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- Herausgeber: John Wiley & Sons
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Sprache: Englisch
Non-Alignment is back with a vengeance.
In recent years, the number of countries embracing this venerable approach to foreign policy has increased exponentially, making it a force to be reckoned with in world affairs. The war in Ukraine, the expansion of the BRICS group, and the conflict in Gaza have given a special impetus to its rise in a new form: Active Non-Alignment (ANA). This has gone hand-in-hand with the growing power and influence of the Global South in world politics.
In this agenda-setting book, Jorge Heine, Carlos Fortin and Carlos Ominami, explain the origins, dynamics and significance of ANA, for the future of world order. Far from a transitory expression of the current state of affairs, they argue that ANA is here to stay. It provides a powerful guide to action and a fine-tuned compass for the Global Majority, that is, the countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, to strike out and prioritize their national interests, whilst navigating the perilous waters of a troubled world in the throes of change.
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CONTENTS
Cover
Table of Contents
Title Page
Copyright
Dedication
Acknowledgments
Abbreviations
Preface
ANA as the way forward
Notes
1. The War in Ukraine: Reactions from the Global South
The reaction of the Global South
The West versus the Rest
Requiem for the West? The Global South and ANA
Great Powers and weaker states
Conclusion
Notes
2. What is Active Non-Alignment and What Fuels It?
Gaza, Israel and the Global South
A post-colonial grand narrative
The new non-alignment
ANA and “playing the field”
From grand strategy to tactics
Latin America: playing both sides against the middle?
ANA and the vexed issue of values
Conclusion
Notes
3. The Cold War, Decolonization and the Non-Aligned Movement
Roots and branches
Enter Tito
Birthplace Bandung
Encounter in Brioni
Belgrade as the launching pad
New actors, new agendas
The new century’s new context
Bringing ideology back in
Conclusion
Notes
4. The Political Economy of Active Non-Alignment
The fragmentation of hegemony
From subordination to interdependence
A new intellectual climate
Energy transition and e-mobility
Towards monetary pluralism
Conclusion
Notes
5. Active Non-Alignment and the ASEAN Way
ASEAN and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
The improbable rise of ASEAN to its current pole position
ASEAN centrality as a driving force
The rise of the RCEP
The Belt and Road Initiative and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific project
A tale of two summits
Conclusion
Notes
6. From the Extreme West to Active Non-Alignment
A region in reverse gear
Chancay, China and ANA
Active Non-Alignment as a response to Great Power competition
ANA in Latin America
Non-alignment across the Global South
A roadmap to step back from the brink
ANA in practice: Brazil in Lula’s third term
Conclusion
Notes
7. The Global South and Active Non-Alignment
The rise of the Global South
What does the Global South want?
Trade, investment and finance
Norms and disciplines of the rules-based order
The BRICS+ and the rise of the Global South
China in the Global South
Conclusion
Notes
Conclusion
Sanctions and economic warfare
An era in flux and the rise of the Global South
ANA as the way forward
The Global South, ANA and the way forward
Notes
Afterword
Whatever happened to nearshoring and friendshoring?
Unpredictability and exacerbated US-China competition
The second Trump administration and the Global South
A light at the end of the tunnel?
Notes
Index
End User License Agreement
List of Figures
Chapter 6
Figure 6.1
Latin America’s % share of global GDP
Figure 6.2
Evolution of Latin America’s per capita income in relation to average global per…
Figure 6.3
Exports from Latin America and the Caribbean (as % share of global exports)
Figure 6.4
Latin America’s % share of world exports
Figure 6.5
Evolution of Latin America’s primary product exports as a share of global primar…
Figure 6.6
Exports of manufactured products by Latin America (as % share of global total)
List of Tables
Chapter 7
Table 7.1
The Global South (number of countries)
Table 7.2
Developing countries’ FDI outward stock (millions of USD)
Table 7.3
ICSID: Chinese companies’ demands for compensation
Guide
Cover
Table of Contents
Title Page
Copyright
Dedication
Acknowledgements
Abbreviations
Preface
Begin Reading
Conclusion
Afterword
Index
End User License Agreement
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The Non-Aligned World
Striking Out in an Era of Great Power Competition
JORGE HEINE, CARLOS FORTIN AND CARLOS OMINAMI
polity
Copyright © Jorge Heine, Carlos Fortin and Carlos Ominami 2025
The right of Jorge Heine, Carlos Fortin and Carlos Ominami to be identified as Authors of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First published in 2025 by Polity Press
Polity Press65 Bridge StreetCambridge CB2 1UR, UK
Polity Press111 River StreetHoboken, NJ 07030, USA
All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purpose of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.
