needed to understand the circumstances under which leaders lead their office, and that is why this volume rightly invites individual biographers to provide detailed studies of each leader.15 Nonetheless, some form of comparison is possible. To aid discussion, Table 2.1 lists some of the contextual factors that might be important and these will be unpacked under each statecraft task considered next.
TABLE 2.1: CONTEXTUAL FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED WHEN ASSESSING LEADERS.
WINNING ELECTORAL STRATEGY
Firstly, leaders need to develop a winning electoral strategy by crafting an image and policy package that will help the party achieve the crucial impetus in the lead-up to the polls. Opinion polls, and, to some extent, local/European election results, give a very good indication of how a party is faring in the development of a winning strategy, and allow a party leader’s fortunes to be charted over time – although this information is not always as readily available for the earlier Conservative leaders, when polling was more infrequent or did not take place at all.
In developing a winning strategy, the leader will need to pay close attention to the interests of key segments of the population, whose votes might be important in gaining a majority. Leaders may need to respond to transformations in the electoral franchise, demography or class structure of society, and build new constituencies of support when necessary. These changes can often disadvantage a leader. The extensions of the franchise in the Great Reform Acts, for example, fundamentally altered the structure of the electorate. This had the potential to turn electoral politics upside down against the Conservative Party, in favour of the Liberal and emergent Labour Party. From 1832 onwards, Britain experienced a growth in the urban working class, from which trade unions emerged. The founding of organisations like the Fabians developed the intellectual basis of social democracy in Britain, while the Labour Party gave parliamentary representation to the movement. Many of the nineteenth-century parties in European parliaments were therefore forced to respond to the development of mass parties such as the British Labour Party by broadening their appeal.16 As the twentieth century progressed, it is often argued that working-class identity subsided, leaving party leaders needing to review their electoral strategy once again.
It is not just a matter of getting more votes than the opposition, however, because the distribution of votes is just as important. The February 1974 general election saw Edward Heath win more votes than his opponent, but fewer seats, and he therefore lost office. Conversely, Winston Churchill’s single electoral victory came in 1951 – an election in which Labour won nearly a quarter of a million more votes. A winning electoral strategy therefore takes this into consideration.
This point highlights how electoral laws can make it easier or more difficult for leaders to win power. The first-past-the-post electoral system has often advantaged the Conservative Party. It has reduced the chances of new parties entering the political system and has given the Tories a disproportionately high share of seats in the House of Commons for their proportion of the popular vote, as Figure 2.1 illustrated. The way in which the constituency boundaries are drawn has periodically conferred a systematic advantage on the party, but not always. In modern times, the system benefited the Conservatives from 1950 to 1966, had a net bias close to zero from then until 1987, and favoured the Labour Party until 2015.17
The laws on party funding and electoral administration will also directly affect a leader’s chances of winning an election. Having money to spend does not guarantee success, but it helps. To some extent, leaders can build electoral resources by developing electoral momentum and credibility, and courting appropriate prospective funders. However, party resources and electoral war chests will also depend on other factors, such as the unions, and the historical relationships between the party and business. Electoral administration can matter, too. The procedures used to compile the electoral register and the process by which citizens vote can also disadvantage some parties and candidates.18
During the long life of the Conservative Party, the media has become increasingly important, with the rising circulation of newspapers, radio and TV. The media, however, is rarely neutral. Although broadcast television has remained relatively neutral in Britain, newspapers are typically openly hostile towards leaders. Some broadcasters will be particularly influential and this will benefit some leaders and disadvantage others.19 In more recent times, the press has often been argued to have had a pro-Conservative bias. But the emergence of the printing press in the nineteenth century was originally thought to be a voice for liberal politics, and therefore posed challenges to Tory leaders. In addition, the longer a government is in office, the harder it might be to achieve a winning electoral strategy. Criticisms may accumulate and governments that appeal to the electorate on platforms of ‘renewal’ or ‘modernisation’, for example, may see the efficacy of their appeal wane over time. Parties in government become increasingly tired, worn down by the daily grind of public administration. The option of escaping responsibility by blaming a previous party in government will become, as a strategy, more tenuous and increasingly difficult to work.
When the incumbent leader can decide the time of an election, in the absence of fixed parliamentary terms, (s)he may have some advantage. Leaders do not always get this right, though. Harold Wilson’s Labour Party overtook the Conservative opposition in the opinion polls for the first time in three years in May 1970 and he called a snap election. However, support for Labour quickly collapsed again and the Conservatives won the election.20 The act of timing an election has therefore been called ‘the most important single decision taken by a British Prime Minister’.21 The Fixed-Term Parliaments Act 2011 has also made this strategic option more complicated for future leaders. It does show, however, that leaders will never try to achieve a winning electoral strategy on a level playing field. Candidates enter with unevenly distributed constraints and opportunities.
