State of the Union, Schuman report on Europe 2023 E-Book
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- Herausgeber: Marie B
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Sprache: Englisch
- Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2023
One year after war irrupted on the continent once more, the European Union has shown remarkable resilience: the adoption of sanctions against Russia, the financial, humanitarian and military support given to Ukraine and the diversification of its energy supply sources have confirmed, once again, that Europe is increasingly adept at responding to crises.
Of course, it is too early to claim victory. Its room for manoeuvre remains limited and its responses must take account of the mistakes of previous decades that have now been highlighted by the reality of the present situation: a lack of investment in its collective defence, a certain naivety in the choice of its dependencies and an excessive faith in the positive political effects of free trade.
And yet the European Union's ability to implement effective coordinated responses and its determination to fight for the freedom of a country under attack has been unwavering, to the extent that the followers of a noxious "every-man-for-himself" attitude have been won over, making it even more attractive for others to join this ambitious project.
Faced with a succession of unprecedented shocks worldwide and caught in the stand-off between America and China, the European model of economic growth, despite the disruptive impact of inflation, is being called upon to renew itself, with a view to strategic autonomy.
This is why the Schuman Report on Europe - the State of the Union 2023 is an essential guide. Through its original analyses of the risks posed and opportunities presented by this crucial moment it constitutes a compass for navigating the complex reality which the European Union now faces. With a wealth of new maps and a unique set of commented statistics, it guides readers who want to understand the main issues at stake, likewise those wishing to contribute to reflection on the construction of tomorrow's Europe.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Managing Director of the Robert Schuman Foundation, former auditor of the 56th national session of the Institute of Higher National Defence Studies (IHEDN),
Pascale Joannin is the editor of the Schuman Report on Europe, the State of the Union, Marie B Editions, and co-editor of the Permanent Atlas of the European Union, Marie B Editions (5th edition), 2021. She is the author of
L'Europe, une chance pour la femme, a Robert Schuman Foundation Note, n° 22, 2004. She has published numerous studies on European issues.
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The State of the Union 2023 Schuman Report on Europe is a collective work created on the initiative of the Robert Schuman Foundation in line with Article 9 of law 57-298 of 11th March 1957 and article L.113-2 paragraph 3 of the Intellectual Property Code.
Original French texts translated into English by Helen Levy
Layout: Nord Compo Cover design: Nord Compo Cover image: Wirestock/Alamy photo Kyiv railway station, Ukraine
Copyright: Éditions Marie B, Lignes de repères collection
ISBN: 978-2-49276-3-410
This digital document has been produced by Nord Compo.
Contents
Summary of maps
1957-2023: the building of Europe
Territories of Europe
Women’s Europe
1. The Challenges
Military expenditure in the world
World Security: EU sanctions, intervention and participation
Major concerns of Europeans
The EU and the energy crisis
The origin of electricity in Europe
The main free trade areas
Inflation
Political colour of prime ministers and number of parties in coalitions
Populisms
2 The Solutions
The EU budget 2023
European and national identities
The Space Sector
The Rise of New Space
R&D Expenditure
European Unicorns
Ultra-marine space
Nuclear Power
Political Europe in 2023
3. The European Union through Statistics
Growth projections (economic recovery) at world level
Extra-EU trade
Intra-EU trade
The Population of the Union
Internal migration
External migration
Public debt
Digitisation of Europe
Environmental Performance Index of Member States
Contributed to this book
Texts
Alexandre Adam
Maître des requêtes at the Conseil d'Etat, Alexandre Adam was deputy European advisor, then European advisor to the President of the Republic (2020-2022). A former diplomat, he was posted to the Legal Affairs Directorate of the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, to the Permanent Representation of France to the European Union and to the French Embassy in Germany.
Laurence Boone
Laurence Boone has a PhD in applied econometrics from the London Business School and has been Secretary of State for Europe since July 2022. Chief Economist of Barclays Capital France (2004-2011), then Chief Economist and Managing Director of Bank of America Merrill Lynch Global Research (2011-2014), she became Sherpa and special advisor for multilateral and European economic and financial affairs to the President of the Republic in 2014. Former Chief Economist of the AXA Group, she was Chief Economist and Deputy Secretary-General of the OECD (2018-2022).
Corinne Deloy
A graduate of Sciences Po and holder of a DEA in political sociology from the University of Paris I – Panthéon Sorbonne, Corinne Deloy formerly worked as a journalist at the Nouvel Observateur and was Secretary General of the Foundation for Political Innovation (Fondapol). She is a researcher at the Centre de recherches internationales de Sciences Po (CERI) and editor of the European Elections Monitor (EEM) of the Robert Schuman Foundation.
