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- Herausgeber: Biteback Publishing
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Sprache: Englisch
UPDATED FOREWORD BY GISELA STUART AND UPDATED AFTERWORD BY JACOB REES-MOGG On 23 June 2016, in the biggest ever vote in British history, 17.4 million people chose to leave the EU. So what does the future now hold after this momentous decision? What will life be like in Britain after we end our European marriage? Will Brexit precipitate the doom and gloom that many predict? Drawing on years of experience at the cutting edge of economic, business and policy issues, plus extensive discussions with leading politicians and diplomats across the UK, Europe and the world, Clean Brexit answers these questions and more. Authors and economists Liam Halligan and Gerard Lyons believe great days lie ahead. Brexit is an opportunity to strike deals with the world's fastest-growing economies, boosting British trade and job prospects. Freed from the EU's regulatory stranglehold, the UK can thrive, spreading wealth throughout the whole of the country. Directly elected MPs will once again have the final say over our laws, borders, taxes and trade negotiations. Important, balanced and accessible, Clean Brexit is the ultimate guide to making a success of Britain's divorce from the EU and a source of strength for voters elsewhere in Europe who have long demanded EU reform, but have been rebuffed.
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Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2018
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The views expressed in this book are solely of the authors – and not necessarily those of any organisation with which they are affiliated.
CONTENTS
FOREWORD TO THE NEW EDITION
Leave voters wanted to take back control over our laws, borders, trade and taxes. Those who voted Remain wanted us to continue being part of a political, economic and legal union where the UK made significant payments and had some say in the European Union’s institutions and decision-making processes.
It seems that both sides will go on arguing about what the other side meant by voting one way or another, but the one thing no one voted for was to continue making automatic payments, being under a legal obligation to comply with rules we played no part in shaping, not being able to change our immigration policy to meet our needs, and giving a foreign court supremacy over our laws.
And yet it is this very outcome that is continually being peddled as an acceptable form of Brexit.
Those who still refuse to accept the outcome of the franchise seem to argue that it must be fair if no one gets what they want. If it looks as if we are leaving but don’t really leave, then we can bridge the gap between Leavers and Remainers. They also calculate that as long as Parliament goes on arguing endlessly over process, rather than ever getting to the substance, then voters can be persuaded to think that they really did try to respect the referendum but in the end it was just too complicated.
But they are wrong. This is at best cowardly groupthink and at worst a betrayal of democratic processes. We had a people’s vote. The people voted to leave the European Union. They have not changed their minds. They expect the politicians to get on with it.
Liam Halligan and Gerard Lyons’s book is as much required reading today as it was when it was first published almost a year ago. It makes it clear why fudging Brexit is politically as well as economically bad for the UK and the EU.
There is no such thing as a soft or hard Brexit; there is only a choice between one which happens according to clearly understood and established rules, or a messy one. Clarity versus chaos. There is no such thing as an extreme right-wing Brexit which requires tempering by reasonable people of goodwill. Surely the left and the right have by now accepted that the desire of a people to take control of their democratic decision-making processes is a good thing. And yet in the context of the referendum the liberal elites are labelling it as a form of right-wing extremism.
Halligan and Lyons argue that we should offer to keep trading under the existing EU tariff-free arrangement but state that, while we would prefer a free trade agreement with the EU if this is not possible, Britain is happy to trade under WTO rules.
They do what the Westminster bubble, consumed by internal bickering, has failed to do: they spell out what the future for the UK outside the EU could and should look like. Government has been too inward-looking and has not done enough to make the case and defend the reasons why a clear majority of British people voted to leave the EU.
Amidst all the talk of tweaking some rules on free movement here and making the odd concession there, Halligan and Lyons set out clearly the economic case for why staying inside the EU would have held us back and argue that technological advances and global trading patterns of goods and services will make us more resilient and adaptable outside the EU.
While the politicians and some London-based commentators are still bickering among themselves, trying to find procedural ways of undermining the referendum result, the country outside the bubble has not changed its mind. They expect their representatives to implement the result of the ballot box. This book underpins the economic argument for why the British people made the right decision.
It explains why there is no need to be afraid of the future. It’s ours to shape and Halligan and Lyons show us how to do it.
Gisela Stuart
June 2018
PREFACE TO THE NEW EDITION
The UK will leave the European Union. Brexit will happen. In June 2018, the EU (Withdrawal) Bill was finally approved by both Houses of Parliament – a vital piece of legislation that will repeal the 1972 European Communities Act. The bill’s passage effectively ensures that Brexit is an irreversible process. What is still not clear, though, is what type of Brexit will take place and when it will finally happen.
That was confirmed by the ill-fated Chequers meeting of the Cabinet on Friday 6 July. At Chequers, the Prime Minister displayed a lack of vision and confidence in her country, outlining a proposal to tie the UK to the EU. For her, apparently unable to grasp how the world is changing, everything seems to be tied to the border issue in Ireland – even though it is clear that neither the EU nor the UK will erect a border once we have left, and indeed we do not need to.
While concessions are inevitable in any process, the danger is that the Chequers plan will bind the UK’s hands in the future on domestic policy and international trade. Moreover, it is likely to trigger further concessions – on migration policy and money – to try to satisfy future EU demands. Brexiters had to decide either to stay in the government and fight, or to resign, as the Brexit Secretary and his ministerial team as well as the Foreign Secretary chose to do.
At the heart of the Brexit debate since the June 2016 referendum has been the contention that the British public may have voted to leave the EU but that they did not vote on how. In Clean Brexit we refute that notion, arguing that the single market and the customs union are the two main legal constructs of the EU and that ‘taking back control of our money, borders, laws and trade’ – a central focus of the referendum – means being outside both.
The two years since June 2016 have not proved to be a springboard for national renewal and confidence about Britain’s future. They could have been, had there been clear leadership and vision, and had the British political, economic and business establishment decided to accept the Brexit vote and move on.