ISBN-13: 978-1-5095-6436-1
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Control Number: 2024947184
The publisher has used its best endeavours to ensure that the URLs for external websites referred to in this book are correct and active at the time of going to press. However, the publisher has no responsibility for the websites and can make no guarantee that a site will remain live or that the content is or will remain appropriate.
Every effort has been made to trace all copyright holders, but if any have been overlooked the publisher will be pleased to include any necessary credits in any subsequent reprint or edition.
For further information on Polity, visit our website:politybooks.com
Dedication
Dedicated to the memory of Celso Furtado, Aníbal Pinto and Raúl Prebisch, brilliant economists and far-sighted thinkers, whose path-breaking work foresaw the rise of the South.
Acknowledgments
In the course of the five years since we first put forward the notion of Active Non-Alignment, we have accumulated significant debts to various entities and colleagues that have believed in this project and have supported it in various ways, mainly by hosting meetings to discuss its implications. They include the Foro Permanente de Política Exterior in Santiago; the Institute of International Studies of the University of Chile; the Chile 21 Foundation; FLACSO-Chile and FLACSO-Argentina; the School of International Relations at the Getulio Vargas Foundation in São Paulo; the School of Public Policy at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver; the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University in Washington DC; the School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi; the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) in Johannesburg; the Fulbright Association of New Jersey; the Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and Economic Studies (ISER) at the University of the West Indies in Mona, Jamaica; the Institute of International Relations (IIR) of the University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, in Trinidad and Tobago; Ashoka University in New Delhi; the Columbus Memorial Library at the Organization of American States (OAS) in Washington DC; the Maison de l’Amérique Latine in Paris; La Maison Française at New York University (NYU); the Global Development Policy Center at Boston University; the Instituto Matías Romero of the Mexican Foreign Ministry in Mexico City; the journal Global Policy; the French journal Le Grand Continent; the Canadian Association for Latin American and Caribbean Studies; the Latin American Studies Association (LASA); and the International Political Science Association (IPSA). A special thanks to Eva-Maria Nag and Gregory Chin of the Global Policy journal for their unwavering support.
Much as this project has been a collaborative endeavor between the three of us, we are also in debt to colleagues who have generously shared their views of earlier versions of the text, allowing us to refine and sharpen our argument: they include Jorge Dominguez, Bernabe Malacalza and Matias Spektor; Gregory Chin and Trita Parsi provided valuable feedback on Chapter 2, and Kishore Mahbubani did so on Chapter 5. We are also indebted to two anonymous readers engaged by Polity Press for their very valuable comments and suggestions. Any shortcomings in the text are our fault alone. As with several of our previous books, our long-time collaborator, Dr. Joseph Turcotte, with his remarkable editing skills, has played a key role in giving proper shape to what was at one point a somewhat unwieldy manuscript.
Finally, we would like to thank that extraordinary editor that is Louise Knight at Polity Press for believing in this project from the word go and for shepherding it so effectively through its various stages.