José Manuel Fernandes
Member of the European Parliament (EPP, PT) since 2009, José Manuel Fernandes is coordinator of the European People's Party in the Committee on Budgets and chairman of the delegation for relations with the Federative Republic of Brazil. He is also head of the Partido Social Democrata (PSD) delegation in the European Parliament. He participated in the negotiations of the new Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027 (MFF), the Recovery and Resilience Facility and the InvestEU programme. He is also permanent co-rapporteur for the new EU own resources.
Charles Fries
Since May 2020, Charles Fries has been Deputy Secretary General for Peace, Security and Defence in the European External Action Service. He has served as Ambassador of France to Turkey (2015-2020), Morocco (2012-2015) and the Czech Republic (2006-2009). Secretary General for European Affairs (2011-2012), he was diplomatic adviser to the Prime Minister (2009-2012), adviser for European Affairs to the President of the Republic (2002-2006) and adviser for European Affairs to the Minister of Foreign Affairs (1993-1995). A former student of the École Nationale d'Administration (ENA-1989).
Jean-Dominique Giuliani
Chairman of the Robert Schuman Foundation, Jean-Dominique Giuliani was the director of cabinet for the President of the Senate, René Monory, and director at SOFRES. A former special advisor to the European Commission and member of the Supervisory Board of Arte, he co-edits the Permanent Atlas of the European Union, Éditions Marie B (5th edition), 2021. He is the author of Européen, sans complexes, Éditions Marie B, 2022 and of La Grande bascule, Éditions de l'école de Guerre, 2019.
Nicolas Goetzmann
Head of macroeconomic research and strategy at Financière de la Cité, an asset management company, Nicolas Goetzmann is a regular columnist for French newspapers (Les Echos, Le Monde). Previously, he worked for a news website, first as an economics editor covering macroeconomics, European institutions and international trade, then as editor-in-chief. From 2000 to 2013, he worked in the private banking sector as a portfolio manager and advisor to high-net-worth individuals in Luxembourg, Geneva and Paris.
Francisco Juan Gómez Martos
Francisco Juan Gómez Martos is a PhD of Political Science, economist and former EU official. He was formerly a professor at the Autonomous University of Madrid (Faculty of Economics) and a visiting professor at the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan (Faculty of Political Science and Journalism). He is the author of several academic publications in European journals and numerous articles published in the newspaper El País. He has published numerous studies for the Foundation.
Pascale Joannin
Managing Director of the Robert Schuman Foundation, former auditor of the 56th national session of the Institute of Higher National Defence Studies (IHEDN), Pascale Joannin is the editor of the Schuman Report on Europe, the State of the Union, Marie B Editions, and co-editor of the Permanent Atlas of the European Union, Marie B Editions (5th edition), 2021. She is the author of L'Europe, une chance pour la femme, a Robert Schuman Foundation Note, no 22, 2004. She has published numerous studies on European issues.
Alain Lamassoure
A graduate of Sciences Po Paris and ENA, Alain Lamassoure began his career as an adviser to the Court of Auditors. Minister for European Affairs (1993-1995), Minister for the Budget and Spokesman for the French government (1995-1997), he was a member of the French National Assembly from 1986 to 1995 and a member of the European Parliament (EPP, FR) from 1989 to 1993 and from 1999 to 2019. He chaired the Committee on Budgets (2009-2014) and the special committees on tax rescissions (TAX 1 and 2) and was rapporteur on the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB). He chairs the Scientific Committee of the Foundation and the Steering Committee of the Observatory for History Teaching in Europe.
Mathilde Lemoine
Group Chief Economist of Edmond de Rothschild, Mathilde Lemoine is a specialist in international macroeconomics and public policy. She was an advisor to the Prime Minister in 2005-2006 after having been a technical advisor to several French ministers of the Economy and Finance. From 2007 to 2015, she was Director of Economic Research and Market Strategy at a major international bank. In 2013, she was appointed member of the Haut Conseil des Finances Publiques (HCFP). Co-author of a textbook on International Economics and Finance (by Boeck éditions) and of numerous publications, she is an editorial writer for the daily newspapers Les Echos, Expansión (Spain) and L'Agefi (Switzerland).
