Operation Mongoose E-Book

Jacinto Valdés-Dapena Vivanco

• Herausgeber: RUTH
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 255

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2016

Beschreibung

Amongst the "jewels of the CIA," the most secret, the deepest, the most compartmentalized operations and that, de facto, violated the supposed limits established for covert operations, we find from attempts on the Head of State´s life to actions of psywar. All these terrorist action will be seen in The Cuba Project, which subsequently would take codified name of Mongoose, the most spectacular and tenebrous plan of covert operations that an American administration has ever carried out against the Cuban Revolution. Mongoose meant the decline of the chosen Gods to avenge the defeat of the Assault Brigade 2506 at the Bay of Pigs.

Leseprobe

LEGAL PAGE

Original title:

Operation Mongoose. Prelude of a Direct Invasion on Cuba

Translation:

Ornán José Batista Peña

Editing:

Josefina Ezpeleta Laplace

Cover Design: 

Francisco Masvidal

Composition: 

JCV

© Jacinto Valdés-Dapena, 2012

© Over the present edition: 

Editorial Capitán San Luis, 2012

ISBN: 978-959-211-415-9

No part of this publication may be reproduced by any means,electronic, reprographic, or otherwise, or transmitted through either public borrowing or rental, without the prior written permission of the Copyright owners. Details of licenses for reproduction may be; obtained from CEDRO (Centro Español de Derechos Reprográficos, www.cedro.org) or www.conlicencia.com.

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Chapter I. A necessary introduction

Chapter I

A necessary Introduction

The battle of Bay of Pigs not only meant the first military defeat in the history of the United States, but also it reflected other transcendental aspects. The Cuban socialism, proclaimed hours before the invasion, had broken the myth of geographical fatalism, questioning topicality and validity of the Monroe Doctrine’ postulates in the middle of the 20th century and the core of it: The Manifest Destiny.

The legend on the CIA infallibility, elaborated with precise accuracy by U.S. propaganda centers, vanished in the Cuban landscape in April 1961. In the record time of seventy-two hours the heroism of the whole country was opening a new phase in the inter-American relations. The Lenin thesis, vehemently defended by Ho Chi Minh in the ‘20s, concerning the relation between struggles for national liberation and socialism, was present in Our America, integrated to the popular, antiimperialistic and nationalistic ideary of the Cuban Revolution, clearly expressed in Jose Marti’s work.

After the Bay of Pigs, John F. Kennedy administration was immediately before the essential dilemma that would characterize U.S.-Cuba relations to the present: what policy to be designed, and what strategy to be followed. The administration could choose between two variants. The former one corresponded to an objective and pragmatic analysis—while rational—that permitted the assessment of the truly character, essence and projections of the Cuban Revolution, while a political and autochthonous process, not derived from the Cold War. Thus, ways, forms, and methods aimed at establishing a communication and a dialog with Cuba were to be examined.

The latter variant consisted in insisting to destroy the Revolution with all available resources. Kennedy did not hesitate and opted for counterrevolutionary violence. It is important to identify, in their general features, the focuses that provoked this decision, the ones that are expressed in the following aspects: Cuba was perceived from the perspective of the U.S. national security and represented a threat for that nation. On April 20, 1961, Kennedy stated:

. . . Should it ever appear that the inter-American doctrine of non-interference merely conceals or excuses a policy of non-action—if the nations of this Hemisphere should fail to meet their commitments against outside communist penetration—then I want it clearly understood that this Government will not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations, which are the security of our Nation.

The national interests of the United States required subordinating activity of the counterrevolution to the guidelines of the Washington policy on the Island.

In its strategy against socialism, particularly the movements of national liberation, the United States gave high importance to special operations. It was not by chance that it gave top priority to operations of green berets, created the Peace Corps, improved advisory to police corps in Latin America, and sponsored operations of political and ideological diversion.

In a meeting with specialists of the U.S. intelligence community, John F. Kennedy exposed his view concerning subversive actions:

As military means become more lethal, which an increasing number of nations have access to them, subversive war, guerrilla warfare and other forms of struggle acquire higher significance. As thermo-nuclear weapons are more powerful, and there are fewer possibilities for their use, subversive operations play an increasing relevant role.2

The principle of the flexible response announced by Kennedy as the core of his project of foreign policy comprised:

1.Conjugation of political, social and economic measures expressed in reformist programs;2.Formulation of active and reactive diplomacy;3.Development of operations for political and ideological diversion;4.Outbreak of local military conflicts to counteract activity of revolutionary movements.

