The Great Mistake E-Book

Peter Beale

• Herausgeber: The History Press
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2004

Beschreibung

On 4 September 1944, the British 11th Armoured Division entered Antwerp, capturing the docks intact. Basing his account on official war diaries, unit histories and personal recollections, Peter Beale examines the background, considers the actions taken and forgone between 4 and 26 September and reviews their effects on subsequent operations.

Leseprobe

THE GREATMISTAKE

THE GREATMISTAKE

THE BATTLE FOR ANTWERP AND THE BEVELAND PENINSULA, SEPTEMBER 1944

PETER BEALE

First published in 2004 by Sutton Publishing

The History Press

The Mill, Brimscombe Port

Stroud, Gloucestershire, GL5 2QG

www.thehistorypress.co.uk

This ebook edition first published in 2013

All rights reserved

© Peter Beale, 2004, 2013

The right of Peter Beale to be identified as the Author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyrights, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

This ebook is copyright material and must not be copied, reproduced, transferred, distributed, leased, licensed or publicly performed or used in any way except as specifically permitted in writing by the publishers, as allowed under the terms and conditions under which it was purchased or as strictly permitted by applicable copyright law. Any unauthorised distribution or use of this text may be a direct infringement of the author’s and publisher’s rights, and those responsible may be liable in law accordingly.

EPUB ISBN 978 0 7524 9504 0

Original typesetting by The History Press

Contents

Maps

Foreword

Acknowledgements

One

What was the Great Mistake?

Two

German Forces, August–September 1944

Three

Topography, Weather and Civilians

Four

Allied Forces: Command Structures and Commanders

Five

The Painted Veil

Six

Perception: Politicians and Commanders

Seven

Perception at the Sharp End: Euphoria

Eight

Allied Strategies

Nine

German Strategy and its Execution

Ten

Allied Operations 4–17 September

Eleven

Retribution: Operations, September–November 1944

Twelve

The Unforgiving Minute

Thirteen

The Reasons Why

Fourteen

Envoi: Teaching Grandmother

Appendix One

German Formations in the Great Mistake

Appendix Two

Allied Orders of Battle

Sources

Bibliography

Maps

Map 1

The Great Mistake

Map 2

21 Army Group Seine crossings, 26–31 August 1944

Map 3

Allied positions, 4 September 1944

Map 4

Situation of German 15th Army, 4 September 1944

Map 5

Antwerp waterways

Map 6

Locations of Forward HQs, June–September 1944

Map 7

German concentration, 5 September 1944

Map 8

Ports of north-west Europe

Map 9

Decision at Avranches

Map 10

Decision at the Seine

Map 11

The West Wall

Map 12

Relocation of German 15th Army

Map 13

Antwerp and northern suburbs

Map 14

Market Garden plan

Map 15

Orders for Canadian Army, 26 August and 3 September 1944

Map 16

Montgomery’s intention, 14 September 1944

Map 17

Advance to Woensdrecht – stage 1

Map 18

Advance to Woensdrecht – stage 2

Map 19

Capture of South Beveland

Map 20

Capture of Walcheren

Map 21

Rupel bridges at Boom

Foreword

Armies throughout the world are notoriously inefficient and wasteful of resources. These faults arise from many different causes, but two are of major importance. These are an inability to learn from past experience and a lack of clearly defined and realistic objectives. To the British Army’s major faults can be added a third, and that is the contempt it has for the competence of other armies, be they those of the enemy or those of their allies.

It has been a disadvantage for the British Army to have emerged on the winning side in the two major conflicts of the twentieth century, the First and Second World Wars. Being one of the winners gives rise to the complacent thought: ‘We won, so we must have done it right’; or alternatively, ‘We beat them, so we won’t have to worry about doing it again.’ These attitudes were proved tragically wrong in the years 1919–39. The British Army took more than ten years to evaluate its performance in the First World War, and British politicians, even if they were made aware of the deficiencies revealed, did little or nothing about them until it was too late.

The second major fault, the lack of clear objectives, is a political rather than a military fault. That does not absolve the armed services of blame. At the level of Grand Strategy the politicians are responsible, but at the operational level the service chiefs have that responsibility. This work is concerned primarily with the Army, the objectives given to the Army by the politicians, and the operational objectives formulated to carry out the country’s political will.

