Death by Design E-Book

Peter Beale

• Herausgeber: The History Press
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 445

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2016

Beschreibung

At the outbreak of war in 1939 British tank crews were ill-equipped, under trained and badly led. As a consequence the lives of hundreds of crewmen were wasted unnecessarily. This was due not only to the poor design and construction of British tanks, but also to the lack of thought and planning on the part of successive pre-war governments and the War Office. Death by Design explores how and why Britain went from leading the world in tank design at the end of the First World War to lagging far behind the design quality of Russian and German tanks in the Second World War. This book is a much-needed warning to governments and military planners: a nation must always be prepared to defend itself and ensure that its soldiers are equipped with the tools to do so.

Leseprobe

DEATH

BY DESIGN

THE FATE OF BRITISH TANK CREWS IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

PETER BEALE

First published in 1998

This edition first published in 2009

The History Press

The Mill, Brimscombe Port

Stroud, Gloucestershire, GL5 2QG

www.thehistorypress.co.uk

This ebook edition first published in 2016

All rights reserved

© Peter Beale, 1998, 2009

The right of Peter Beale to be identified as the Author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyrights, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

This ebook is copyright material and must not be copied, reproduced, transferred, distributed, leased, licensed or publicly performed or used in any way except as specifically permitted in writing by the publishers, as allowed under the terms and conditions under which it was purchased or as strictly permitted by applicable copyright law. Any unauthorised distribution or use of this text may be a direct infringement of the author’s and publisher’s rights, and those responsible may be liable in law accordingly.

EPUB SBN 978 0 7509 7934 4

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eBook converted by Geethik Technologies

Contents

Acknowledgements

Abbreviations

Prologue VIGILANCE SLEEPS

Chapter 1. ATROPHY OF AN ARMY

Chapter 2. HOW ARE TANKS USED?

Chapter 3. A SAD TALE: BRITISH TANK DEVELOPMENT, 1919–45

Chapter 4. WITHOUT A GUN THE BATTLE WAS LOST

Chapter 5. CUSTOMER COMPLAINTS

Chapter 6. THE FORGES OF VULCAN

Chapter 7. TEACHING YOUR GRANDMOTHER

Chapter 8. THE BONE POINTS WHERE?

Bibliography

Acknowledgements

The main sources used in writing this book were those of the Tank Museum Library at Bovington and the Public Record Office (PRO) at Kew. The help and courtesy of the staff of both organizations is most gratefully acknowledged, particularly that of the Tank Museum Librarian, David Fletcher. His knowledge and experience have been of immense value, and the prompt and willing attention given by all Tank Museum Library staff is much appreciated.

Discussions with Paul Harris of the Department of Military Studies, Royal Military Academy (RMA) Sandhurst, provided valuable direction and orientation, as did many discussions with former tank soldiers, in particular Lt Col P.N. (Berry) Veale, DSO, MC. Jonathan Falconer of Sutton Publishing was, as always, encouraging, helpful and prompt. My secretaries, Colleen Jones and Kristie Franks, converted manuscript into typescript with clear mind and nimble fingers, and then did the whole thing over again at least three times. And my most grateful thanks to my wife, Shirley, for all her help, encouragement and patience, and for taking such a vital part in researching the original documents at the Tank Museum and the PRO.

Abbreviations

A/A

Anti-Aircraft

ACIGS

Assistant Chief of the Imperial General Staff

ACE

Associated Equipment Company (makers of heavy engineering equipment)

AFV

Armoured Fighting Vehicle

AG

Adjutant General

AP

Armour Piercing shot

APC

Armour Piercing Capped

APCBC

Armour Piercing Capped Ballistic Capped

APDS

Armour Piercing Discarding sabot (generally abbreviated to ‘sabot’)

A/T

Anti-Tank

BEF

British Expeditionary Force (elements of the British Army sent to France in 1939 and 1940)

CAFV

Chairman, Armoured Fighting Vehicle Division of the Ministry of Supply

CCRA

Commander Corps Royal Artillery (senior artilleryman in an Army corps, accountable to corps commander for effective use of all corps artillery)

CETD

Chief Engineer Tank Development

CGME

Controller-General of Mechanical Engineering

CGRD

Controller-General Research & Development

CID

Committee for Imperial Defence

CIGS

Chief of the Imperial General Staff (the senior soldier in the British Army)

CIM

Chief Inspector of Mechanization

CRA

Commander Royal Artillery (senior artillery man in a division, accountable to the divisional commander for effective use of all divisional artillery)

DA

Director of Artillery

DAFV

Director, Armoured Fighting Vehicles

DDGFVP

Deputy Director General Fighting Vehicle Production

DESE

Director, Engineer & Signals Equipment

DFVI

Director, Fighting Vehicle Inspection

DFVP

Director, Fighting Vehicle Production

DGA

Director General of Artillery

DGES

Director General of Equipment and Stores

DGFVP

Director General, Fighting Vehicle Production

DGM

Director General of Munitions

DGME

Director General of Mechanical Engineering

DGMP

Director General of Munitions Production

DGTS

Director General of Tank Supply

DGTT

Director General of Tanks and Transport

DM

Director of Mechanization

DMGO

Deputy Master General of Ordnance

DMI

Director of Military Intelligence

DMO

Director of Military Operations

DMT

Director of Military Training

DNLE

Directorate of Naval Land Equipment

DOF

Director of Ordnance Factories

DOI

Director of Operations and Intelligence (later split into DMO and DMI)

