Zitadelle E-Book

Mark Healy

• Herausgeber: The History Press
• Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 977

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2016

Beschreibung

Few battles attract interest so much as the Battle of Kursk. Operation Zitadelle, the code name given by Hitler to the Wehrmacht's last offensive on the Eastern Front in July 1943, has acquired an almost mythic status as one of the greatest clashes of armour in the history of warfare. Long been depicted as the 'the swan song of the German tank arm' by virtue of the huge tank losses experienced by the Germans; the reality, in light of the emergence of new information proved it to be anything but, with historians previously accepting without question exaggerated Soviet accounts of the battle. For all the resources devoted to this operation by the Germans, Zitadelle was an abysmal failure; and whilst they were not outfought by the Red Army at Kursk, they were out-thought by commanders of outstanding quality. Zitadelle describes the German and Soviet tactics and explores the realities of the battles on sodden ground that culminated in the defeat of the panzers and the Soviet advance on the Reich.

Leseprobe

Zitadelle

Zitadelle

THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE KURSK SALIENT 4–17 JULY 1943

MARK HEALY

For Eileen and Ron, For their many kindnesses over the years.

First published 2008

This paperback edition published 2010

by Spellmount, The History Press Ltd

The Mill, Brimscombe Port

Stroud, Gloucestershire, GL5 2QG

www.thehistorypress.co.uk

This ebook edition first published in 2016

All rights reserved

© Mark Healy, 2008, 2010

The right of Mark Healy to be identified as the Author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyrights, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

This ebook is copyright material and must not be copied, reproduced, transferred, distributed, leased, licensed or publicly performed or used in any way except as specifically permitted in writing by the publishers, as allowed under the terms and conditions under which it was purchased or as strictly permitted by applicable copyright law. Any unauthorised distribution or use of this text may be a direct infringement of the author’s and publisher’s rights, and those responsible may be liable in law accordingly.

Aircraft profile on page 11 of the colour section, below, courtesy of Osprey Publishing, Oxford, UK, from Jagdgeschwader 52: The Experten, John Weal (Aviation Elite Units 15)

EPUB ISBN 978 0 7509 7957 3

Typesetting and origination by The History Press Ltd.

eBook converted by Geethik Technologies

CONTENTS

Introduction

Acknowledgements

Chronology

Maps

PART ONE: WHY KURSK?

1 The Führer and the Field Marshal

2 What is to be Done?

3 The Case for a Mobile Strategy – Manstein’s Backhand Option

4 The Führer’s Agenda

5 Enter Zeitzler

6 Operational Orders Numbers 5 and 6

7 The View from the Kremlin

8 The Role of Enigma and Lucy

9 The Decision and the Plan

10 The ‘Citadel’

11 Air Power and the Role of the Partisans

12 ‘Know Thine Enemy’

13 Delay After Delay …

14 … After Delay

15 The German Plan

16 The Role of the Luftwaffe

PART TWO: THE ARMIES

17 A ‘New’ Red Army

18 Soviet Industry and Lend-Lease

19 The Ostheer on the Eve of Zitadelle

20 The Waffen SS at Kursk

PART THREE: CHARIOTS OF FIRE – THE TANKS AT KURSK

21 A Neglected and Much Abused Instrument

22 December 1942 – The State of Panzer and AFV Production

23 ‘I Need You’ – the Return of Guderian

24 The ‘Wonder Weapons’

25 The Workhorses

26 Armour and Firepower

27 Tank Design, Crew Proficiency and Training

28 Tactics, Terrain and Weather

PART FOUR: THE BATTLE OF KURSK: 4 JULY – 11 JULY 1943

29 The Overture: Thursday 1 – Sunday 4 July 1943

30 The Offensive Begins: Monday 5 July – Army Group South

31 Monday 5 July – Army Group Centre, Ninth Army

32 Tuesday 6 July – Army Group South

33 Wednesday 7 July

34 Thursday 8 July – 4th Panzer Army

35 Thursday 8, Friday 9 and Saturday 10 July – Ninth Army

36 Friday 9 and Saturday 10 July – 4th Panzer Army

37 Why Prokhorovka? A Misinterpretation

38 10 July – SS Panzer Corps and III Panzer Corps

39 Sunday 11 July – Headquarters: Army Detachment Kempf

40 Sunday 11 July – 4th Panzer Army, Voronezh Front and 48th Panzer Corps

PART FIVE: THE BATTLE FOR PROKHOROVKA 12–17 JULY: ‘SPECTACLE WITHOUT PROFIT’