In the Second World War the British Army’s principal opponents were the Italians, the Germans and the Japanese. The Italians were considered to be cowardly, non-battleworthy, and generally lightweight troops. This judgement was not altogether wrong, although Italian troops under Rommel fought well in the desert. However, the British Army had some respect for the quality of the German soldier, based on the experience of the First World War. The Japanese were thought of as funny little men with spectacles and bad teeth, whose factories could make only second-rate products. This attitude was mirrored in the British Army’s contempt for them as soldiers – until the two armies met in combat. Wavell was a commander who had a particularly low opinion of Japanese military competence.

The principal allies of the British in the Second World War were the Russians, the French, the Americans and the countries of the Empire – Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. The Russians were seen as disorganised hordes whose only strength lay in their numbers; the French had large forces and a long military tradition, but they were considered decadent.

The Americans and the armies of the Empire were all considered to be amateurs in war – a reflection on their colonial past. It was thought that they could not comprehend or execute strategic concepts, but they could provide large numbers of fit, even if amateur, soldiers. The contempt for American ability for military command was strongest at the highest level of the British Government and its military apparatus. Two of the most outspoken critics were Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial Staff, and Montgomery, Commander of the British 8th Army and subsequently 21 Army Group. Both of these two were equally contemptuous of the strategic ability of the Commander of the 1st Canadian Army, Gen Harry Crerar.

It was the belief of the British that it was only possible for professional soldiers to understand and execute military campaigns at the highest level. This arrogant attitude had little justification, considering that the British Army had won only two campaigns in the first three years of the Second World War (North Africa 1940, Gen O’Connor, and East Africa 1941, Gen Cunningham), both against ill-trained and poorly supplied Italians.

This book makes clear how these faults affected the course of the campaign in north-west Europe, particularly around Antwerp in the autumn of 1944. The central purpose of this work is not to impute blame, but to identify the causes of one of the major tactical blunders of that campaign. A very powerful tool for improvement is the evaluation of mistakes. To use that tool, the mistakes must be acknowledged, and their causes and cures sought with objectivity.

Acknowledgements

My thanks to Cornelius Ryan, who used the phrase ‘The Great Mistake’ in A Bridge Too Far to describe the failure of 21 Army Group to drive north from Antwerp on 4 September 1944. Curiosity as to the reasons for this mistake led to the research that formed the basis for this book.

Several people helped with research and production, and I would like to thank in particular Jonathan Falconer at Sutton Publishing for his encouragement and continued support; Christopher Dawkins of the Library of the Australian Defence Force Academy for preparing a very extensive list of references; and Stephen Bond for research at the National Library of Australia.

Living in Australia, it is of course not possible to access primary records held in England, and for his research at the National Archives and the Imperial War Museum my most grateful thanks go to my cousin Nick Beale. His intelligent appreciation and selection of relevant documents was invaluable.

Finally, my loving thanks to my wife Shirley, who has as always supported my work with patience, understanding and love.

Peter Beale

Valentine, New South Wales

Chapter One

WHAT WAS THE GREAT MISTAKE?

On 4 September 1944, units of 11 British Armoured Division entered Antwerp after a whirlwind advance through northern France and Belgium. With considerable help from the local Belgian Resistance, they captured the essential installations that controlled the operations of the docks, and occupied the dock area and the city up to the Albert Canal. But in spite of pleas from the Resistance, the British advanced no further for two days.

Had they immediately crossed the Albert Canal before the bridges across it were blown, their tanks could have moved north against light opposition and reached the Woensdrecht isthmus within hours. Such action would have sealed the isthmus, trapped 15 German Army to the west of the isthmus, and made the task of clearing the banks of the Scheldt estuary relatively easy and quick before the retreating Germans could rally and regroup.

The failure to cross the Albert Canal and advance north was called ‘The Great Mistake’ by Cornelius Ryan. What were the reasons for the mistake, and are there lessons we can learn from it? This part of the campaign had as its starting point the crossing of the lower reaches of the River Seine. The force under the command of 21 Army Group when they closed to the Seine was very mobile, consisting as it did of five armoured divisions, five independent armoured brigades and eight infantry divisions (see Appendix 2).

CROSSING THE RIVER SEINE

After the closing of the Falaise–Argentan pocket and the annihilation of much of the German forces in it, Allied forces advanced to the River Seine. The original plan for Operation Overlord envisaged that the Germans would have established defences along the river, and it would need set-piece attacks to cross it. But the German collapse allowed the Allies to close up rapidly to the river and make assault crossings on the run.

