142,99 €
Mehr erfahren.
- Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
- Kategorie: Fachliteratur
- Sprache: Englisch
Inventing isn’t easy! After identifying and presenting the 12 "valleys of death", the real obstacles limiting the transition from an original idea to an innovative one, including the notion of socially responsible research, Knowledge Production Modes between Science and Applications 2 applies the concepts introduced in Volume 1.
The book starts off with 3D printing, which has essentially broken through all barriers by offering remarkable advantages over existing mechanical technology. The situation is different for 4D printing and bio-printing. First of all, we need to tackle the complexity inherent in these processes, and move away from disciplinarity to find robust, applicable solutions, despite the obstacles. This is possible in niche areas, but currently, low profitability still limits their general applicability and the willingness of researchers to embrace interdisciplinary convergence....
Das E-Book können Sie in Legimi-Apps oder einer beliebigen App lesen, die das folgende Format unterstützen:
Seitenzahl: 446
Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2024
Ähnliche
Table of Contents
Cover
Table of Contents
Title Page
Copyright Page
Foreword: Additive Manufacturing: From 3D Printing to Bio-printing
Introduction to Volume 2
1 Socially Responsible Research (SRR)
1.1. Introduction
1.2. Setting the scene
1.3. Modes of action
1.4. Provisional conclusion
1.5. Conclusion: from the 12 “Labors of Hercules” to the 12 “death valleys”
1.6. References
2 3D, 4D and Bio-printing Innovations and Additive Manufacturing
2.1. Introduction
2.2. Additive manufacturing or 3D printing
2.3. Reaching out to society
2.4. Consequences
2.5. 4D printing
2.6. Bio-printing
2.7. Discussion
2.8. Conclusion
2.9. References
3 Creativity and Additive Manufacturing
3.1. Toward a Big Bang of creativity
3.2. A comparison with 3D, 4D and bio-printing
3.3. Conclusion
3.4. References
4 Conclusion
C.1. A little tale of (almost) the end
C.2. Conclusion
C.3. References
Index
Other titles from iSTE in Systems and Industrial Engineering – Robotics
End User License Agreement
List of Tables
Chapter 1
Table 1.1
Difficult relationships between science and the public
Table 1.2
The 12 “death valleys” and associated criteria
Chapter 2
Table 2.1
Other industrially important 3D processes (source: Protolabs 2020; P
...
Table 2.2
Potential of different 3D technologies: red: rather negative; light
...
Chapter 3
Table 3.1
Possible application niches for the short term (green), medium term
...
Table 3.2
Positioning of 3D technologies in the conceptual space – application
...
List of Illustrations
Chapter 1
Figure 1.1
TRL spaces for SRR
Figure 1.2
Socially responsible research (SRR) between creation and society
Figure 1.3
For a responsible innovation
Figure 1.4
Schematic representation of the elements that interact in responsib
...
Figure 1.5
Trend in the number of publications on the theme of research and in
...
Figure 1.6
Reproducibility and integrity in research: the role of scientists a
...
Figure 1.7
Risk mapping for a decision in a situation of uncertainty
Figure 1.8
The case of mobile telephony
Figure 1.9
Case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy
Figure 1.10
Example of nanoparticles
Figure 1.11
Example of the Covid-19 pandemic
Figure 1.12
Innovation trajectories
Figure 1.13
Correlation between latitude and creativity
Chapter 2
Figure 2.1
Increase in the number of annual publications: orange: 4D printing;
...
Figure 2.2
Optical thickness µ
Figure 2.3
Example of a 3D object produced in the late 1980s
Figure 2.4
Advantages and limitations of 3D printing in relation to object des
...
Figure 2.5
The foundations of successful innovation
Figure 2.6
Temporal effects on process improvement
Figure 2.7
Positive environmental aspects of additive manufacturing
Figure 2.8
“Valleys of death” and 3D printing (specific case of stereo-lithogr
...
Figure 2.9
Pasteur’s quadrant: three basic research approaches (pure, use-insp
...
Figure 2.10
Process coupling – materials in 4D printing
Figure 2.11
Possible deformations of pure and/or associated materials that can
...
Figure 2.12
Spectacular example of a 4D object made with heat-sensitive polyme
...
Figure 2.13
Topics covered in 4D printing publications (1: 63%; 2: 2%; 3: 16%;
...
Figure 2.14
The question of modeling of shape by stimulation, the “possible” c
...
Figure 2.15
Scale elements to consider (tendon case) (source: Sommer (2016))
Figure 2.16
General principle of use (“virtuous circle”) of bio-printing
...
Figure 2.17
Cell carrier-deposit association in bioprinting
Figure 2.18
Principle of bio-printing with changes of living printed materials
...
Figure 2.19
Fork bifurcation
Figure 2.20
Schematic representation of a landscape of attractors
Figure 2.21
Bifurcations in a biological system
Chapter 3
Figure 3.1
Historical approach to disruptions and inventions
Figure 3.2
Elements likely to be involved in the initial phase of creativity (
...
Figure 3.3
Constellations for creativity
Figure 3.4
Clarification
Figure 3.5
Disciplinary difficulty in representing a complicated object
Figure 3.6
From idea to clarification
Figure 3.7
Properties of disruptive innovations (source: Montgomery et al. 201
...
Figure 3.8
Additivity principle (a reminder)
Figure 3.9
Attractiveness of additive manufacturing
Figure 3.10
The anisotropy of the material creates a curvature when changing t
...
