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- Herausgeber: Biteback Publishing
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Sprache: Englisch
Britain's most important relationship, between civil servants and ministers, has reached breaking point. Drawing on interviews with former government ministers and Permanent Secretaries – including Vince Cable, Caroline Flint, Rory Stewart, Philip Rutnam, Simon McDonald and Una O'Brien – The Mind of the Minister provides expert guidance and recommendations for how this vital relationship can improve. Centuries of carefully built trust and mutual understanding have been undermined and strained in recent years, not least by mismanagement at the highest level, a scorched-earth approach to constitutional norms and the testing of civil service integrity. This relationship now needs urgent attention. Ministers, famously, begin the job with an hour's notice and often know little about the department they've landed in. They bring energy, drive and optimism for change, but over time, these ambitions can be drowned by reality, accountability and crises, as well as the distractions of promotion, demotion or a changing political landscape. Civil servants, on the other hand, serve the government of the day and remain in post while ministers come and go. They must be ready to adjust and impartially support a minister of any political persuasion or personality. How does this partnership really work in practice? How do both sides adjust to the different chapters in a ministerial lifespan? What happens if rule makers become rule breakers without repercussions? This compelling book lifts the curtain on the minister–civil servant partnership, highlighting that this crucial relationship must improve – for the sake of our democracy.
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Restoring trust between ministers and civil servants
THE MIND OF THE MINISTER
Tom Brown
For Elodie and Miles
Contents
Introduction
On 29 February 2020, I awoke to the prospect of a birthday for the first time in four years. The discovery that I was born on a leap year evokes surprise and (to me, at least) strange reactions from other people; around the world, 29 February carries all sorts of mysterious connotations and superstitions. In Ireland, it has been considered the day that women may propose to men. Italian proverbs have warned that leap years make women erratic and they are urged not to make any big life decisions until the leap year has ended. Greek and Ukrainian folklore suggests that getting married during a leap year will ultimately end in divorce. It is a day that apparently both births and dooms relationships.
The day of 29 February 2020 was also the day that Sir Philip Rutnam chose, very publicly, to resign as Permanent Secretary from the Home Office, following a high-profile clash with Home Secretary Priti Patel. The moment marked a nadir in relations between civil servants and ministers and sent seismic waves through Westminster (the world of politicians) and Whitehall (the world of civil servants). In the pouring rain (under an umbrella), Rutnam opened with this statement: x
I have this morning resigned as Permanent Secretary of the Home Office. I take this decision with great regret after a career of thirty-three years. I am making this statement now because I will be issuing a claim against the Home Office for constructive dismissal. In the last ten days, I have been the target of a vicious and orchestrated briefing campaign. It has been alleged that I have briefed the media against the Home Secretary. This – along with many other claims – is completely false.
The Home Secretary categorically denied any involvement in this campaign to the Cabinet Office. I regret I do not believe her. She has not made the efforts I would expect to dissociate herself from the comments. Even despite this campaign, I was willing to effect a reconciliation with the Home Secretary, as requested by the Cabinet Secretary on behalf of the Prime Minister. But despite my efforts to engage with her, Priti Patel has made no effort to engage with me to discuss this.1
In normal language, this might sound like a strong statement. In the language of government, these were devastating words which shook the foundations of minister–civil servant relations. Long before the term ‘unprecedented’ became commonplace, former head of the civil service Lord Kerslake described the nature of Rutnam’s resignation as just that, stating that it would ‘send shockwaves through the civil service’.2 It was and it did.
Superstition might suggest that the leap year had struck again, ending another relationship in divorce. More likely is that we were witnessing another drastic moment of decline in Britain’s most important relationship – that of ministers and civil servants. That sounds like an exaggeration, but it is not. Government exists to serve citizens, which it does through projects and services. These xiare underpinned by policy (a plan or course of action by the government), which is initiated by ministers and then developed and delivered by civil servants. When it comes to health, education, pensions, benefits, transport, police, national defence and security, protecting consumers, national energy supply and paying for all of those things, it is the most critical relationship for the country. And this was a drastic moment. There have been (few and far between) examples of senior civil servants being moved within Whitehall to get away from a minister who they were unable to get along with (including a couple of premature departures in the 1990s). But none at the level of Rutnam or in the manner in which he was forced out.
Trouble had been brewing in the years leading up to this moment. In 2018, one (unnamed) Permanent Secretary said the relationship was at its ‘lowest ebb’:
I think it was very low in the Francis Maude days [2010–14], but it’s pretty low now. I think a number of things are making it worse at the moment … The default is that [civil servants are] to blame for everything. We’re to blame for Brexit being difficult; if we say Brexit’s difficult, we’re blamed for being Remoaners.3
Things got worse. The Patel–Rutnam fall-out of 2020 marked a distinct low moment. Later that year, during the Covid-19 pandemic, the Department for Education faced a school exam grading controversy, where an algorithm designed to combat grade inflation ended up disproportionately benefiting private school students and penalising those from state schools. It was a major error and caused stress and anxiety for thousands of students. The Department for Education’s Permanent Secretary, Jonathan Slater, and the CEO of xiiexams regulator Ofqual, Sally Collier, were forced to resign. The Secretary of State for Education, Gavin Williamson, who should have taken responsibility (under the principle of individual ministerial responsibility), refused to. Slater only discovered plans to replace him after he was contacted by a journalist from TheTimesfor comment. His sacking was widely seen as a way to shield Williamson.