The crossings by 21 Army Group took place in the last days of August. The British 2nd Army crossed at two places: 43 Division of XXX Corps on 26 August at Vernon; and 15 Division of XII Corps at St Pierre de Vouvray, where a firm position was established on the east bank on 29 August.

1. The Great Mistake.

2. 21 Army Group Seine crossings, 26–31 August 1944.

The 1st Canadian Army consisted of II Canadian Corps and I British Corps. The Canadian Corps crossed between Pont de l’Arche and Elbeuf on 26 and 27 August, and entered Rouen on 30 August. Downstream from Rouen, 51 Division of I Corps pushed patrols across the river on 30 August, and further downstream again 49 Division, accompanied by the Royal Netherlands Brigade, got elements over the river on the same day.

XXX CORPS CROSSING AT VERNON

The crossing furthest upstream and nearest to Paris was that made by 43 Division of XXX Corps at Vernon. The leading brigade started their crossing at 1900 hr on 25 August. Although the Germans had no prepared positions on the northern bank, they still put up determined resistance. It was not until 28 August that the division was able to construct a class 9 bridge, followed by a class 40 to allow passage of tanks across the river. On 28 August, 11 Armoured Division, accompanied by 8 Armoured Brigade, moved over the bridge, and the next day they began their advance north-eastward on two parallel axes.

On the first day, 29 August, the pace of the advance was restricted by bad weather, demolitions and pockets of enemy resistance. On 30 August, the Guards Armoured Division took over the right-hand axis, and that evening the Corps Commander, Gen Horrocks, ordered a night advance to seize bridges over the River Somme at or near Amiens. This was achieved early on 31 August.

The advance continued at great speed, and by 2 September the Guards Armoured had captured Douai and Tournai and 11 Armoured had by-passed Lille. Orders were now issued directing the Guards on Brussels and the 11th on Antwerp. In the early hours of 3 September the Guards crossed the Belgian border, and before nightfall the whole division was in Brussels with units fanning out round the city to control the main approaches. On the next day, 4 September, elements of the division entered Louvain.

On the left axis, 11 Armoured fought through opposition on 3 September to reach a position to the east of Alost by nightfall. The next day they advanced on Antwerp, capturing the city and the docks. They were thus firmly established in Antwerp, with very effective support from the Belgian White Brigade, on 4 September.

XII CORPS CROSSING AT ST PIERRE DU VOUVRAY

The advance from the XII Corps bridgehead began on 30 August, with 4 Armoured Brigade leading and 53 Division close behind. The armour moved 25 miles during the day, reaching Gournay by nightfall. The next day, 31 August, 7 Armoured Division passed through the leading troops, and by the end of the day was within 20 miles of the River Somme. On 1 September, 7 Armoured drove on and, in spite of opposition, secured a bridge over the river between Amiens and Abbeville. Opposition became stronger during the next two days, and on 4 September the division bypassed Lille to the east so that it could advance more rapidly. It was thus able to reach Oudenarde and then Ghent on 5 September.

II CANADIAN CORPS CROSSINGS, ELBEUF–PONT DE L’ARCHE

On 30 August, 3 Canadian Division cleared the line of the River Seine into Rouen. Patrols pushed into the city and beyond, and on the next day 9 Canadian Brigade moved through the city in a triumphal procession and then on to the coast. They reached and captured the coastal town of Le Treport on 1 September.

On the same day, 2 Canadian Division captured Dieppe, the scene of the tragic raid on 19 August 1942 in which the raiding force, most of them Canadian, lost 3,600 out of 6,000 men. On the next day, the division stayed in Dieppe, partly to absorb 1,000 reinforcements and partly to prepare for a memorial ceremony on 3 September.

4 Canadian Armoured Division moved out of the bridgehead and reached Buchy, one-third of the way to the Somme, on 31 August. There the Corps Commander, Gen Simonds, received orders to make a night march to the Somme at Abbeville where, so Montgomery told him, there was a bridgehead over the river that had been captured by XXX Corps. Simonds decided that the advance should be made by the Polish Armoured Division and 3 Canadian Division, leaving 4 Canadian Armoured to refit and reorganise.

On arrival at the river on 1 September, they found that there was no bridgehead, and it was not until 3 September that the engineers of Polish Armoured were able to construct a class 40 bridge to take their tanks across. By the evening of 4 September, the Poles were 25 miles north of the Somme, but were held up by determined anti-tank opposition.