Instead, we have seen a coordinated and well-funded campaign to reverse Brexit, or to tie the government’s hands to such an extent that the UK ends up with ‘Brexit in name only’ – Brino. That would see Britain leave the EU but unable to achieve either the economic freedom or the political sovereignty that Brexit promises to bring. Such is the ferocity of the campaign to reverse or seriously restrict Brexit that it sometimes appears there are senior lawmakers and journalists who are almost willing a national humiliation during these Article 50 negotiations, with the UK becoming a vassal state in order to teach ‘the people’ a lesson, and in the hope of forcing a second vote. Of course, this must be avoided.
The main reason we are in the current situation, though, with the UK struggling to adopt a coherent negotiating position, is because of the government. The Prime Minister and the Chancellor both voted to remain – and both have made clear this is how they would vote again. As such, they view Brexit as making the best of a bad job. On the contrary, leaving the EU is a once in a lifetime opportunity to restore the UK’s economy, adopt our own trade policy, position the country globally and distance ourselves from the deep-rooted problems that threaten the euro area and the broader EU.
Polling evidence has consistently shown that the bulk of the British people, regardless of how they voted, now want the government – and the political class more broadly – to get on and deliver Brexit. That is hardly surprising – especially as leaving the EU is ultimately in the UK’s best interests, particularly the further ahead one looks.
Perhaps, more by luck than judgement, the government’s approach may turn out right in the end, though after Chequers that seems unlikely. But we would have approached the Article 50 negotiations very differently.
A positive vision has been missing from the start. The government should have responded to the Brexit vote by articulating a clear statement of the opportunities ahead, of the UK’s standing in the world and the leadership role we could take on global trade, not least given our renewed ability to act independently, instead of under the EU’s auspices, at the World Trade Organization.
A confident articulation of the UK’s future outside the EU was vital – not just to reassure the population, however they voted, but also for an international business audience. Instead, outside of the UK, this space has been filled by some parts of the UK media who have consistently talked down Brexit and the country at the same time, refusing to see any possibility of a positive outcome.
The government, also, should have granted the 3 million-plus European citizens living in the UK rights to remain immediately after the referendum, and not used them as a bargaining tool, regardless of the EU’s approach.
Since the UK triggered Article 50 in March 2017, the can has too often been kicked down the road, to avoid divisions within the government. This has happened to such an extent that, two years on from the referendum, it is still not clear what the government’s approach to trade will be. This is despite the fact that both the Conservatives and Labour fought the 2017 election on a platform to ‘respect the referendum result’ and leave the EU, with the Conservatives spelling out the need to be outside the single market and customs union.
Moreover, as has been widely said, the tail has been allowed to wag the dog, with the Northern Ireland border issue dominating much of the UK’s Brexit debate. To say as much is not, of course, to undermine the Good Friday Agreement. It is merely to recognise that the Irish land border can continue to be as ‘invisible’ as now with the use of technology, ‘authorised economic operator’ schemes and regular ‘behind the border’ checks.
The UK should not have conceded to pay a huge EU exit bill, especially when we were under no legal compulsion to do so, and certainly should not have agreed to pay it without the guarantee of a free trade agreement (FTA) with the EU. To have leverage in the Brexit endgame, the UK must reserve the right to leave the EU with no formal FTA, taking with it the £39 billion we’ve offered as part of a divorce settlement and trading with the EU under WTO rules instead.
We should not be fearful in negotiations with the EU. It should be eminently possible to secure an FTA with the EU, as we have been trading freely with them for over four decades. Normally trade deals are complicated because both sides start far apart. Not so here. Instead, the EU’s approach has been to make an example of the UK, to deter other member states from leaving. In this case, the UK should have taken a more assertive role in its negotiation. We have blinked first at every stage.
The root of the problem has been the unwillingness to prepare for a ‘no deal’ outcome. Here, we have argued that the UK should be prepared to trade under WTO rules, as we already do with most nations beyond the EU. ‘No deal is better than a bad deal,’ as the Prime Minister stated back in her seminal Lancaster House speech in January 2017 – a refrain which, for many months now, she appears to have abandoned altogether.
Had the government spent the past two years making preparations for a ‘no deal’ Brexit, and promoting this as the perfectly acceptable outcome that it is, the UK could now be negotiating from a position of strength. Instead, ministers have allowed a narrative to be shaped which suggests that trading under WTO rules would be ‘disastrous’. This is nonsense.
The UK trades under WTO rules with the US – our biggest single-country trading partner. Most global trade takes place outside formal FTAs, under WTO rules. Yet, having allowed this very viable option to be painted as ‘cataclysmic’ by Brexit opponents, the government should not be surprised that a substantial number of MPs, and many Remain voters, are now alarmed by the prospect of leaving with ‘no deal’, even in the event of a stalemate with the EU.
But it may not come to this. One of the many positive things the government has achieved, in addition to pushing through vital Brexit legislation, has been to agree a transition deal with the EU – something the authors were at the forefront of proposing, as we outline in this book.
Although the government has made mistakes, ministers have not been helped by those leading parliamentarians who have sought to undermine Brexit, rather than work together in the national interest. As a result, our EU negotiations have often appeared to be operating from a position of weakness when, in fact – given the EU’s large UK trade surplus and the loss of its second largest contributor – Britain has many powerful cards to play.
‘Clean Brexit’ – as we outline here – is to be outside the single market and customs union and to be free of the European Court of Justice. It is not the same as a hard Brexit, which would involve an erosion of workers’ rights and a race to the bottom on regulations, which is not what we have articulated (although it is clearly what some mistakenly fear).
The government should also have done far more since the referendum to stress how Brexit could positively affect the domestic economy. Since June 2016, the UK has defied the ridiculously pessimistic and completely erroneous projections of Project Fear. That government-backed campaign used Treasury-provided models to warn that merely a vote to leave would produce ‘an immediate and profound economic shock’ – with 800,000 jobs being lost within two years. Instead, employment has risen significantly and is now at a record high.