41 Monday 12 July – The Tank Battle at Prokhorovka

42 Monday 12 July – From the Railway Embankment Southward through to Belenikhino

43 Monday 12 July – North of the Psel and East of the Donets

44 The Real Tank Losses

45 Tuesday 13 July – 5th Guards Tank Army, SS Panzer Corps and III Panzer Corps

46 10–14 July – The view from Rastenburg

47 14–17 July – ‘Operation Roland’

PART SIX: CONCLUSION

48 Costs and Consequences

PART SEVEN

Appendix 1 German Army Order of Battle

Appendix 2 Soviet Army Order of Battle

Appendix 3 German and Soviet Aircraft

Appendix 4 German and Soviet Tank Types

Appendix 5 Other Weaponry

Bibliography

INTRODUCTION

This is the second book I have written on the Battle of Kursk. The first, published in 1992 and still in print, reflected the state of knowledge available at the time. It therefore contains errors of fact and interpretation. Much in the way of new information has become available since and this has led to the publication of a number of titles addressing this great clash between the Ostheer and the Red Army in the summer of 1943. This has permitted a far more accurate picture of the antecedents of this battle, and of its course and importance, to be offered to the reading public.

A number of these texts are of significance. Published in 1999 was the Battle of Kursk by Col David Glantz and Jonathan House. In this work, the authors chose to address the subject mainly from the Soviet perspective and this benefited from the immense knowledge and expertise of the former deriving from his many years of unprecedented access to, and study of, the archives of the Red Army. Another book, by Niklas Zetterling and Anders Frankson published in 2000, offers a remarkable statistical analysis of the battle and is unlikely to be surpassed in the manner of its treatment of the subject. Of great importance also, is that by Professor Steven Newton who has re-translated and provided his own critical commentary of the almost forgotten documentation commissioned by the US Army after the war from senior Wehrmacht staff who directly participated in or were otherwise involved in the Kursk offensive. His book serves to bring clarification to a number of still controversial aspects of the battle. All of these books are deserving of serious study.

Coming from a different perspective are the remarkable text and photo books published by J.J.Fedorowicz Publishing in Canada. This company specialises in unit histories of the German Army and the Waffen SS. They have released a number of publications concerning Zitadelle, the most significant being the two-volume set by J.Restayn and N.Moller. Products of many years of research, these two volumes address operations in the north and south of the salient respectively. They contain a large number of new photographs and present an unforgettable image of the scale of the battle. In addition, RZM publishers have released a six-volume photo coverage of the battle employing recently discovered film taken by PK cameraman who operated with II SS Panzer Corps during the battle. Given the frequency with which new pictures are still being discovered in private archives in Germany, it makes one wonder how many Wehrmacht servicemen did not take a Leica camera to war with them!

So, given the number of recent texts published on the subject of Kursk, why another? In the first instance, Kursk is an evergreen subject and thus generates a seemingly inexhaustible fascination. This stems primarily from its perceived status as the ‘greatest tank battle’ in history, the head-on clash of the II SS Panzer Corps and 5th Guards Tank Army in the fields around Prokhorovka on 12 July 1943 having acquired an almost mythic reputation. As with all myths, the reality is somewhat less grandiose but no less dramatic for the re-telling. However, what in particular has motivated me is the question that has always nagged whenever I have considered this battle: why did the Germans bother? This was especially so, as by the time Zitadelle was finally launched in early July, what had been deemed in March to be the essential pre-condition for its success – that it be launched at the earliest opportunity after the ground was ‘dry in the spring’ – had long since fallen by the wayside. Indeed, why did the Germans persist with an operation that, ‘like topsy’, had grown and grown with scarce military assets committed to it, and when professional military opinion was being expressed that the possibility of a successful outcome was receding the longer the delay in launching it? I hope I have produced a credible answer here.

Nor has it traditionally been possible to identify who was responsible for the delay of the attack date from early May to the beginning of July. In this matter, the testimony of many of the surviving senior participants is dubious inasmuch as many employed their memoirs to re-write their role in the planning process and shift the blame for Zitadelle’s failure on to others. ‘Failure is an orphan’ and no one wishes to claim parenthood! The traditional scapegoat has always been General Zeitzler – the Chief of Staff of the Army (OKH). Whilst he was an early and strong advocate for the offensive, and was responsible, with Hitler, for formulating Operational Orders 5 and 6 – which provided the primary documentation for Zitadelle – it is no longer possible to impute to him responsibility for all that transpired after May 5, 1943.

On that date, Hitler held a meeting in Munich to discuss the implications of evidence provided by General Model of enemy preparations in the Kursk salient, with the leading lights of the operation. This clearly indicated that the Soviet intention was to engage the Germans in a strategic defensive rather than employ the salient as the springboard for a major offensive directed against Army Group South, as the rationale for Zitadelle had always presumed. According to General Busse, the Chief of Staff of Army Group South, who attended a pre-conference discussion between Zeitzler and von Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, the Chief of the OKH was adamant that the launch date of the offensive ought not to be delayed, at least not beyond the end of May. Busse states in his transcript, which provides the only verbatim report of the conference, that Zeitzler told Manstein Hitler had already decided to delay the launch date pending delivery of new and superior armour to the participating units, and that Zeitzler did not believe this would improve the chances of success. He expressed the view that any delay ‘[would] be to the enemy’s advantage’.