On 4 September, 3 Canadian Division moved over the Somme at Abbeville and advanced to the outskirts of Boulogne. The next day, part of the division moved on to Calais, with the intention that both ports should be invested and captured. 4 Canadian Armoured reached the Somme on 2 September, and concentrated astride the river, ready to move forward to assist the Poles.

CROSSINGS BY I CORPS

I British Corps consisted of 49 and 51 Infantry Divisions. 49 Division crossed the Seine between Caudebec and Vieux Port, and immediately swung left so that it could advance westward to invest and capture Le Havre, known as Operation Astonia. 51 Division was also to take part in this operation, but was first given the task of liberating St Valery. It was there on 12 June 1940 that the then commander of the division, Maj Gen Fortune, was forced to surrender with 8,000 men of his division to 7 Panzer Division and its leader Erwin Rommel.

On 1 September 1944, 51 Division avenged the disaster of 1940, and then turned westward to join 49 Division at Le Havre. Both divisions of I Corps, together with 33 and 34 Armoured Brigades, were therefore outside Le Havre on 4 September. They remained there during the preparations for the assault, which started on 10 September and was successfully completed on 12 September.

THE DAY OF THE GREAT MISTAKE, 4 SEPTEMBER 1944

The positions of the main formations of 21 Army Group on 4 September 1944 are shown below. The right flank of 21 Army Group was covered by the 1st US Army. The English Channel coast of north-east France had been reached between St Valery and the mouth of the Somme. Le Havre was still held by the Germans, as were the ports of Boulogne, Calais, Dunkirk, Ostend and Zeebrugge. Antwerp had been captured, but as yet the northern suburbs of the city and the road to Woensdrecht and Bergen op Zoom were in German hands. But on this vital day, 4 September, those hands were still weak.

3. Allied positions, 4 September 1944.

4. Situation of German 15th Army, 4 September 1944.

The German 15th Army had been holding the Pas de Calais, and had maintained a strong presence there because of the fear that the Allies would mount a second invasion across the narrowest part of the Channel. The Germans continued to believe the probability, progressively winding down to a possibility, that this invasion would take place. The belief was fostered by the massive and very skilful deception of Operation Fortitude.

The 15th Army had some fifteen divisions under its command on 6 June 1944, when the Normandy landings started. It was not until the German situation in Normandy deteriorated significantly that divisions were transferred from the 15th to the 7th Army. But even at the end of August the Germans had 100,000 men or more; there were additional troops in the ‘fortresses’ of the Channel ports, but they had been ordered to hold out in those fortresses.

By 4 September, as Map 4 shows, that part of 15th Army west and south-west of the estuary of the Scheldt was contained between the English Channel, the 1st Canadian Army pushing east from the Somme, and the strong thrust of the British 2nd Army from the Seine, across the Somme at Amiens, reaching the Scheldt at Antwerp. This thrust cut off any possibility of the 15th Army escaping to the south and east of Antwerp.

Map 1 shows the situation closer to Antwerp. The 15th Army was falling back from the Somme towards the Leopold Canal and the towns of Breskens and Terneuzen. It still held the Walcheren–South Beveland peninsula in strength. On 4 September the area between Merxem and Woensdrecht was held lightly.

The ‘Great Mistake’, then, was the failure by the Allies to send whatever force could be mustered to seize a crossing over the Albert Canal at Merxem (as the Belgian White Brigade encouraged and implored them to do), and send an armoured column with all possible speed to the isthmus 2 miles west of Woensdrecht. This column would have had to be reinforced promptly to put in place a block to prevent the escape of the 15th Army. But had this been done, and then followed up once again very promptly with more troops, there could have been an opportunity to sweep up the Beveland peninsula during the very short period that existed until the resilient Germans reorganised themselves.

The Great Mistake was to lose this fleeting opportunity.