Figure 3.11
Positioning of bio-printing at the interface with other discipline
...
Figure 3.12
Simulations based on the same dataset leading to different results
Guide
Cover Page
Table of Contents
Title Page
Copyright Page
Foreword: Additive Manufacturing: From 3D Printing to Bio-printing
Introduction to Volume 2
Begin Reading
Index
Other titles from iSTE in Systems and Industrial Engineering – Robotics
WILEY END USER LICENSE AGREEMENT
Pages
iii
iv
vii
viii
ix
xi
xii
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
Series EditorJean-Charles Pomerol
Knowledge Production Modes between Science and Applications 2
Applications
Jean-Claude André
First published 2024 in Great Britain and the United States by ISTE Ltd and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of research or private study, or criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, this publication may only be reproduced, stored or transmitted, in any form or by any means, with the prior permission in writing of the publishers, or in the case of reprographic reproduction in accordance with the terms and licenses issued by the CLA. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside these terms should be sent to the publishers at the undermentioned address:
ISTE Ltd27-37 St George’s RoadLondon SW19 4EUUK
www.iste.co.uk
John Wiley & Sons, Inc.111 River StreetHoboken, NJ 07030USA
www.wiley.com
© ISTE Ltd 2024 The rights of Jean-Claude André to be identified as the author of this work have been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s), contributor(s) or editor(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of ISTE Group.
Library of Congress Control Number: 2023949774
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication DataA CIP record for this book is available from the British LibraryISBN 978-1-78630-935-8
ForewordAdditive Manufacturing: From 3D Printing to Bio-printing
Jean-Claude André’s new book is invaluable because it is written by someone who has a wealth of experience and has studied and followed the path from the researcher’s idea to industrial application.
For over 50 years, Jean-Claude André has successively or simultaneously been a researcher, deputy scientific director of the CNRS engineering sciences department, scientific director of a joint organization devoted to workplace safety and advisor to the Institut national des sciences et de l’ingénierie des systèmes (INSIS-CNRS). It is fortunate that he thought to put his experience in writing because, unfortunately, in France, the invaluable experience of people like Jean-Claude André is often ignored by “managers” with no culture of innovation and often even without the slightest knowledge in science and/or engineering. May they one day open this book, promote innovation and halt the deindustrialization of France.
Jean-Claude André begins by reminding us of the role of manufacturing in a country’s economy, and its dependence on science and innovation. He points out – and no one should ignore this – that a job created in an industrial zone, as a result of political incentives and subsidies, and inaugurated with much fanfare, costs the community at least 10 times more than a job created in an innovative startup.
A large part of the book (in two volumes) is devoted to the transition from invention to innovation to industrial manufacturing. Chapters 1 and 2 of Volume 1 follow the long and winding road from one to the other, from supporting creativity to mobilizing producers, via the indispensable POC (proof of concept). Jean-Claude André describes in detail all of the pitfalls to be avoided in transforming an idea into a product. We must thank him for shedding light on the decision-making process, the immoderate and sometimes ignorant use of TRLs (Technology Readiness Levels) by the research administration in France and Europe. He also devotes several pages to industrial property and patents, indispensable for private research, yet disastrous as performance indicators for researchers since they measure above all an institution’s ability to pay lawyers and annuities. A great deal of space is devoted to the startups that line the road from idea to unicorn, many of whose corpses lie by the side of the road. We look at the various ways in which we can help them avoid going off the rails.
In Volume 2, Chapter 1 focuses on the social responsibility of researchers, inventors and companies. Communication plays a key role as an interface between science and the public. The difficulties and weaknesses highlighted during the Covid-19 crisis are well known. The author does not shy away from the issue, stressing the extent to which communication errors, ill-considered announcements made by ignorant people, the procrastination of expert advice and false hopes fuel the resentment of the crowd, always quick to look for scapegoats.
Beyond individual responsibility, Jean-Claude André advocates socially responsible research (SRR). At the end of the first part of this two-volume work (Chapters 1 and 2 of Volume 1 and Chapter 1 of Volume 2), the author summarizes in a table (section 1.5, Volume 2) that all of those responsible for innovation policy should have in front of them lists of the 12 obstacles to overcome in order to move from the researcher’s idea to innovation and economic success.
Chapter 2 of Volume 2 looks back at Jean-Claude André’s experience as inventor, with Alain Le Méhauté, of 3D printing, now known as “additive manufacturing”. Jean-Claude André describes the genesis and development of his adventure, which led from a laboratory experiment to additive manufacturing and its various technologies. An adventure with sales in the billions of euros per year, which is far from over. It is a fascinating story that sheds light on the blindness of many institutions and officials who prefer to do nothing, rather than take the slightest risk of supporting an innovation that could ultimately fail. It is as if we should only support startups that we are sure will become unicorns!
From 3D printing, Jean-Claude André moves on to 4D, describing the problems and associated technologies. He explains how this type of innovation must initially rely on a niche policy. After 4D printing, we move on to bio-printing and its challenges.
Chapter 3 of Volume 2 provides an overview of all of the processes that lead from creativity to industrialization. Asking the right questions, valuing interaction between researchers, fostering interdisciplinarity and integration are just some of the recommendations that emerge, drawn from the experience of starting up 3D printing, without forgetting the role of chance. The future of 4D and bio-printing is considered in the light of the applications that are already possible and described.