It was, thus, exposed what would be subsequently called as low-intensity conflict, whose first trial was undertaken against Cuba after the Bay of Pigs, and which would be present in the U.S. policy towards Latin America and the Caribbean to the present.

Cuba Study Group of Maxwell Taylor. Directives of the National Security Council. Views of Kennedy’s advisors

Cuba Study Group of Maxwell Taylor. Directives of the National Security Council. Views of Kennedy’s advisors

Shortly after the Bay of Pigs failure, President Kennedy gave Gen. Maxwell Taylor the mission of describing, explaining, and concluding on the causes that determined the disaster of Operation Pluto. Taylor’s appointment was not a mere chance; it was the signal of Pentagon presence as a very important force in new subversive plans that were to be shaped on Cuba.

President Kennedy’s instructions to Taylor, contained in an April 22, 1961 letter, were:

“To take a close look at all our practices and programs in the areas of military and paramilitary, guerrilla and anti-guerrilla activities which fall short of outright war. I believe we need to strengthen our work in this area. In the course of your study, I hope you will give special attention to the lessons which can be learned from recent events in Cuba.”3

That same day, the first meeting of the General Taylor’s Cuba Study Group for investigations on covert operations on Cuba developed by the CIA, was held. It is important to mention its members, because it was made up by those who had had direct responsibilities in the execution of the Operation Pluto and by those who, subsequently, took the direction of the Operation Mongoose in 1962.

PARTICIPANTS

Study Group Members

General Maxwell Taylor

Attorney General Robert Kennedy

Admiral Arleigh Burke

Allen W.Dulles

Department of Defense

Major General David W. Gray

Colonel C.W.Shuler

Commander Mitchell

CIA Personnel

General C. P. Cabell

C. Tracy Barnes

Colonel J. C. King

Jacob D. Esterline

[Name not declassified]

Colonel Jack Hawkins4

In this working group, Richard Bissell, Chief of the CIA clandestine services, main architect of the Operation Pluto and one of the founders of the Central Intelligence Agency does not appear.

Analysis of points approached in this meeting gives much light on covert operations on Cuba, developed by the CIA in fulfillment of guidelines of foreign policy of the U.S. Government.

Colonel King (Chief of the CIA Western Hemisphere Division, to which the operational working group on Cuba was subordinated then) explained that by late 1958, the CIA undertook two attempts for preventing the revolutionary forces headed by Fidel Castro from taking the political power in Cuba. The first attempt was in November 1958 when the CIA contacted Justo Carrillo, of the Montecristi Group, to forge a plan that would impede the victory of the Rebel Army and displace Fidel Castro as the main leader of the revolutionary movement that faced the tyranny. The second attempt was to take place in December of the same year: The former U.S. ambassador in Brazil and Peru, William Pawley, supported by the Chief of the CIA station in Havana, contacted Batista and proposed him the creation of a Junta which he would give the power to.

In the meeting, a CIA specialist, not identified, explained that on September 21, 1959, he took the responsibility to plan potential actions of the CIA in contingency situations that might develop in Latin America. Most Central American countries (Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador) were identified as potential contingency problems due to their governments lack of stability. Haiti and Santo Domingo were objectives of top priority. In South America, Paraguay, Bolivia, and Argentina were included among the countries that required to be studied.

Cuba was the objective number one for contingency planning. It was also considered that from the United States perspective, the Cuban situation continued worsening, and in December 1959 it was made the decision that the CIA needed to urgently consider the activation of two programs:

1.Selection, recruitment and careful assessment (including medical, psychological, psychiatric, and polygraph aspects) of about thirty-five Cubans, preferably with prior military experience, for intensive training program to make them be instructors in different paramilitary specialties (including leadership, sabotage, communications, etc.).2.Undertake training of Cuban recruits, in a clandestine way, to be organized in small teams, similar to the concept of U.S. special forces, and to infiltrate them as communication agents in areas of Cuba where opposition centers were identified requiring specialized training, leadership and military insurance.

Jacob D. Esterline, one of the chiefs of the CIA Operational Group working on Cuba, made an analysis of the Cuban Task Force. This Task Force had been organized to undertake actions on Cuba, and steps that led to report presented to President Eisenhower on March 14, 1960, which was the first authorization for mounting an operation aimed at overthrowing the Cuban Revolutionary Government.