The ‘group think’ and status quo bias of the economics profession has led some to question whether there will be any Brexit dividend. There are, in fact, two aspects to any Brexit dividend. One is how to spend the money that the UK currently sends to the EU. This sum featured prominently in the referendum campaign – with the £350 million figure on the side of the bus. We were not part of the official campaign and criticised this figure at the time, as it reflected the UK’s gross and not net payment to the EU, which was closer to £180 million a week. Most economists would accept this aspect of the dividend, although there are differences over the amount.1
The second part of the Brexit dividend derives from an improved future economic performance and higher future tax revenues. But economic opinions diverge significantly over this. The consensus – reflected in the view of the Office for Budget Responsibility – is that any boost received from a return of money sent to the EU would be offset by an underperformance of the economy after Brexit. We think this view is wrong, as long as we leave the EU in the correct way.
To achieve a full dividend, the economy needs to perform well and, crucially, better outside the EU – and this means leaving the single market and the customs union, with the government then implementing the correct economic policies to boost the domestic economy. This pro-growth strategy has to be about boosting investment, infrastructure and innovation, underpinned by the right incentives, while lowering the tax and regulatory burden on businesses and avoiding likely expensive future EU legislation.
Part of the reason it is proving so difficult to leave the EU is because the organisation’s tentacles now reach so many areas. The flipside is that Brexit will bring newly restored powers that can be used to our advantage. These have been articulated quite well in the post-referendum debate on farming and the environment, but have been barely discussed when it comes to other important and sensitive areas – such as immigration. The authors fully recognise that the UK faces many economic challenges. But those who argue there is no dividend fail to appreciate the opportunities arising from Brexit – opportunities we outline in the second half of this book.
There has also been a tendency since June 2016 to overlook the deep-rooted problems in the Eurozone and EU. These have continued to surface in recent years in elections across Europe, and it is easy to see why. The cheap-money policies of the European Central Bank are helping, for now, to paper over the cracks. But the economic imbalances have grown. While the ongoing EU migrant crisis has captured the headlines, there is much popular concern in Germany that economic and monetary union has become a transfer union, under which creditor nations automatically transfer long-term funding to debtors. Voters in many other Eurozone countries, meanwhile, are deeply concerned about the impact of the euro on long-term unemployment, as their nations struggle to regain competitiveness within the context of a relatively overvalued German-dominated currency.
President Macron has highlighted a reality that we need to face up to in the UK: either the EU fragments into different layers, with a core and a periphery, or it marches on to closer political union. A failed UK Brexit, which sees us agreeing to a bad deal and failing to break cleanly away, would align us to an EU in which we must choose between being either in the periphery, where we would have very little say, or being aligned to a tightly knit political union centred on the euro currency, which has deep-rooted flaws.
It strikes us that events of the last year have reinforced the case for our ‘Clean Brexit’ strategy. And, while the UK government should have handled the Article 50 negotiations far better, the words of the Prime Minister on the evening that the EU (Withdrawal) Bill was approved ring true. ‘Nothing would hurt our democracy more’, said Theresa May on 20 June 2018, ‘than to give the people the choice, and then not to trust their judgement when they give it.’
Liam Halligan and Gerard Lyons
July 2018
Notes
1Saturday Evening Post, 15.02.30, ‘The United States of Europe’, republished in The Collected Essays of Sir WinstonChurchill, Volume II: Churchill and Politics, (London: Library of Imperial History, 1976), pp. 176–86.
GLOSSARY
CLEAN BREXIT IN BRIEF
Below, we outline our Clean Brexit negotiating strategy: twenty-five principles we believe the government should adopt during the Article 50 negotiations ahead of March 2019. These bullet points relate largely to the first half of the book.
We then present our ‘Blueprint for a post-Brexit Britain’ – in twenty-five additional bullet points. These suggest domestic economic policy priorities – the main subject of the second half of this book.
TWENTY-FIVE ARTICLE 50 NEGOTIATING PRINCIPLES
Clean Brexit
1) Rule out single market membership The benefits of single market ‘membership’ are grossly overstated. Inside the single market, Britain remains liable for multi-billion-pound annual payments to the EU, while accepting European Court of Justice (ECJ) jurisdiction and freedom of movement rules. This is not Brexit. The single market requires all UK firms – not just exporters – to comply with unnecessary and expensive EU rules. The single market in services barely exists – which penalises the UK, the world’s second-largest services exporter.
2) Rule out customs union membership too Inside the customs union, Britain cannot cut free trade agreements (FTAs) with the four fifths of the world economy that exists beyond the EU. The EU’s Common External Tariff (CET) makes UK imports more expensive – including food – and results in us sending additional millions of pounds to Brussels every year.
3) Explain that Clean Brexit is the best option for both the UK and EU Under a Clean Brexit, the UK leaves the single market and the customs union. As such, Britain quickly regains control of sensitive issues relating to our money, borders, laws and trade. Clean Brexit avoids cherry-picking, leaving the EU’s ‘four freedoms’ intact. This is better for Britain, the EU 27 and the vital relationship between them – given the benefits of ongoing cooperation across a range of headings.
4) Do not attempt a potentially explosive Messy Brexit – aka Soft Brexit A Messy Brexit seeks to trade off single market membership against freedom of movement rules. This gives Britain no control over the central aspects of leaving the EU. Taking this route maximises ‘cliff-edge’ dangers and business uncertainty – and could result in a disastrous stalemate. So-called Soft Brexit, while rhetorically appealing to some, does not exist. Attempting to break EU treaties would actually result in Messy Brexit, risking a systemic crisis that could tear the EU apart.