André Loesekrug-Pietri
Chair and Scientific Director of the Joint European Disruptive Initiative (JEDI), the European ARPA, André Loesekrug-Pietri first worked as assistant to the CEO of Aerospatiale-Airbus. He then spent 15 years in private equity, including 10 years in Asia. In 2017, he was a special advisor to the French Minister of Defence. A graduate of HEC Paris and Harvard Kennedy School and an alumnus of Sup'Aéro, he is a reservist (RC) in the French Air Force. He is a member of the Innovation Council of the Munich Security Conference and the Future Fund of the Saarland.
Christophe Lucas
Vice-Admiral Christophe Lucas joined the Naval Academy in 1988 and is a specialist pilot. He has served in naval aviation and on surface ships. He has participated in numerous operations and commanded an anti-submarine frigate. He has also held positions in human resources, international relations and operations. He commanded the Force Maritime des Fusiliers Marines et Commandos, then served as the coordinating authority for the French Navy's international relations, before being appointed Deputy Director General for International Relations and Strategy (DGRIS) in 2022.
Paraskevi Papantoniou
Paraskevi (Evi) Papantoniou is Director for Space (ff) in the European Commission's Directorate-General for Industry, Defence and Space (DG DEFIS). She is responsible for the space policy and the Copernicus and Galileo/EGNOS programmes, as well as for measures in support of the aerospace ecosystem, and for relations with the European Space Agency (ESA) and the European Union Space Programme Agency (EUSPA). She was previously Head of Unit in the Directorate-General for the Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (DG GROW). A competition lawyer, she has worked at the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg.
Odile Renaud-Basso
As President of the EBRD since November 2020, Odile Renaud-Basso is the first woman to head a multilateral development bank. She was previously Director General of the French Treasury from 2016 to 2020. Prior to this position, she was Deputy Director of the Prime Minister's Office from 2012 to 2013, then Deputy Director General of the Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations from 2013 to 2016. She is a graduate of the Institut d'études Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po) and of the École Nationale d'Administration (ENA).
Maia Sandu
President of the Republic of Moldova since November 2020, Maia Sandu started her political career in 2012, when she became Minister of Education. In 2015, she launched a political movement fighting corruption in Moldova. In 2019, she briefly served as Prime Minister. Under her leadership, Moldova became a candidate country for the European Union in June 2022. Before entering politics, Maia Sandu worked at the Moldovan Ministry of Economy, the World Bank, Chisinau and Washington D.C. She studied at the Moldovan Academy of Economic Studies and graduated from Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government in 2010.
Dubravka Šuica
Since December 2019, Dubravka Šuica has been Vice President of the European Commission responsible for democracy and demography. She was the first female mayor of Dubrovnik (2001-2009) and received the World Mayor Award in 2006. She entered politics as a member of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and was a Member of Parliament (2000-2011). For ten years she was Vice President of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe. From 2013 to 2019, she was a Member of the European Parliament (EPP, HR), Vice-Chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Since 2012, she has been Vice-President for Women of the European People's Party.
Pierre Vimont
Pierre Vimont holds a law degree, is a graduate of Sciences Po and a former student of ENA. He joined the French diplomatic service in 1977. In 1999, he was appointed Ambassador, Permanent Representative of France to the European Union. Director of the cabinet of three foreign ministers, he was then appointed Ambassador of France to the United States from 2007 to 2010 and became Executive Secretary General of the European External Action Service (2010-2015). Since then, he has been entrusted with various missions by the French authorities.
Željana Zovko
A Croatian diplomat and politician, Željana Zovko is a Member of the European Parliament (EPP, HR). She is Vice-President of the EPP Group in the European Parliament and Vice-Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee. She is also EPP Vice-Coordinator for Foreign Affairs and Vice-Chair of the Delegation for relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. She is also a member of the Committee on Culture and Education and the Subcommittee on Security and Defence, and a member of the Delegation for relations with the United States and the Delegation to the Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly.
Statistics
Olivier Lenoir
A graduate of the Ecole Normale Supérieure with a degree in economics and diplomacy, Olivier Lenoir is currently a strategy analyst in the digital sector in Warsaw, with the Orange Group. His European career has also led him to work at the International Labour Office, the Human Rights Defender and La Sapienza University in Rome.
Maps
Pascal Orcier
A former student of the ENS in Lyon, Pascal Orcier is an associate professor and PhD in geography, a specialist in the Baltic States, a cartographer, and a teacher of European classes at the Beaussier high school in La Seyne-sur-Mer (83) and preparatory classes at the Stanislas high school in Cannes (06).