August 2024
Jorge Heine, Boston, Massachusetts
Carlos Fortin, Brighton, England
Carlos Ominami, Paris, France
Abbreviations
ADMM+
ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus
AIIB
Asian Investment and Infrastructure Bank
AMLO
President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (Mexico)
ANA
Active Non-Alignment
AOIP
ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific
APEC
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
APEP
Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity
ARF
ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEAN + 3
ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korea
BRI
Belt and Road Initiative
BRIC
Brazil, Russia, India and China
BRICS
BRIC plus South Africa
BRICS+
Expansion of the BRICS group
CARICOM
Caribbean Community
CCP
Chinese Communist Party
CELAC
Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
CIS
Community of Independent States
CPSU
Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CPTPP
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
EAS
East Asia Summit
ECFR
European Council on Foreign Relations
ECLAC
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
ECOSOC
United Nations Economic and Social Council
EU
European Union
EV
electric vehicle
FDI
foreign direct investment
FOIP
Free and Open Indo-Pacific
FTA
free trade agreement
FTAA
Free Trade Area of the Americas
G7
Group of 7
G20
Group of 20
G77+China
Group of 77
GATT
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP
gross domestic product
IBSA
India, Brazil and South Africa
ICC
International Criminal Court
ICJ
International Court of Justice
ICSID
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (World Bank)
IDFC
International Development Finance Corporation
IFI
international financial institution
IIR
Institute of International Relations (University of the West Indies, St. Augustine)
IMF
International Monetary Fund
IP
intellectual property
IPSA
International Political Science Association
IR
international relations
IRA
Inflation Reduction Act (United States)
ISDS
investor-state dispute settlement
ISER
Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and Economic Studies (University of the West Indies, Mona)
LAC
Latin America and the Caribbean
LASA
Latin American Studies Association
LIO
liberal international order
MDGs
Millenium Development Goals
MERCOSUR
Southern Common Market
MOU
Memorandum of Understanding
NAM
Non-Aligned Movement
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDB
New Development Bank, so-called BRICS Bank
NDRC
National Development and Reform Commission
NGO
non-governmental organization
NIEO
New International Economic Order
OAS
Organization of American States
OECD
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
P-5
Permanent 5
PPP
purchasing power parity
R&D
research and development
RBO
rules-based order
RCEP
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
RMB
renminbi
SAIIA
South African Institute of International Affairs
SCO
Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SDR
IMF Special Drawing Rights
SEANWFZ
Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
SOA
Summit of the Americas
SOE
state-owned enterprise
TAC
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia
TPP
Trans-Pacific Partnership
UAE
United Arab Emirates
UN
United Nations
UNASUR
Union of South American Nations
UNCTAD
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP
United Nations Development Programme
UNGA
United Nations General Assembly
UNHRC
United Nations Human Rights Council
UNSC
United Nations Security Council
USD
US dollars
WTO
World Trade Organization
XUAR
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China
ZOPFAN
Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality
Preface
In May 2024, at a White House press conference held during a state visit to the United States, Kenyan president William Ruto was asked whether Kenya preferred Chinese or US investment. His response was: “We are facing neither East nor West. We are facing forward.” In doing so, he was citing Kwame Nkrumah – Ghana’s first Prime Minister and one of the founding fathers of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).1
Five years ago, we put forward the concept of Active Non-Alignment (ANA) as the best way for Latin America to deal with the crisis it faced at the time, one aggravated by the pressures it was being subjected to both by Washington and Beijing to follow their dictates.2 The concept resonated and triggered considerable interest across the region. It was also criticized by some as anachronistic, as nothing more than an exercise in nostalgia that bore no relevance to the realities of the new century. Yet, today, non-alignment is back with a vengeance, and not just in Latin America, but also in Africa and Asia, albeit in a new incarnation, as ANA.
What is Active Non-Alignment? ANA is a foreign policy doctrine based on refusing to take sides in the Great Power competition that is a signature feature of the international system of the third decade of the new century. Deployed by developing nations that find themselves pressured by the United States, on the one hand, and by China, on the other, it puts the national interest of the country front and center – as opposed to doing so with the geopolitical concerns of others. It examines each foreign policy issue on its merits, rejecting what it considers an artificial binary choice between Washington and Beijing. The grand strategy of ANA is what has been called “playing the field,” that is, taking advantage of this competition among the Great Powers to maximize the development opportunities for Global South nations, in a way that was not possible during the “unipolar moment” of unbridled US primacy, or even during the Cold War.
In turn, the tactic of ANA is that of hedging, that is, taking on a middle position between balancing and bandwagoning, while keeping options open. ANA aims to keep good relations with both (or more) Great Powers in conflict, while diversifying links as much as possible. Hedging is the best approach to deal with situations of uncertainty, in which outcomes are not assured and the downside to making the wrong choice can be devastating. A key feature of it is its proactive nature, always in search of new opportunities to enhance the economic growth and development of nations whose populations are badly in need of both. Ultimately, ANA aims at enhancing and strengthening national autonomy.
How does ANA differ from traditional non-alignment, i.e., the notions espoused by the NAM in its heyday?