Following the Munich meeting, and notwithstanding the views expressed by the participants there, Hitler unilaterally ordered the first of what was to become a series of Führer-sanctioned delays to the launch date for the offensive. There are also sound reasons for inferring that the primary motivation for these delays stemmed from Hitler’s concern with the events in the Mediterranean theatre and with the possible withdrawal of Italy from the conflict. Hitler said as much in his final briefing to senior officers on 1 July when he announced the final launch date for Zitadelle. Nor did he wait long to close down the eastern offensive once the Allies landed in Sicily, ten days later. Although Soviet accounts of the battle have always rejected this as being in some way a device to demean the role of the Red Army in defeating the Germans at Kursk, it is my view that Hitler’s focus was always more on Italy than Russia. The interplay between the two theatres and the German leader’s view, prompted as it was by politics and his sentimental attachment to Mussolini, was that events in Italy carried for him a higher priority than did the offensive in Russia.

It is also perhaps opportune to place Zitadelle in its proper context by stripping away the hyperbole that has surrounded this offensive, whether it originated with Hitler or was produced by those who have written about it later. To argue that had the Germans triumphed at Kursk it would have led to victory on the Eastern Front, is to claim more for the operation than either Hitler or Zeitzler expected. It is only if we start with the presumption that in the early spring of 1943, Hitler and his General Staff ‘were fully aware of the fact that it was no longer possible to achieve a decisive victory on the Eastern Front, certainly not in a single battle’, that will we understand the real purposes of the operation. Elimination of the Kursk salient would, the Germans believed, thwart Soviet offensive ambitions in southern Russia. In presuming that the enemy’s primary strategic objective for the summer of 1943 was the destruction of Army Group South and that he would employ the Kursk salient as the springboard for this attack, a pre-emptive German offensive to eliminate the position would defeat and capture the huge force that the Red Army was assembling within it. The primary purpose of Zitadelle was thus to stabilize the Eastern Front and draw Soviet offensive teeth for the remainder of the summer. Zitadelle is best understood as functioning as a massive spoiling operation.

Nonetheless, victory at Kursk, crowed Hitler, would act ‘as a beacon to the world’. It would restore the prestige of Führer and Wehrmacht, both so diminished by the disaster of Stalingrad. It would also serve to restore faith in final victory over the Soviet Union among Germany’s allies whose loyalty was clearly wavering after Stalingrad. Other, more tangible benefits that would flow from success would include the shortening of the front-line in southern Russia. This would free-up vitally needed troops to provide a modest reserve for the Ostheer. In addition, the expected massive haul of prisoners had been already been earmarked for despatch westward, even before the offensive’s launch, to satisfy the voracious appetite of Germany’s factories for yet more Ostarbeiter. Most important of all, assuming it could be secured as soon as ‘the ground was dry’, victory at Kursk would permit the release of vital armoured units for rapid transfer westward to deal with an expected Allied landing there. Only after that had been defeated, did Hitler and his General Staff envisage that they could turn once more to the East and concentrate all of Germany’s resources on a final showdown with the USSR.

There are issues of interpretation in accounting for why the battle unfolded as it did. This is especially so with respect to operations in the south of the salient. For decades, our understanding of the passage of events there has been governed by Soviet accounts. As depicted, German actions were explained away as a reaction to the efficacy of the defensive efforts of the Red Army and the cumulative impact of the losses in armour incurred by 4th Panzer Army during the course of its advance between 5–10 July. However, other documentation – and herein lies the importance of the work of Professor Steven Newton – has shown that this explanation (and it is this that provides the narrative framework for Glantz and House’s analysis of Kursk), is in my opinion in error. It was not the case that the shift of the German schwerpunkt away from the River Psel and towards the north-west and Prokhorovka on the 9/10 July by the SS Panzer Corps was carried out because of the strength of the Soviet defensive effort on the approaches to Oboyan. Rather, Herman Hoth, Commander of 4th Panzer Army had had this manoeuvre written into the German battle plan prior to the start of Zitadelle. Furthermore, the planning staff of 4th Panzer Army – and of the two respective Corps command staffs under its aegis – clearly understood that success in the south of the salient was wholly contingent on this manoeuvre.