In September 2020, the Permanent Secretary of the Government Legal Department, Jonathan Jones, resigned over the government’s plan to use the Internal Market Bill to back out of parts of its withdrawal agreement with the EU. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Brandon Lewis, had told MPs that the bill would break international law in a ‘very specific and limited way’ by giving UK ministers the power to override EU law in ‘tightly defined circumstances’ if border negotiations broke down. The government was asking civil servants to break the law.
The year of 2020 also saw a clear-out of other Permanent Secretaries, on a scale not witnessed before. In a very public war on Whitehall, government sources leaked that Sir Simon McDonald, Sir Philip Rutnam and Sir Tom Scholar (Permanent Secretaries at the Foreign Office, Home Office and HM Treasury, respectively) were on a three-person hit list of those they wanted removed from post.4 Scholar managed to survive the 2020 cull of Permanent Secretaries but was later removed by Liz Truss during her short spell as Prime Minister in 2022.
Following widespread press reports that he was to be sacked, Cabinet Secretary Sir Mark Sedwill left in September 2020. TheTelegraphsaid that Downing Street regarded Sedwill as ‘too much of a Europhile and establishment figure’ to be in post for its planned Whitehall reforms. Sir Richard Heaton left the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) at the xiiiend of his initial five-year appointment period, but he apparently only learned of his departure because it was tagged onto the end of a statement by No. 10 announcing the departure of Sedwill.5
Sir Simon McDonald had worked with Boris Johnson while he was Foreign Secretary and they appeared to have a tense relationship, including during Johnson’s exit from the role. As Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), McDonald had subsequently criticised Johnson’s handling of a row over leaked cables that led to the resignation of Sir Kim Darroch, the UK ambassador to the US, during the Tory leadership contest (which Johnson won). McDonald had expected to stay to oversee the merger of the FCO with the Department for International Development (DfID) in 2020 but was forced out early, in what some described as prime ministerial revenge.
The Covid era also brought about many more examples of a deterioration in the health of the relationship between ministers and civil servants. In November 2022, Adam Tolley KC began a fivemonth investigation into the behaviour of Dominic Raab, following accusations of bullying. Tolley concluded Raab’s conduct ‘involved an abuse or misuse of power in a way that undermines or humiliates’ officials. Following publication of the inquiry findings, in April 2023, Raab resigned. Later that year, the Covid Inquiry produced damning findings, particularly Helen MacNamara’s testimony of Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s refusal to address misogyny, lying and ‘nuclear levels’ of overconfidence.
One senior civil servant, with over thirty years of experience, said of that time: ‘There is a poisonous, horrible atmosphere – a feeling that retribution could strike at any time for offering the wrong advice to the wrong person.’6 In December 2022, Jill Rutter wrote for xivthe Institute for Government that ‘Brexit, Covid and Boris Johnson have made existing tensions in relations between civil servants and ministers unsustainable’.7
Following seismic events and crises (like Brexit and Covid), there is often much analysis attributing the extreme circumstances to extreme actions. There is no doubt that the relationship between civil servants and ministers, and particularly Permanent Secretaries (as the top civil servant in a department) and Secretaries of State (the minister in charge of that department), reached its worst point during the periods of Brexit and Covid. But the basis of how the two work together, in true British institutional fashion, sits upon centuries of carefully constructed precedent and mutual understanding. None of these periods marked the first occasion that civil servants had been asked, by ministers, to break the law. They did not mark the first occasion that a minister should have resigned but did not. We can be fairly confident that cases of bullying or intimidating behaviour from ministers occurred before 2016. But the intensity of damaging behaviour, the testing of civil service integrity and a scorched-earth approach to constitutional norms have left scars that need more than time to heal.
The relationship between ministers and civil servants is a subject about which relatively little is known, beyond those who have happened to have done the job themselves. In public consciousness, the reflection of how ministers and civil servants work together is somewhere between the TV shows YesMinister and The Thickof It. Both are funny and provide glimpses into the workings of government, but neither presents the whole picture, not even in combination.
Civil servants are employed by the Crown (the state), which is represented by the executive (the government of the day). The political party with the most elected representatives in Parliament forms xva government of ministers. Most civil servants work in government departments and are therefore employed by a government minister (a Secretary of State). However, the department itself is led and run by a top civil servant, the Permanent Secretary. The civil service (unlike the US system) is not politically appointed and is intended to remain as a consistent body of expertise capable of delivering policy ideas for ministers. Ministers, meanwhile, retain the democratic mandate for authority and decision-making. In the currency of power, ministers are paid the big bucks but at the price of public accountability – which is why they come and go.