Specialists of the CIA confirmed that the plan on Cuba was conceived with four main directions: (1) creation of political opposition; (2) transmission means on Cuba; (3) creation of a paramilitary force outside Cuba, demanding talents of leaders, and (4) covert intelligence and actions from within Cuba.

From consulted information, it is obvious that already in the 1960 fall, the CIA recognized that its original plans conceived in the Operation Pluto were condemned to fail, so the concept of paramilitary force was interpreted now in Assault Brigade (force of military invasion). In operational terms this decision expresses a malfunction, while the covert operation became an overt operation.

Willing to intensify subversive action on Cuba, and in the middle of deliberations of the Study Group on Cuba concerning the causes of the fiasco of the Bay of Pigs and formulation of political proposals, the U.S. Government draws, in the meantime, guidelines aimed at undermining socialism in Cuba. A level of integration in political, military, economic, diplomatic, intelligence and propaganda factors characterizes these guidelines. All would be framed into the strategy to run out and destroy Cuba attacking all flanks; it was the KennedysBlitzkriegwho had placed the Cuban issue in the center of the United States policy towards Latin America.

The May 4, 1961 memorandum of action No. 2413 of the National Security Council (NSC) contains the principal directions of subversion and terrorism strategies designed for the rest of 1961. The president would personally be in charge to give the relevant instructions.

The elements which characterize this strategy are expressed in the following indications, established by the NSC:

1.Agreed that U.S. policy towards Cuba should aim at the downfall of Castro, and ... the matter should be reviewed . . . with a view of further actions.2.Agreed that the United States should not undertake a military intervention in Cuba now, but should do nothing that would foreclose the possibility of military intervention in the future.5

On May Day 1961, Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense of the United States had sent the chiefs of the JCS the contingency plan for Cuba. The content of this comprised:

a) Invasion project of U.S. troops in Cuba.

b) The use of 60,000 ground troops, but sea and aerial units.

c) Preparations will be undertaken within a twenty-five-day term.

d) The objective of the plan was to occupy the Island in eight days, even though it was considered that the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) would fight guerrilla warfare against invaders in Oriente and the Escambray mountains.

3. Agreed that the United States should not impose a naval blockade or attempt an air war against Cuba. . . .

4. Noted the importance the President attaches to obtaining timely and adequate intelligence as to Cuban military capabilities, especially the enhancement of such capabilities by Sino-Soviet Bloc military assistance, so that U.S. capabilities for possible intervention may be maintained at an adequate level.

5. Noted the importance the President attaches to publication in the Free World press of terrorist actions of the Castro regime, and to possible political action to end the current terror.

6. Noted the President’s direction that the Central Intelligence Agency, with other departments, should make a detailed study of possible weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the elements, which exert control in Cuba today.

7. Agreed that relations with the Revolutionary Council should be improved and made more open, and while it cannot be recognized as a government-in-exile, support should be given to it insofar as it continues to represent substantial Cuban sentiment.

8. Agreed that no separate Cuban military force should be organized in the United States, but that Cuban nationals would be encouraged to enlist in the U.S. armed forces under plans to be developed by the Secretary of Defense. . . .

9. Agreed not to impose an immediate trade embargo on Cuba. The Secretary of State agreed to send to the President an analysis of the effects of the U.S. embargo on trade with Cuba in relation to the Battle Act. It was agreed that when an embargo is imposed, it should be as complete as possible, with certain exceptions for . . . distributions of drugs.

10. Agreed that the United States should at once initiate negotiation to enlarge the willingness of other American states to join in bilateral, multilateral and OAS arrangements against Castro, such as

a) breaking diplomatic relations with Cuba;

b) controlling subversive activities of Cuban agents;

c) preventing arm shipments to Castro;

d) limiting economic relations with Cuba;

e) creating a Caribbean security force;

f) initiating naval patrol to prevent Cuban invasion of other states in the Caribbean;

g) denunciation of Castro as agent of international communism by all nations of this hemisphere.

11. Agreed that the Alliance for Progress should be strengthened by such measures as

a) rapid implementation of selected social development projects;

b) acceleration of implementation of other Latin American aid; and

c) provision of additional resources for Latin American economic and social development, including consideration of a supplemental appropriation for development loans of the order of $200 - $400 million.