Opening three issues
5) No ‘divorce bill’ to be agreed until the end of the Article 50 period The UK is under no legal obligation to pay the EU to leave. But we want to exit on good terms. If we are to pay anything, the sum should be finalised at the end of the Article 50 period, so we extract maximum concessions from each incremental increase in agreed payment. The final total should be transferred over several years – perhaps as part of a transition agreement. The total payment should reflect the extent of goodwill and cooperation shown by the EU ahead of March 2019.
6) Take the initiative to resolve EU citizens’ rights While standing firm on cash, the UK should guarantee the residency rights of the 3.1 million EU citizens living in Britain, subject to criminal checks and proof of ‘means of financial support’. That makes sense for them and UK businesses employing them. This issue has become embroiled in the dispute over ECJ jurisdiction, allowing the EU to portray Britain as intolerant. A unilateral guarantee, under British law, would force the EU to reciprocate – or be accused of ‘using people as bargaining chips’. The rights of the 1.2 million EU-based UK citizens are covered by the Vienna Convention.
7) Work closely with the Republic of Ireland to maintain open borders The EU will try to exploit sensitivities over a ‘hard’ Irish border, not least because the government’s House of Commons majority relies on support from the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). Ensure controls on goods across the Irish land border are electronic and ‘frictionless’. Confirm information-sharing agreements with Dublin to facilitate ongoing freedom of movement between the UK and Republic of Ireland – an arrangement much valued by both countries that long predates the EU.
Trade with the EU
8) Offer to keep trading under existing EU tariff-free arrangements, but state that, if this isn’t possible, Britain is happy to trade under WTO rules Trading under WTO rules is often presented as damaging or irresponsible. This is alarmist nonsense. WTO tariffs are relatively low and falling. The US, China and many other leading economies conduct extensive trade with the EU under WTO rules – Britain can do the same. Much of the UK’s trade with the non-EU, over half our total trade, is largely under WTO rules.
9) While WTO rules are fine, the UK would prefer a free trade agreement (FTA) with the EU. But this can be agreed after Article 50 expires. With WTO rules as a solid platform, it is by no means essential to strike a UK–EU FTA by March 2019. Failing to grasp this reality amounts to a major strategic error. Negotiating a complex, multi-sector FTA with twenty-seven governments, themselves with conflicting interests, plus ratification by national Parliaments and the European Parliament, may anyway be impossible in the Article 50 timeframe. The UK should remain open to negotiation, though – including on less ambitious sector-based deals (relating to automobiles, for instance, or financial services).
10) Under Clean Brexit, we prepare for WTO trade rules with the EU Having declared Clean Brexit, the UK re-introduces systems to manage cross-Channel immigration and customs checks. Unless we are logistically prepared for WTO rules, the threat to reject a disadvantageous FTA is not credible. The UK leaves the single market fully compliant with EU regulations, by definition. Before leaving the customs union, we reoccupy our WTO seat and adopt our own tariff schedules. This ordered approach contrasts with the last-minute brinkmanship of a Messy Brexit – which could result in political, diplomatic and even economic chaos.
No deal?
11) ‘No deal is better than a bad deal.’ State this clearly and often ‘No deal’ simply means we don’t strike a UK–EU FTA before March 2019. Again, this is by no means a disaster – and has its benefits. Negotiating up against a hard deadline, the terms of any FTA with the EU, which we must live with for years, would be far worse than a deal settled under less time pressure. Under ‘no deal’, UK and EU exporters pay relatively low WTO tariffs. Britain’s EU trade deficit would generate substantial net tariff revenues, which could be used to compensate UK exporters.
12) ‘No deal’ is very different from ‘just walking away’ ‘No deal’ is a coherent position, in terms of both negotiation and outcome – with UK–EU trade operating under WTO rules, as we look to cut an FTA after March 2019. ‘Just walking away’, in contrast, means failing to settle administrative issues such as mutual recognition agreements on goods and aircraft landing rights. No one is advocating such an approach. It is unthinkable that existing and uncontroversial EU protocols granted to countless other non-EU members would not apply to the UK, not least as we leave the EU fully compliant. For Brussels to deny Britain such rights would breach both WTO and EU law, while incensing EU businesses and voters by threatening billions of euros of profit and countless EU jobs.
13) Announce a ‘no deal’ administrative deadline The UK government should set a deadline – perhaps the autumn of 2018 – after which we announce that FTA negotiations will take a back seat, with Britain focusing instead on preparing to trade under WTO rules. If an FTA is impossible to agree and ratify during the Article 50 period, that should be acknowledged early – so WTO rules can be introduced as smoothly as possible. While continuing with UK–EU trade negotiations after this deadline – including sector-based deals – the change of emphasis will make sure the EU knows Britain is serious about trading with no FTA.
Negotiation tactics
14) If the EU imposes WTO tariffs, make clear the UK will reciprocate Some economists want the UK to grant the EU tariff-free access, even if they impose WTO tariffs on us. While sympathetic to this view, on balance we disagree. ‘Unilateral free trade’ is attractive in theory, and lowers prices, but would be politically naïve. We would advocate a gradual reduction of import tariffs. Once outside the EU, trading under WTO rules, the UK will anyway be well-placed to negotiate a future tariff-reducing FTA with the EU. Having WTO tariffs in place that we can offer to remove strengthens our hand.
15) Compile a sector-by-sector menu to help guide our FTA negotiations Ahead of detailed Article 50 talks, the government must plan how to treat key sectors. Ministers should identify what sector-specific transition measures and additional temporary subsidies are needed after Brexit – and if so for how long. Sectors to consider include autos and related supply chains, agriculture, fishing, pharmaceuticals and financial services. Industry leaders should be closely consulted, but negotiating priorities should not be publicly disclosed until closer to March 2019.
16) Ensure ‘strategic issues’ feature in the Brexit negotiations There are many ‘strategic’ areas where the EU would benefit from future close ties with the UK – whether in defence, security, environmental protection, scientific research or educational and cultural exchange. Britain has a leadership role, of value to EU members, across numerous non-economic headings. The Article 50 negotiations should reflect this reality.