All in all, this book contains the invaluable lessons of real-life experience and encyclopedic knowledge, backed up by a truly impressive bibliography. Nowhere else will you find such an important body of knowledge on the links between research, invention and industrialization. In addition, Jean-Claude André’s erudition is also reflected in an impressive number of quotations, sometimes surprising or amusing, but always highly illuminating, making this book an enthralling read, dense but exceptional in its truth of a lifetime’s experience.
Jean-Charles POMEROL
President of the Agoranov incubator
Introduction to Volume 2
Research management, the operation of projects, overly production-based evaluations, weaknesses in interdisciplinary project management, and the position of academic research in relation to the business world are all issues raised in Volume 1 and are reexamined in this volume, simultaneously addressing the somewhat uncertain and difficult link between ideas and innovation, a key element in the development of promising emerging technologies. This work, in a way a prerequisite to any link with society, is undoubtedly useful with its bottom-up logic, with a modest number of actors to save time in producing a convincing proof of concept. But this is clearly not enough, and this aspect is discussed in this volume.
The previous volume showed that there can be no innovation without society, especially not against society, because invention, as well as innovation, are aimed at society. However, before the “happy” idea and its users are connected in real life, there are many obstacles to overcome, often far removed from science, yet some of them are part of it. To take one example, scientific research brings to the forefront complexity in invention. It cannot stop there, because the downstream, productive sector needs clear procedures for making objects, with simple and robust processes resulting from this intellectual “fermentation”.
On the one hand, we need to make radical transitions between complexity and determinism in order to produce but, on the other hand, attractive inventions are needed to make industrial sense of this production for interested customers. This means that, as soon as possible, these in-depth interactions between a science open to society and industrial production open to science must be put in place as soon as possible, despite the various “Herculean tasks” presented in Volume 1. They should lead to a genuine pooling of interests, and perhaps one day to a real merging.
In the long run, however, the relevance of a project will be judged by the researcher and/or their research unit on the basis of upstream risk-taking: individual risk-taking from the outset, exploiting the imagination, and then more collective risk-taking in scientific and technological support groups. This means that the organization of the laboratory must include reflexive, supportive partners who anticipate change, and who are not only committed to “protective values” (satisfying passive precepts of biased for example) or the hierarchical logics of an old order and ordinary careers…
This evaluation cannot therefore be solely academic in the disciplinary sense! In this context, science (researchers and organizations) must acknowledge its societal responsibility, which must be aimed at deepening and broadening knowledge. Science is not a trinket to be displayed in a global frame of reference; it has a local, or even wider, social or societal utility. It therefore needs to think responsibly about its aims and consequences (and it would be nice if it could think about the resources it devotes to them!). It must include a reflection on what technological progress represents, which is not an end in itself, but a means to living (well) on our planet. By reflecting with other stakeholders on its aims, it should not claim to be neutral, simply by asserting its objectivity, but should be committed to supporting the sharing of knowledge and the applicative powers associated with these achievements. Generally speaking, this is what Volume 2 aims to show, with the aims of responsible research, and from a more factual standpoint, around known situations arising from three-dimensional printing.
1Socially Responsible Research (SRR)
The implementation of scientific advances in our social practices without us being truly attentive to their impact on our values and representations, or at least with the feeling of powerlessness to control the inevitable process.
(Hirsch 2021)
I think we were so happy to develop all this criticism, because we were so sure of the authority of science. And that the authority of science would be shared because there was a common world. […] We didn’t even need to articulate this notion of a shared world, because it was self-evident. […] Now we have people who no longer share the idea that there is a common world. And this changes everything, of course1.
(Latour 2018)
The eternal question of disciplines and professions for which it is difficult to separate the context of discovery and the context of justification.
(Lénel 2014)
1.1. Introduction
With the atomic bomb, after Oppenheimer, the academic world questioned the responsibility of researchers and engineers for technological innovations. It is always difficult to distinguish between right and wrong… but, for example, when we know that 24% of greenhouse gas emissions in the United States are directly linked to the industrial sector, it seems worthwhile to examine how science can help reduce this rate (Everett 2022). In elongating this need for responsibility, Grundwald (2014) points out that questions of technology assessment today extend as far as its future consequences and the need to take account of society’s expectations. However, these expectations are subject to change, as can be seen today on certain issues associated with the war between Russia and Ukraine. It is becoming increasingly complex to distinguish between the individual and collective responsibilities of those involved in innovation. Debref et al. (2019) talk about inscribing social responsibility into the innovation process:
taking into account potential impacts on social well-being (Pavie 2012);
using social and environmental constraints to drive innovation (Temple et al. 2018). In other words, innovation has thus become responsible.
For Saint-Simon (1923), it is a question of “revising all ideas to base them on the principles of industry, to relate all morality to production”, a morality centered on satisfying all the needs of the members of the social body. Today, disruptive innovations are taking hold, notably with digital technologies associated with the concept of Industry 4.0. They are changing concepts, knowledge, our way of living together and therefore our social practices as a whole. “Every technical object is a negotiation […]; it is simultaneously the contract that momentarily seals the balance of power and the weapon brandished for other conflicts and negotiations” (Roqueplo 1983).
Even if the exercise is a delicate one, an ethics of the present day should explore new scientific fields and their possible consequences for society. It should go so far as to envisage modes of consultation with society, with a view to making the necessary trade-offs, albeit provisional and incomplete, choices (Hirsch 2021). Innovation is exploding in many fields to the point where attempts at exogenous anticipation, and even monitoring, are proving impossible. This is the current challenge facing ethical thinking. From now on, researchers and creative thinkers have a responsibility linked to their projects to produce new knowledge that can have an impact on society: pluralism of viewpoints and pluridisciplinarity of expertise with a view to the common good.