Although, in my opinion, it is unlikely that it will ever be possible to give a definitive figure for German tank losses at Kursk – a matter of perennial fascination to some – we can give a far more accurate accounting of tank losses than heretofore. What the research on strength returns from participating German tank divisions at Kursk held on microfilm in the US National Archives and in documents at the Bundesarchiv in Germany reveal, are loss rates that quite simply refute the long-held view of this battle as ‘the death ride of the panzers’. It is necessary to clarify our terminology here. In the past, figures for tank losses have been presented as being synonymous with ‘total write-offs’. Hence, the prevalence of the common perception, certainly fostered by Soviet accounts, that the battlefields to the north and south of the salient were littered with the gutted remains of thousands of destroyed AFVs. Figures presented within actually point to a very different reality. In fact, the total number of ‘written-off’ panzers was surprisingly small given the intensity of the combat. Of the total number of panzers and Assault Guns written-off and lost to the Ostheer in July by Ninth Army and 4th Panzer Army, the greater numbers were incurred after Zitadelle had been concluded, as these same formations contended with Soviet counter-offensives.

On the other hand, loss rates, as in machines that had ‘fallen out’ of service because of battle damage or breakdown, and were thus in need of repair, were high, and mounted on a daily basis the longer the offensive continued. As the Germans advanced, they were able to recover such machines from the battlefield very quickly – indeed, both sides had very efficient tank recovery teams. Those in need of minor attention cycled through the repair process very quickly, and it may be that a large number of panzers and Assault Guns could have done so at least twice during the course of the offensive. The fluctuating availability of Tiger tanks is not just accounted for by battle damage. It was a complex machine and needed frequent attention to maintain serviceability. The Panther, notwithstanding the very clear potential of the design, had been committed to battle prematurely. Given the very large number of teething problems it was still showing, is not surprising that so many fell out in the course of the battle. Although deemed by many to be a failure in the offensive, its long 75mm gun proved itself a potent killer of Russian armour.

By 10 July, nearly half of the tanks and Assault Guns committed to battle by 4th Panzer Army just five days before were under short- and long-term repair. The latter meant weeks of work. Although these were not ‘destroyed’, their non-availability effectively reduced the strength of Hoth’s schwerpunkt on a daily basis. In practical terms, a machine removed from the daily order of battle is as good a result to one’s enemy as a tank written off. Many of the machines undergoing longer-term repair were captured in situ, in the repair shops, as the Germans retreated in the face of the Red Army’s counter-offensives in the period after Kursk. Machines ‘knocked-out’ in this period were perforce abandoned by the Germans on the battlefield, and thus captured by the Russians.

It is paradoxical for a battle rendered infamous by virtue of the numbers of tanks engaged, that on the German side the greatest weakness lay not in armour, but in infantry. Indeed, it was the lack of resources in this still key arm of service that contributed profoundly to the reduction in German tank numbers during the course of the battle. Even before the offensive, the implications of a lack of infantry formations were fully appreciated by the German commanders. Even von Manstein acknowledged that once the offensive commenced, it would be necessary to employ armour to take on roles that normally fell within the purview of the infantry. So great had been the bloodletting in this arm over the previous two years that the lack of infantry divisions had a major impact on German tank losses on the Kursk battlefield. Here was an environment that required large bodies of infantry to support and protect armour against an enemy supreme in the art of close-combat fighting and on a battlefield engineered by him for that very purpose. This shortage also had an impact on the strategic level in the spring of 1943. The deficiency in infantry divisions denied the Germans the means to disguise their strategic options, thus permitting the Soviets to read their likely offensive intentions prior to Zitadelle. It was this lack of infantry, and numbers continued to decline substantially after Kursk even as the numbers of panzers and Assault Guns increased – there being more of these on the Eastern Front in December 1943 than at the start of Zitadelle – that had a larger impact on German military fortunes in the East than any other factor.

What is clear is that the Soviet victory at Kursk was not the product of German errors. It would demean the Soviet achievement to suggest that. However, I am not prepared to subscribe to many Soviet accounts of the battle that were designed for propaganda purposes. It was, for example, not true that the Red Army was always in control of events in the battle. This was especially false in the south of the salient where Hoth’s Panzer Army came very close to destroying Katukov’s 6th Tank Army in the fighting before the Psel. By the time the Germans consciously chose to shift the schwerpunkt of their offensive drive away from the frontal assault on Oboyan, Katukov’s command was but a pale shadow of its pre-battle strength and only survived because of that shift.