17) Recognise the strength of the City The City – with its formidable combination of skills, knowledge and infrastructure – is largely Brexit-proof. London will remain the financial capital of Europe and, free of EU constraints, could even enhance its status as a global financial hub. While some firms may lose EU ‘passporting’ rights, the overall impact should be manageable and financial services will anyway benefit from ‘regulatory equivalence’. While Brussels may threaten punitive regulatory action, EU-based firms and governments rely on the City to raise capital and for other specialized financial services.
Global Britain
18) Negotiate FTAs with the rest of the world Some EU officials claim the UK cannot discuss or agree trade agreements with non-EU countries before March 2019. This is wrong. Any FTA negotiated before March 2019, that does not come into force until we have left breaches no EU treaty obligations. Our FTAs should focus on access for the services sector and investment flows, safeguarding of intellectual property rights and a commitment to remove tariff and non-tariff barriers (NTBs).
19) Be clear that non-EU FTAs need not be in place before March 2019 It would be helpful, during the Article 50 talks, if the EU sees Britain making progress on non-EU FTAs. Such deals, though, are not vital – and rushing into them could, again, result in unattractive terms. The UK already sells 56 per cent of its exports outside the EU, the majority to countries where the EU has no FTA. The notion that we must have a string of non-EU trade deals in place before the Article 50 window closes, or our trade will collapse, is nonsense.
20) ‘Port over’ existing EU FTAs and other trade facilitation agreements The EU has FTAs with a handful of large economies – including South Korea and Mexico – and lesser trade facilitation agreements with others. The UK should propose an ‘exchange of notes’ with these nations so, where possible, existing EU deals apply to the UK after Brexit. This is far less complex than cutting FTAs and other deals from scratch.
21) Act as a cheerleader for free trade, but remain pragmatic Outside the EU, the UK should, as a point of principle, promote free trade around the world, encouraging the eradication of both tariffs and NTBs. Lowering import tariffs, ultimately to zero, benefits UK consumers and importers of intermediate goods – even though we prefer a gradual approach. This pragmatism should extend to recognising the dislocation that changing tariff regimes could cause some sectors – reinforcing the importance of the UK’s industrial and regional strategy.
Ready for Brexit
22) Agree on a T-Tab to make Brexit as smooth as possible If the ‘no deal’ deadline passes, with an FTA deemed unlikely ahead of March 2019, the UK and EU should minimise business disruption by agreeing a ‘Temporary Transition Agreement for Britain’ (T-Tab). Subject to negotiation, this could comprise a ‘zero-for-zero’ tariff deal and mutual recognition agreements – to remain temporarily until they are updated or, better still, subsumed under a comprehensive UK–EU FTA. A T-Tab would also include specific government support for certain domestic sectors. The length of transition should be, at most, two years – and the UK should take care to remain free of ongoing ECJ jurisdiction.
23) Keep the ‘Repeal Bill’ as simple as possible The European Union (Withdrawal) Bill – known as the ‘Repeal Bill’ – brings EU law relating to the UK onto the British statute book. On ‘Brexit Day’, then, nothing changes across a range of sectors – lessening cliff-edge dangers. The Act should be entirely uncontroversial, amounting to ‘cut and paste’ – so as to minimize the danger of parliamentary wrecking tactics. Repatriating a vast body of law will allow MPs of all parties to consider which aspects they want to scrap or amend – emphasising that Brexit is, above all, about empowering British democracy.
24) Scale-up Whitehall, but use some imagination There have been reports that say the UK does not have enough skilled staff in key areas of Whitehall and the broader civil service – including trade negotiators and customs officials. Such warnings should be taken seriously. Senior trade negotiators need to be trained and recruited, including from overseas. The civil service should be restructured in order to prepare for the return of competencies from Brussels.
25) Decide how best to use ‘our EU money’ In 2016, the UK paid a net figure of £165 million a week to the EU. After March 2019, even if we are making staged ‘divorce payments’ as part of a negotiated T-Tab, or paying to be part of future projects, lower net payments and tariff revenues should produce a ‘Brexit bonus’. This money could be earmarked to help certain sectors or regions adjust or, indeed, for spending on the NHS. It should emphatically not be used to ‘buy’ some form of ongoing single market ‘membership’ – paying to tie the UK into EU regulations and the continued weakening of our democracy.
BLUEPRINT FOR A POST-BREXIT BRITAIN
Brexit provides a unique opportunity to reinvigorate the British economy. Below, we present a summary of our recommendations for UK economic policy, particularly after March 2019. We have included opportunities arising from Brexit, as well as some long-standing issues the UK should have addressed while in the EU.
People
1) Protect workers’ rights – avoiding a genuinely Hard Brexit Leaving the single market and the customs union isn’t Hard Brexit. It is Brexit. A genuinely Hard Brexit would involve a ‘race to the bottom’ on working conditions once the UK is no longer obliged to comply with EU rules. This must be avoided at all costs – and is, anyway, highly unlikely. After March 2019, laws and regulations will be determined by Parliament – answerable to UK voters. Many existing UK-derived rules on pay and labour conditions are already more progressive than those applying elsewhere in the EU – such as our minimum wage and equal pay legislation.
2) Put skills and vocational training at the heart of government policy British-based firms have under-invested in UK staff over many years, in part due to the EU’s freedom of movement rules. The UK must become a high-wage, high-productivity economy – which means, above all, more investment in skills. Align the UK’s tax, training and education policies to meet publicly stated skills goals, overseen by a Cabinet Minister for Training and Skills. Overhaul student loans, providing a heavily discounted education for those taking economically vital subjects – particularly science, technology, engineering and mathematics. University numbers are too high and vocational training numbers too low. Both trends should be reversed.