DOS

Director of Ordnance Services

DRAC

Director, Royal Armoured Corps

DSD

Director of Staff Duties

DTD

Director of Tank Design

DTE

Director of Transportation Equipment

DTP

Director of Tank Production

DTS

Director of Tank Supply

EMF

Experimental Mechanical Force

FGS

Fancy Goods Store (the canteen at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst)

Flak

Flieger Abwehr Kanone (anti-aircraft gun)

FVPE

Fighting Vehicles Proving Establishment

GMC

General Motors Corporation

GSO

General Staff Officer

HE

High Explosive

HQ

Headquarters

HV

High Velocity (relating to a tank or anti-tank gun)

KwK

Kampfwagen Kanone (tank gun)

LMSR

London, Midland & Scottish Railway Company

MGO

Master General of Ordnance

MV

Medium Velocity (relating to tank or anti-tank guns)

NCO

Non-Commissioned Officer

OCTU

Officer Cadet Training Unit

OP

Observation post

PAK

Panzer Abwehr Kanone (anti-tank gun)

PRO

Public Record Office

QMG

Quarter Master General

RA

Royal Artillery

RAC

Royal Armoured Corps

RAOC

Royal Army Ordnance Corps

RE

Royal Engineers

REME

Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers

RHA

Royal Horse Artillery

RMC

Royal Military College

RTC

Royal Tank Corps

RTR

Royal Tank Regiment

RUSI

Royal United Services Institute

RYPA

Roll, yaw and pitch apparatus

SCNE

Select Committee on National Expenditure

SP

Self-Propelled (often refers to artillery on a tracked chassis)

TOG

The Old Gang

TR

Training Regiment

VCIGS

Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff

WOSB

War Office Selection Board

Prologue

VIGILANCE SLEEPS

Owing to the large number of casualties the full story of the Royal Wiltshire Yeomanry action will never be known. It is known that the leading Crusader squadron met six 88mm anti-tank guns and unhesitatingly charged on to them, destroying four out of the six at the cost of the whole squadron. Their Grant and Sherman tanks were also in action, but again owing to casualties their deeds are not known. The commanding officer and the squadron leaders were all casualties at an early stage, and the rear link tank lost touch in the smoke and dust. By 0900 hrs there were only five tanks of the Royal Wiltshire Yeomanry left.

FROM AN ACCOUNT OF THE ACTION OF 9TH ARMOURED BRIGADE, EL ALAMEIN, 2 NOVEMBER 1942

Actions such as this took place throughout the Second World War. Tank crews were ill equipped, undertrained, badly led, uncertain what they should be doing, but generally courageous. The genesis of this book was the observation from reading many accounts, and the direct experience of tank battles, that the development of British tanks before and during the Second World War was a disgrace. Further investigation and discussion led to the view that the ineffective performance of British tank units – particularly when compared with that of German and Russian tank forces – was not due only to the poor design and construction of the British tanks they used.

The original thesis suggested the title Death by Design. The title has been retained, even though the causes of unnecessary wastage of the lives of tank crews can be attributed to incomplete training, uncertainty of doctrine and poor leadership, as well as sub-standard design. These four causes were the main contributors to the ill-pre-preparedness of British armoured forces not only at the beginning of the war in 1939, but also before the war and during the whole of its course until early 1945.

Tank crews were murdered because they were sent into battle so ill prepared. The thing that should make us angry and indignant is that with a little thought and planning these murders could have been avoided. In November 1918 Britain’s tank forces were more advanced than any others in the world, and ideas were being developed for the provision and use of progressively more effective tank forces. Had progress been maintained, even on a modest scale, it would have been possible for Britain to have tank forces comparable with those of Germany in 1936. This was the year when Hitler reoccupied the Rhineland, the first manifestation of his aggressive intentions. A determined and well-equipped British Army, including appropriate armoured formations, might well have acted as a deterrent.

A Crusader knocked out in the Western Desert, 1942. It probably did not belong to the Royal Wiltshire Yeomanry, because an encounter with a German 88mm would have left it far more battered. (Tank Museum)

This was not to be, and at no time until 1945 did Britain’s armoured capability meet that of the Germans. There were fleeting moments of equipment parity, provided in particular by the Matilda Tank in 1940 and early 1941. But Matildas were available only in small quantities in the places where they were needed, and their design did not lend itself to further upgrading.

The purpose of this book is to review the significant history relating to the development of British tank forces up to 1945, and to identify as far as possible the causes that led to those forces being so ill prepared to fight. The principal sections of the book cover the main international events of the period from 1919 to 1939, and the response of the British government to those events, particularly relating to the provision of the armed forces; the development of tank doctrine, tanks and tank guns; and the training provided at all levels of the tank forces.

The review of what happened allows us to see some of the reasons why Alistair Horne could make the statement: ‘The story of Britain’s tank inferiority all through World War II is one the great disgraces of her military history.’ Evaluation of the reasons suggests many ways in which things could have been done better. It is all too late for those tank soldiers who lie buried in a foreign field, and it is a long time ago anyway; but a nation must always be prepared to defend itself, and it should take all reasonable steps to ensure that those entrusted with its defence are properly prepared to do so.

A Matilda – ‘The Queen of the Desert’ – which was equal to the best the Germans could produce, but the period of parity was only from 1940 to mid-1941.