Despite some forms of devolution (including Scottish and Welsh Parliaments, the Northern Ireland Assembly and Metro Mayors), the UK remains very centralised. The vast majority of decision-making still happens in a single postcode (SW1) between a maximum of 109 ministers8 (roughly twenty-five to thirty of which form the Cabinet) and a couple of thousand senior civil servants. It is the relationship between these two parties that has soured so much in recent years and on which this book is focused.
In some ways, it is unfortunate that such an impactful element of public life sits with so few people, although that does mean we can be more targeted in trying to make improvements. It is a fallacy that time, alone, heals all wounds. Patience, behaviour change and consistency play much greater roles, as does acknowledging the history of past mistakes so we are not inevitably doomed to repeat them. In the end, it will be up to the individuals who fulfil those public roles to improve how they work together. If relations are bad, it is not enough for civil servants to hold their breath and wait or hope for someone to arrive who they get along with better; an amiable, favourable minister could be replaced at any moment. And it is not enough for ministers to simply decide that force of will is enough xvito bend and change the delivery machine of government. That approach forgets that the machine is, in fact, constructed of people.
Ministers, famously, begin the job with an hour’s notice. There is an enormous amount to do and they are in at the deep end, often knowing very little about the department they’ve landed in but bringing energy, drive and optimism for change. Over time, these can be drowned by reality, accountability and crises. And then, eventually, by the distraction of promotion, demotion or a changing political landscape.
A minister evolves over their time in office and civil servants must seek to understand that changing person again and again over the minister’s tenure. No minister is the same person on the day they leave as the day they arrived; but their mandate remains and so the onus is on civil servants to keep trying to understand the minister, attuning to different personalities and preferences. Experienced senior civil servants can quickly decipher whether ministers are more policyor communications-driven (usually derived from a combination of their background, topic experience and ambition); whether they think in ink or through debate; whether they prefer detail or synopsis; whether they like having a smorgasbord of options or a strong recommendation; and whether they are efficient and well organised or… not.
Douglas Wass, Permanent Secretary to HM Treasury from 1974–83, captured the blurred nature of the minister–civil servant relationship:
Ministers do not always define their political objectives, or if they do, they define them in terms which permit quite a lot of discretion in their interpretation. On the other hand, administrative methods are often highly charged political issues. The way a tax is xviiadministered may greatly affect the political standing of the government; and the use of some administrative techniques may be anathema to Ministers. So in the real-world, Ministers and civil servants are inextricably mixed up with each other. And they can only function on the basis of a close and harmonious partnership in which each has the trust of the other.9
This conclusion seems clear and, to anyone looking at the issue, obvious. Perhaps the easy to ask, difficult to answer question is: how? How do ministers and civil servants build a close and harmonious partnership in which each has the trust of the other? Civil servants serve the government of the day and by their nature, they must be ready to adjust and support a minister of any political persuasion, or personality, and to provide options for any policy idea. How can a minister, of tribal political nature, trust civil servants who have been implementing the ideas of their nemesis (another political party)? The civil servant will say they are governed by a code and that they are committed to impartiality, honesty, integrity and objectivity. I have worked with thousands of civil servants, public officials and politicians in more than forty countries throughout my career, from policy and communications teams to Permanent Secretaries and Prime Ministers. Do I believe British civil servants are committed to impartiality, honesty, integrity and objectivity? Yes. But politics is about people and feeling and emotion and momentum. The commitments of the Civil Service Code are vitally important, but alone they are insufficient to establish trust.
Ministers are governed by the Ministerial Code. Except there is a catch: the final decision over whether a minister has breached the expected standards of that code rests with the Prime Minister. A Prime Minister simply needs to decide not to implement the xviiistandards of the code on their ministers for it to lose any potency of protection. If rule makers do not believe the rules apply to themselves, it is difficult for civil servants to know where they stand. Rules, guidelines and frameworks alone are insufficient to establish trust.
In the alchemy of governance, the trust between a minister and the civil servants around them is the most precious element, transforming policy visions into tangible realities. But it also aids navigation through crisis and makes the country a better place to live. A fundamental question this book asks is: How can ministers and civil servants build, and rebuild, trust?
Building genuine trusting relationships is an art form rather than a science, which is a frustration if you are in a hurry or have an agenda to get on with. The reality is that humans are individuals and different from one another. Life would, perhaps, be easier if everyone could fit into simple boxes, but if there was a fixed formula for successful working between ministers and civil servants, I suspect it would have been found by now. I am somewhat sceptical of ‘one-man think tank’-style analysis (it is usually from men), which suggests everything is broken but, fortuitously for us, they have all the answers to fix it. I do not have all the answers, which is why I have drawn from a wide variety of people who have been on one side or the other of the minister–civil servant relationship. For this book, I interviewed, in depth and on the record, thirteen prominent former ministers and Permanent Secretaries to gain a much deeper understanding of how ministers and officials can work better together. I also spoke with dozens more in my research. Collectively, they bring reflection, experience and differing views: some of the base ingredients needed to improve something.