12. Agreed that the U.S. Information Agency would expand its existing program in Latin America, but not initiate electronic warfare against the Castro regime; means of propaganda should be made available to non-U.S. groups.6

13. Agreed that U.S. military officers, under general guidance to be prepared by the Department of State, would discuss the Castro threat to all Latin America with Latin American officers,

14. Agreed that the Secretary of State should prepare a report on possible judicial basis for effective anticommunist action.7

An important objective of propaganda campaigns on which the U.S. administration insists by the late first half of 1961 is in relation with the presentation of a new public image of the Cuban Revolution to the world. In this sense, the methods proposed by the advisors of national security intended to reveal, according to them, the character of the Cuban Revolution as a “betrayed revolution” and to show a progressive image of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and its political will to save Cuba from communism.

The intention to present other image of Cuba was influenced by revealed results in a Gallup Poll, according to which 65.4% of the American people were against the armed intervention and just the 44.1% favored the indirect assistance of the counterrevolution.

On June 13, 1961, the Cuba Study Group submitted the U.S. President the report concerning the Operation Pluto.8

When interpreting this report, the following focuses are deduced and concluded:

1.The Operation Pluto in its character and essence did not correspond with the concept of covert operation as this is defined by the NSC of the United States.2.The Central Intelligence Agency wrongly estimated the magnitude the operation might assume out of the operational context. The report expressed:

By about November 1960, the impossibility of running Zapata as a covert operation under CIA should have been recognized and the situation reviewed. The subsequent decision might then have been made to limit the efforts to attain covertness to the degree and nature of U.S. participation, and to assign responsibility for the amphibious operation to the Department of Defense. In this case, the CIA would have assisted in concealing the participation of Defense. Failing such a reorientation, the project should have been abandoned.9

3. The principle of co-operation and coordination that rules the U.S. Government policy was openly violated. Thus, it is exposed in the report:

Once the need of the operation was established, its success should have had the primary consideration of all agencies in the Government. Operational restrictions designed to protect its covert character should have been accepted only if did not impair the chance of success. As it was, the leaders of the operation were obliged to fit their plan inside changing the ground rules laid down for non-military considerations, which often had serious operational disadvantages.10

4. Another aspect pointed out in the report refers to the presentation of content and significance of the operation to political leaders. In the report it is thus expressed that: “The leaders of the operation did not always present their case with sufficient force and clarity to the senior officials of the Government to allow the latter to appreciate the consequences of some of their decisions. This remark applies in particular to the circumstances surrounding the cancellation of the D-day strikes.”11

5. It is clearly specified that perspectives of success were doubtful from the lack of integrality in the focus with which the operation mounted, because according to the report:

There was a marginal character of the operation which increased with each additional limitation and cast a serious doubt over its ultimate success. The landing force was small in relation to its 36-mile beachhead and to the probable enemy reaction. The air support was short of pilots if the beach was to require cover for a long period. There were no fighters to keep off such Castro airplanes as might escape the initial air strikes. . . .12

6. It is evident that groups of information and analysis of the CIA involved in the operation were incapable of undertaking accurate diagnosis and prospects in relation to the measures of response that Cuba would unleash before the landing. They did not recognize the truth of the operational situation undertaken in a country in revolution; they fell in the trap of the ideology that justified their plans and did not put into practice scientific principles, based on political, sociological, psychological, and military studies. In terms of Marxist science it can be stated that there was no relation between the objective and subjective factor. Thus, what apparently is a philosophical problem turned into a political disaster.

7. President Kennedy was not appropriately informed on alternatives that would be present in case the Assault Brigade failed to sustain the beachhead. He approved the operation thinking that in case the Brigade did not keep control of such a place, guerilla warfare would then be put into practice.

8. Installation of the senior offices in charge of directing operations from a general headquarters in Washington made perception of what was happening in the theater of operations difficult; it also provoked that chiefs of the expeditionary group did not have opportune access to required information to operate.