GOVERNING COMPETENCE
Secondly, a leader must cultivate a reputation for governing competence, especially in the area of economic policy. Many have argued that leaders can be ‘too far to the left’ or ‘too far to the right’ and that this might adversely affect their chances of being re-elected. Many psephologists think, however, that what matters more is whether a leader is perceived to be competent on a problem that the public consider to be pressing.22 The problem that is usually most pressing is, in the words of Bill Clinton’s campaign strategist, the ‘economy, stupid’. Or, as Harold Wilson put it: ‘All political history shows that the standing of the government and its ability to hold the confidence of the electorate at the general election depends on the success of its economic policy.’ Being seen as the party that will bring jobs and prosperity is a vote winner. On issues like the economy, there is less disagreement about what a voter wants: jobs, economic growth and prosperity. The paramount question for them is which leader and which party will deliver that.
Understood in this way, the fortunes of many leaders may be the result of their ability to generate a perception of them as competent in managing the economy. It is perception rather than reality that is important, however. John Major was initially successful in statecraft terms, in so far as he won the 1992 general election when the economy had suffered from the greatest recession since the 1930s. Yet, paradoxically, Major lost in 1997 when economic growth was strong and unemployment and inflation were falling. The Conservatives’ long-term lead over the Labour Party on economic management was lost following ‘Black Wednesday’ on 16 September 1992, when sterling suffered a serious crisis, interest rates soured and Britain exited the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). An economic recovery followed, but there was no similar recovery of confidence among the electorate in the Conservatives’ ability to manage the economy.23
A leader’s ability to achieve governing competence is hindered or helped by a number of factors. Political leaders take office with a number of historical legacies. Their parties might be associated as being ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ on the economy. Once in office, the ability of a leader to develop a reputation for competence is strongly influenced by the state of the economy. They may inherit an economy with a balance-of-payments deficit, sluggish growth and a high public debt. Responsibility for slow growth can sometimes be shifted to predecessors or other factors. However, as already suggested, this strategy becomes increasingly implausible the longer the party is in office. Sometimes, politically difficult decisions are required, such as making Budget cuts or raising taxes, in order to invest in new industries or infrastructure and establish new growth.
In the domain of foreign policy, some leaders may inherit pressing international crises such as an ongoing war or a diplomatic conflict with a potential aggressor. The international political system is also increasingly interlinked, with the divide between ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ policy disappearing, especially for members of the European Union (EU). This integration of the internal and external realms may, in itself, present opportunities and constraints. There may even be times when political leaders utilise international institutions to help them manage or solve national problems, or use them as scapegoats for their own mistakes.
PARTY MANAGEMENT
Thirdly, leaders need to successfully manage their party. Party leaders do not always fall from office at election time. Most famously, Margaret Thatcher was ejected by members of her own Cabinet. As Robert Saunders notes in this volume, during the mid-nineteenth century, governments won and lost power more through their management of the floor of the House of Commons than through the ballot box.24 Leaders therefore have to ensure that the (shadow) Cabinet, parliamentary party, party management and grass-roots members are content enough with their performance to allow them to continue. This does not mean that the relationship between leaders and their party need always be harmonious. Leaders might deliberately harbour an antagonistic relationship in order to prove to the wider public that they are different. They will, however, need to fend off any potential leadership challenges and ensure sufficient coalescence so as not to threaten their credibility for being able to deliver legislation and competence in office.
Party management will also be more difficult for some leaders than others. Some leaders will face credible rivals equipped with the political skill and courage to challenge them; some will not. Rules for dethroning a leader – if they are bureaucratic or place a burden on challengers to gather significant support before challenging their leader – will make managing the party easier for the leader. It is in no one’s interest to undertake a long and protracted internal leadership battle, because that may affect the party’s chances of election. A failed attempt to oust a leader can also have negative consequences for the careers of the instigators. If a rival needs the backing of a significant amount of the parliamentary party to trigger a contest, many will be deterred.25
Party dissent can undermine the authority of a leader and result in such leadership challenges. The ability of leaders to resolve dissent can be influenced by: the sanctions they have available to discipline errant party members; the degree to which there is greater homogeneity of preferences within the party; whether there are strong traditions of party loyalty; and whether there are specialist committee systems and established spokesmen on particular issues.
Although the degree of party discipline among the main political parties today is often overstated, the Conservative Party is typical of many other long-standing European parties in that they centralised their control over the parliamentary party from a time in the nineteenth century, when the party was a looser collection of men with shared interests.
The emergence of new issues can threaten to split a party. For example: the Corn Laws divided the Tories in the nineteenth century, after Robert Peel’s 1846 repeal; tariff reform split the Conservatives at the start of the twentieth century; and Europe has been a continual source of friction and tension ever since Britain’s entry in 1973. These divisions offer challenges but also opportunities. They can provide the opportunity for new leaders to emerge or they can split the opposition, as home rule did for the Liberals at the end of the nineteenth century, opening up an opportunity for Conservative hegemony in party politics.
It is also worth noting that the longer a government is in office, the greater opportunity there is for restlessness among backbenchers to occur and leadership challengers to arise. A honeymoon period of party discipline may appear and disappear.
POLITICAL ARGUMENT HEGEMONY
Fourthly, leaders will need to win ‘the battle of ideas’ so that the party’s arguments about policy solutions and the general stance of government become generally accepted among the elite, and perhaps even the general public. In more grand terms, this has been coined ‘political argument hegemony’. A party leader who is successful in these terms might find that political opponents adopt their policies as manifesto commitments in the run-up to an election, or their ideas become the hallmark of government policy in future years.