Si vis pacem, para bellum (If you want peace, prepare for war) Vegetius (fourth century)

CHAPTER 1

Atrophy of an Army

INTERWAR HISTORY 1918–39

At the beginning of 1919 the forces of Germany lay defeated, and those of Britain and her allies were strong and all-conquering. But by 1939 Britain’s army was small, ill equipped and ill trained, while Germany’s army was vigorous, well equipped and about to be triumphant. Why such a reversal? The answers lie largely in the terms imposed on Germany in 1919, and the national attitudes and reactions of Britain and Germany in response to international events as they unfolded.

This chapter reviews briefly the main historical events from 1919 to 1939, beginning with the features of the Treaty of Versailles that set those events in train. The reactions of progressive British governments are then considered, leading on to the effect those reactions were to have on the state of the British Army in 1939.

The Treaty of Versailles was the formal instrument for ending the hostilities of the First World War. Most countries who fought against Germany were invited; the significant countries not invited were Germany and Russia. There were three people of outstanding importance at the conference to determine the terms of the treaty: France’s Georges Clemenceau, known as Le Tigre (the tiger), who stood for an earnest desire to fetter and cripple Germany forever; America’s Woodrow Wilson who was full of ideas (his Fourteen Points) but no plan; and Britain’s Lloyd-George who felt initially that Germany should be treated with justice and compassion, but his self-serving political instincts, and an imminent election, made him change his view and promise that he would ask for the trial of Kaiser Wilhelm II, punishment of those responsible for atrocities, and the fullest indemnities for Germany.

With one main leader withdrawn into the clouds and the other two bent on hammering Germany it is hardly surprising that the terms of the treaty (see Appendix I) were considered by Germans at the time, and by historians subsequently, to have been unreasonably harsh. Like any other proud nation Germany was not going to take these perceived injustices lying down. There was a mood which would compel them, under a suitable leader, to right these wrongs.

In contrast to this determined attitude the British wanted only to sit back peacefully and not have to be involved in a similar conflict ever again. They would look after the empire, of course, but the League of Nations would look after any international unpleasantness.

SIGNIFICANT HISTORICAL EVENTS LEADING TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR:

3 January 1925:

Mussolini becomes dictator of Italy

October 1929:

Wall Street Crash

18 September 1931:

Japan invades Manchuria; League of Nations does nothing

2 August 1934:

Hitler becomes dictator of Germany

3 October 1935:

Mussolini invades Abyssinia

7 March 1936:

Hilter reoccupies Rhineland

12 March 1938:

Hitler invades Austria

August/September 1938:

Czechoslovakia under pressure of invasion; war seems inevitable

September 1938:

Chamberlain meets Hitler and finally gets his ‘letter of intent’ (so-called ‘peace in our time’)

15 March 1939:

Hitler invades Czechoslovakia and occupies Prague

31 March 1939:

Chamberlain promises aid to Poland in the event of aggression

23 August 1939:

Germany and Russia sign a non-aggression pact

1 September 1939:

Germany invades Poland

3 September 1939:

Britain and France declare war on Germany

BRITAIN’S DEFENCE NEEDS

A nation’s survival can be defended and upheld by three main means: diplomacy, economic strength and armed strength. During the period 1919–39 these methods were used to achieve the objective of Britain’s national survival, and in the early part the main thrust was by diplomatic and political means. Britain, along with many other countries, considered that the League of Nations would provide collective security for all member nations – and, indeed, all the world. It was therefore considered that the need for armed strength as a complement to diplomacy was of secondary importance. Indeed, soon after the end of the First World War the government promulgated the policy called the Ten Year Rule. This stated that in the government’s view there was no likelihood of a war for ten years, which clearly meant that there was no need to keep substantial armed forces in being during those ten years. In 1920 it was assumed that there would be no war until 1930; in 1921 no war until 1931; and so on. Thus the provision of armed forces was allowed to slip back by a process of progressive procrastination.

Britain’s defence requirements were more complicated than those of many other countries because she had to consider not only the defence of the home islands, but also that of her imperial possessions. This defence was required not only for those possessions themselves but also because they provided much of the raw material and food that Britain required. It was necessary not only to protect those countries themselves from external or internal threats but also to protect the sea lanes between those countries and Britain. A particularly important locality that required protection was the Suez Canal, forming as it did a vital link between Britain and India and other British possessions beyond Suez. So to the first requirement for the employment of armed strength, home defence, was added the second, maintaining imperial holdings and communications.

The third area where armed forces might have to be employed was what was called the Continental Force. This requirement was for an armed force which could go to the aid of Britain’s allies, specifically those on the European continent. This had been done in 1914 when Britain sent the expeditionary force to help the French and Belgians, which over a four-year period became a very substantial army. There was much debate as to whether Britain still required to maintain the capability of sending such a force. This debate was renewed from time to time during the course of the 1920s and the 1930s.

METHODS FOR ACHIEVING DEFENCE OBJECTIVES

Assuming that the three main defence objectives are home defence, protection of imperial holdings and the communications with them, and the provision of a continental force, what are the ways in which those objectives can be achieved, and what are the requirements for the Army, Royal Navy and Royal Air Force (RAF) respectively?

A Light Tank Mk VI B (Indian pattern) leaves a fort at some point in the mid-1930s. (Tank Museum 1623/B6)

A Light Tank Mk VI B (Indian pattern) ascends – with difficulty – the Nahakki Pass; the light tanks could at least move in such country, and there was therefore a significant demand for this type of tank. (Tank Museum 268/A4)

Home defence depends on all three services, in particular the Royal Navy, to prevent any forces landing on Britain’s shores. That task can also be undertaken by the RAF who can intercept aircraft supporting invasion forces; the RAF can also repel those invasion forces themselves. The British Army assists in preventing hostile forces from landing, and then has the major role in combating those forces once they have landed; another role is the provision of anti-aircraft defence.

