The Monad System Theory of Self Structure E-Book

Skye Wood

• Herausgeber: BookRix
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2020

Beschreibung

This book contains writings:

• Combining Leibniz's concept of monads with the Internal Family Systems therapy approach to form a tiered theory of the mind
• On boring versus interesting recursion
• On idea transmission
• On possessive language and the self
• Comparing various forms of Pragmatism

• and on why the diametric model of autism and schizotypy is unsound.

Anyone who is interested in the self, philosophy, psychology, or meaning will find this interesting.

Leseprobe

Skye Wood

The Monad System Theory of Self Structure

And Other Writings

BookRix GmbH & Co. KG81371 Munich

The Monad System Theory of Self Structure (2020)

The Theory

It is possible to synthesize Leibniz's concept of monads, including the points made in the Monadology about dominant monads, and the Internal Family Systems theapeutic approach into a theory of the structure of the psyche. I will assume familiarity with Leibniz; the Monadology is not terribly long to read in any case. As for Internal Family Systems, this approach conceptualizes the psyche as made of "parts" that interact with each other and which should ultimately be in harmony, and it also posits that there is a self which ought to lead the parts (read more here).

Combining these concepts with monads, essentially, the dominant monad with secure dominance corresponds to the coherence of the mind or experienced self, and the alignment of the parts with a leading self. Deviating slightly from IFS language and framing, I believe the self is a part but that it is the dominant part, corresponding with the dominant monad.

Incoherence, which corresponds with self-alienation, can occur in a variety of ways at several different levels: surface, structural, and root. The deeper the level, the greater the incoherence and the lesser stability of the dominant monad or self's control. At the surface level are most neuroses. Different parts can be in conflict, but there is no real threat to the stability of the self-structure. One of the neuroses with the closest proximity to a structural threat is OCD, since this throws the self into question. Another around this level would be depersonalization.

At the structural level, no one part or monad has successfully gained equal or greater power with respect to the self or dominant monad, but the self or dominant monad has lost its reign. Leibniz differentiates the "soul" as having memory. In this case, there is loss of the self's complete control over one's memory, and there is also the self's lack of recognizing certain other monads as constituent to the whole system's structure. This corresponds with psychosis, in both the sense of loss of control, as well as the sense in which parts of oneself become recognized as external entities. These entities, or rogue monads or parts, do not have control over the memory or complete control over anything else; nonetheless, they have more power than they would in a coherent self system. By contrast, when there is incoherence (ie disharmony or alienation) at the root level, this corresponds with monads within the mind achieving control over parts of the mind including the memory. The phenomena at this level correspond with Dissociative Identity Disorder.

It is important to note that I intend no causal claims here, only correspondences. I also do not mean to imply that incoherence is a causal force, and that some incoherence will worsen to other levels. Self-alienation is the basic phenomenon which worsens, but even still I do not claim that self-alienation is a cause. I am agnostic to the various factors in mental illness and neurodivergence that are posited to be causes.

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Additional Points

As Thomas Metzinger points out in Being No One, under normal conditions, the machinery of the mind is not accessible to our awareness. To put it into Leibnizian terms, the dominant monad which subsumes the others is unreflexive to some degree. To acknowledge its own nature, someone's system needs to be in disarray. This enables reconstruction and the learning of the structure.One can return to the self aware of one's structural nature (whether in terms of monads or parts) and thereby not reach full awareness of each monad (for dominated monads' awarenesses are coopted by the dominant), but rather a new SELF-awareness.However, self-awareness does not constitute a self, and this is why it is possible to be deluded that one is dead or not a person. In order to have a self, there needs to be a certain level of coherence and control over memory. There can be more than one "self" in this sense, but only one will correspond with the dominant monad.