“Without the freedom to criticize technology, there is no ‘technical progress’ either, only and when this conditioning becomes cybernetic, as is the case today with new technologies, the threat becomes considerable” (Virilio 2001). Virilio takes up the Kantian theme of the public use of reason, which must always remain free (Kant and Mendelsohn 2007). But with big science, and its successive transformations, the novelties enabled by scientific developments bring us new technological possibilities every day. According to Fukuyama (2002), “today there are too many commercial interests and too much handling of money for self-regulation to continue to function properly in the future”. Similarly, researchers are guided in their choices by the possibilities of access to funding, directed by the authorities in major programs (ANR in France and Horizon Europe in Brussels).
So we need to discover new ways of paying attention (getting out of our ivory towers), sharing knowledge (between scientists and technologists, on the one hand, and with society on the other) and interdisciplinary expertise in increasingly complex and wide-ranging fields, mobilizing and affirmation of choices. “It’s all about recognizing the interconnectedness and importance of situated knowledge, and not pitting sources of knowledge against each other and the knowledge sources of scientists” (Lénel 2014). This principle of socially responsible research should enable us to move away from an overly disciplinary and “sacralized” conception of science, specific to France. In these circumstances, for informed debates, according to Jaeger and Mispelblom-Beyer (2014), the following two conditions are necessary:
to not regard non-ideologized disagreements as a waste of time, an obstacle to the emergence of a truth (at least provisional) that can simply be revealed by asserting arguments of authority;
to avoid bypassing them with a “conciliationism” that avoids taking a position and leads to inaction (Charlot 1995).
NOTE.– Ethics and responsibility.
In principle, “research ethics” concerns the conditions of acceptability of research involving humans, society and animals. In this chapter, proposals will focus on the social impacts of innovation and little on human-related aspects, and even less on animal ethics (see, for example, Potter 1971; Richmond 2000; Pinsart 2009; Halioua 2017). Under these conditions, thinking does not consist of denying the existence of reality, of “facts”, but in emphasizing the part of construction in the perception we have of them. More than the question of discipline, it is the question of the need to study action that emerges, as this is not the prerogative of any discipline, human sciences or so-called “hard” sciences. So, rather than talking about ethics, which could lead to confusion, we have chosen to talk about the principles of responsibility.
NOTE.– Acceptability.
The expression of a goal to better respond to user aspirations from the earliest stages of innovation, and not in the final phase, when work is limited to the social acceptability of the final product, corresponds, according to Chouteau et al. (2020), to the final exploration of the theme. But in both of these “considerations”, the word acceptability, more or less social, has been used. By “contribting to a metaorphosis” in the way some people deal with this word in relation to society, the discourse on responsible innovation has generally avoided undergoing a thorough conceptual deconstruction (Thapa et al. 2019). However, the dictionary indicates that acceptability refers to a character of something that is more or less tolerable. It is a tricky concept to define, apart from the perception, founded or unfounded, of risks. Since the end of the 30 years post World War Two, in most Western countries, public protests have been voiced. The rise of these reactions associated with technologies appears to be a public thematization of risks, that is, the formation in the public sphere (in the Habermasian sense) of universalizing norms such as “environmental and health protection” (Lehoux et al. 2019).
Generally speaking, the French are clearly interested in new technologies (Bauer et al. 2021). But within this framework between the social body and the worlds of research and innovation, how do the players – all of the players – position themselves, and who is ultimately responsible for what?
The necessary relationship between science and society undoubtedly need to be reexplored periodically with a view to strengthening trust between all stakeholders. The malaise linked to the loss of trust in the “system” is reflected in a number of opinions; but is it possible to find the right words to express and operationalize this search for agreement between science, technology and society (Kerninon 2009)? Ronsavallon (2006) distinguishes several forms of democracy:
involvement where citizens join forces to produce a “common world”;
expression, linked to the manifestation of collective feelings;
intervention that aims for joint action to achieve a chosen result.
In these three forms of political activity, it is clear that the “involvement” component of innovation is not strictly covered (Lechevalier 2019). Forms of mistrust and loss of legitimacy of certain technologies emerge from this deficit. There are several reasons for this negative assessment:
the lack of explanation of what is being promoted in technological terms;
the absence of an overarching vision;
the weakness of a common intellectual elaboration between public and experts;
– the development of a “social disarticulation” by not sufficiently associating technological advantages and risks for humans and the environment (Touraine 1988);
abusive extension given to the notion of harm (degradation of the principle of “non-negligence” according to Ogien (2007)).
1.2. Setting the scene
Our culture dictates that we must win: on the battlefield as well as in cut-throat economic and scientific competition… now that we’ve reached the extreme limits of performance, martial violence and economics, are we so sure that we must always win, even spiritually? (Serres 2007).
Are innovations revolutionary? Are they based on originality, the surprising, the unexpected? On the contrary, most of them are very conventional. They’re based on simple, predictable laws of evolution that nature itself knows how to put to good use. To innovate is to think outside the box (Dortier 2015).
The greater the speed of operation, the slower the response to the unexpected event (Ellul 1988).
The company creates technology in relation to its own culture and its own traditions, and in a recursive manner, technology is an important element in social evolution, “as customs adapt to technical availability and constraints and this transformation is often unexpected” (Gaudin 2005). Thus, it is becoming increasingly clear that man-made objects are not neutral and can lead to forms of ethnocide through artifacts (Jaulin 1970, 1977) but science, technology and society must integrate human components into all of their psychological and social complexities, as well as their temporal evolutions (Barré 2020).