COMMENTS BY MILITARY COMMANDERS AND HISTORIANS

In A Bridge Too Far, Cornelius Ryan records how 11 Armoured Division under Gen Pip Roberts reported on 4 September that the city of Antwerp had been captured with the docks intact:

The thirty-seven-year-old Roberts had brilliantly executed his orders. Unfortunately, in one of the greatest miscalculations of the European war, no one had directed him to take advantage of the situation – that is, strike north, grab bridgeheads over the Albert Canal in the northern suburbs, and then make a dash for the base of the South Beveland peninsula only 18 miles away. By holding its 2-mile-wide neck, Roberts could have bottled up German forces on the isthmus, preparatory to clearing the vital northern bank. It was a momentous oversight. The port of Antwerp, one of the war’s major prizes, was secured; but its approaches, still held by the Germans, were not. This great facility, which could have shortened and fed Allied supply lines all along the front, was useless. Yet nobody, in the heady atmosphere of the moment, saw this oversight as more than a temporary condition. Indeed, there seemed no need to hurry. With the Germans reeling, the mop-up could take place at any time. The 11th Armoured, its assignment completed, held its position awaiting new orders.

The person who could have given immediate orders to move forward with all possible urgency was the XXX Corps commander, Lt Gen Brian Horrocks. In his autobiography, A Full Life, he says that the Antwerp docks seemed the obvious objective, but he subsequently realised that this was a serious mistake. His excuse was that his eyes were fixed entirely on the Rhine. It never occurred to him that the Allies would not be able to use the port until the banks on either side of the estuary had been cleared of enemy troops and the mines swept. He goes on to say:

If I had ordered Roberts, not to liberate Antwerp, but to by-pass the town on the east, cross the Albert Canal and advance only 15 miles north-west towards Woensdrecht, we should have blocked the main German escape route. The meagre force in front of him was spread out on a 50-mile front along the canal. And on 3 September we still had 100 miles of petrol per vehicle, and one further day’s supply within reach.

In his History of the Second World War, Liddell Hart comments on what he calls ‘an extraordinary oversight’:

When the 11th Armoured Division raced into Antwerp on September 4 it had captured the docks intact, but made no effort to secure the bridges over the Albert Canal, and these were blown up by the time a crossing was attempted two days later, the division then being switched eastwards. The divisional commander, Roberts, had not thought of seizing the bridges immediately he occupied the city, and no one above had thought of giving him orders to do so. It was a multiple lapse by four commanders: from the top Montgomery, then Dempsey, Horrocks, and Roberts, four commanders who were normally alert to tactical opportunities.

Moreover, barely 20 miles north of Antwerp is the exit from the Beveland peninsula, a bottleneck only a few hundred yards wide. During the second and third weeks of September the remains of the German 15th Army were allowed to slip away northwards from the Pas de Calais. They were then ferried across the mouth of the Scheldt and escaped through the Beveland bottleneck. Three of the divisions arrived in time to strengthen the Germans’ desperately thin front in Holland before Montgomery launched his drive for the Rhine at Arnhem, and helped to check it.

The German General Eugen-Felix Schwalbe was put in charge of the operation for ferrying the 15th Army units across the Scheldt. He achieved this task to his own enormous satisfaction, and presumably that of his superiors. He has this to say about the Allied inaction:

I was in constant fear that the Allies would cut off the Beveland Isthmus by an advance north of Antwerp and thereby trap such troops as were in the process of moving out. If this had happened our alternative plan was to evacuate the troops through the Dutch islands to Dordrecht and Rotterdam. But such a journey would have been slow and dangerous. It would have meant a twelve-hour voyage by sea rather than the three-quarters of an hour needed to cross from Breskens to Flushing. We could not have hoped to rescue anything but the troops themselves had it been necessary to adopt this course.

In his Defeat in the West, Milton Shulman is critical:

If there be one criticism to make of Allied tactics at this stage of the campaign, it was the failure to push on beyond Antwerp shortly after the port had been taken. From 4 to 21 September no serious effort was made to cover this stretch of 20 miles from Antwerp to the base of the Beveland isthmus, thereby depriving 15 Army of their only reasonable escape route. True, the small British armoured spearheads that reached Antwerp were tired after their headlong dash from the Seine, and the long supply haul from Normandy had affected the availability of petrol, food and ammunition for any large-scale operation. Nevertheless, with little to oppose them but the hastily assembled infantry troops in Holland, a gamble of this kind might well have paid handsome dividends. Had the Allies bottled up 15 Army in the Beveland peninsula, or even forced them to take the hazardous sea voyage to Rotterdam, there could never have been an effective German position south of the Maas River. And had this position not existed there might have been a different outcome to the airborne operation at Arnhem. The fact that no determined effort was made to seal off the escape route of 15 Army is probably a measure of the surprise with which the Allied Supreme Command received the news that Antwerp had been taken.