3) Build new homes on a large scale Take immediate steps to ensure that 300,000 new homes are built each year over the next decade – double the current rate of construction. While this will require additional planning permissions, the immediate priority is to ensure large builders implement permissions already granted. Revive the ‘garden cities’ movement, with local authorities setting up ‘new town companies’. This will limit building on greenbelt land and other sensitive sites – but some greenbelt will need to be shifted. The UK’s housing shortage is now so serious, and causing such economic and social damage, it is not feasible to hope the situation will change without radical reform.
4) Use a ‘National Development Corporation’ to break the building logjam Central government should establish a National Development Corporation (NDC) that purchases green- and brownfield land suitable for housing, while managing existing state-owned land. The NDC grants itself planning permission on selected holdings, before selling it in lots to private developers. The captured ‘planning gain’ – the huge rise in land values once planning permission is granted – then funds schools, hospitals and other infrastructure at no net cost to the Exchequer, lessening local objections to additional housing. Every UK economic recovery over the last century has been associated with a sharp rise in house-building – except that since 2008: the slowest, most subdued recovery in modern history. That is not a coincidence.
Business
5) Create an enabling environment for business based on low and simple tax As we leave the EU, Britain needs to forge a domestic economic policy based on high growth and investment. This is less about ‘picking winners’ than creating an enabling environment for business. The key principles are low and simple taxation, world-class transport and broadband connectivity, reasonably priced energy, a steady supply of skilled and unskilled labour and maximum access to international export markets.
6) Ease the regulatory burden while retaining global industry standards The Treasury, working with the Department for Business, should examine where regulatory gains can be achieved as we prepare to leave the EU. While fully recognising global industry standards, not least to facilitate trade deals and protect consumers, a particular effort should be made to ease the regulatory burden on our all-important small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) – the engine room of UK employment, innovation and growth.
7) Close the ‘Macmillan Gap’ – finally The UK banking sector has failed for several generations adequately to finance domestic companies, particularly SMEs. This is the ‘Macmillan Gap’ – first identified in 1931. Explore regulatory changes that will help SMEs to access capital, not least for investment, helping them bridge the long-standing gap between fickle bank loans and far more complex equity finance.
8) Prepare the UK to play a leading role in 4IR As the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) has gathered pace, based on digital and nanotechnology, Britain has developed some world-class ‘tech clusters’. But there is a disconnect between the presence of tech giants in the UK, and a relative lack of domestic investment and related employment. Our broader training policy must include a focus on digital and technical skills. Bolster efforts to make the information superhighway a reality across Britain, with super-fast broadband viewed as a utility, like access to water or electricity.
Control
9) Pass legislation on UK immigration Prior to March 2019, the UK must prepare to return to the system of managed immigration that Britain operated for decades prior the EU’s freedom of movement rules. Creating a system that is business-friendly and humane – with provision for all types of skilled and unskilled labour – will reassure many who voted Remain. Demonstrating that the UK government is now in charge, and immigration will be managed, will reassure many others who voted Leave.
10) Implement a ‘return of competencies’ plan A comprehensive Cabinet Office assessment is needed of the ‘competencies’ and legislative powers returning from Brussels, outlining the extra policy tools and levers available. Once the UK is outside the EU, there will be much that can, over time, be abandoned or improved upon – examples include competition law, state aid, regional policy, the precautionary principle that hinders research and the terms granted to UK firms in domestic procurement. Much work is happening behind the scenes in Whitehall – and we are conscious of this in making this recommendation.
11) Immediately fund necessary practical steps to make Brexit work The Treasury has not shown enough urgency in funding areas necessary for Brexit to succeed. Resources are needed, for instance, to train new customs officials, for a technology upgrade at UK ports and for new patrol boats and other unmanned devices to monitor our 200-mile exclusive economic zone. Such expenditures, across a range of sectors, must continue once we have left the EU. Brexit is a process, not a one-off event.
Economy
12) Emphasise regional policy, with a focus on infrastructure Freed from EU state aid rules, and with a return of competency for ‘cohesion funds’, there is much scope to boost UK regional policy. Efforts to address the UK’s regional divide should focus on infrastructure spending. Transport can play a transformative role – regional airports should be expanded significantly and HS3 prioritised, to help create an alternative UK growth centre in the north-west. We need new bridges, tolls roads and enhanced rail links beyond the south-east. Leaving the EU allows low-tax free ports to bring enterprise and prosperity to coastal areas.
13) Create an investment fund to boost infrastructure spending The Labour manifesto was right to propose a National Transformation Fund to invest £250 billion over ten years in the UK’s transport, communications and energy infrastructure. This should be seeded by central government – taking advantage of low long-term interest rates. We would put greater emphasis, though, on infrastructure bonds, with the private sector channelling institutional pension and life assurance savings into infrastructure investments that generate a regular income stream, matching long-term revenues with long-term liabilities.
14) Ensure universities play a major role in economic strategy, beyond education Build on the role leading universities play in regional growth, encouraging stronger links between higher education, academic research and industry. Look for lessons from the US university sector, the only global challenger to the UK, yet more successful in transferring business ideas from campuses to commerce. Showcase UK universities when building the case for ongoing inward investment. Re-examine the funding of universities, exploring how more money can be attracted to research.
15) Exclude students from migration numbers International students should not be included in migration figures – they are not permanent residents and attracting overseas students delivers significant gains for the economy. Students should only count if, having completed their UK education, they then stay. While not guaranteed residency, recently graduated foreign students should be favoured if they hold industry-specific qualifications. Justifiable concerns must be addressed about the abuse of student visas in ‘fake colleges’.
Reform
16) Commit to fiscal devolution Fiscal devolution is necessary and desirable once the UK has left the EU. The recommendation of the London Finance Commission should be adopted nationally, with stamp duty from property transactions retained at the local level. While the UK will remain a ‘unitary’ state, municipal bonds could play an important role in funding specific local infrastructure projects. Work to maintain a UK-wide consensus for Brexit by sharing regional powers returned from the EU with respective administrations in Edinburgh, Belfast and Cardiff.