On this theme, Habermas (2002) writes:
At first glance, moral theory and ethics seem to be preoccupied with the same question: ‘What must I do?’; ‘What must we do?’. Only ‘ought’ no longer has the same meaning when we ask ourselves about the rights and duties we impute to everyone reciprocally from the point of view of the first person plural, and when, concerned about our own lives, we adopt the point of view of the first person singular to ask ourselves what, all things considered, is better to do in the long run ‘for me’ or ‘for us’.
Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to introduce the framework of responsibility that could/should inhabit the thinking of researchers and/or inventors, especially if we take Michel Serres’ (2008) opinion on the relationship between technical innovation and society into account. He writes: “By separating nature and culture in this way, have we committed an error of judgment, resulting in a mortal crime against ourselves and the world, both inert and living?”. Indeed, in attempting to answer this question, we must take into account the influence of the progress of scientific knowledge on the understanding that researchers/inventors have of themselves as people responsible for their actions, even future ones. This reflection on responsibility corresponds to a modest proposal for a commitment to scientific research, adapted to “techno-sapiens” (Lipovetsky and Serroy 2008), toward an “ethics of knowledge”.
As Figure 1.1 shows, the TRL values of these ideas, if possible prior to the production of a POC, are quite low.
Although the focus is on making the outcomes of innovation processes more accountable and desirable, the technological and commercial natures of these processes are not questioned in this book (for more on this topic, see, for example, Berger-Douce 2015; von Schomberg and Blok 2021).
Responsible innovation refers, according to Lehoux et al. (2019), to “different types of socio-technical systems that can be described as ‘responsible’ because they share the objective of meeting societal challenges and are oriented towards a common good that recognizes that life in society depends on the good governance of a shared set of resources (material or not)” (Flahault 2013; Forsyth and Johnson 2014). It involves an ethical reflection on the merits of technological development in a given social framework (von Schomberg 2013; Stilgoe et al. 2013).
Figure 1.2 illustrates the main components of the Lehoux et al. (2019) model and summarizes the empirical categories derived from individual studies. In this model, the rather interdisciplinary cognitive-technological activity involves different categories of resources of various origins (materials, capital, technologies, practical or scientific knowledge, etc.). This activity proceeds by “creative DIY” (Gurca and Ravishankar 2016), mutual learning and experimentation (see POC). It requires a technological and ethical design flexibility to envisage a socially “acceptable” achievement. Even if this is not part of French culture, it could be fostered by a cultural context where failure is seen as a source of learning and where the innovator may have room to maneuver. This is all the more true in the early stages of POC (Wittrock et al. 2021).
Figure 1.1TRL spaces for SRR
Figure 1.2Socially responsible research (SRR) between creation and society
Without it being easy to notice, artifacts act through feedback on practices and culture of society to such an extent that de la Miranda (2010) has written: “By acting on matter, Man simultaneously acts on himself. This makes us not just external users, but theoretically responsible creators, insofar as technology is a part of ourselves”. Within this framework, Attali (2007) assigns a number of missions to the world in the making. He writes:
Freedom in the sense of less pain and effort, more free time, despite the eminently illusory nature of this freedom ‘enclosed within four walls that are those of death and birth’. This freedom, the desire to live better within these four walls, the will to remove these walls by making life longer and better, and then the will to pass on better living conditions to those who will later live in this same room.
This ethic on how to “live well together”, in the sense of Ricœur (1990) (“aiming for a good life, with and for others in just institutions”), leads sciences and/or creative people to help produce innumerable goods, elements of technological progress. In fact, today it seems that our technological know-how is increasingly outstripping man’s knowledge, which is being disrupted by the very rapid dynamics of change. In any case, Puech (2008) writes that “technology is only neutral if it is considered as a means only, the difficulty being in the ‘only’”. Indeed, it cannot be considered neutral because of the instigation associated with the production of new consumer goods, and, as Ellul (1954) points out, because of the “principle of irreversibility of efficiency”.
Feenberg (2004), drawing on cultural and ideological presuppositions, proposes that the approach to science-society implications, in relation to the technological adventure and its social significance, can be summed up in the following propositions:
The technical design is not determined by a general criterion of efficiency, but by a social process that selects between technical alternatives according to a variety of case-specific criteria.
The social process does not concern the satisfaction of “natural” human needs, but the cultural definition of these needs and therefore of the problems posed to technology.
Competing definitions reflect conflicting social visions of modern society, embodied in different technical choices.
But what becomes of these proposals if we consider Saint-Exupéry’s views on a form of soft totalitarianism? In 1943, he wrote of France and the United States:
Today’s man is held together, depending on the environment, with belote or bridge. We are surprisingly well castrated. So we are free at last. Our arms and legs were cut off, then we were left free to walk. Personally, I hate these times, when mankind is becoming gentle, polite and quiet cattle under ‘universal totalitarianism’. We’re led to believe that this is moral progress […]. People who are fed ready-made food, standard food, like cattle being fed hay. That’s the man of today (Saint-Exupéry 1956).
This aspect of social control is an essential part of SRR thinking and will be examined further below.