I’ve wondered, many times, while writing this book: ‘Was it really xixthat bad?’ The intensity of examples of souring relationships between ministers and civil servants, particularly since 2016, is inescapable. But government still functions, a change of government can signal a reset and critics might label some of the fall-outs as overblown. It is tempting to think that a period of calm and the de-escalation of conflict is sufficient to see past the events of 2016–24. But the trajectory of change has taken place over a much longer period than that and the nature of British constitutional norms means that when something ‘unprecedented’ happens, it creates a new precedent that enables it to happen again. By definition, those things cannot be undone and so ministers and civil servants must now decide the future direction of the relationship.
As with all things, the relationships between ministers and civil servants are neither all bad nor all good (though some are considerably better or worse than others). But each time, I have come back to the question, ‘How important is this relationship?’ If you have any interest in government successfully serving citizens, then I would say it is critical. In which case, it needs all the investment and careful attention it can get – for the sake of the country. xx
NOTES
1 ‘Philip Rutnam resignation: His full statement’, The Guardian, 29 February 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/feb/29/philip-rutnam-resignation-his-full-statement
2 ‘How Office boss quits over “campaign against him”’, BBC News, 29 February 2020, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-51687287
3 ‘Is government fit for purpose? The Kakabadse Report’, Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Civil Service Effectiveness Inquiry, https://www.civilservant.org.uk/library/2018-Kakabadse_Report.pdf
4 Edward Malnick, ‘Top civil servants on Tories’ “hit list”’, Telegraph, 22 February 2020, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2020/02/22/top-civil-servants-tories-hit-list/
5 Martin Stanley, ‘Dismissal: Permanent Secretaries,’ Understanding the Civil Service, https://www.civilservant.org.uk/information-dismissal-permanent_secretaries.html
6 Rajeev Syal and Rowena Mason, ‘Inside Boris Johnson’s Whitehall: “A poisonous, horrible atmosphere”’, The Guardian, 25 February 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/feb/25/inside-boris-johnsons-whitehall-a-poisonous-horrible-atmosphere
7 Jill Rutter, ‘Civil service–ministerial relations: Time for a reset’, Institute for Government, 19 December 2022, https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publication/civil-serviceministerial-relations
8 According to the Ministerial and Other Salaries Act 1975
9 Douglas Wass, ‘The Privileged Adviser’, Reith Lecture, 23 November 1983, https://downloads.bbc.co.uk/rmhttp/radio4/transcripts/1983_reith3.pdf
PART ONE
SETTING THE SCENE
The period between 2016 and 2024 (and particularly during the Boris Johnson administration) does not mark the only time that ministers and civil servants have faced a strain in their relationship. But it did mark a particularly intense period of turmoil and sat within the context of two all-encompassing events: Brexit and the Covid pandemic. It was also a period during which several constitutional precedents, underpinning the way in which ministers and civil servants work together, were undermined. Those acts cannot be undone, and because of the UK’s uncodified constitution, it’s easy for such acts to set precedent and then become established norms. In other words, it is not possible to pretend nothing happened between 2016 and 2024 and simply return to old ways; those no longer exist. A new space has been created and decisions must be made about how these new precedents are governed or formalised. In order to step back and decide on the way forward, it is important to understand the context of the minister–civil servant relationship and its evolution so far. 2
Civil servants: The backstory
The civil service is often referred to as if it were a single entity. That was once true. Today, in practice, it is a collection of organisations tied together by a series of threads, unified in their commitment to serve the government of the day and by a carefully established code and set of principles which have been honed over 170 years. The nature of the British civil service rests very heavily upon two reports:
The 1854 Northcote–Trevelyan Report established the core values which form the bedrock of today’s Civil Service Code: integrity, honesty, objectivity and impartiality.The 1918 Haldane Report emphasised the necessity for government departments to engage in ongoing knowledge enhancement and research to provide a solid foundation for policymaking. It also established a mutual interdependence between ministers and civil servants.However, it is not only these reports that have shaped the working relationship between civil servants and ministers. There have been several other significant reports, rules and events which have carefully evolved the relationship over the course of more than 150 years.
THE NORTHCOTE–TREVELYAN REFORMS (1854)
The Northcote–Trevelyan Report laid the foundation for a professional civil service by emphasising merit-based recruitment. The reforms minimised political patronage, allowing civil servants to serve with increased integrity and impartiality and enabling them 3to offer unbiased support and advice to ministers, irrespective of political affiliation. Importantly, these reforms established the principles of integrity, honesty, objectivity and impartiality, providing the foundation for civil servants’ professional ethos and the Civil Service Code’s core values. The reforms heralded a new era where talent and hard work should define a civil servant’s rise through the ranks, not who they knew.
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (1855)
The establishment of the Civil Service Commission to oversee merit-based recruitment reinforced the professional barrier between ministers and civil service appointments. This allowed civil servants to function as objective administrators, focusing on policy implementation and efficient administration without undue political influence.
THE INTRODUCTION OF COMPETITIVE EXAMINATIONS (1870)
The introduction of competitive examinations for entry into the civil service helped ensure that civil servants possessed the necessary expertise and competence to effectively support ministerial directives and collaborate on policy development, enhancing the functional synergy between civil servants and ministers.