In terms of the international setting developing nations find themselves in, there are obvious parallels between the Cold War and the current Great Power competition. In both cases, the US is pitted against a power that defines itself as Communist, and, in both cases, these parties reach out to the hearts and minds of the peoples of what used to be called the Third World and is now known as the Global South. In this context, the key principles espoused by the NAM, like those of non-intervention, peaceful coexistence, multilateralism and the respect of international law, retain their currency. The fact that we still live in the nuclear age, and the specter of nuclear annihilation has by no means disappeared, makes championing the cause of peace as dear to the ANA as it was to the NAM. That said, there are obvious differences between the two situations.
In the third decade of the new century, the geo-economic axis has shifted from the North Atlantic to the Asia Pacific.3 Of the top ten cities with the largest number of billionaires in 2024, six are in Asia.4 New international financial institutions (IFIs), like the Asian Investment and Infrastructure Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank (NDB), dot the multilateral development banking landscape. This allows for the “collective financial statecraft” of today’s Global South, and the possibility of it tapping into the vast resources of projects like China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), amounting to a cool one trillion dollars in its first decade. This is very different from the diplomatie des cahiers des doleances (victimhood diplomacy) of yesterday’s Third World, whose demands for vast transfers of wealth from North to South fell on deaf ears. Today’s Global South thus speaks from a position of relative strength, as opposed to the considerable weakness of the Third World of the 1950s and 1960s, giving ANA much more leverage to pursue its objectives. Whereas the key platforms of non-alignment were the NAM itself and the G77 – huge, unwieldy bodies that had the power of numbers, but little else – today’s ANA relies on smaller but more effective bodies, like the BRICS, that command not just ideational but also considerable material resources to attain their objectives. This signals a decisive shift in the traditionally fraught relationship between the Global North and the Global South.
Over the past five years we have continued to develop and refine the concept of ANA, which has come to the fore at a time of momentous change in world politics. A veritable cascade of earth-shattering developments – the COVID-19 pandemic; the Russian invasion of Ukraine; the dramatic expansion of the BRICS group (now known as BRICS+), representing a considerable challenge to the West; and Israel’s war in Gaza in the wake of Hamas’s attack on Israel – have impelled this seismic moment.
This overlapping succession of events has led some to speak of a “polycrisis,”5 leading us to Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci’s dictum in his Prison Notebooks that “the crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born: in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.”6
What is dying is the old world order that followed the end of the Cold War in 1989–91, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. This was a world order that, for want of a better term, came to be known as “the unipolar moment,” to signify the undisputed hegemony of the US. What is not yet born is the new order that will replace it. While some refer to it as a multipolar order, others, like Amitav Acharya, speak of a multiplex order.7 And in this transition, with the old rules falling by the wayside and the new ones not yet in place, a bit of a “free for all” persists. Thus, the seemingly chaotic state of the world today.
Yet, two phenomena stand out at this significant turning point in world affairs. One is the rise of the Global South as a force to be reckoned with in international politics. The other is the re-emergence of non-alignment as an approach to foreign policy in the post-colonial world. The two are closely associated. As key countries from the Global South contend with the many challenges of this troubled world, the conduct of their foreign policy is increasingly driven by ANA.
ANA as the way forward
So, what is ANA all about and why has it spread like wildfire?
Building on our work on the subject over the past five years, our argument in this book is the following:
The world order is undergoing a major moment of transition, in many ways as significant as the one that took place at the end of the Cold War.
This transition is driven by the relative decline of the hitherto-hegemonic power, the United States, and by the rapid rise of China – though also by the emergence of other rising powers, what Fareed Zakaria has referred to as “The Rise of the Rest.”
8
As tends to happen in history, this dynamic has triggered a fierce Great Power competition – between Washington and Beijing. This has escalated from a trade war to a tech war to a conflict with increasingly ideological and military overtones.
In this competition, weaker states, especially those in the developing world, find themselves between a rock and a hard place. In such circumstances, ANA represents the best alternative to deal with this predicament.
ANA means that countries put their own national interest front and center, refusing to budge to pressure from the Great Powers. For the ANA doctrine, the grand strategy is what Kassab has called “playing the field,” that is, picking and choosing among the various issues, as opposed to siding automatically with one or another of the Great Powers.