PrefaceThe European Union’s New Life
Jean-Dominique GIULIANI
European integration was launched in 1950, five years after the end of the conflict in Europe. The context was very particular. For all the states on the continent, it was a matter of survival and reconstruction, of urgency to redress desperate situations and to overcome the trauma of the worst of the conflict.
The current context has obviously nothing to do with these challenges.
Over the years and with the passing of the treaties, the Community, now the Union, has adapted by enlarging. Ten treaties have changed its institutions, policies, and resources. The European Union is still not a State, but it has taken on some of its attributes in the areas of its exclusive competences (customs union, competition, currency, protection of the oceans, trade) but also in the area of shared competences, or even competences reserved for the States. Indeed, the latter are increasingly calling on the “European dimension” to resolve difficulties that they cannot solve alone. This was the case during the Covid pandemic. Today, it is the demand for policy to consolidate European industry. More and more sectors are concerned by these demands on the part of the States, which, moreover, often match citizens’ expectations.
The old recurrent quarrel between federalists and sovereigntists has largely been superseded. The Union is more intergovernmental than most sovereigntists ever dreamed of; it is more federalist than most federalists ever hoped for. Developments in the Union have proved both sides right. The states are increasingly turning to the Union’s institutions – nothing is possible at European level without the agreement of the states.
Although the principles on which European cooperation was founded remain largely inspired by the same method, that of Schuman and Monnet, its face and attributes no longer have much in common with the original creation. Its transformation is accelerating in line with the rapid upheavals of a changing world.
It is therefore truly a new life in a new context that the European Union has already embarked upon.
It has enabled Europe to remain firmly in the history books despite a tragic 20th century that has punctuated a long journey through division and conflict.
Seventy-three years of European integration, i.e. organised cooperation between the continent’s nations, have given the Member States the hope of recovering their wealth through stability and the development of peaceful relations amongst themselves.
The results are extraordinarily positive: peace, a prosperous internal market, organised solidarity, the world’s second reserve currency, shared and asserted values in the face of the hardening of power relations on the international scene. The Union’s gross domestic product represents 15% of the world’s GDP, a share only slightly lower than that of the United States, and a GDP per capita averaging over €40,000. The Union has become the world’s leading trading area, the world’s largest trader in services with 24.5% of the total, a prosperous external trade representing 16.2% of world trade and a particularly dynamic internal trade representing 61% of Member States’ trade overall.
At the turn of this century, one might say that the European venture had succeeded beyond all expectations. However, for some years now, the 21st century has been challenging it with two fundamental developments, together with events that are accentuating these.
The whole world has opened up to trade and this development is now shared widely. New players are enjoying growth and their demographics promise them a privileged place in the league table of world powers. And as the balance of power shifts, Europe faces new competition, especially from Asia. In addition, a nationalist revival, spurred on by states lacking ideologies, but which are intent on maintaining their autocratic regimes, is making its mark on the planet and is prompting withdrawal.
Europe no longer had any real enemies. It is now discovering new ones with Russia, which rejects its achievements and ideals; it must compete with others such as China; it is encountering provocative actors such as Türkiye or turbulent neighbours such as the United Kingdom; and it has some sound allies, but their interests sometimes differ.
At the same time, the European economy and society must adapt to a double digital and ecological revolution. Digitisation and its future quantum and artificial promises are a far more important revolution than the invention of the printing press. They are disrupting production processes, forcing the reinvention of a new form of marketing, and completely changing the way we communicate, and therefore also the way we exercise our rights and duties as citizens in democratic systems. This revolution is underway, but it has not yet finished producing new outcomes.
At the same time, Western public opinion is gradually becoming aware of the limits of an economic model based solely on the exploitation of resources and, above all, of its consequences for health, biological diversity, and natural areas. A powerful movement has arisen, particularly in Europe, supported by citizens’ demands, which is pushing European governments and authorities to declare that they will be the best in establishing an economic order that respects the environment. This has led to a number of regulations that Europeans are imposing on themselves, in the belief that they are setting an example. With this they run the risk of not taking sufficient account of and compensating for the destabilising impact of these measures on economic competition, i.e. growth, employment and, therefore, the social policies to which people are attached.
The accumulation of these new challenges for the European Union constitutes a vital challenge. It must adapt as quickly as possible and indeed it has begun to do so. In a totally new global context, its future depends on it.