17) Make a radical reassessment of government spending The UK needs to decide on the appropriate size of the state as a share of GDP. We favour a radical approach, bearing down on public spending, consistent with a sustainable tax take. If voters want higher government spending, we must be honest about the implications, taking steps to raise the necessary taxation. It is not acceptable to keep borrowing every year, loading debts onto future generations.
18) Appoint a Royal Commission to consider a Bismarckian approach to welfare The UK should consider whether our welfare system needs to become more ‘contributory’, moving from a Beveridge system of universal provision to a Bismarckian system where personal contributions play a greater role in determining levels of entitlement. Such an inquiry is necessary – given our growing and fast-ageing population – and should be conducted with an open mind, with any recommendation not detracting from minimum subsistence benefits or ‘free-at-the-point-of-use’ health care.
19) Take a fresh look at our institutional infrastructure The role, structure and stated priorities of the UK’s main macroeconomic institutions need to be examined – including the Treasury and the Bank of England. The Treasury has become too powerful, while the Bank of England probably needs to show more independence. We believe that more ‘outsiders’ from industry and elsewhere should be seconded to such bodies, in order to tackle ‘group think’.
20) Implement our own Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) Ensure our post-Brexit approach to the environment is positive for UK people and firms. We should only remain in the European Emissions Trading System if our obligations are outside the jurisdiction of the ECJ, where they currently fall. Better still would be a UK-specific ETS, along with a UK-wide carbon tax. Britain’s desire to simplify its carbon pricing policy, with just one carbon price after 2021, will be more achievable outside the EU’s ETS.
Global
21) Outline a positive post-Brexit vision based on reform and enhanced trade Our thinking has been anchored in the EU for over forty years. Yet inside the EU, our record on investment and productivity has been poor. Amidst inevitable near-term uncertainties, it will take time for the entire country to feel ‘comfortable’ outside the EU. But the potential Brexit upsides are huge – not least the forging of deeper trade links with fast-growing economies beyond the EU. Outlining an upbeat vision, combined with bold and constructive domestic policies, will ultimately positively impact how Britain sees itself, while bolstering the UK’s reputation across the world.
22) Spearhead a ‘Go Global’ and ‘Britain is open for business’ campaign Brexit provides a unique opportunity to reinvigorate the British economy. A ‘Go Global’ campaign should dispel misplaced fears that the UK will be more isolationist outside the EU. Since June 2016, the UK has attracted sizeable inward investment. The need for world-class export promotion must be taken extremely seriously, drawing on the experience of Austrade, Enterprise Ireland and other examples of international best practice.
23) Make the Department for International Trade permanent While building up expertise in trade negotiation during the Article 50 process, the UK needs to maintain a permanent trade secretariat that will manage our existing FTAs and constantly seek to widen the scope of our trade relations around the world.
24) Work with other countries to address migration ‘push factors’ The scale of immigration from the Middle East and North Africa into Europe is too large to be ignored. Work with other nations to address ‘push factors’ encouraging people to leave such regions. Redirect some of our overseas aid budget towards preventing emerging economies from losing talented people – aligning some aid flows to the export of UK university courses, to help such nations gain the human capital and international contacts that will drive future growth. Work on ‘agriculture for services’ trade deals under which low-income nations sell more farm produce to wealthy Western countries.
25) Develop the UK’s leadership role on global issues Having left the EU, Britain needs to adopt a leadership role at the WTO, building support to cut tariffs and NTBs, particularly on services. We should push to eradicate all trade barriers and global subsidies discriminating against underdeveloped countries, particularly in agriculture. The UK should remain a signatory to the Paris Agreement on climate change. As the largest military power in Western Europe, post-Brexit Britain must consolidate its leadership role within NATO.
INTRODUCTION
‘A vote to leave the EU would result in an immediate and profound shock to our economy.’
GEORGE OSBORNE, MAY 20161
As is so often the case, the ‘smart money’ was wrong. Ahead of the UK’s referendum on EU membership, the overwhelming consensus among political analysts, backed up by successive opinion polls and investors, was that Britain would vote Remain.
Less than a week before the vote, online prediction markets became emphatic. As campaigning reached a crescendo, the weight of money bet on either side suggested an ‘80 per cent probability’ of continued EU membership.2 Among ‘decided’ voters, the pollsters put Remain ahead, with most analysts then assuming the 8–10 per cent of ‘undecided’ voters would be ‘most likely to stay with what they know’. There was a self-reinforcing prediction, echoed across the print and broadcast media and reflected in financial markets, that an ‘inherently cautious’ UK electorate would take the stern advice of Prime Minister David Cameron, Chancellor George Osborne, HM Treasury, the Bank of England and pretty much the entire British and international establishment. Surely UK voters wouldn’t take a ‘leap in the dark’.3
On the morning of Thursday 23 June 2016, foreign exchange markets were skewed heavily towards Remain winning – a victory that almost all mainstream economists expected to be hugely positive for the UK economy. For the entire week leading up to the referendum, the pound had climbed steadily, as uncertainty regarding the outcome dissipated, crystallising into a conventional wisdom ‘baked into’ financial markets that Britain would vote to stay in the EU.
That’s why the announcement of a single result in a single constituency in the early hours of 24 June produced such a violent market reaction. When news came through that Sunderland, a largely working-class city in the industrial north-east, had voted decisively to leave, sterling plunged 3 per cent against the dollar. This was an extremely dramatic fall, given that Sunderland was just one of 382 voting districts across Britain, and only the third district to declare.
Although Sunderland had been expected to vote Leave, the recorded victory margin was a massive twenty-two percentage points, almost four times more than expected. This was a result so decisive it suggested the entire Leave vote may have been underestimated, right across the country. At a stroke, although vote counts in 99 per cent of the referendum districts were ongoing, Sunderland caused billions of dollars of ‘smart money’ to unwind on foreign exchanges across the globe. The world suddenly realised that Brexit was on the cards.