9
In turn, in terms of foreign policy tactics, ANA relies on hedging, that is, a middle position between balancing and bandwagoning, which allows states to keep their options open. This is the safest way to deal with situations of high uncertainty, such as the one the world finds itself in today, in which (once again) the specter of nuclear war has raised its ugly head.
The major wars that arose in 2022–4 – mainly the war in Ukraine resulting from Russia’s invasion, and Israel’s war on Gaza after being attacked by Hamas – have brought to the fore the growing rift between North and South.
Yet, far from being fundamental causes of this rift, these wars and the reactions to them in the South are expressions of a much deeper malaise of the post-colonial world with current international arrangements.
Thus, the rise of the Global South reflects the view in Africa, Asia and Latin America that the Great Powers today do little to deal with global issues like climate change, pandemics and the rise of international organized crime, or with the pressing concerns of developing nations such as financial indebtedness, food and water scarcity and mass migrations. Instead, the Great Powers seem more focused on petty squabbles among themselves, on issues like erecting artificial islands in the South China Sea, or raising prohibitive tariffs on electric vehicles (EVs) in each other’s markets, instead of dealing with the world’s very real major problems. Simply by working together on these issues, the US and China, which together represent 40 percent of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP), could do much to resolve them, if only they set their minds to it.
In this context, ANA emerges as a powerful tool and guide to action in an uncertain world. If deftly handled, it can do much to enhance the development opportunities for what is increasingly referred to as the Global Majority.
Notes
1.
Globely News
. (2024, May 23). Kenya’s Ruto Balances the US and China.
2.
Fortin, C. Heine, J. and Ominami, C. (2020). Latinoamérica: No Alineamiento y segunda Guerra Fría (Latin America: Non-Alignment and the Second Cold War).
Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica
20:3; Fortin, C., Heine, J. and Ominami, C. (2023). European War and Global Pandemic: The Renewed Validity of Active Non-Alignment.
Global Policy
, January 30; Fortin, C., Heine, J. and Ominami, C. (eds.). (2023).
Latin American Foreign Policies in the New World Order: The Active Non-Alignment Option
. Anthem Press.
3.
De la Torre, A., Didier, T., Ize, A., Lederman, D. and Schmukler, S. (2015).
Latin America and the Rising South: Changing World, Changing Priorities
. Washington D.C., The World Bank.
4.
Hurun Global Rich List 2024. (2024). Hurun Research Institute.
5.
Albert, M. (2024).
Navigating the Polycrisis: Managing the Futures of Capitalism and the Earth
. MIT Press.
6.
Gramsci, A. (1971).
Selections from the Prison Notebooks
. International Publishers. See also, Babic, M. (2020). Let’s Talk about the Interregnum: Gramsci and the Crisis of the Liberal World Order.
International Affairs
96:3, pp. 767–86.
7.
Acharya, A. (2018).
The End of American World Order
. Polity.
8.
Zakaria, F. (2012).
The Post-American World
. W. W. Norton.
9.
Kassab, H. (2020).
Weak States as Spheres of Great Power Competition
. Routledge.
1The War in Ukraine: Reactions from the Global South
The war in Ukraine triggered by Russia’s invasion on February 24, 2022, constitutes the most significant casus belli in Europe since the end of World War II.1 As of this writing, two-and-a-half years after the war began, it shows no sign of coming to an end. The 8 million refugees, and the hundreds of thousands of fatalities, civilian and military, that the war has caused are proof positive of how wrongheaded the notions proclaiming Europe as a continent of peace had been. Those notions – based on the idea that Europe had left behind the nationalisms of yore; that it had learned the lessons of the tragic first half of the twentieth century; and that it was embarked upon building a regional space in which nation-states and national borders would be relegated to a distant past, thus bringing about a permanent Pax Europaea – have been shown to be misguided.2 The images of modern apartment buildings destroyed by missiles and bombs of various kinds, and of old ladies fleeing, with a few belongings in hand, from their ancestral villages, now razed to the ground, cannot but shock us deeply.