The challenge of efficiency
Citizens expect European cooperation to prove its effectiveness. Reflexes are still national, but the European dimension naturally and quickly asserted itself. The Covid pandemic is a good example: national measures did not last more than two months, and a vigorous European response helped Europe to become the leading producer and donor of vaccines, then to build a strong financial response to the resulting economic situation, the famous €750 billion post-pandemic recovery plan. Europeans have been massively vaccinated, and the pandemic brought under control with growth surging as soon as restrictions were lifted. In retrospect, this was a success.
The European Union did not stop there and started to overhaul its economic support policies during the crisis. The General Block Exemption Regulation1 has allowed exceptions to the rules on competition and state aid control. The establishment of the Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEI) has opened the way to genuine industrial policy measures, making it possible to finance programmes in the field of batteries, hydrogen and electronic chips. Because this mechanism was exempt from prior European control the European Commission estimates that it was possible for the states to decide on 91% of the aid distributed to address the crisis. It indicates that under this scheme €672 billion of aid has been distributed by the Member States. The Commission now intends to go further by establishing a “temporary crisis and transition framework”, a common aid fund for industries undergoing conversion, specific “anti-relocation” aid and authorising tax benefits, provided that all these actions contribute to promoting ecological transition.
Commissioner Thierry Breton has been creative in proposing an aid fund for the defence industry that will invest primarily in Europe, in launching a number of specifically European programmes to provide new generation electronic chips, to acquire clean space capabilities, to explore and anticipate quantum computing and to set up a sovereign wealth fund to fuel investment in the industries of the future. Its Clean Tech Act project aims to support industries deemed critical (solar, wind, etc.) to achieve the ecological transition.
These advances represent undeniable innovations in the nature and speed of response by the European authorities, even if their preparation did not obscure divergence between Europeans who do not share the same ideas about so-called industrial policies and do not always have the same short-term interests. On the other hand, they demonstrated a long-term vision that have highlighted the advantage of a European component in policies in adapting to the new context.
The “liberal software”, which has enabled Europe to build its single market, has been a real asset for the consumer. It is now being challenged by competing continent-states that generously subsidise their industrial champions. The return of “state logic” and public intervention is justified by the extent of the changes that have occurred in the value production chain and the balance of power in the world. The digital revolution, the development of large, demographically powerful states, ecological demands and competition for resources have led to particularly proactive behaviour on the part of these large states, which are at the forefront of growth and global competition.
European sovereignty rather than mercantilism
The European Union is not a state. In many areas, it cannot act as quickly and decisively as large states. Despite its efforts, which were unthinkable a few years ago, it must now acquire the agility that states are capable of in their responses to crises and show greater unity and speed in the solutions they provide. Within the EU, divergence remains between some small countries that are still overly attached to the outdated patterns of old economic rules, favouring the comfortable status quo, and others that are forced to be more responsive and daring, favouring growth over discipline. The “growth or discipline” debate is raging and is not about to end soon.
The year 2023 is crucial in this respect. If the European Union succeeds in improving the way it demonstrates the effectiveness of its decisions to support its economy, in a way that is based on solidarity and shared between the Member States, this will be a milestone for future growth.
Several major challenges await it in this respect.
Will it be able to create the sense of belonging that might legitimise the principle of European preference? A “Buy European Act”, equivalent to that of all states, is being called for by some, who believe that European public money must first and foremost benefit the European economy. This is already a rule adopted for the European Defence Fund; it should now become standard practice which borrows nothing from protectionism and everything from a logic of efficiency and political identification. The Commissioner for the Internal Market intends to accentuate this approach for certain joint armaments programmes in which the Union’s military industries would cooperate. The control of foreign investments is part of the same logic. While the European Union took specific measures in 2020 to prevent foreign groups subsidised by their public authorities from getting their hands on European industrial or trade assets, the Member States do not apply them in the same way. Germany, for example, let the Chinese state-owned company Cosco take a 25% stake in the container terminal in the port of Hamburg despite the negative opinion of six German ministries, the security services and the European Commission!
The European Union and its Member States must break with a blissful mercantilism that has refused to take on board the changing international context marked by the brutal return of power relations and competition. The future of the European Union depends on it.
Growth rather than caution
This problem is also reflected in the monetary policy equations.
Faced with the return of inflation, the European Central Bank has found itself under pressure to increase its key rates significantly. Using the strong reaction of the US Fed as a pretext, the usual supporters of coercive disciplines obtained rate hikes from the ECB, the effect of which has not been demonstrated. The formidable challenge for the European monetary authority is to combat inflation, largely caused by rising energy prices, without curbing growth. Here again, ordo-liberal ideology faces the new world. Yet only growth will help show citizens the effectiveness of the European dimension and, obviously, make debts sustainable and, above all, “repayable”.