THE HALDANE REPORT (1918)
The Haldane Report underscored the need for robust collaboration between ministers and civil servants, proposing a model where both parties work closely on the basis of mutual respect and shared knowledge. This relationship was aimed at improving policy formulation and decision-making, recognising the specialised knowledge that civil servants bring to the government. The report introduced 4the idea of mutual interdependence, with ministers providing authority and officials providing expertise.
Richard Burdon Haldane suggested that this collaborative effort should not be confined to a small group of officials around a minister, as was common in the nineteenth century, but should extend across entire departments, leveraging their collective expertise and perspectives. Despite enormous changes over the past 100 years, this remains the model on which ministers and civil servants operate.
Former senior civil servant Martin Stanley summarised the impact of the Haldane model well:
UK civil servants are intended to work so closely with Ministers that they know Ministers’ minds so well that they take the same decisions that Ministers would take, given the law and the substance of the relevant government policy. This is the reason why civil servants are almost always present when Ministers meet their colleagues to discuss policy and when Ministers meet others in ‘official’ meetings. They listen in to ministerial phone calls, take notes of meetings and debrief those who need to know. Ministers may not reach decisions in private, with each other or with someone else – nor can officials.1 Professors Dave Richards and Martin Smith have added to this:
Constitutionally, the Haldane convention does not recognise any division in the personality of ministers and their officials … The principles of both indivisibility and mutual dependence within the UK system are seen as providing both a practical and constitutional constraint to protect against the arbitrary (ab)use of power … This convention became a bedrock of the Westminster 5model. It established the modus operandi that officials and ministers should operate in a symbiotic relationship whereby ministers decide after consultation with their officials whose wisdom, institutional memory and knowledge of the processes of governing helps to guide the minister. The official is loyal to the minister who takes the rap when things go wrong. Whatever the problems with this approach, democratic or otherwise, it at least outlined clear lines of responsibility and accountability.2
CENTRAL COORDINATION BY THE TREASURY (1920)
The move to centralise civil service coordination under the Treasury was designed to unify administrative practices across departments, leading to more cohesive support for ministerial projects and initiatives. This helped streamline interactions between civil servants and ministers, facilitating smoother policy execution.
THE CARLTONA PRINCIPLE (1943)
The Carltona Principle allowed civil servants to exercise power on behalf of ministers, underscoring the delegation and trust integral to the minister–civil servant relationship. This principle has facilitated efficient government operation by enabling ministers to rely on civil servants for the execution of their decisions, reflecting an operational aspect of their collaboration.
THE CRICHEL DOWN RULES (1954)
The Crichel Down affair involved a promise in Parliament by Winston Churchill in 1941 that requisitioned land would be returned to its owners after the Second World War, once it was no longer required for the purpose for which it had been bought. After the war, the land was handed over to the Ministry of Agriculture, 6which increased the price of the land far in excess of the amount the original owners had sold it for. Mass outcry and a public inquiry ensued, following which the minister responsible, Sir Thomas Dugdale, resigned. That moment set a precedent for ministerial responsibility and a chain of accountability, whereby civil servants were accountable to their ministers, and ministers were accountable to Parliament. Ministerial accountability was subsequently established, whereby it is expected that a minister will protect a civil servant who has carried out an order by the minister. This includes a minister acknowledging and taking responsibility for a mistake made by a civil servant and not exposing them to public criticism.
The Crichel Down episode is important in constitutional terms because of the four categories drawn up by the then Home Secretary, Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, to distinguish the degree of accountability of ministers for their civil servants:
A minister must protect a civil servant who has carried out an explicit order by the minister.A minister must protect and defend a civil servant who acts properly in accordance with the policy laid down by the minister.Where an official makes a mistake or causes some delay, but not on an important issue of policy and not where a claim to individual rights is seriously involved, the minister acknowledges the mistake and accepts the responsibility, although he is not personally involved, and states that he will take appropriate corrective action in the department. The minister would not expose the official to public criticism.Where action has been taken by a civil servant of which the minister disapproves and has no prior knowledge, and the conduct of the official is reprehensible, there is no obligation on the part 7of the minister to endorse what he believes is wrong or to defend what are clearly shown to be errors of his officials. But the minister remains constitutionally responsible to Parliament for the fact that something has gone wrong, and the minister alone can tell Parliament what has occurred.3The subsequent Crichel Down Rules improved the transparency and accountability of civil servants, particularly in the management of public assets, reinforcing the trust and reliability expected by ministers. These rules helped solidify a more accountable and ethically grounded relationship between civil servants and ministers.
THE FULTON REPORT (1968)
The Fulton Report highlighted the necessity for modernisation and specialisation within the civil service, leading to a more skilled and adaptable workforce capable of effectively supporting a range of ministerial needs and enhancing the overall responsiveness of civil servants to ministerial goals.
THE CIVIL SERVICE DEPARTMENT (1968)
The creation of the Civil Service Department was instrumental in elevating the professional management within the civil service, ensuring that civil servants were well prepared to meet the increasingly complex demands of ministers and to provide high-level administrative support.