Imperial holdings and communications needed to be protected particularly by the Royal Navy because of the Navy’s great mobility and ability to move quickly from one trouble-spot to another with substantial firepower. The role of the RAF in defending imperial holdings and communications was to assist the Navy and to carry out bombing and other attacks on insurrections within the countries which form part of the empire. The role of the Army was to provide a force which could defend the countries of the empire against invasion and against internal insurrection or other troubles. In some countries, particularly India, the troops from Britain were very substantially supported by troops of the country itself, but there was still a need for British forces in various roles in all of those imperial possessions.

The Continental Force was a much more contentious item. Basically the requirement was to provide support to Britain’s European allies. Britain provided substantial forces in the First World War and gave great support to the French. If Britain were allied to France at any future time would France expect a contribution from Britain in her defence? The answer was obviously yes. But what form could that support take? One view put forward very strongly was that the most effective form of support would be by an air force, and a land force would not be necessary.

The role of air forces was a subject for intense debate after 1918. Their expansion during the First World War had been very substantial considering that, in effect, there were no air forces at the beginning of that war. By the end Germany had 200 squadrons of aircraft, France 260 and Britain 100. These forces were mainly used as fighter squadrons or for reconnaissance. There was certainly some bombing, and the bombing which took place over England created a very strong impact on both the people who were bombed and the British government. It was felt that bombing alone could destroy both the will and the capability of a country to defend itself. This was put forward in particular by an Italian, Giulio Douhet, in his book The Command of the Air (1921). His thesis was that there was no effective defence against the bomber and that both civilian morale and industrial and defence installations would be destroyed very quickly after the employment of substantial air power.

This then presented the government with two major choices for providing support to a continental ally. The first was by building up a substantial bomber fleet, the second by providing a substantial armed force on the ground. In both cases the Royal Navy would provide support, particularly to the armed force on the ground. There was at that time a reluctance on the part of the RAF to provide air support, both in protection of supply routes to the Army and in a direct tactical fashion.

BRITISH GOVERNMENT REACTIONS TO THE EVENTS, 1918–39

In this section we consider the reactions of the British government to the historical events which occurred between 1920 and 1939, and consider in particular the actions that were taken to maintain the defence objectives mentioned in the previous section.

The first significant action to be taken was obviously to demobilize all the enormous forces that Britain had raised during the First World War. Because it seemed clear that this had been ‘a war to end wars’ it was not necessary to consider the need to fight another war for a long time. Some people thought that there would be no more wars. The decision regarding no more wars resulted in the Ten Year Rule mentioned in the previous section. Ministers could assume that there would be no serious assault on Britain itself, nor would there be any need for the Continental Force. The only requirement that had to be met was that to defend the imperial possessions and the lanes of communications with those possessions. This requirement involved mainly the Royal Navy, which would make sure that the sea lanes were not threatened by any hostile powers and would protect any troops being sent to any area where hostilities had broken out on land.

On the land itself there was a need to provide British troops to deal with local insurgents either from within or outside the particular British territory. The British would be supported generally by troops belonging to the imperial possession itself. The particular areas of initial concern were Palestine and the north-west frontier of India. Other trouble spots arose during the years from 1920 to 1930, but generally the number of troops required was small. The British Army did have a commitment in the Rhineland, where, with the French, they formed the force occupying the demilitarized zone. This was to be occupied for a total period of fifteen years but troops were to be withdrawn progressively, first after five years and then after ten years. In fact they were all withdrawn after ten years and the last allied occupation troops left the Rhineland in 1930.

A Light Tank Mk III in Palestine, 1936; it belonged to the 6th Battalion, Royal Tank Corps. (Tank Museum 367/E6)

It was not until the 1930s that significant international trouble began. Italy had a dictator in the person of Mussolini, but his intentions were not taken to be aggressive up to that time. In Germany Hitler had not yet come to power, although his Nazi Party was becoming more powerful. Up to 1930, however, Germany was not seen as an aggressor nation partly because she had no significant forces with which to be aggressive. The other possible country that could disturb the peace of the world to any large degree was Japan, and again up to 1930 there was no significant indication that Japan had any aggressive intentions.

The first overt action to create a disturbance in international affairs was the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. On the night of 18 September 1931 a small charge of dynamite exploded in the marshalling yards just outside of Mukden, Manchuria’s capital. The bomb did little harm but was used immediately by the Japanese as an excuse to protect imperial interests in Manchuria. They promptly invaded, seizing towns and communication centres throughout the southern part of that land. Immediately after the Mukden incident, Chiang Kai-shek, representing China, counselled a policy of no resistance and announced that China would take its case to the League of Nations. This might have restrained the Japanese if any of the major powers had been prepared to espouse China’s rights; unfortunately no one was. The Japanese representatives at Geneva insisted that they had acted only to restore order, that they had no territorial ambitions and that they would certainly withdraw once safety of life and property had been assured.

In the end the league appointed a commission to investigate the affair. In February 1932 Manchuria was proclaimed by the Japanese as a separate nation and given the new name of Manchukuo.