Boosting growth means allowing investments that are sometimes daring, like so many bets on the future; it means facilitating their financing by all means, in particular with accessible rates as well as financial, fiscal, and regulatory aid. Such will be the European debates of 2023, which will have to choose between caution and growth, the future or comfort.
Europeans are passionate about the fight against global warming and form the vanguard of this battle, which is the subject of a very broad consensus. This is a positive development, and it is a measure of the degree of democracy and commitment of European citizens, who can hold many other peoples in high regard.
However, this new light must not lead to excessive caution and therefore excessive regulation. The European decision-making level must not be the only one to set rules, introduce bans and constraints. It must also be the level of opportunities, incentives, and perspectives. In this respect, the precautionary principle is the enemy of the future and the European Parliament would do well to take a step back from its regulatory frenzy.
Didn’t the prudential rules imposed on banks after the 2011 financial crisis force them to manage their activities too cautiously, especially in the distribution of credit, which is not very innovation-oriented and requires real risk-taking?
Hasn’t taxonomy, especially green taxonomy, become a hindrance to innovation and growth? Is it effective to restrict the financing of activities that meet urgent needs, such as security and defence or the transition from dirty fossil fuels to clean energy? Under the influence of the European Parliament, the European dimension seems increasingly to take the form of prohibitions and constraints, sometimes following the path of easy demagogy, rather than that of rational and progressive planning.
It is time for the European Union to systematically accompany its environmental decisions with financial, fiscal or regulatory compensations and realistic implementation timetables allowing for successful ecological and digital transitions. Otherwise, these measures will be a factor of recession in an economy that is already weakened because it is changing.
More generally, the reluctance of certain States could be fatal to the whole of Europe, due to a lack of responsiveness, audacity and enthusiasm. In reality, in 2023, the European Union has the choice between an “old man’s policy”, which is fairly consistent with its demography and a soft political consensus, and a “youthful upsurge” which enhances its assets, but requires risk-taking and gambling. In launching NextGenerationEU, the Commission has understood this. Going into debt to discover, to invest, to build, to achieve, going into debt together to strengthen European solidarity, asserting oneself on the international scene with European specificities is a necessity that Europeans must believe in. To be convinced of this and to do so is one of the major challenges that the Union and its national governments are now facing.
Geopolitical challenges
The horror of the Russian war, which is targeting civilians, including women and children, cannot be tolerated by Europe. It would otherwise inevitably spread, for the continent is still pieced together with scars cut by history. Reopening them with rape, deportation and execution is a criminal act. Putin’s Russia can no longer be considered a responsible and credible power because it is reopening the chapter of the worst exactions committed in the “Bloodlands”2 at Europe’s very heart. Hence, the aggression in Ukraine represents an existential challenge to Europeans, whereas the legitimacy of the European project finds its origin and its strength in the promise of peace.
The European Union took up the gauntlet with surprising unity and unexpected effectiveness. Despite the differences, particularly regarding the sanctions against Russia for its violations of international law and its own commitments, national governments have been able to show unanimity in taking unprecedented decisions. More than 1,386 individuals and 171 entities are now subject to sanctions. These are working and have already led to a recession in Russia. In less than a year, dependence on Russian energy supplies has been reduced to almost zero; alternative suppliers have been found; joint gas purchases have been scheduled.
On the diplomatic front, the European Union has been able to make itself indispensable alongside NATO and cooperation between the two has found an effective complementarity. The sums committed to Ukraine exceeded €67 billion, an amount close to that of the United States. European funds mainly have intended to help the Ukrainian state and its citizens survive, while military aid has come mainly from America. However, for the first time, the European Union, through its “peace facility”, has financed arms supplies organised by the member states. It has committed nearly than €12 billion.
The European response has been the backbone of the Western approach, coordinated with our partners. It is a long-term approach and is designed to limit the impact on citizens. It has mobilised considerable resources, the scale of which no Member State has contested.