Whilst I believe, notwithstanding its scale and spectacle, that Kursk was less decisive in determining the outcome of the War in the East than Moscow or Stalingrad, it is nonetheless understandable how significant this victory was for the Red Army and the USSR. In the consciousness of the Russian people it ranks alongside other great battles that had a decisive impact on the history of the nation, such as Kulikovo, Poltava, Borodino, Moscow and Stalingrad. What victory at Kursk demonstrated was that the Red Army could defeat the Wehrmacht in the summer as well as in the winter. It was therefore a professional ‘rite of passage’ and for that reason, its psychological impact was profound. If Stalin had still been prepared to entertain a political accommodation with Hitler in the late winter and early spring of 1943, Zitadelle vanquished such thoughts from his mind altogether. After Kursk the USSR was on the road to emerging as one of the world’s two post-war superpowers. Above all, Zitadelle symbolised the incredible journey that the Red Army had made since that terrible summer of two years before. It is unlikely that any other state could have made that transition.

However, it also needs to be borne in mind that for the Russians, containing the German offensive was just the first stage in a complex defensive-offensive strategy that also embraced the two counter-offensives launched after they had countered Zitadelle. For them, what began at Kursk on 4 July only ended towards the end of August with the re-capture of the city of Kharkov. Even if Soviet losses were higher in tanks and manpower than the enemy’s, this was accepted by Stalin as the necessary price the Red Army would have to pay to defeat the Germans. In terms of the factors that mattered – strategy, and the manner in which resources were deployed and employed to that end – the Germans were out-thought and outfought in the summer of 1943. Whilst it is possible to understand the sentiments of a panzer veteran who expressed the view to the author that the Germans were victorious at Kursk because ‘they destroyed more tanks’, he is wrong. The Germans did not lose Kursk – they were defeated, by an enemy the Nazi state despised.

Nor do I subscribe to the theories of those authors who postulate an alternative outcome for Zitadelle, one in Germany’s favour, if only they had done this or that. As a matter of principle, counter-factual accounts are extremely dubious and in many cases they only weave a story by leaving out those contingent factors that did in the end determine the outcome of events. On the German side, one factor that would have to be removed would be Hitler himself. In 1943, no one could gainsay the Führer. His word was the equivalent of holy writ, as von Manstein and Zeitzler discovered all too well. ‘What would the Führer say about it?’ read the poster on the walls of most command posts throughout the Ostheer. To invoke theoretical alternative models of how Germany could have responded in 1943, as if the German leader was not the determinant of what transpired, is to move into the realm of fantasy. It is nonsense. It is certainly not History.

In the text, I have employed the terms Soviet and Russian synonymously. This is in no way to demean the contribution of the very many non-Russian nationalities to the Soviet victory at Kursk. It is merely being practical. The purpose of the pictures is to give an impression to the reader of the scale of the battle and is not an exhaustive photographic treatment. There are other texts – and I have listed them in the bibliography – that address this concern admirably. A number of the pictures are frames taken from the few surviving newsreels taken by Propaganda Kompanie camera operators. Although these images have been digitally enhanced, their quality is not of the best. They have nonetheless been included because they were filmed in battle and thus have an unimpeachable authenticity.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In the first instance, I must thank my publisher and especially Jamie Wilson for his forbearance in staying with the title. The original contract called for publication of this book many years ago! Occasional periods of illness slowed me down. Jamie is a real gentleman, and I hope that he feels that the finished result has justified his faith in the project and his patience.

I wish to express my appreciation to the following persons who over the years lent their ears and expertise by allowing me to bounce my ideas off them, and to test out the text on occasions. Robert Forsyth of Classic and Chevron Publications provided invaluable advice and critical comment, drawing on his experience as a specialist author and book editor. Especial thanks also go to Ron Pluck for his help in so many ways, in addition to his critical observations about the text. I would also like to thank Professor Steven Newton for proffering the occasional vital and useful piece of information and advice.

A special word of thanks must go to Jeff Dugdale and Michael Wood who allowed me to take advantage of their many years of research on strength returns and orders of battle for German Panzer Divisions found in the US National Archives and the BundesArchiv. Their generosity is greatly appreciated.

I wish to express my appreciation to the following publishers for permission to employ quotations from their books. Top of the list must be John Fedorowicz and his colleagues at J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing for allowing me to employ numerous quotations from the many books they have published about Kursk and German military units that served in the battle. Their generosity has been especially appreciated. Others include Blackwells, OUP, Weidenfeld, The History Press, De Capo, Classic, Greenhill and Presidio. I owe a great thank you to Marcus Jaugitz for the supply of photographs from his personal collection.

I wish also to express my appreciation to Angus Creighton for the AFV colour profiles and Mark Rolfe, John Weal and Dave Howley for the aircraft profiles.

Above all, I wish to thank my wife and son who have borne with me over the many years it has taken to bring this book to fruition. I know that they feel a profound sense of relief that the thing is finally out of the way. It does mean that we can do something else with our lives. That is until I start the next one!

Finally, all errors and opinions are my own. Where you find the former, I offer up a mea culpa in advance. The latter, I hope I have justified!