In The Second World War, John Keegan looks back at the operations after the Allied victory in Normandy:

In retrospect it can be seen that the failure to clear the Scheldt estuary, and thus to open the way for the Allies’ fleet of cross-Channel supply vessels to deliver directly to Antwerp in the immediate rear of 1 Canadian, 2 British, and 1 American Armies was the most calamitous flaw in the post-Normandy campaign. It was, moreover, barely excusable, since Ultra was supplying Montgomery’s headquarters from 5 September onwards with intelligence of Hitler’s decision of 3 September to deny the Allies the use of the Channel ports and waterways; and on 12 September Montgomery’s own intelligence section at 21 Army Group reported that the Germans intended to ‘hold out as long as possible astride the approaches to Antwerp, without which the installations of the port, though little damaged, can be of no service to us’.

It would be fair to call Maj Gen Pip Roberts, commanding 11 Armoured Division, the Liberator of Antwerp. His division had distinguished itself in Normandy, and in a brilliant sweep north-east from the Seine it had ended its run by capturing most of Antwerp up to the Albert Canal, saving the vital sluicegates and port installations before they could be destroyed by the Germans.

There they stopped. The tanks had just completed one of the fastest advances in history, moving sometimes all through the night. Men and vehicles were fatigued, though not exhausted. Nearly forty years later, in 1983, Roberts insisted that he could have gone on across the Albert Canal on 4 September, resistance being still so feeble:

Monty’s failure at Antwerp is evidence again that he was not a good general at seizing opportunities. My thoughts, like Horrocks’ and Monty’s, were east to the Rhine on 4 September. We should have looked west towards Walcheren.

Unfortunately, I did not appreciate the significance of the fighting on the Albert Canal, and the Germans did not blow the crucial bridge for another twelve hours. If briefed before, I would have crossed the Albert Canal with tanks to the east of Antwerp and closed the Germans’ route into Beveland and Walcheren.

At that time petrol was coming up regularly on lorries, and we saved space on lorries by not using much ammunition. I had enough petrol to continue my advance.

The importance of having free access to the docks of Antwerp was understood at the very highest level. In Churchill’s memoirs covering this period the Prime Minister says: ‘Without the vast harbours of this city no advance across the lower Rhine and into the plains of northern Germany was possible.’ And in a despatch of a few days later, sent while he was at sea on his way to the Quebec Conference to be held on 10 September, Churchill wrote: ‘It is difficult to see how Twenty-First Army Group can advance in force to the German frontier until it has cleared up the stubborn resistance at the Channel ports and dealt with the Germans at Walcheren and north of Antwerp.’

This point was emphasised at the Quebec Conference, where the Combined Chiefs of Staff underlined the urgent need to open the port of Antwerp. Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsey was the Naval Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Expeditionary Force, Eisenhower’s senior naval commander. His sailor’s eye discerned the importance of opening supply ports, and on 4 September he sent a signal to Eisenhower, Montgomery, the Admiralty and the Commander-in-Chief, Nore:

It is essential if Antwerp and Rotterdam are to be opened quickly enemy must be prevented from:

* carrying out demolitions and blocking ports

* mining and blocking Scheldt and new waterway between Rotterdam and the Hook

* both Antwerp and Rotterdam are highly vulnerable to mining and blocking. If the enemy succeeds in these operations the time it will take to open the ports cannot be estimated

* it will be necessary for coastal batteries to be captured before approach channels to the river routes can be established.

On the next day, Ramsey wrote in his diary: ‘Antwerp is useless unless the Scheldt is cleared of the enemy.’

The capture of Antwerp with its docks intact was of paramount importance, since it offered an early improvement to the deteriorating logistics system. But as Ramsey said, it would be of value only if the approaches were cleared. Yet not one senior Army commander made this necessity clear to his subordinates, nor did they realise it themselves. Eisenhower’s directive of 4 September called for ‘securing’ of Antwerp without emphasising the need for its use. Montgomery, with his eyes fixed on the far side of the Rhine, paid it but scant attention, although his supply situation was becoming difficult. As a result, no instructions were given by 1st Canadian or British 2nd Army to subordinate formations to give priority to clearing the approaches. This was in spite of the above-quoted signal from Admiral Ramsey.

Montgomery did not at once exploit beyond the Antwerp docks, and the bridges leading north over the Albert Canal were not captured. The subsequent arrival of German reinforcements ensured a prolonged defence of the estuary, which could have otherwise been freed in a matter of days. The battles to free the estuary lasted into November and caused heavy casualties, most of them Canadian. In the early days of September, those Canadians were concentrating on capturing the Channel ports, most of which were severely damaged.