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, as the leader of Europe’s largest economy, has played a key role in the European Union’s reaction to the war. And it was he who, drawing on the extraordinary ability of the German language to coin new terms by merely pasting words together, coined the one that perhaps best defines the meaning of this tragic war: Zeitenwende,3 that is, a change of epoch. Scholz was referring not just to the war itself, but to the end of an era in which Germany’s industrial development benefited from access to cheap and plentiful Russian oil and gas. In 2023, Germany, which is not formally involved in the war in Ukraine, had lower economic growth than Russia – a country that is not only a party in the war, but also suffers the devastating consequences of Western economic and financial sanctions that have effectively excluded the country from the international banking system and frozen $300 billion (USD) in Russian assets abroad.4
There is no doubt that the Russian invasion of Ukraine was an open violation of international law and of the United Nations Charter. Respect of national sovereignty has been a bedrock principle of the international system. This was crassly ignored on February 24, 2022, as was the principle of non-intervention in the affairs of other states. According to the 1991 Minsk Treaty among the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), that is, the former (now independent) Soviet republics, Ukraine would proceed to dismantle the nuclear weapons it had inherited from the former Soviet Union, and deliver them to its successor state, the Russian Federation. In turn, according to the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, Russia committed to guarantee the security of Ukraine in case of an attack on it – which in this case was undertaken by Russia itself.5
It should thus not be surprising that the reaction of many countries across the world was an immediate condemnation of Russia’s invasion. For obvious reasons, this was especially so in Europe and in North America, that is, across the North Atlantic and especially in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states. Paradoxically, Moscow’s action ended up being a boon to NATO. The alliance, which had been previously affected by strong divisions, particularly during the years of the first Trump administration, closed ranks as it had seldom done before. Countries that until then had kept out of NATO, like Finland and Sweden, changed their minds and joined it, strengthening the alliance and completing a front that would cover almost the whole Western border of the Russian Federation.
Given that the Russian justification for invading Ukraine was to stop NATO’s Eastern expansion (which NATO undertook not just by incorporating former Soviet allies in the Warsaw Pact, but also by opening the door to former Soviet provinces like Ukraine and Georgia), this is ironic.6 It is, in many ways, a classic case of a self-fulfilling prophecy.7
The reaction of the Global South
Beyond this “boomerang effect” of Russia’s “special operation” (in Moscow’s euphemism) in Ukraine on NATO, the European Union (EU) and the Group of Seven, and the new sense of purpose with which this imbued the Western alliance, what was the reaction to it in the rest of the world, i.e., in Africa, Asia and Latin America?
From many young and mostly small countries – most of which came into independence only after World War II and have a deep attachment to their newly acquired sovereignty and to the principle of non-intervention in international affairs – one might have expected a reaction like that of Western nations. The unprovoked attack on Ukraine could well be seen as a classic case of a Great Power bullying a smaller state, a crass attempt to subject it to its own will, if not downright annex it, as Russia had done previously with Crimea in 2014.
This could well have been seen as the ultimate nightmare for developing nations, a precedent-setting breaking of the established rules of the existing international order, something that tomorrow could happen to any other country.
And yes, most of the United Nations (UN) member states condemned the Russian invasion, some 142 (out of 193) in a UN General Assembly vote on March 1, 2022. But the vote was far from unanimous. Some of the largest countries in the world, like India, China, Pakistan and South Africa, refused to condemn the invasion, and further resolutions in April of that year, designed to punish Russia for its actions (like the one suspending its membership in the UN Human Rights Council [UNHRC]), garnered fewer votes and elicited some pushback.
In that regard, the case of Latin America is especially revealing. In a region with a strong tradition of commitment to international law, whose nations represented 40 percent of the founding membership of the UN, and that for historical reasons has always stood up for the principle of non-intervention in international affairs, one could have expected a closing of ranks with the West’s position on the war in Ukraine. The close association in defense and security matters with the US, and the often-mentioned cultural affinity of many South American countries, especially those of the Southern Cone, with Europe, led many to assume that this closing of ranks would occur. But, although the overall reaction was mixed, and with many gradations, it did not happen that way.
No Latin American country voted against the UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution of March 1, 2022, condemning the Russian invasion; four (Bolivia, Cuba, El Salvador and Nicaragua) abstained, and one (Venezuela) did not vote. However, things changed when it came to the resolution on suspending Russia from the UNHRC, which several Latin American countries opposed. And there was also the curious phenomenon of a gap between what we might call presidential diplomacy (diplomacy led by the head of state) and that conducted by the foreign ministries.