An area known for car manufacturing, and a beneficiary of significant foreign direct investment, Sunderland had shown real defiance. From that result onward, it was clear that the UK’s EU referendum could produce a major political upset. The overwhelming majority of political pundits and investors who believed them were soon exposed as having misjudged the national mood.
Six hours after Sunderland, when the nationwide vote count was over, sterling had dropped to its lowest dollar level in more than thirty years. When the London Stock Exchange opened on Friday morning, the FTSE 100 nosedived a nerve-jangling 8.7 per cent. Investors then watched aghast as the British Prime Minister resigned outside Downing Street. By lunchtime, gold prices had spiked 10 per cent.
But despite the early stomach-churning headlines – ‘£150bn wiped off the value of stocks in a single morning’ – financial markets proved remarkably resilient. After the initial drop, the FTSE 100 recovered. By close of play on Friday, the day after the referendum, London’s main stock index was down just 1.9 per cent compared to the day before the referendum – and slightly up on the weekend before. Having plunged following the Brexit vote, sterling similarly staged a partial recovery. And, after a few weeks, what with the UK sporting a large current account deficit, many concluded a lower pound would benefit the UK economy, giving it a much needed export boost.4
CLEAN, NOT SOFT
Since the summer of 2016, the UK economy has held up rather well. Prior to the Brexit referendum, a HM Treasury study that was widely cited by then Chancellor George Osborne warned that the very act of voting to leave the EU would produce ‘an immediate and profound economic shock’.5 Treasury mandarins warned that if voters backed Brexit in the June referendum, the UK economy would contract by 1 per cent between July and September, compared to the same quarter in 2015, before shrinking another 0.4 per cent from October to December. Merely the decision to leave the EU, then, as opposed to actually leaving, would push the UK into recession.6 This alarming forecast was, during the referendum campaign, repeatedly described as ‘fact’ by the Remain camp, not least the Chancellor himself.
The reality has been rather different. From July to September 2016, despite the referendum outcome, UK GDP grew by 0.5 per cent – only slightly less than the 0.6 per cent during the three months before the vote and the complete opposite of the Treasury forecast. Growth stayed buoyant from October through to December 2016, with GDP expanding by 0.7 per cent – once again, defying all official predictions. At the time of writing, official data points to 0.3 per cent growth during the second quarter of 2017, above the increase seen in the first three months, but having lost momentum ahead of the unexpected general election. The service sector, accounting for three quarters of the UK economy, remains strong, having expanded 2.3 per cent over the year since the referendum.
The performance of the British economy since the Brexit vote has been somewhat of a tale of two halves – with a strong showing during the second half of 2016 followed by more moderate growth between January and June 2017. Consumer spending surged before Christmas last year but as inflation has gone up, with prices of goods and services rising faster than wages, consumption has been squeezed.
This rise in inflation – from 0.6 per cent in June 2016 to 2.6 per cent in June 2017 – was partly due to weaker sterling pushing up import prices. It is often overlooked, though, that the inflation from mid-2016 was seen globally, with price pressures rising across the US, Germany and the Eurozone too.7 Since the spring of 2017, inflation has eased elsewhere, but remained more elevated in the UK. The Bank of England, writing in its August 2017 Inflation Report, expects UK inflation to peak towards the end of the year, before falling. This is the pattern it followed in the wake of sterling’s depreciation after the 2008 global financial crisis. If this happens, it will ease pressure on real incomes, helping spending to recover. In July 2017, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which was also very critical of Brexit ahead of the referendum, predicted the UK economy will expand by a relatively buoyant 1.7 per cent in 2017 and 1.5 per cent in 2018.
While the Brexit vote has caused some business uncertainty, and will continue to do so, the Treasury’s ‘immediate and profound economic shock’ prediction now looks absurd. Since the referendum, UK unemployment has fallen to a 42-year low. The Treasury’s pre-referendum forecast pointed to 500,000 job losses during the first twelve months after any Leave vote. Britain’s factories have benefited instead from steady growth and strengthening exports, helped by a more competitive pound and a broader rebound in the global economy. At the time of writing, a new survey from the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) shows manufacturing output growing at its fastest rate since 1995.8
A continuation of the UK’s relatively solid economic performance should bolster the country’s position during Brexit negotiations with the European Commission and the EU 27. The Eurozone, despite deep-rooted structural problems, is meanwhile set for some cyclical rebound in coming years, after a decade of weakness, finally responding to strong simulative policies from the European Central Bank (ECB).
There is much speculation regarding what ‘deal’ the Article 50 negotiations might produce between the UK and EU – in terms of trade access, any ‘divorce payment’ and the residency and working rights of citizens – ahead of our planned leaving date in March 2019.9 It is a central argument of this book that the UK’s Brexit negotiations could and should be kept as simple as possible.
Under a Clean Brexit,10 the UK will be outside both the EU’s single market and customs union. The economic benefits of the single market and the customs union are grossly exaggerated, as this book will explain, and in net terms are probably negative. Clean Brexit also means ruling out the permanent adoption of ‘off-the-shelf’ solutions – such as retaining European Economic Area (EEA) membership, known as the ‘Norway model’, or selecting the ‘Swiss option’ and permanently joining the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Both are problematic and, anyway, do not amount to Brexit.
The UK could try to break apart the EU’s four freedoms and seek single market membership along with a special dispensation from freedom of movement rules and other related conditions.11 Efforts to achieve such a bespoke deal, however, would all but guarantee an extremely acrimonious negotiation. The UK’s determination to assert its newly reclaimed sovereignty would be put in direct conflict with EU core principles, which, if seriously breached, could tear the bloc apart. While this cherry-picking option is often called Soft Brexit, we refer to it as Messy Brexit because it risks causing chronic business uncertainty, last-minute decision-making and diplomatic chaos.