9. There was no clear or explicit position, rather determining, concerning feasibility of the operation on the part of the DOD in which different factors intervened. Thus, the report expresses that:

…By acquiescing in the Zapata Plan, they gave the impression to others of approving it although they had expressed their preference for Trinidad at the outset, a point which apparently never reached the senior civilian officials. As a body they reviewed the successive changes of the plan piecemeal and only within a limited context, a procedure which was inadequate procedure for the proper examination of all military ramifications. Individually, they had differing understandings of important features of the operation apparently arising from oral briefings in absence of written documents.13

10. From the study undertaken, it was evident that the NSC had wrongly directed the operation in such a way that the intelligence community, the institutions represented at the NSC, the President’s advisors and the executive itself failed to undertake and design a correct strategy. Therefore, this was not a simple defeat of the CIA plans, but of a whole policy that would have required other means, methods and forms to face a revolution backed up by a whole people willing to continue forward in the political, social, and economic changes despite the proposal of the United States. Kennedy had no other choice but to personally assume the political cost of the failure, even though he would not renounce to destroy the revolutionary work. New pledges would be undertaken, and new threats of aggression would hang over Cuba.

It was necessary, therefore, to establish new courses of action, because as the report concludes:

…in the light of the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion that the preparation and execution of paramilitary operations such as Zapata are a form of Cold War action in which the country must be prepared to engage. If it does so, it must engage in it with a maximum chance of success. Such operations should be planned and executed by a governmental mechanism capable of bringing into play, in addition to military and covert techniques, all other forces, political, ideological, economic and intelligence, which can contribute to its success. No such mechanism presently exists, but should be created to plan, coordinate and further a national Cold War strategy capable of including paramilitary operations.14

In the minds of the authors of the report submitted to the President to determine the causes and conditions of failure of the operation and new directions to promote against Cuba was already present the Operation Mongoose.

In the late ‘90s two important documents on the CIA failure at the Bay of Pigs were released: the General Inspector Lyman Kirkpatrick’s report and the assessment of Col. Jack Hawkins’ main military planner of the Operation Pluto. Both documents contribute to the analysis of causes and conditions that explain the U.S. assessment on the failure of the operation, provide considerations, assessments and judgments concerning the mistakes committed by the CIA, from the tactical and strategic viewpoint.

In July 1961, a plan of the United States Central Intelligence Agency was known, whose proposals were pointing to deepen subversive actions on Cuba.15This plan pointed to the creation of a broad organization of resistance to be subject to the CIA control. That is, agents and internal resources under a control and direction of the CIA; to support counter-revolutionary organizations inland that were willing to generate clandestine operations; and to create bases of primary operations in the United States. In this way, the CIA aspired to create a clandestine movement in the Island sustained in its operational interests, instead of a clandestine movement sustained in the criterion to build an independent counterrevolutionary political force to face the Revolution.

Absence of identification in relation to the tactics to follow between Kennedy and the CIA’s advisors would be a constant that will always be present during the whole Kennedy’s presidential period. In fact, both Kennedy and his advisors recognized, after the Bay of Pigs, the political need to rebuild the Central Intelligence Agency to empower it in order to face challenges of new times.

In the second half of July 1961, President Kennedy examined the pros and the cons of an intervention in Cuba. In that sense, he consults Admiral Arleigh Burke if indeed the United States would have to intervene in Cuba. Burke’s response did not wait: the United States necessarily would have to intervene, then Kennedy asked Admiral Burke if the Island could easily be occupied, to which he responded that every time this was getting more difficult. Then, Kennedy asked another question: What would happen if the United States intervenes in Cuba? Burke answered that this would be a hell, but someday the United States would have to do it.

In a very interesting way it is observed that on August 16, 1961, during a meeting of the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) of the Armed Forces of the United States, a contingency plan in case of violence against the Naval Base at Guantánamo was examined. Coincidentally, and not for mere chance, in this period plots to assassinate Commander in Chief had the involvement of the U.S. Navy placed at the Base.

The referred contingency plan, elaborated from a supposed Cuban provocation against the Naval Base at Guantánamo to cause the beginning of hostilities, present the following aspects:

1.Defense of the Naval Base at Guantánamo;2.Contributing to establish a friendly government to the United States interest;3.Restoring and keeping the order.

The measures of the plan contemplate the blockade to Cuba, reinforcement in the Base and amphibious air attack on the Island.

On August 22, 1961, President Kennedy’s advisor, Richard Goodwin made an assessment in relation to the Organization of American States (OAS) Conference held in Punta del Este, called by the United States to propose concrete actions on Cuba. The Cuban delegation that attended the conference was headed by Commander Ernesto “Che” Guevara, who during his participation, made public the stance of the Cuban Revolution in matters of foreign policy.

When assessing the results of the conference, Goodwin pointed out that any hope of action of the OAS on Cuba was condemned to failure, because big countries like Mexico and Brazil opposed to such action.