In two of the region’s biggest countries, Argentina and Mexico, which often lead the way in Latin America’s relations with the rest of the world, this became especially apparent.8While the presidents expressed their refusal to take sides on the issue of the war, their foreign ministries took positions much closer to Washington’s. In the case of Mexico, this was taken to the limit by President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, popularly known as AMLO, who quickly drifted away from his initial stance of condemning the invasion, while Mexico’s mission to the UN in New York coordinated positions with the US on the drafting of resolutions that did precisely that. Two other Latin American presidents, Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil and Alberto Fernández of Argentina, had undertaken state visits to Russia in February 2022, shortly before the start of the war, with Bolsonaro stating that he was in Moscow “in solidarity with Russia.”9 Latin America’s rejection of the Western stance on the Ukraine war came to a head when both the US and Germany, in a request undergirded by an official visit by Olaf Scholz to Argentina, Brazil and Chile in January 2023, formally asked several Latin American countries to provide weapons to Ukraine, a request that was publicly rejected by all the countries involved.
If this was the case in Latin America, in Africa the refusal to stand with the West on the issue of the war in Ukraine was even more pronounced. At the March 1 UNGA vote, “Africa was split down the middle, with 27 states voting for the resolution, one voting against it (Eritrea), and the rest abstaining or absent from the vote.”10 South Africa, which abstained, took an especially vocal stance, arguing that the resolution would only make matters worse. In the UNGA vote to suspend Russia from the UNHRC, only ten African countries voted in favor of it, nine voted against it, twenty-three abstained and eight were not present. As South African Foreign Minister Naledi Pandor put it in a May 12, 2022 speech:
South Africa, along with other members of the Global South, resist “becoming embroiled in the politics of confrontation and aggression that has been advocated by the powerful countries,” are seeking to “assert their independent, non-aligned views” and wish to promote “peaceful resolution of the conflict through dialogue and negotiation” in keeping with the approach of the Non-Aligned Movement that recognizes the right of maintaining independent foreign policies.11
In Southeast Asia, the reaction to the Russian invasion of Ukraine was also mixed. On March 1, 2022, eight of the ten Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states voted to condemn Russia’s actions, the only exceptions being Laos and Vietnam. On the April 2022 resolution to suspend Russia from the UNHRC, however, six ASEAN members abstained, Laos and Vietnam voted against it, and only the Philippines and the Myanmar government-in-exile voted in favor. The most outspoken critic of Russia’s actions has been Singapore, which condemned the invasion and imposed sanctions on Moscow, but even Singapore abstained on the resolution suspending Russia from the UNHRC.12 Indonesia, which chaired the Group of 20 (G20) in 2022, was subjected to Western pressure to not invite Russia to the group’s summit held in Bali in November that year, but refused, offering, as a compromise solution, to invite Ukraine to the meeting. Indonesia, though condemning the invasion, pointedly refused to mention Russia by name when it did so.
In South Asia the situation is not too different. Bangladesh, India and Pakistan refused to condemn Russia’s actions. India, which sees itself as a leader of the Global South, has been adamant in its reluctance to align itself on the Russia-Ukraine war.13 This has been irksome to the US, which had undertaken a charm offensive of sorts towards India in recent years. Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Donald Trump exchanged visits in September 2019 and February 2020, respectively. The Indian Prime Minister also visited the White House to take part in the first summit of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“the Quad”) in March 2021. The Quad is a military alliance formed by the US, Australia, Japan and India. With India occupying center stage in Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy, and the Quad being referred to by some (with a certain amount of hyperbole) as “Asia’s NATO,” the US assumption was that India would be on board with NATO’s position on the war in Ukraine. But it was not. In fact, India has stepped up its oil purchases from Russia, despite the imposition of US sanctions on trade with Russia. India has thus played a key role in boosting Russia’s exports and access to hard currency in difficult times, and in facilitating its remarkable economic resilience, much against the predictions that Western sanctions would make its economy crumble. From importing less than 1 percent of its oil from Russia before the war, by 2023, 40 percent of India’s imported oil came from there.14
This leads us to the fact that the real pushback from the Global South against the Western stance on the war in Ukraine came not so much on the floor of the UNGA in votes on resolutions of various kinds, but against the diplomatic, economic and financial sanctions against Russia. Imposed unilaterally by the US and its Western allies, almost no country in Africa, Asia and Latin America, with isolated exceptions like Costa Rica and Singapore, went along with them.