The Japanese installed Henry P’u Yi, the last of the Manchu dynasty, as head of the government of the new country. He was, of course, entirely dependent upon Japan. The league’s investigative committee, under Lord Lytton, finally reported in 1932. It flatly condemned Japanese aggression. Japan, however, had no intention of apologizing or surrendering what it had gained. When the other nations at Geneva accepted the report the Japanese walked out and left the league. They then began pushing their Manchurian invasion further inland in China.

This created concern in the British cabinet and they decided on 23 March 1932 to revoke the Ten Year Rule in response to the increasing threat posed by Japan. The whole cabinet accepted the cancellation of the Ten Year Rule without dissent; however, it went on to state that this did not justify immediate increases in defence spending, and that in view of the disarmament conference the whole spending question should be studied further. The armed services had won the right to plan but not to spend.

The dominant department in the cabinet was HM Treasury. Through its control of finance it became the central body for the development and coordination of policies on most matters, but particularly those where significant sums had to be spent. (This of course applied to all the three service departments.) But HM Treasury had also to consider Britain’s economic condition. Because of the Wall Street Crash in 1929 and the spread of economic depression throughout the world during 1930–1 the Treasury had to pay very close attention to Britain’s ability to spend money on defence without suppressing economic recovery. The balance between the economy and defence was one which was to occupy the Treasury and the War Office from 1932 until 1939.

On 30 January 1933 Hitler became the Chancellor of Germany. That appointment and the Nazi Party’s subsequent consolidation of power was a source of great concern to the British Foreign Office and government generally. There were fears about Germany’s rearmament which led the government to view with dismay the possibility of aggression in Europe as well as in the Far East.

In the light of this change in Europe the British Chiefs of Staff drew up a new assessment of the imperial defence situation. They considered that Germany would be a profound threat to British security within 3 to 5 years and emphasized how unprepared the Army was for any type of continental role. This unpreparedness would take years to remedy because Britain was lacking not only the weapons of war and the service people, but also the plant to produce those weapons. The delay between nominating the requirement for a weapon and the production of that weapon in battleworthy form with people trained to use it can be as long as 3 or 4 years. The Chiefs of Staff recommended that the deficiency in the defence forces should be dealt with immediately.

The paper in which this was proposed was presented to the Committee for Imperial Defence (CID). The CID decided that a group called the Defence Requirements Committee (DRC) should be instituted to formulate plans for Britain’s rearmament.

The Defence Requirements Committee was set up in November 1933 and had on it the most powerful and influential civil servants in British government at the time. The chairman was Maurice Hankey, the Secretary to the Cabinet and the Committee for Imperial Defence. Other members were Warren Fisher, the Permanent Secretary to the Treasurer; Robert Vansittart, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State; and the three heads of the services: Adm Chatfield, Sir Edward Ellington and FM Montgomery Massingberd. The first meeting of the Defence Requirements Committee took place on 14 November 1933 and agreed in principle to concern itself primarily with the nation’s military needs. They considered the threats to Britain as they were at that moment. Vansittart expressed the belief that Germany was the primary threat in the long term. The committee agreed and then came to grips with the question of how Japan should be dealt with in view of the position of Germany. Fisher of the Treasury argued that because the nation lacked the resources to engage two first-class powers at the same time it had to decide which was the more serious threat and concentrate on that. Fisher suggested that it would be as well to gain Japan’s respect by a show of resolve in the Far East. He therefore recommended the rapid completion of the base in Singapore and the modernization of part of the fleet for operations there.

To deal with the German threat the committee proposed a five-year programme to remedy the deficiencies of the armed forces. Under this programme the Royal Air Force would be brought up to fifty-two squadrons, a strength recommended and approved in 1923 but never achieved owing to subsequent economies. The Army was to be able to put 4 infantry divisions, 1 tank brigade and 1 cavalry division on the continent within five years. For the Royal Navy the committee recommended that the existing fleet should be modernized, new bases built and the air arm increased. This report resulted from the DRC’s first meeting and was discussed by the cabinet on 14 March 1934. Their initial discussion reached no decisions and they had a second meeting on the matter five days later.

Nothing was settled at this meeting and it was decided that an outside committee should make a decision on the terms of reference. In effect the report was shelved as the cabinet was unwilling to come to grips with the unpleasant and expensive realities it set forth. Pressure from the Chiefs of Staff on 20 April forced the cabinet to make a decision. Their decision was that those questions should be turned over to the Ministerial Committee on the Disarmament Conference.

Thus the matter of rearmament was discussed by a disarmament committee. The membership of this committee consisted entirely of politicians, and it was therefore going to consider the political and economic implications of any proposed course of action. In the political climate of the time, with pacifism still a dominant force and an election a little more than a year away, the committee was not going to go out of its way to adopt programmes that would upset large segments of the electorate.

The first meeting of the Ministerial Committee on the Disarmament Conference discussed the DRC report. Having decided that it was better to improve relations with Japan rather than spend money on Singapore and the modernization of the Royal Navy in the Far East, the committee then considered the German threat. Chamberlain questioned the need for the Continental Force. It was pointed out that if Germany was going to control Belgium and Holland she would have an ideal area from which to bomb England. Chamberlain replied that if the RAF were built up it could provide a deterrent to Germany’s even thinking of such a move. This in part stemmed from a statement made by Baldwin in November 1932 in a speech to the House of Commons when he spoke about air attacks by hostile bombers and said: ‘In the next war you will find that any town which is within reach of an aerodrome can be bombed within the first five minutes of war from the air. It is well for the man in the street to realize that there is no power on earth that can protect him from being bombed. Whatever people may tell him the bomber will always get through.’ Chamberlain’s counter to this threat by German bombers was to suggest the building up of a strong bomber force for the RAF. The report from the Defence Requirements Committee was also sent to the Treasury. As a result of the Treasury report and further discussions by the disarmament committee it was resolved on 12 July 1934 that the Army should receive a budget of £20 million to be spent over five years, while the RAF should receive a further forty new squadrons to act as a deterrent to Germany and inspire confidence at home.