Heidegger (1958) wrote: “What kind of decision-making mechanism be put in place to enable all citizens to express their views, not on research itself, but on the questions raised by the applications of research?”. The rapprochement and integration between science and innovation leads us to reflect on the responsibility of the researcher or creative artist, in a context marked by an increasingly ambivalent acceptance of risk. While the researcher and the “applicator” are bound by forms of responsibility yet to be defined, the user is not always innocent of the use he makes of the devices he acquires. This is the case with the numerous detours of innovations that we have seen that had totally escaped the designers… In case of the exploration of uncontrolled fields in terms of risks to society and the environment associated with technological research, we need to explore new forms of social and cultural rationalization.
So, according to Neubauer and Joly (2004), there is a form of social control, the need for direct in scientific choices (see also Dietz 1995; Irwin 1995; Dienel and Renn 1997; Andersen and Jaeger 1999; Calame 1999; House of Lords 2000; Callon et al. 2001). The advantages of these practices can be summarized as follows:
Participatory procedures can contribute to the political and objective legitimacy of decision-making processes. If we follow Callon’s (2003) definition of objectivity: “Knowledge can be said to be all the more objective when it has been put in a position to respond to the greatest possible number of objections”, then decisions taken with the participation of many different players have a better chance of being accepted by the public. The problem is to know how to share honestly between the knowledgeable and the uninitiated, and how to make the issues understandable to the public. Participation should, however, create a proximity between politicians and citizens that should reinforce the transparency of decision-making processes and encourage the reinstallation of trust.
Citizen participation should improve the knowledge base on which decisions are made, as it includes the diversity of knowledge (local, empirical, traditional, and different worldviews) that is taken into account alongside expert knowledge (and which forces the “translation” of confined knowledge), enabling solutions to be found that are better adapted to the complex realities on the ground (Callon 2003; Neubauer and Joly 2004).
The open science movement (Nosek et al. 2015) represents an effort to resolve the credibility crisis of coupling by promoting transparency in the research process (Tsui 2021).
“Citizens’ conferences or juries are places where new forms of knowledge creation are practiced. Unlike a poll or plebiscite, questions are open-ended and new ideas can enter the process”.
The use of expertise, in a very broad sense and across very different professions and sectors, ensures a multi-disciplinarity of viewpoints, values and different elements (scientific advice in politics was based on the idea of the independence of experts). However, this independence has become problematic, not least because of the commercialization of research.
Deliberative procedures must avoid the predominance in decision-making of the particular of a single group of players. Experience proves the competence of laypersons in dealing with complex issues, and their ability to act in the general interest and from a long-term perspective.
One of the aims of participatory procedures is also to enlighten citizens (without actually sharing the “deficit model”) and thus contribute to opinion-forming. However, this transfer of scientific knowledge should take into account the variability of “lay” audiences who need to form their own viewpoints (Allum et al. 2008; Schefeule et al. 2009; Jakobsen et al. 2019; Wittrock et al. 2021; Deserti et al. 2022). What is more, this plurality of viewpoints is hardly diminished by the media industries that would, according to Brumfield (2009), be at the origin of reliable sources of information adapted to citizens’ needs.
From an economic point of view, although sometimes expensive at the outset (carrying out a procedure), they have a very good benefit/cost quotient over the medium and long term, since they have the advantage of preventing potential conflicts, anticipating resistance upstream and making the necessary adjustments in good time.
From a practical point of view, co-created knowledge is needed to envision multi-dimensional and multi-scale innovation dynamics, initiated and monitored to encourage the creation of economic value alongside solutions to different challenges. In these processes, it is necessary to “test the innovation” to guarantee accountability of the final product.
Scientific skills and competencies required for innovation as an exploratory mode covering the central theoretical perspectives and fundamental concepts of responsible innovation, on the one hand, and empirical insights into how actors address dilemmas and related tensions in different contexts when innovating, on the other hand (Jakobsen et al. 2019).
Schwarz and Thompson (1990) define technological development as a dynamic, evolutionary process that associates technologies with patterns of organization, even disorganization, in conjunction with creative ideas, thus introducing a three-dimensional perspective to studies of responsible innovation (see also Fløys and Jakobsen 2017; Sjøtun 2019). Figure 1.3 therefore takes into account the fact that emerging innovations are part of a more complex discursive process, insofar as they are likely to produce a dynamic shift in “rationalities”.
Figure 1.3For a responsible innovation
1.2.1. Decision-making and ethics
Compartmentalizing disciplines leads either to literary people who don’t know anything about science, who are ignorantly cultured, or to scientists who don’t know anything about literature, who are uneducated and uncultured, i.e. two varieties of imbeciles. The problems we face today require all disciplines (Serres 2015).
The rejection by scientific thought of all ideas based upon value concepts, such as perfection, harmony, meaning and aim, and finally the complete devalorization of being, the separation of the world of value and the world of facts (Koyré 1968).
A society’s organizing system co-evolves with its production system and defines how it understands the world and governs behavior, encompassing models of thought, belief systems, social systems, political systems, economic systems, and governance structures which impact ways of thinking, seeing and making decisions at individual, institutional and collective scales. The ultimate design of the production system will be indelibly based on choices and decisions relating to how we design the different elements of our organization system (Arbib et al. 2021).
Throughout this chapter, we will examine the difficulty of putting into operation the various aspects associated with the “socialization” of scientific activities, the researcher’s “freedom”, which makes them responsible in a democratic society because, for various reasons, they are obliged to make choices. In our Western democracies, individual freedom is less a right than a duty. The fact that it can be considered illusory in the name of all the determinations over which we have no control, and which guide our decisions, does nothing to change the imperative it indicates (Jurdant 1994). In another context, Comte-Sponville (2004) defines, in relation to decision-making processes, four interacting orders of potential interest to the world of technoscientific research:
The techno-scientific order: we need to define the boundary between what is scientifically possible and what is impossible (this means that if only this order existed, as long as all of the funding was available, everything possible would normally be explored).