Why has this been the case? What explains this remarkable gap between North and South on one of the defining issues of our time?
The West versus the Rest
Events in Ukraine have given new life and provided a badly needed unity of purpose to the Western alliance, expressed in groupings like the G7 and NATO. The renewed resolve and impetus among these Global North entities has been welcome by Western leaders. In the wake of the Summit for Democracy held in Washington on December 10, 2021, US President Joseph R. Biden, without missing a beat, proceeded to cast what would become the war in Ukraine as part and parcel of the worldwide struggle between democracy and authoritarianism, between good and evil, in language reminiscent of that of the 1950s and 1960s pitting the Free World against Soviet communism.
Put in those terms, the reaction of so much of the developing world (85 percent of the world’s population lives in countries that have rejected the application of Western sanctions on Russia) becomes even more puzzling. Do these countries not realize what is at stake in Ukraine? Why can’t they take a clear stance on an issue that appears to be so clear-cut, and act accordingly?
Yet, on closer examination, the issue is far from clear-cut. In fact, some of the largest and most populous democracies in the world, like India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, South Africa, Brazil, Mexico and Argentina, have not sided with Ukraine in this conflict. This makes the claim about the supposed cleavage between democracy and authoritarianism revealed by this war a questionable proposition. Not surprisingly, the argument has been made that this unwillingness to take sides reflects some sort of indecisiveness on the part of national leaders, a shameful behavior, or, worse, a moral failure at a time of reckoning.15
Yet, far from bringing to the fore a cleavage between democracy and authoritarianism, or some sort of character defect on the part of Global South leaders, what the war in Ukraine has exposed is something very different: the fact that the main divide in the world today is between the Global North and the Global South. Much as the G7 was given a new lease on life by Russia’s actions, the stark reality is that leading countries in the South have refused to take sides in this war, reflecting the disconnect between the developed and the developing world.
There are, of course, differences in these perceptions across the South, and we’ll get to them below. However, a first cut at an explanation for this apparently counterintuitive behavior of so many countries across the developing world would start by questioning the assertion that the war in Ukraine presents a unique and unprecedented challenge to the “rules-based international order.” According to this reasoning, failure to condemn Russian action in the strongest terms would open the door to many more violations of this order, and the crumbling of any semblance of a peaceful international system. The war in Ukraine is a great tragedy and Russia’s unprovoked aggression of a neighboring, sovereign nation should be deplored. That said, the notion that this is a “unique” war is untenable. In the past seventy years (that is, in the aftermath of World War II), many wars have taken place, mostly in Africa and Asia, several of them unprovoked and initiated by NATO member states themselves. In the recent past, a war in Yemen raged for eight years, leading to the deaths of 250,000 Yemenites – a war waged with weapons supplied by leading NATO member states. In none of these conflicts, whether in Afghanistan, Iraq or Yemen, has this led to assertions about the “unique” nature of such wars and the need for their universal condemnation, let alone for the imposition of global sanctions on the aggressor nation. On the contrary, they were considered as part and parcel of the regular order of business in the management of international relations, as is best illustrated by the case of the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The answer to the question, “Who was prosecuted for the war in Iraq?,” which led to the loss of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi lives, as well as to that of 4,000 American servicemen and women, is, “no one,” though it was a war waged under false pretenses (Saddam Hussein’s famous “Weapons of Mass Destruction” turned out, of course, not to exist) and with no basis in international law.
What, then, is so “unique” about the war in Ukraine?
What is so unique about it is that it is taking place in Europe. And, as Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar has so eloquently put it, “Europe has to grow out of the mindset that Europe’s problems are the world’s problems, but the world’s problems are not Europe’s.”16 Just because the war is taking place in the Old Continent does not mean that the whole world has to pitch in and provide Kiev with whatever it needs to counter Russian aggression. Western hypocrisy about the “rules-based order” (RBO) has rubbed many countries in the Global South the wrong way. But so has the extraordinary effort to make the Ukraine war into what Juan Gabriel Tokatlian has called the first truly global war.17