The war in Ukraine has been a real wake-up call for Europeans in terms of their security policies at a time when they were trying to take on more responsibility in this area. The adoption of a common analysis of risks and threats, a draft strategy, the “Strategic Compass” in March 2022, the implementation of the European Defence Fund, the adoption of regulations allowing progress towards more autonomy of decision making in trade matters as well as in the regulatory field, notably in matters of digital technology, all move in the direction of reinforcing the autonomy of thought and decision making. The return of NATO and the United States to the strategic issue of European defence does not leave the European Union much room for manoeuvre. It has to be admitted that it has made full use of this and that it has assumed the main economic and financial role in aid to Ukraine. It is now time to go further and become fully involved in the quest for global solutions to ensure the stability and security of the continent.
There is little doubt that this will only be possible once the Russian attempt to challenge states’ borders and their freedom of choice, starting with Ukraine, has failed. Whatever the outcome of the conflict – and one can only hope that Ukraine will return to its internationally recognised borders – in the future, Europe must be involved in the pursuit of a stable and sustainable security architecture.
This can only be done by demonstrating real strength that gives credibility to its own diplomacy. We are far from this. European military capabilities are insufficient despite the general rearmament of nations and the conditioned national reflexes that are pushing for rearmament and that may even be counterproductive.
Not all the lessons of the Russian aggression in Ukraine have been learned. The mass of conventional armies is not enough to deter a nuclear-armed aggressor like Russia. Only European autonomy based on nuclear deterrence can protect Europe from Russia and, later, from other global perils. Spending hundreds of billions on conventional equipment will reignite the arms race. Apart from France, and despite its repeated overtures for several decades, Europeans rely on the US nuclear deterrent as a safeguard and cautiously camp under the protection of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. In the light of history, this is a risky gamble. The United States is a reliable ally to Europe, but is there really any guarantee that an American president would immediately and automatically put the security of his own citizens and territory at stake with his strike force if the independence or borders of a European member state of the Alliance were challenged? At the very least, he would think twice.
The NATO umbrella, the world's leading military alliance, an institution that has greatly facilitated the interoperability of European armies with each other and with our allies, can only be truly secure if Europeans take their full share of responsibility. An American president with little regard for courtesy has brutally and rudely reminded them of this already.
Could we not envisage, within the Alliance, a European commitment to guarantee European security, that is to say that of its closest neighbours and partners? A treaty, an agreement, a political declaration that would give substance to the mutual defence clause of Article 42-7 of the Treaty on European Union, which is deemed insufficient by Finland and Sweden, who are therefore asking to join NATO? This could be done through a political agreement with the two European nations with the necessary resources, the United Kingdom outside the Union and France inside, which keeps calling in vain for its partners to join discussions regarding dissuasion.
Finally, in diplomatic and military matters, the European Union must decide to make the most of the complementarities of its member states without trying to force them all to contribute in the same way to Europe's assertiveness on the international stage. This is a difficult exercise. Some would like to challenge the unanimity required to take decisions in these areas. This would be neither in line with the European promise to respect national identities, nor desirable because it would marginalise the smaller or less influential states, which would weaken the whole.
Member States have different histories, traditions and political sensitivities, and their security is central to their sovereignty. Rather than vainly trying to share them, it might be possible to add them together. It would then be a matter of accepting that the Member States, after adopting a common strategy, would contribute, each according to their possibilities, to specific objectives. All of “Europe’s grey matter” should be concentrated on defining them.
To put it plainly, let us not ask Germany to ignore its fundamental law and accept deterrence by repeated external interventions, nor neutral countries to be as pro-active as others on military issues. Instead, let us seek points of agreement on disarmament, peacekeeping, and even forceful intervention when necessary to defend common interests, with only those nations that are prepared to do so. The Treaty on European Union already provides for this. As for nuclear deterrence, it is possible to give a “European dimension” to the existing ones, recognising their contribution to maintaining Europe's own security. Dialogue on this subject is now urgent.
The conflict in Ukraine could thus be an opportunity for new European developments, a real new beginning made necessary by external constraints.
Political Challenges
However, the political challenges that the Union faces should not be underestimated. Foremost among these is its imminent and unavoidable enlargement. Europeans have promised their neighbours integration into their community, and this promise has long served as foreign policy at their borders. Candidates have become weary of the extent and duration of the necessary rapprochement. It makes them sensitive to the interested attentions of other powers such as Russia or China. It keeps them away with the help of Turkey, which intends to play its own part. Political pressure is so strong – on the part of the people – that in June 2022 the Europeans promised integration to Ukraine and Moldova.
Without changes to its institutions and decision-making procedures, the European Union runs a twofold risk: that of importing additional problems that it cannot solve on its own, and that of paralysing its ability to take decisions. In terms of the former, we remember the accession of Cyprus, which was supposed to provide a solution to the occupation of part of the island by Turkey; in terms of the latter, we must consider the current difficulties in getting reluctant Poland and Hungary to implement European law.