The legal-political order corresponds to the democratic order and may differ from one country to another. The state manages constraints and interests to ensure the stability of the social body. In principle, there is no moral position on the part of the state in democratic systems.
The moral order: this order subjects researchers to a certain number of moral requirements (if only because the knowledge of scientists, in the fields they dominate, is more important than that of citizens).
The ethics order: framing actions with a view to the overall well-being of citizens (right/wrong relationships); this relationship to ethics depends on the society in which we live (evolving nature of perceptions, acceptability, attractiveness, context, etc.). It is an approach that aims to understand ourselves to know what is desirable or undesirable, good or bad.
The last two criteria focus on analyzing the moral justification for research into a new technology in processes of critical foresight, because the technologies in question are rarely value and impact free. In fact, being responsible means being able to make a decision in situations of uncertainty and, in particular, when it involves several orders at once, without confusing them. When they are in contradiction, responsibility is linked to the decision to give priority to one or the other. According to Simon (1947), the decision-making process is based on the representation of the “dissonant” situation in which we intend to intervene. It is conceivable, in line with Boudon (1977, 2009), that these more or less collective decisions will bring together different, even contradictory interests, but adapted to the situation (between a choice using “individual” decision theories or those of games taking into account the effects of interdependencies and the “unpredictable” behavior of others).
This gives rise to forms of fragility that need to be addressed as scientific activity progresses. And this is precisely what the notion of socially responsible research expresses (André 2013). The European Union has introduced a number of “constraints”, for example in the European Charter for Researchers (Horizon 2020 2020), which brings together elements of deontology and ethics research. In the 19th century, De Tocqueville (1981) wrote:
Not far from this class is another party, whose object is to materialize mankind, to hit upon what is expedient without heeding what is just, to acquire knowledge without faith, and prosperity apart from virtue; assuming the title of the champions of modern civilization, and placing themselves in a station which they usurp with insolence, and from which they are driven by their own unworthiness.
Figure 1.4, taken from Tijdink et al. (2021), gives an idea of the scope covered by the SRR concept.
Figure 1.4Schematic representation of the elements that interact in responsible research practices; the three rings represent the different levels of consideration of SRR: scientific frameworks, the scientific system and the empirical cycle
These authors have identified several main themes that need to be taken into account in future research in the field of social responsibility:
evaluation responsible for research and researchers;
the effect of open science and transparency on SRR;
research on mentoring, supervision or responsible management and modeling managers;
the effect of education and training on SRR;
verification of reproducibility or robustness of results;
mastering integrity challenges (Haven et al. 2019a, 2019b, 2021; Horbach and Halffman 2019);
responsible evaluation.
NOTE.– Integrity.
Research practices that are, to say the least, imprecise from an ethical point of view, the research system with its high level of competition, unidimensional evaluation criteria, an individualistic research culture individualistic research culture and the pressure to publish for an academic career, can lead to unnecessary publications (Fanelli et al. 2015). Behaviors such as falsification, plagiarism and questionable research-checking practices are unacceptable (John et al. 2012; Haven et al. 2020). Research can result in misconduct, which can lead to rejection (Davies 2019) and risks of loss of confidence in science.
The situation is important for the creativity associated with artifact sciences, because “technological development transforms the meaning of what is human” (Heidegger 2003). Surprisingly, the framing of actions aimed at technological development is poorly developed in comparison with the life sciences, which are subject to a clear legal framework and recognized bioethical aspects (UNESCO 2005).
By way of example, Article 4 of the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (voted unanimously) imposes an imperative respect which illustrates this desire:
In the application and advancement of scientific knowledge, medical practice and associated technologies, the direct and indirect benefits to patients, research participants and other affected individuals should be maximized, and any harmful effects likely to affect such individuals should be minimized.
Freud, in 1908, introduced elements now known as (Freud’s) three frustrations: the first related to Galileo moving the center of the world; the second to Darwin placing the ape as Man’s cousin; and finally, to Freud himself placing human behavior in a new context. Should we add to these losses of egocentricity a fourth frustration for the researcher involved in the technological future, linked to a questioning of the premise of science? The questioning of his “freedom” or power?
The aim of this chapter is to show that the main role of science, which was to draw a coherent and acceptable picture of the world in which we are forced to live, is changing. Since, in particular, Isaac Newton, the world of intellectuals has been dominated by “natural laws”, based on rational, scientific, mathematizable and, until recently, essentially deterministic thinking (André 2008). On these foundations, Weber (1985) considers that, in modernity as currently constructed, the rational, dominating context of technology translates into a control of social life that threatens non-technological values. This tendency leads to what he calls the “iron cage” of bureaucracy. He is joined on this point by Taylor (2001), who characterizes our techno-scientific civilization by the arrival of “moments of complexity” which are likely to lead, without us being careful, to very profound transformations in society (which he defines as a transformation of our cultural plausibilities). Similarly, Janicaud (2002) further underlines this when he writes: “The danger in talking about techno-scientific societies is to suggest that we are sacrificing ourselves to a kind of ‘ontological majoration’ of tech-noscience, i.e. that we are betting on its capacity to found a culture, civilization and humanity”. Puech (2008), for his part, believes that “we are absorbed by the objects and their petty concerns. For this reason, we are deprived of the dignity of a way of thinking that asks questions about Being, which nonetheless constitutes a characteristic potential of the human being”. This futility of things constitutes, according to this author, what Heidegger calls “dereliction” (see Heidegger 1927; quoted in Puech (2008)).