Richard Goodwin, one of the main architects of the Kennedy administration policy towards Cuba formulated recommendations in relation to actions to be developed:

1. Paying low public attention to the Cuban problem to prevent Cuba from being considered a “victim of the United States policy;”

2. Intensifying moderately, measures of economic pressure on Cuba, as well as undertaking sabotage in key sectors of the economy and implementing in all its dimension the Act of Trade with the Enemy of the United States Treasure Department;

3. Developing moderately military pressure, such as not divulged sea maneuvers near the Cuban coastline, reinforcing the Naval Base at Guantánamo, and spreading false information;

4. Continuing and increasing covert operations aimed at first of all destroying economic centers and delivering resources for activities to be undertaken by members of counterrevolutionary organizations, with political and ideological objectives;

5. Increasing propaganda work pointing to: account the Cuban people how their government is sacrificing their welfare in favor of international communism; broadly divulge economic failures of the Cuban Government in Latin America and the Caribbean; create the Security Pact of the Caribbean as a strictly defensive measure;

6. Beginning the study of possible conflicts that might exist in the top Cuban leadership.

Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and counterrevolutionary organizations in the country, in the period post-Bay Of Pigs to late 19.61. The political arena

Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and counterrevolutionary organizations in the country, in the period post-Bay Of Pigs to late 19.61. The political arena

From the defeat of the Assault Brigade 2506, still with the taste of powder in the battlefield, the Central Intelligence Agency compelled in unleashing flash operations aimed at destroying, by means of armed violence in the most immediate time, the Cuban Revolution. An important study of this period is found in Fabián Escalante Font book,La Guerra Secreta de la CIA contra Cuba[The CIA Secret War on Cuba], where principal aims, directions of work and intentions that characterized the CIA and the counterrevolutionary activity in the period April-November 1961 are examined.

A whole of factors intervene and are related among them to explain the high aggressiveness degree showed by the CIA and the U.S. Government:

1. The defeat of the Assault Brigade 2506 was the hardest setback experienced by John F. Kennedy in his political life.

The failure of the Bay of Pigs exposed him to a strong criticism not from the ranks of Republicans, but even in the own Democratic ranks. A crisis of credibility in the executive to lead the destinies of the nation emerged. Kennedy felt compelled to return the strike at any cost.

2. Bay of Pigs also meant the strongest setback of the Central Intelligence Agency since its creation in 1947. Langley’s mystical theology, Allen Dulles’s legend and the myth of invincibility of the United States vanished in only seventy-two hours in April 1961.

The Central Intelligence Agency and its director Allen Dulles knew that they had to go for the search of the lost time in the Operation Pluto and hit a deadly and final strike to the Cuban Revolution in the coming months. Otherwise, Kennedy would decide what he had already reflected on: to restructure and rebuild the CIA with other cadres, particularly those who did not intervene in the Operation Pluto. For the CIA, destroying the Revolution meant the physical elimination of Commander in Chief Fidel Castro and other leaders of the Revolution. This event would associate with an armed uprising in search of assistance of the United States and the OAS, a coverage under which the direct military intervention of the U.S. troops would camouflage.

3. The counterrevolutionary organizations were going through a critical phase of their existence from the dismantling of the Revolutionary United Front (FUR) leadership, in March 1961, which had eliminated the perspectives of an armed uprising coinciding with the landing of the Assault Brigade 2506. Had the FUR achieved its objectives of unity in the country, the principal counterrevolutionary organizations operating in Cuba would be present. The recovery of the counterrevolution would depend on high degree from the logistic support of the CIA, as well as the assembling of new structures of the counterrevolution that operated in the Island.

Between June and December 1961 the Cuban authorities discovered and frustrated important plots to assassinate Fidel Castro Ruz. One of these plans was aimed at promoting instability in the country and to unleash the U.S. military intervention. The United States Central Intelligence Agency and the Naval Intelligence Service of the Naval Base at Guantánamo organized the Operation Patty as it was called by the foe.

The principal objective was to assassinate Fidel and Raul during the celebration of acts for July 26 in La Habana and Oriente provinces.

The plan related with the undertaking of self-provocation in the Base, sabotage and uprisings in order to create conditions for the military intervention of the U.S. troops. Alfredo Izaguirre de la Riva and other U.S. intelligence agents, who had been infiltrated into the country, were under arrest.16