Mark P. Healy Dorset, England

CHRONOLOGY

1943

2 February

Final German resistance comes to an end in Stalingrad.

6 February

Field Marshal von Manstein presents possible options for summer operations in Russia to Hitler during a visit to Führer headquarters, at Rastenburg in East Prussia.

8 February

Soviets recapture Kursk.

17/18 February

Hitler visits headquarters of Army Group South at Zaporozhye to discuss the appalling situation of German forces in Southern Russia. Manstein demands the ‘operation freedom’ to conduct operations in theatre without recourse to securing sanction from Rastenburg. Hitler reluctantly concedes. Manstein orders redeployment of his armoured assets prior to beginning a counter-offensive against over-extended Soviet forces heading for the River Dnieper.

18 February – 18 March

German counter-offensive recovers much territory lost to the Red Army. Kharkov is retaken with heavy German losses. Manstein closes down all offensive operations on 23 March.

13 March

Five days before the fall of Belgorod, Hitler and Zeitzler sign Operational Order No: 5, identifying the Kursk salient as the prime target for an early, albeit limited offensive by forces from Army Groups South and Centre.

25 March

Operation Buffel – the staged withdrawal of German 9th Army from the Rzhev salient to the east of Smolensk in sector of Army Group Centre, begun twenty days before, comes to an end. Forces released, already earmarked by OKW as northern strike force to attack the Kursk salient in concert with forces from Army Group South, as soon as ‘the ground is dry’.

8 April

Deputy Supreme Commander Marshal Georgi Zhukov sends Stalin long telegram recommending that the Red Army await the German summer offensive, which identifies the Kursk salient as the objective.

12 April

In the Kremlin, the decision is taken to forego intended offensive and instead embrace a strategic defensive in light of overwhelming evidence that Germans intend to launch major offensive to destroy it. Stalin issues orders to transform the salient into massive defensive bastion to defeat attacking panzer divisions.

15 April

Operational Order No: 6 supersedes directive of 13 March. This orders destruction of Kursk salient, with offensive code-named Zitadelle, to begin on 3/4 May.

5 May

Hitler convenes a conference with selected members of the OKH and high ranking officers from Army Groups Centre and South in Munich. This was prompted by Model’s presentation to the Führer, wherein he demonstrated that the Russians were not preparing to launch an offensive, but were rather geared up for a strategic defensive. Hitler determines that German forces are not strong enough, and orders a delay to await delivery of new panzers and Assault Guns, ie. the Panther, Ferdinand, Brummbär, Hornisse and more Tiger Is.

10 May

In a meeting in Berlin, Guderian, as Inspector of Panzer Troops, tells Hitler that he thinks the new Panther medium tank will not be ready for service in Zitadelle.

Early May

Final surrender of all Axis troops in North Africa. German thoughts turn to the possibility of needing to take military action in Italy in the event of an Allied invasion of southern Europe. This factor and the continuing problems with new military equipment earmarked for Kursk, leads to yet more delays to the launch of Zitadelle.

1 July

Hitler tells his generals that all now seems quiet in the Mediterranean and he has decided to launch Zitadelle on 5 July.

4 July

Pre-offensive push by Grossdeutschland division late in the afternoon ushers in beginning of the great offensive in the East.

5 – 17 July

Battle of Kursk.

12 July

Tank battle at Prokhorovka.

13 July

Hitler terminates Zitadelle, but permits von Manstein to continue with limited offensive operations in the south of the salient.

12/13 July

Soviets launch their first counter-offensive, code named Kutuzov, against Orel salient.

17 July

All German offensive operations in the salient closed down. Withdrawal of all German forces to their pre-offensive start lines.

Map 1: The von Manstein options for the summer of 1943 Within days of the final surrender of all German forces at Stalingrad, von Manstein had proposed to Hitler two options for the conduct of the coming summer campaign. Of the two, von Manstein strongly advocated support for his very ambitious ‘backhand’ proposal (A). As it was, for reasons explained in the text, Hitler and Zeitzler determined to run with Manstein’s seemingly less risky plan for a limited offensive, which he designated the ‘forehand’ (B). The purpose of this operation was to rapidly defeat and capture a sizeable Soviet force and to deny the enemy the chance to embark on further offensive operations during the rest of the summer. By the time of his visit to Zaporozhye on 10 March 1943, the German leader and his army Chief of staff had already determined that the Kursk salient would be the focus of such an operation. The overriding priority was that it was to be launched as soon as the weather permitted, and the mobile divisions of Ninth Army and Army Group South had recouped from the exertions of the winter campaign. Allocated the code name of Zitadelle, the offensive was scheduled for launch ‘as soon as the ground was dry’.