THE ARMSTRONG MEMORANDUM (1985)
The Armstrong Memorandum detailed the ethical framework within which civil servants operate, emphasising their commitment to serve the government of the day efficiently and impartially. This 8guidance ensured that civil servants supported ministers in a manner consistent with legal and ethical standards, fostering a stable and trustworthy governmental environment. Crucially, the Armstrong Memorandum was designed to ensure the confidence of ministers that civil servants will always support the government of the day.
THE ‘NEXT STEPS’ INITIATIVE (1988)
The ‘Next Steps’ initiative led to the formation of executive agencies (part of a government department that is managerially and budgetarily separate), which allowed civil servants to manage operational functions more effectively and with greater autonomy. This structure supported a more efficient collaboration with ministers by clarifying roles and responsibilities, thus enhancing the focus on achieving ministerial objectives.
THE CITIZEN’S CHARTER (1991)
The Citizen’s Charter initiative placed a greater emphasis on service quality and responsiveness to the public, aligning civil service operations more closely with ministerial commitments to public accountability. This alignment helped ensure that civil servants were not only supporting ministers but also jointly accountable for the delivery of public services.
THE CIVIL SERVICE CODE (1996)
The establishment of the Civil Service Code legally codified civil servants’ roles and responsibilities, emphasising integrity, honesty, objectivity and impartiality. This legal backbone supports the enduring values highlighted in the earlier history, ensuring that civil servants’ conduct continues to meet the highest standards in support of democratic governance.9
Ministers: The backstory
The formal history of ministers extends further back than the permanent civil service, but the evolution of the role has been less steady and consistent than for officials. Crucially, also, there has not been a continuous handover and building of institutional knowledge as there has been within the civil service. In a change of government, typically, the outgoing administration does not engage in a detailed handover with the incoming one, and civil servants do not disclose the plans of a previous government to a new one – as part of their commitment to serve the government of the day. In being politically impartial, civil servants may not disclose the advice they have given to ministers. That includes advice given to an incumbent’s predecessor.
Many of the major events which have evolved the role of the minister tally with the milestones for civil service changes.
THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION (1688)
The Glorious Revolution established the constitutional monarchy and Parliament’s supremacy over the Crown, which led to the gradual development of a distinct ministerial role within the government. This was the foundation for the relationship between ministers and civil servants, emphasising the importance of accountability to Parliament.
THE NORTHCOTE–TREVELYAN REFORMS (1854)
Although primarily focused on the civil service, the Northcote–Trevelyan reforms also indirectly influenced the development of the ministerial role by professionalising the civil service. Ministers were now supported by competent and permanent civil servants, rather 10than personal appointees. From this point, the relationship became rooted, more formally, in meritocracy and professionalism.
THE PARLIAMENT ACTS (1911 AND 1949)
The Parliament Acts removed the House of Lords’ power to veto a bill (1911) and reduced its power to delay a bill to one year (1949). The Acts increased the power and responsibility of the House of Commons and, by extension, the ministers within it. This was important for the relationship between ministers and officials, as it increased the civil service’s role in ensuring that ministers could meet their expanded legislative responsibilities, reinforcing the need for effective policy advice and administration.
THE FULTON COMMITTEE (1968)
The Fulton Committee’s examination of the civil service also led to a re-evaluation of how ministers interact with their civil servants, advocating for better management and specialisation. This pushed for a more specialised civil service, which in turn required ministers to engage more deeply with expert advice and support for effective governance.
THE CIVIL SERVICE DEPARTMENT’S CREATION (1968)
Following the Fulton Report, the Civil Service Department was created, which aimed to manage the civil service more effectively, influencing how civil servants were allocated and managed in support of ministers. This led to more structured support for ministers, with improved allocation and management of civil service resources.
THE THATCHER REFORMS (1980s)
Margaret Thatcher’s tenure saw significant changes in the ethos 11of the civil service, pushing for a more businesslike, efficient government. The period also saw tensions emerge, as the roles of civil servants and the expectations of ministers evolved. This shifted the civil service towards a culture of efficiency and performance, affecting the dynamic between civil servants and ministers, often leading to stress on traditional roles and responsibilities. The launch and broadcast of political sitcom Yes Minister in the 1980s was (and is) responsible for several myths surrounding people’s understanding of the civil service. But the show’s release coincided with the exact moment the real-life relationship between ministers and civil servants accelerated away from this portrayal, as Thatcher’s government tore through formalities of the 1950s and ’60s and shifted the primary purpose of civil servants from being policy advisers to policy deliverers. These changes then provided a platform for further changes, particularly with a growing role for special advisers, during Tony Blair’s tenure.
THE ‘NEXT STEPS’ INITIATIVE (1988)
The ‘Next Steps’ initiative led to the establishment of executive agencies, changing the operational landscape of ministries and the way ministers interacted with the civil service. This created a more focused and agency-specific approach to civil service work, altering the traditional broad-support model and requiring ministers to adapt to a new structure of civil service interaction.