Chapter Two

GERMAN FORCES, AUGUST–SEPTEMBER 1944

GERMAN COMMANDERS IN THE WEST

There was a considerable difference between the actual German force available to oppose and attack from the West and the Allied perception of that force. We first look at the real situation of the Germans in the vicinity of Antwerp in the period late August to early September 1944, as well as the possibilities of reinforcing those formations.

The main problem in attempting to set down the facts of the German military situation at that time is that it was extremely fluid. This account cannot therefore pretend to be completely accurate, and it is unlikely that the Germans themselves were aware of the precise locations and strengths of all of their formations.

The German forces in north-west Europe were under the command of the Commander-in-Chief West, or to use the German designation, Oberbefehlshaber (OB) West. Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt had been OB West until he was fired by Hitler. At the beginning of July, when asked what should be done about the situation in Normandy, Rundstedt replied: ‘End the war, you fools, what else can you do?’ Somewhat naturally, Hitler considered this to be defeatist, and replaced him with Field Marshal Gunther von Kluge on 4 July. Six weeks later, on 17 August, von Kluge committed suicide, and was replaced by Field Marshal Walther Model.

As OB West, von Kluge had commanded Army Group B under Rommel and Army Group G under General Blaskowitz. Rommel was badly wounded by a strafing Allied plane on 17 July, and no one was sent to replace him. Thus, from mid-July until he committed suicide von Kluge fulfilled the dual roles of OB West and OB Army Group B. These two roles were taken over by Model. He was to concentrate on his northernmost formation, Army Group B, to meet the urgent threat posed by the Allied 21 Army Group and 1st US Army. Army Group G had in effect been written off. Following the second Allied invasion (Operation Dragoon) carried out by French and American troops in the area of Marseilles on 15 August, Army Group G had hurriedly left southern France and was falling back in disarray to the German border.

Model sent regular reports to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Staff (in German Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, or OKW). That officer was General Oberst Jodl, to whom Model sent his reports endorsed ‘with request for submission to the Führer’. Three of these reports were sent on 24 August, 29 August and 4 September. They give a picture of a progressively worsening situation, and one in dire need of reinforcement. However, Model is still clearly in control of his depleted and battered forces, and makes such moves as are feasible given the pressures the Allies are inflicting on the ground and in the air.

MODEL’S REPORT TO OKW, 24 AUGUST

Model’s report of 24 August, which was written before the Allies had crossed the Seine, describes the German positions along the river. Downstream from Paris they were held in sequence by LXXXVI Corps, LXXIV Corps, LXXXI Corps and XLVII Panzer Corps. Between them the four corps had twelve divisions or divisional battle-groups (this term implying a greatly reduced division). These included infantry divisions, parachute divisions (in German Fallschirm, or Fs), and field divisions of the German Air Force (in German Luftwaffe, or Lw). The divisions were: 711, 346, 3 Fs, 353, 271, 331, 344, 17 Lw Field, 49, 18 Lw Field, 6 Fs and 275.

Model goes on to say that in view of the strong Allied pressure it was probable that the Seine line could not be held, and he would have to fall back to the River Somme. That line needed to be constructed and occupied urgently, and for that purpose he had the very weak remnants of twelve divisions, which were: 352 (the stalwart defenders of Omaha Beach), 84, 89, 326, 363, 276, 277, 708, 272, 273, 343 and 5 Fs.

MODEL’S REPORT TO OKW, 29 AUGUST

Situation of the enemy

The British Army Group (25–27 Divisions) has started a rapid thrust across the Seine towards the north with the intention of driving our forces to the coast and taking possession of the V1 bases. They have powerful artillery support and total superiority in the air; they have up to 1,500 tanks that they can employ between the coast and Paris. [Note: with this number of divisions and tanks, and the location defined as ‘between the coast and Paris’, Model must have combined 1st US Army and 21 British Army Group in these figures.]

Situation of our troops

The divisions which came back across the Seine from Normandy after hard fighting and under extreme difficulty are armed only with few medium weapons, in general carbines, etc. Supply of personal and material requirements is completely inadequate. After five exhausted infantry divisions have been taken off to be used in the Fatherland, we can create four formations by combining the remnants of eleven divisions plus some reinforcements. These formations are in personnel only, all of whom will need equipment.