The actions over this period of time illustrate the way in which requirements were formulated by professional defence people for the defence of all of Britain’s interests and were dealt with by politicians in a way that can only be described as vacillating. This approach, coupled with the Treasury’s reluctance to spend money on defence, resulted in a very slow improvement in the quality and size of Britain’s forces. However, there were two sides to this question.

On 4 March 1935 a White Paper on Defence stated that the government had to increase defence expenditure because of the deterioration of the international situation and the failure of the Disarmament Conference. On 9 March Hitler used the White Paper, which he claimed was directed against Germany, as a pretext to announce the existence of the German Air Force to the world. This made the government sit up and ask the Air Ministry for an assessment of the relative strengths of the two air forces.

The cabinet appointed a sub-committee of the Disarmament Committee on Air Parity to look into the situation. The committee recommended that to obtain parity it would be necessary to spend almost £10 million more than the current air estimate. On 21 May 1935 the cabinet authorized that the numbers and types of planes suggested be ordered immediately, subject to Treasury review.

This was called Scheme C, and required the purchase of 3,800 planes between then and April 1937. This would not only enable Britain to maintain parity with Germany, but would encourage the expansion of the aircraft industry.

While Scheme C was being debated in parliament, the Defence Requirements Committee was assessing what was needed for all three services to provide adequate defence of the country. The resultant plan was called the Ideal Scheme and was presented on 11 November 1935; each of the services was considered.

The RAF reserves were to be expanded (in addition to the already authorized Scheme C); the Royal Navy would have a fleet sufficient to meet Japan in the Far East, while still being able to deal with a simultaneous threat in home waters; and the Army was to be able to put a Field Force of 4 infantry divisions, 1 tank brigade and 1 cavalry division on the continent within a time-frame to be determined.

The main problem with the Ideal Scheme was its cost, which was more than £400 million above and beyond expenditure planned for the next four years. The Treasury position on the Ideal Scheme was put forward by Neville Chamberlain, then Chancellor of the Exchequer. He considered that it would exceed Britain’s capacity to pay, and would thus dislocate the national economy. Therefore it would have to be scaled down to the point where it would be in line with the nation’s resources. Scaling down demanded allocation of priorities, and Chamberlain argued that an RAF with a powerful strike capability was the best investment. The Royal Navy would receive second priority, and the Army a distant third.

Neville Chamberlain was Chancellor of the Exchequer 1931–7, and Prime Minister 1937–40. More than any other single person he was responsible for the ill-preparedness of Britain’s armed forces at the outbreak of the Second World War.

These views were reinforced in respect of the Army by the industrialist Lord Weir, who considered that the logistics of equipping a Field Force made such a force unrealizable for several years. For the Army the decision was taken in February 1936 that plans be prepared for a Field Force to be ready in five years, and that all plans to expand the Territorial Army be cancelled.

The rearmament expenditure agreed in the 1936 budget continued to make the Treasury very uncomfortable. This discomfort was greatly reinforced when the defence services’ estimates for the 1937 budget were received. The Treasury became determined that defence spending, and the borrowing required for it, could not be allowed to exceed certain prescribed limits. A memorandum was prepared by Richard Hopkins of the Treasury on the future of defence finance and was ready for Chamberlain when he became Prime Minister on 28 May 1937. Chamberlain then authorized the Treasury to draw up a plan for the complete re-evaluation of the rearmament programme based on the Hopkins paper. This plan, drawn up in a few weeks, recommended a detailed review by the services of their current and anticipated expenditures. The Treasury also recommended that until the review was completed, decisions on new defence programmes should be postponed.

During the summer of 1937, while this review was being carried out, the cabinet assigned to the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, Sir Thomas Inskip, the task of preparing a report recommending the direction and shape that rearmament should assume.

Inskip issued an interim report in December 1937, and the final report in February 1938. The basic strategy advocated was to limit Britain’s military preparations to those sufficient to protect the country from a ‘sudden knock-out blow’. This strategy meant that the order of priority for defence resources was: security of the United Kingdom; keeping the sea lanes open; defence of British territories; the fourth priority, and a bad last only to be undertaken after the other priorities had been met, was the Continental Force.

The Army felt, with good reason, that it had become the ‘Cinderella’ of the services. The Continental Force would have been made up of operational field units and would have been able to move quickly to combat aggression against continental allies. The table (Figure 1.1) shows that in the three really significant years for preparing an Army for 1939 (1936, 1937 and 1938) expenditure on the Army was lowest or equal lowest for the three services. Although the increases in expenditure were substantial in 1938 and especially 1939, by then it had become far too late to provide a well-trained and well-equipped Army for the Second World War when it broke out. The lead times for the design and manufacture of equipment, for the training of soldiers to man the equipment and for the development of leaders to command those soldiers, are measured in years. Months were all that were allowed by the blinkered, cowardly, appeasing politicians of pre-1939 Britain.