But it was the success of the scientific method that brought society to this high technological level:
If the human condition consists in Man’s being a conditioned being for whom everything, given or man-made, immediately becomes a condition of his further existence, then man ‘adjusted’ himself to an environment of machines the moment he designed them. […] Even the most refined tool remains a servant, unable to guide or to replace the hand. Even the most primitive machine guides the body’s labor and eventually replaces it altogether (Arendt 1968).
In fact, the line between acceptance and rejection of a technology depends on whether the technology is considered neutral, value-laden or simply symbolic:
The invention of the steam engine and the locomotive is tantamount to the invention of a rail disaster […] Each period of technical evolution brings with it its own set of instruments and machines, and the appearance of specific accidents, revealing ‘in the negative’ the rise of scientific thought (Virilio 1996).
There are two at least partly separate areas to explore: ethics and/or morals, on the one hand, and risks, on the other hand.
So, crisis after crisis, emotion after emotion, we must now ask ourselves what place the “arrogant intelligence” of scientific rationality should have when, for example, reserves are dwindling or when the social order is profoundly challenged by its technological contributions. Technological innovation results in new, previously unimagined possibilities, and makes certain tasks easier to perform (Reschler 1998). However, if we think about it, the overall effect is to make people’s lives more subject to progress and more complicated. How far can we go to avoid going beyond the simple conservative tensions associated with technological progress? According to Nordon (2006), some scientists, particularly in theoretical disciplines, “consider that knowledge does not have to be useful, and work ‘for the honor of the human spirit’”. The thesis of the practical neutrality of science, reduced to mere knowledge, avoids the realm of action. Others, emerging from a set of fallacious representations of purely contemplative scientific knowledge (Lavelle 2007), want to be useful and proclaim that fundamental research is indispensable to applicable research (and vice versa)? For the latter, intention, decision, actions and their consequences fit perfectly into responsible action.
“Philosophers distinguish between knowledge and action, usually on the basis of Kant’s critical division between the faculty of knowing and the faculty of desiring” (Lavelle 2007). And what many of them have in common is a desire to have it both ways: to work solely according to their own personal tastes, without taking orders from anyone else, and to derive additional glory from the fact that their work sometimes has positive applications. As Stengers and Bensaude-Vincent (2003) remind us:
The contradiction between the admission of a strategic interest and the exaltation of disinterestedness is carefully avoided. Better still, any question raised about the legitimacy of such a disinterested pursuit is regarded as an act of criminalization – even a manifesto of anti-science.
This desire to be able to satisfy our own scientific desires is naturally also found in academic laboratories oriented toward engineering, as in all of the other sciences more specifically oriented toward the deepening of knowledge: “In many respects, society recognizes the importance of a search for knowledge […]. However, it is natural that there are more specific expectations on certain subjects and with a view to certain objectives” (Prieu et al. (2004); see also Forman (2007)). However, lost in his solitude and in the multitude of disciplines, the researcher, in good faith, may never realize the influence he exerts. In 1819, Benjamin Constant, on this subject, but in a different context, wrote the following eloquent sentences: “Never did his will imprint itself on the whole: nothing establishes his cooperation in his own eyes […]. We have lost in imagination what we have gained in knowledge” (Constant 1997).
NOTE.– Interdisciplinarity, science and responsibility.
How can we ‘share’ (in the etymological sense of the word communication) knowledge and build scientific knowledge off the beaten track? Our answer is twofold: by developing a dialogical ethic between indiscipline and responsibility, which is only possible by adopting an epistemology that breaks with the dream of a reason capable of saying what is true in an absolute and total way. In other words, drawing on the anarchist lessons of Kropotkin and Feyerabend, for whom it is the search for the researcher’s emancipation that must govern the construction of scientific knowledge, and not confinement in some absolute and unsurpassable ‘truth program’ (Veyne 1983) – whether the latter is called ‘discipline’, ‘pluri-discipline’, ‘inter-discipline’ or even ‘indiscipline’! (Dacheux 2013).
Classical science cannot think about its social and ecological responsibility because “for there to be responsibility, there must be a conscious subject; but the classical scientific vision (deterministic and reductionist) eliminates consciousness, eliminates the subject, eliminates freedom […]”. This “ethical blindness” of science is also due, continues the sociologist, to “the disciplinary culture, which fragments knowledge, and specialized training, which renders the scientist ignorant of, and then indifferent to, epistemological and, of course, ethical issues. Science is blind to what it is, what it is becoming, what it could or should be” (Morin 2004).
But under these conditions, society is increasingly calling to account those who have led it to its current state, unquestioningly dragged along by the media and advertising to the inevitable technical progress (to make themselves understood or to mask problems, such is the new “law” of communication (Mercier 2008))!
According to Tubiana (2007), “even the most rigorous scientists are afraid of upsetting the media by daring to tell the truth, because they feel that one day they will need them, so it is better keep quiet rather than oppose ‘political correctness’”. This situation of formal imbalance allows active groups (elements of temptation of democratic populism?) to unrelentingly raise the question of whether technology has indeed been developed to the measure of Man, in order to serve some purpose, or to less obvious objectives… However, “the social distribution of knowledge of