Treaty changes literally terrorise governments who do not believe they can persuade their citizens to adopt them. Will the European Union be able to do without them and will it continue to move forward by concluding treaties outside the Union, which are intended to be integrated into the European legal corpus, and thus make it even more complex?
In reality, the EU cannot escape a change in its governance and would be well advised to start working on it now. The conference on the future of Europe, held in 2021 and 2022, and opinion polls all point to an increase in support for the European institutions and a strong expectation on the part of citizens for the European dimension of public action. Will Europe’s leaders to be bold enough to take courageous initiatives in this area? Experience shows that the example of the few can convince a majority of states to advance the integration of all.
Because the fundamental question remains of the citizens' support for the European project. They accept its logic and understand its rational necessity in the face of the upheavals and changes now taking place. But we must recognise that few institutions, procedures or decisions arouse enthusiasm and, above all, the pride of belonging that enables leaders to move forward.
It cannot be said often enough that the institutions' communication policy is insufficient and often miserable. As is often the case, these institutions engage in dialogue with each other, which is sometimes difficult, neglecting the public dimension, which is the only one capable of bringing about real reforms. This is an area where everything seems to need revision, and no institution is immune to profound revisions.
Tackling these issues is even more urgent in that the war is spreading legitimate anxiety, the return of inflation is putting many households in difficulty and a general malaise has descended on all democracies, including in Europe. The often-ephemeral successes of populism bear witness to this. They never last, but they gain a foothold during the elections, disturbing minds and weakening the intermediary bodies that are part of Europe's democratic culture.
The need for reform is therefore more urgent than ever before. The European Union has understood this, but it still needs to convince its members, to gauge the necessary speed of action and to demonstrate its effectiveness. It has the means to do so.
The fact remains that the European Union has changed profoundly in a few months. In less than five years, the time of a mandate, it has acquired most of the tools it lacked to develop an industrial policy, organise solidarity in times of adversity, and a strategy of autonomy in economic and health matters. It is even trying its hand at extraterritoriality as it exports its rules with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the Digital Services Act (DSA). It wants to extend its law on compliance and duty of care (DCSDD) requiring the respect of human rights in value chains. It is essential for its members and partners. Much remains to be done, particularly in military and diplomatic matters, to assume and deploy its power. But for the European Union, in 2023, a new life is beginning.
1. Regulation 651/2014 17 June 2014
2. Timothy Snider “ Bloodlands, Europe Between Hitler and Stalin ”, Basic Books, New York, 2010.
1.The Challenges
With war next door, Moldova accelerates towards the EU
Maia SANDU
Russia’s ruthless invasion of Ukraine has upended the existing order in Europe and the world, and with it the security architecture, global energy, trade, and financial systems.
Since the end of the Cold War, technological progress and economic growth had led to stronger cooperation and an unprecedented level of connectivity between countries.
Growing interdependence of the world’s economies, cultures, and populations, brought about by cross-border trade and flows of investment, people, and information have promoted reconciliation and prosperity.
Dictatorships fell, one-party rule ended, democracy prevailed.
The Republic of Moldova declared independence in 1991.
Like us, the newly independent states had great expectations.
We embraced this new beginning as a chance for peace and democratic development.
We committed to being part of the free world. A world where states are sovereign and equal; where borders are respected; where states cooperate, settle disputes peacefully and fulfil obligations under international law; where respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is at the heart of governance.
And like others, Moldova hoped that buffer zones, spheres of influence and land grabs were a matter of the past. Above all, we wanted to live freely and choose our own future.
But our aspirations to make our own choices were met by Russia’s imperialist response. Its encouragement and support for secessionist rebels on the left bank of the Nistru river gave birth to a frozen conflict.
Frozen conflicts, like the one in Moldova’s Transnistrian region, have become one of Russia’s foreign policy tools to destabilise its neighbourhood, prevent democratic consolidation and to simply hold back our development.
Fast-forward a quarter of a century and a similar toolbox is applied to keep the EU-hopeful Ukraine part of the Russian sphere of influence. First Crimea, then Donbas, and eight years later – on that grim morning of 24 February 2022 – a full scale invasion of Ukraine.
This ruthless, unjust, illegal war has unleashed an unimaginable tragedy on the Ukrainian people, generating shock waves across Europe and beyond the continent.