FIGURE 1.1: DEFENCE EXPENDITURE BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT 1930–9 (£ MILLION)

The various delays imposed by the government on the development of even the most modest Army impacted on all its branches; infantry, tanks, artillery, engineers and signals. The greatest impact was felt by those branches of the Army where lead times for the design and manufacture of equipment was the largest. The lead time for a new tank – from the initial specification to receipt of operational tanks by field units – cannot be fewer than three years and may be as many as six. This assumes that there is a reasonably firm specification at the outset, i.e., the users of tanks or their superiors can state clearly what the tank is required to do. The broad requirements are translated into specifics, such as: what main gun or guns are needed, and what ancillary armament; how fast the tank must move, and over what sort of country; what range of operation is needed, and thus how much fuel; what opposition is to be expected, and what protection or thickness of armour is appropriate.

A major problem for British tank designers and manufacturers in the interwar years was the lack of a detailed specification. This stemmed in turn from uncertainty as to how tanks should be used. The first matter to consider is therefore the function of an armoured force. What are the useful contributions that tanks can make as part of an Army? This forms the subject of the next chapter.

APPENDIX 1.1 THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

1. Chronology

President Woodrow Wilson developed a statement of fourteen points to serve as a basis for the cessation of hostilities between Germany and the Allied Powers. He presented this statement to the US Congress on 8 January 1918. He amplified the points in various speeches during 1918. (A summary of the fourteen points and the chronology for 1918 are given in Section 2.)

The terms of the armistice had to be formalized into a treaty. The Paris Peace Conference debated this treaty, starting on 18 January 1919. On 7 May 1919 the terms of the treaty were presented to a German delegation summoned to hear them; Germany had not been represented at the Peace Conference.

The Germans were outraged by many of the terms and the differences between them and the Fourteen Points. But they were in no position to take any action by force, and signed the treaty on 28 June 1919. The main heads of the treaty are described in Section 3. Finally, treaties were signed with Germany’s supporters; those treaties are listed in Section 4.

2. President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, presented to the US Congress on 8 January 1918.

1. Open covenants of peace openly arrived at, with no subsequent private understandings.

2. Absolute freedom of navigation on the seas.

3. Removal of all economic barriers between all nations consenting to peace.

4. National armaments to be reduced to minimum consistent with domestic safety.

5. Impartial adjustment of colonial claims.

6. Evacuation of Russian territory.

7. Evacuation and restoration of Belgium.

8. All French territory to be freed, invaded portions restored, including Alsace Lorraine.

9. Italian frontiers to be readjusted.

10. Peoples of Austria–Hungary to have freest opportunity of autonomous development.

11. Romania, Serbia and Montenegro evacuated; territorial integrity of Balkan states to be guaranteed.

12. Turkey be to assured secure sovereignty; Turkish-occupied territories to be given opportunity for autonomous development.

13. Independent Polish state to be set up and guaranteed: Poland should have free and secure access to the sea.

14. A general association of nations to be formed to afford political independence and territorial integrity to all nations great and small.

President Wilson developed his theories during 1918 with the following statements:

11 February 1918, to US Congress: The Four Principles.

4 July 1918: The Four Ends: these can be summarized into one sentence: ‘We seek the reign of law, based on the consent of the governed and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind.’

27 September 1918: The Five Particulars: these stress the need for impartial justice and the avoidance of any covert groupings of league members for any purpose whatsoever.

On 4 October 1918 the German government requested President Wilson to bring about an armistice on the basis of the Fourteen Points. After discussions with Germany President Wilson asked the Allied governments if they would grant an armistice on the basis of the Fourteen Points. They agreed, but with two modifications:

• Exclusion of Point 2, freedom of navigation on the seas

• Inclusion of a reparations clause: ‘Compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air.’

These conditions were presented to the German government by President Wilson on 5 November 1918. The German government gave no written reply to these terms, but accepted them by asking FM Foch, Generalissimo of Allied Forces, for an armistice. This was granted on 11 November 1918.

3. Analysis of the Treaty of Versailles, 1919

Signed on 28 June 1919 and brought into force by exchange of notifications on 10 January 1920. Note that this treaty was only between the Allied Powers and Germany. The treaty had fifteen parts; there was no direct relationship between the parts and the Fourteen Points, although some of the points found expression in the treaty.

Part I: The establishment of the League of Nations, intended to unite all its signatories in a league guaranteeing their territorial independence and integrity.

Parts II & III: Territorial dispositions: Germany lost territory in the west, north and east.

West: Belgium acquired from Germany the frontier districts of Moresnel, Eupen and Malmedy; Luxembourg ceased to be associated with Germany in a customs union and later entered into an economic union with Belgium; the Saar basin was placed under the control of the League of Nations, with a plebiscite to take place in 1935 (it was, and the Saar voted to return to Germany); Alsace and Lorraine were ceded to France by Germany; the left (west) bank of the Rhine and the right bank to a line drawn 50 km to the east were demilitarized.

North: Germany lost northern Schleswig to Denmark in a plebiscite; the Flensburg zone elected for Germany.

East: Germany ceded West Prussia and most of the province of Poznan to Poland. This created a corridor separating East Prussia from the rest of Germany. Danzig was created a free city under the league.

Part IV German rights and interests outside Germany: Germany ceded all its overseas colonies to the Allied powers, who distributed them to various mandatories.

Part V Military, naval and air clauses: Germany agreed to reduce its Army to 100,000; the size of the Navy was restricted, and no replacement ship was to exceed 10,000 tons; all naval and military air forces were prohibited, and all aircraft and other equipment were to be destroyed.