THE INTRODUCTION OF THE MINISTERIAL CODE (1997)
The codification of a Ministerial Code provided clear guidelines on how ministers should conduct themselves in relation to the civil service, reinforcing standards of conduct and the relationship dynamic. The code introduced a standardised approach to interactions 12between ministers and civil servants, clarifying expectations and roles.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND GOVERNANCE ACT (2010)
The Constitutional Reform and Governance Act codified many practices relating to civil servants and ministers, formalising aspects of their relationship, particularly around appointments and the role of civil servants. This strengthened the framework governing the interaction between ministers and civil servants, ensuring more transparency and fairness in their working relationship.
The evolution of the relationship between ministers and civil servants has happened slowly and over a long period of time. Mapped against major political events,4 it’s clear how changes have steadily taken place in line with the United Kingdom’s own journey:
15This careful evolution has fostered a cohesive set of values, rooted in commitment to public service and serving the country. Crucially, it has also set layers of precedent on which the particular type of relationship between ministers and civil servants rests. Ministers should know what behaviours to expect from civil servants, have clarity on the chain of accountability and trust that civil servants will work with them on the basis of mutual interdependence.
While civil servants share similarities between them, not all departments are the same; each has their own culture, identity and preferences. After leaving office, Amber Rudd reflected on her periods as Secretary of State in two very different departments: the Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) and the Home Office:
The difference really is a difference in character of two different departments. DECC is a department which is trying to do something noble … It felt like the people there really believed in what they were doing, a sort of noble cause in terms of decarbonising and keeping people’s bills down. All that felt quite interesting, contained, people would come up with interesting ideas. The Home Office – it’s homeland security, it’s a defensive position. It’s a completely different environment really.5
When trying to understand why relations between so many ministers and civil servants have soured in recent years, it’s important to consider these different cultures. But it is also an important consideration for an incoming minister as it is these embedded cultures which shape and form departmental lines to take (the established biases of a government department). 16
Special advisers: The backstory
While the nature of the relationship between ministers and civil servants has evolved carefully over the past 170 years, a third actor has emerged in recent decades. Special advisers in the UK trace their formal origins back to the 1960s, although similar roles existed informally before that. Until the 1920s, it was usual to have a small number of personal and political appointees serving in the Prime Minister’s office, and there are several examples of informal advisers after that.6 John Wyndham had joined Harold Macmillan’s private secretaries at No. 10 (the Prime Minister’s office) in 1957, but the first notable special adviser, in its modern guise, was Marcia Williams, appointed by Harold Wilson in 1964. Williams played a pivotal role for Wilson in both personal and political capacities and set a precedent for the integral role of special advisers in political governance.
The role of the special adviser was then formally recognised during Edward Heath’s government in the early 1970s. Special advisers were instituted to provide ministers with advice that was overtly political, distinct from the non-partisan advice given by the permanent civil service. This differentiation was intended to enhance the political responsiveness of ministerial decisions without compromising the neutrality of the civil service.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, under successive governments, the number and influence of special advisers grew, reflecting the increasing complexity of government decision-making and communications. At this point, the roles of advisers diversified, ranging from policy specialists to media and communications strategists. It was becoming clearer that there was a separation between the political roles of special advisers and the administrative roles of civil 17servants. But the resistance to fully formalise the role continued to muddy the governance of advisers.
In 1978, the Committee on Political Activities of Civil Servants, chaired by Sir Arthur Armitage, concluded ‘that the guidelines and rules for the political activities of Special Advisers should be laid down by the Prime Minister; and that these should be separate and distinct from the rules applicable to career civil servants.’ This evolved in 1986, when the Treasury and the Civil Service Committee established a new position, stating that special advisers ‘are civil servants and they are bound by all the conventions of civil servants’.
Margaret Thatcher then provided a written answer on the question of the role of special advisers on 10 April 1984, which stated that ‘their terms of appointment are similar to those of other civil servants and they are subject to the same rules of conduct … apart from certain exceptions which reflect the special nature of their role’.7 In short, there was still a way for special advisers to act as they pleased.
In 1997, after eighteen years in opposition, Labour re-entered government. But Tony Blair’s government was cautious of a civil service which had spent so long working with, and delivering for, their opposite numbers, and came to rely much more on the network of advisers they had established in opposition. Trust had been built in adversity and the new government coming in relied upon the advisers who had been there for the long winter in opposition. The role of the special adviser changed dramatically, where their numbers and the scope of their influence expanded significantly. High-profile advisers like Alastair Campbell, who served as Blair’s director of communications, were seen as pivotal figures in shaping government policy and public communications. Special advisers 18(SpAds) became established as crucial players, greasing the wheels of government and providing a political buffer to allow civil servants to focus on policy and administration.
The Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 was a landmark in formalising the status and functions of special advisers, setting legal boundaries and employment conditions and aiming to stabilise their roles within the governmental framework. In 2016, the Cabinet Office issued a Code of Conduct for Special Advisers, but the formal governance for SpAds still has many holes and there remains no training or preparation for the job.
Governance of the relationship
The relationship between civil servants and ministers is governed by the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 and via the Civil Service Code (with the civil service’s values of integrity, honesty, objectivity and impartiality) and the Ministerial Code.