Map 2: The ‘Citadel’ – the Red Army’s defences within the Kursk Salient Of all the strategies Hitler could have chosen for the summer of 1943, none would play so well into the hands of the Red Army as an offensive directed at the destruction of the Kursk salient. If mobile operations were still deemed to be the forte of the Ostheer, then the Soviets were the acknowledged masters of defensive operations. S.M. Shtemenko, a general on the Soviet General Staff, would later crow that no better opportunity to defeat the Germans could present itself in the summer of 1943 than that they should oblige the Red Army by attacking the Kursk salient: a position that the Red Army had already by mid-May transformed into the ‘strongest fortress in the world’ by the creation of a series of defensive lines screened by massive fixed defences, dug-in tanks, huge minefields and a mass of anti-tank and conventional artillery. By this masterful combination of engineering, deception (Maskirovka) and an immense secret deployment of overwhelmingly superior numerical forces, the Soviets were able to deceive the Germans into believing that all they were doing was embarking upon was a strategic defence of the salient. In fact, this was merely the first stage in their wide-ranging strategy for the summer.

Map 3: Ninth Army’s Offensive against the Central Front Although servicing one overall plan, to all intents and purposes the German assaults on the respective necks of the Kursk salient were fought as two separate battles. From the outset General Walter Model adopted a different approach to that employed by von Manstein. In assaulting the Soviet Central Front along a short frontage, he first fed in his infantry to create the primary breach in the enemy line before committing the mass of his armour. Hindsight revealed this this as a major error. In consequence, the piecemeal commitment of his panzer divisions prevented him generating the mass of armour in emulation of von Manstein in the south, who was able to effect a breach of the Soviet defence lines by using his panzer divisions as a massive fist from the outset. With his main thrust directed against the Soviet 13th Army to the west of the Orel/Kursk railway line, Model never managed more than a slow and costly grind through extremely heavy enemy defences, which were continually reinforced overnight by infantry, armour and masses of artillery pulled in from neighbouring 48th and 70th Armies. It had become apparent to Model within less than a week of the start of the offensive that he simply did not have the strength to breach the Soviet lines. By 11 July, Ninth Army had shot its offensive bolt. If Zitadelle represented the bankruptcy of German military planning in the Second World War, then the northern offensive represents the very nadir in the operational employment of the Army in the conflict.

Map 4: 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf, 5–17 July The massive armoured fist that was launched by General of Panzer Troops Hermann Hoth against the defences of the Voronezh Front on the morning of 5 July represented one of the most powerful assemblages of armoured might ever fielded by the Germans for one operation during the Second World War. Unlike Model, von Manstein had decided, in the light of the expected efficacy of the Soviet defences, to employ his panzers from the very outset as a huge armoured phalanx in a bid to effect a rapid breach of the enemy lines. Not only would this help reduce his tank casualties, but it would permit 4th Panzer Army to reach the open steppe beyond the river Psel more quickly. But almost from the outset the German timetable went awry here too. A combination of factors conspired to make this so: the lack of infantry divisions to support the panzers, allied to the failure of III Panzer Corps to match the advance of the SS Panzer Corps and thus provide the necessary flank cover for that key formation. This led to Totenkopf being hived-off from Hausser’s schwerpunkt and being allocated the task of acting as flank guard for both the Leibstandarte and Das Reich as they drove on toward the Psel. For 48th Panzer Corps, driving towards Oboyan on the left, the inability of 3rd Panzer Division, on the far bank of the Pena, to match its rate of advance meant that it too was finding its flank under continuous pressure from a series of withering Soviet armoured assaults. On 10 July, in accordance with Hoth’s pre-offensive orders, the SS Panzer Corps swung its schwerpunkt away from Oboyan and northeast, towards Prokhorovka, to deal with the oncoming Soviet strategic armoured reserve in the form of 5th Guards Tank Army. It would do so, however, without III Panzer Corps, which was still struggling to break free of the Soviet defence lines on the eastern side of the Donets. In consequence, these two closing bodies of armour would run headlong into one another within days, precipitating the greatest tank clash in the history of modern warfare.

Map 5: II SS Panzer Corps v 5th Guards Tank Army – 12 July The tank battle between on the 12 July at Prokhorovka has become legendary. For many years the understanding of this massive armoured brawl came mainly from the account of General Pavel Rotmistrov, the commander of 5th Guards Tank Army, whose forces contended with those of the SS Panzer Corps in the fields to the east of the town. Consequently, the numbers of tanks engaged were inflated, particularly those of the Germans. In reality, the Germans had far fewer tanks and Assault Guns. Although the clash continued throughout the day and across the frontage of all three SS Divisions, the most dramatic involved the engagement of the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler with Soviet forces between the River Psel and the Belgorod-Kursk railway line just after 0600 hours (Berlin time). Nearly 500 T-34s and T-70s were thrown against 70 panzers and Assault Guns, of which only four of the former were Tigers. Soviet tank losses were huge. By day’s end on 12 July, both sides were exhausted and though the Germans made fitful attempts on the following day to resume their advance, they had, to all intents and purposes, shot their bolt. On that same day, Hitler ordered that Zitadelle be closed down. Prokhorovka proved in the end to be of great benefit to the Red Army, even though their tank losses on the day were prodigious.