Part VI Prisoners of war were to be returned, and graves were to be maintained.

Part VII Kaiser Wilhelm II was to be tried as a war criminal; however, the Dutch government refused to release him and the matter lapsed.

Part VIII Germany was to accept responsibility for losses and damage caused by Germany and her allies, and to pay reparation for it.

Part IX Financial clauses: these relate to the technicalities of German reparation payments and other financial matters.

Part X Economic clauses: these clauses dealt with the restoration of commercial relations; the most important provision was that securing ‘most favoured nation’ treatment from Germany for five years without reciprocity.

Part XI Aerial navigation: Allied aircraft had full liberty of passage over Germany until 1 January 1923.

Part XII Ports, waterways and railways: the main aim of this section was to secure international control over rivers which flow through more than one country. International commissions were set up to control the Rhine, Elbe, Oder and Danube rivers.

Part XIII Labour. This section created the International Labour Organization through which the league members would endeavour to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labour for all workers.

Part XIV Guarantees: the Rhineland, and bridgeheads across the Rhine at Cologne, Coblenz and Mainz, were to be occupied for varying periods up to fifteen years.

Part XV Miscellaneous provisions, none of great significance for subsequent history.

4. Other Treaties Determining the Outcome of the First World War

The Treaty of Versailles was between the Allied Powers and Germany; it did not include those countries that at one time or another during the conflict had supported Germany. Treaties with those other countries were signed at different places and at different times as follows:

10 September 1919:

Austria signed the Treaty of St Germain.

27 November 1919:

Bulgaria signed the Treaty of Neuilly.

4 June 1920:

Hungary signed the Treaty of the Trianon.

10 August 1920:

Turkey signed the Treaty of Sèvres.

CHAPTER 2

How are Tanks Used?

Scene: Salisbury Plain, 3 March 1932

The three young officers all wore the cap badge of the Royal Tank Corps (RTC). They shivered as they stood on the ridge and looked over the farmlands and woods towards the river. It was 7 a.m.

‘Hell of a time to meet.’

‘CO always likes an early start, but he could have chosen a warmer day.’

‘Do we know it’s going to be him that’s coming?’

‘That’s my bet. Look, isn’t that a scout car coming up the hill there?’

They watched as the scout car came to a halt. A tall figure dismounted, leaned in to say something to his driver, and walked across to the three officers. As he approached they came to attention and saluted.

‘Good morning, gentlemen. Right time, right place; good. At ease, and I’ll tell you what this is about. But first, you’ve all prepared your thoughts on the paper I sent you?’

‘Yes, Colonel.’

‘Well then. This is part of a programme to get ideas from throughout the Tank Corps as to how tanks can be used. It started at the top, and the General reckoned that it would be useful to get the thoughts of forward-thinking officers in an informal way. He asked me to select one subaltern from each squadron, give them a major tactical problem, and get their thoughts on what forces they would need and how they would use them. You’ve all had the same problem outlined to you in my confidential memo, and now I want your ideas. As I said in the memo, don’t be restricted in your thinking.

‘One final point before we start. Don’t get too carried away with being selected for this. Your squadron commanders have given good reports on all of you, but there are plenty of others not far behind.

‘Right, let’s start with you, Pat. That village over there, Parbury, is held by what appears to be an enemy division. We can assume they have artillery, but haven’t identified any other supporting forces. As you’ve been told, you are in command of a mobile force of about divisional strength, but you’ve been given a choice of what’s in the force. Tell me how your force is organized, and what you’re going to do with it.’

‘Yes, Sir. First, my force would be based round the tank brigade with mediums. I’d have a brigade of light tanks, a regiment of artillery, and a battalion of infantry. We would advance to the line of that road there’ – Pat pointed to a road about a mile short of the river and parallel to it, indicated by a line of trees – ‘with the tank brigade. The light brigade and the artillery would advance to the same place. As soon as the artillery were ready to fire we would start to shell Parbury, and advance with the light brigade to assault the bridge. From there we’d be guided by enemy reaction.’

‘Fine, Pat, I’ll ask you some questions and raise a few points when we’ve heard the others. You next, Bob.’

‘Sir. Like Pat’s, the central part of my force would be the tank brigade. I’d reverse the size of the infantry and the light tanks by having a brigade of infantry and a single regiment of light tanks. The light tanks would be used for reconnaissance, and the infantry would have lorries to move them forward quickly. I’d have three regiments of artillery, and a bridging company of engineers. The general plan would be to make a diversionary attack on Parbury, but with the main attack slightly later on the bridge about three miles downstream.’ He pointed. ‘I’d bring the artillery up to a position where it could support either attack, a mile back from the river and half-way between the bridges. The main attack would be an infantry assault, with the intention of seizing the downstream bridge and putting the tank brigade across. The infantry would hold the bridgehead, and the tank brigade would start to roll the enemy position up from the downstream bridge to Parbury. That’s it broadly, Sir.’

‘Thanks, Bob. My comments later, as for Pat. Now you, Charles.’

‘My force would be almost the same as Bob’s, Sir, and you know that none of us knew who else was going to be here. The only addition to my force is a squadron of RAF for close support, partly for reconnaissance and partly for bombing. My plan is different, because I know there’s a ford suitable for tanks almost half-way between Parbury and the downstream bridge. I’d use the planes to check the defence, and I’m making the assumption that their main defence will be at Parbury, with a secondary strongpoint at the downstream bridge, and a mobile force as reserve.