The Cabinet Manual, published in October 2011 in the context of the coalition government, is a comprehensive document outlining the internal rules and procedures under which the UK government operates. Authored under the auspices of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet Secretary, its purpose is to be a transparent codification of the conventions that dictate government operations, aiming to make the workings of government more open and accountable. On how civil servants and ministers should work together, it says:
Civil servants are required to act with honesty, objectivity, impartiality and integrity. Ministers must uphold the political impartiality of the civil service, and not ask civil servants to act in any way which would conflict with the Civil Service Code and 19the requirements of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010.8
The Act codifies the expectations and principles guiding the interaction between ministers and civil servants, emphasising the need for a professional and unbiased civil service. Civil servants should serve the government of the day while maintaining high standards of propriety. Meanwhile, the Ministerial Code’s opening principle is that ‘ministers of the Crown are expected to maintain high standards of behaviour and to behave in a way that upholds the highest standards of propriety’.9 More specifically:
1.2 Ministers should be professional in all their dealings and treat all those with whom they come into contact with consideration and respect. Working relationships, including with civil servants, ministerial and parliamentary colleagues and parliamentary staff should be proper and appropriate. Harassing, bullying or other inappropriate or discriminating behaviour wherever it takes place is not consistent with the Ministerial Code and will not be tolerated.
The Ministerial Code is primarily about minimum expectations for the behaviour of ministers (with what appears to be a fairly low bar) and procedural guidance. It has in-built weaknesses, one of which leads all judgement of compliance with the code to one person:
1.7 Where the Prime Minister determines that a breach of the expected standards has occurred, they may ask the Independent Adviser for confidential advice on the appropriate sanction. The final decision rests with the Prime Minister. Where the Prime Minister retains his confidence in the Minister, available sanctions 20include requiring some form of public apology, remedial action, or removal of ministerial salary for a period.
The expectation is that if a minister breaches the code, they are removed from office, either through resignation or termination. Since the publication of the Ministerial Code in 1997, this process was consistently applied in several high-profile cases, with the most significant in-built weakness not showing itself to be a problem:
Peter Mandelson (2001): The Northern Ireland Secretary resigned for a second time after accusations – hotly denied – that he used his position to influence a passport application.David Blunkett (2005): The Work and Pensions Secretary resigned after being accused of breaking the Ministerial Code by taking a job with DNA Bioscience, which could have led to a conflict of interest, while he was still an MP.Liam Fox (2011): The Defence Secretary resigned after it was found that he had given a close friend, Adam Werritty, access to the Ministry of Defence and allowed him to join official trips, despite him not having an official role.Damian Green (2017): The Minister of the Cabinet Office was found to have made misleading statements about allegations that pornography was found on his office computer in 2008. He was sacked after an investigation determined that he had breached the Ministerial Code.But in 2020, following the resignation of Philip Rutnam, as detailed at the beginning of this book, this all changed. Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s ethics adviser, Sir Alex Allan, began an inquiry into the 21behaviour of Priti Patel. After several months, Allan’s report said that the Home Secretary’s conduct ‘amounted to behaviour that can be described as bullying’ – noting instances of ‘shouting and swearing’ and finding that she had breached the Ministerial Code, ‘even if unintentionally’. It was that final word which Johnson used to pirouette around the straightforward consequence of Allan’s conclusion. The Prime Minister insisted Patel was not a bully, that the code had not been breached and that he had full confidence in her. He then urged colleagues in a WhatsApp message to ‘form a square around the Prittster’.10
Sir Alex Allan, who had also served Johnson’s two predecessors, issued a statement at the same time as the Prime Minister’s decision, saying, ‘I feel that it is right that I should now resign from my position as the Prime Minister’s independent adviser on the code.’
Johnson had taken advantage of the Ministerial Code’s flexibility and undermined its standing, demonstrating that rules, alone, are insufficient to establish strong, functioning, trusting relationships.
The civil service is in a difficult position. In 2024, the UK Governance Project, chaired by the Rt Hon. Dominic Grieve, sought to make practical recommendations to improve governance in UK institutions. About the civil service, it wrote:
The ability of the Civil Service to operate within and uphold standards in governance has been the bedrock of much of the operation of our governance system. We recognise that, in 2024, the Civil Service is under strain as an institution. In private, in conversations with those who have experience as Ministers or senior Civil Servants, it is striking how much consensus there is on the need for a fundamental re-think.1122
In tacit acknowledgement of the nadir of civil service–ministerial relations, it recommended legal changes to protect civil servants. In this, the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 would be amended to make explicit that civil servants have a legal obligation to act in compliance with their responsibilities under the Civil Service Code and therefore ministers could not direct them to act in opposition to the code.
Nearly everyone agrees that civil service reform is needed and that amending the rules to provide more protection for civil servants is a good first step. But that is only half the solution. While rules can be an equalising force, providing clarity and consistency (which is particularly important given that civil servants remain in post while ministers come and go), rules can also be a tool used to ensure a particular outcome – which gives considerable power to those making them. And rules can also be changed again in future, making them unpredictable and short-lived. Reform is needed in (and for) the civil service, but a shift in approach and mindset must also occur, to enable civil servants to work better with the government of the day and to allow ministers to get the best out of the civil service.