Map 6: From Zitadelle to the Soviet advance to the Dniepr The measure of the failure of Zitadelle to realise any of its objectives and the consequences for the Germans can be seen in this map. Between the closing down of all German offensive operations in the salient on 17 July, and 22 September, the German position in southern Russia collapsed in the face of myriad Soviet counter-offensives. Beginning with Kutuzov on 12 July and moving through Polkovodets Rumyantsev in early August, the Germans were forced to abandon the Donets and begin a full-scale retreat westward to the line of the river Dniepr. Following the triumph of Soviet strategy in the summer of 1943, having defeated the German offensive against the Kursk salient, within less than two years the Red Army would have taken Berlin.

Guderian (to Hitler): ‘Why do you want to attack in the East at all this year?’

Keitel (interjecting): ‘We must attack for political reasons.’

Guderian: ‘How many people do you think even know where Kursk is? It’s a matter of profound indifference to the world whether we hold Kursk or not. I repeat my question. Why do we want to attack in the East at all this year?’

Hitler: ‘You’re quite right. Whenever I think of this attack my stomach turns over.’

Guderian: ‘In that case your reaction to the problem is the correct one. Leave it alone!’

It was here, against the enemy’s main concentration, that we ourselves could use our manpower and weapons to the greatest effect, particularly our big tank formations. No other sector, even if we were successful there, promised so much as the Kursk salient.

General S.M. Shtemenko – Soviet General Staff, 1943.

1

THE FÜHRER AND THE FIELD MARSHAL

For the second time in less than a month, a security detachment had moved quickly to cordon off all approaches to and from the airfield serving the headquarters of Army Group South at Zaporozhye, a large industrial city trailing for several kilometres along the banks of the lower Dnieper in the southern Ukraine. At the main entrance to the base, all personnel, irrespective of rank, were stopped and questioned by the feldgendarmerie, their papers carefully scrutinized before being allowed to proceed about their business. Then shortly before 1040 hours on 10 March 1943, the reason for the heightened activity became apparent. Sweeping in over the western approaches to the airfield came a Focke-Wulf Condor transport bearing the Führer of the German People and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, from Vinnitsa, the site of his Eastern Front headquarters and venue since February of his late winter sojourn in Russia.

In contrast to his previous visit, when from high above the Ukrainian steppe Adolf Hitler had viewed nothing but a snow-covered and windswept desolation, the appearance of large patches of washed out greenery breaking through the monotonous whiteness below was clearly the harbinger of the great thaw that would soon break across the region, heralding the arrival of spring and the return of warmer weather. Then the landscape would be transformed into a ‘sea’ of floods by the snowmelt, bringing in its train an enforced, albeit temporary halt to all military activity across the breadth of the vast front in Southern Russia. In the time remaining before the inevitable onset of this ‘muddy season’, known to the natives as the rasputitsa – the period without roads – the Führer had every expectation that the still unfolding German counter-offensive would have been brought to a successful conclusion. If so, this would return to him ownership of the Soviet Union’s fourth largest industrial city and ostensibly wrest back from the Russians the military initiative that they had held since late November, when the jaws of the Red Army had closed around and entombed the Sixth Army at Stalingrad.

‘Operation Uranus’ – the Soviet code name for the great offensive which had by 30 November 1942 encircled von Paulus’ command in Stalingrad – had been but the prelude to a succession of shattering offensive blows by a Red Army that just six months before Adolf Hitler had described – in a moment of fatal hubris – as ‘finished’. Since December the Soviets had run rampant, ripping open and pouring through the Axis front line along the River Don and overwhelming numerous Italian, Hungarian, Romanian and German formations in their rapid advance westward. The Axis forces had been forced by the Red Army into a series of humiliating retreats, which by early February 1943 led to the forcible surrender of almost all territorial gains acquired by them in the course of the previous summer’s offensive. However, the recent turn-around in fortunes, brought about by the German counter-offensive launched in mid-February, and which was even now wreaking destruction on the over-extended formations of the Red Army, had clearly revived the Führer’s spirits. This had noticeably helped to alleviate the depression and self-doubt that had afflicted him ever since von Paulus’ surrender to the Russians at the beginning of February.

Even so, the irony of this particular visit could not have been lost on the German leader. It was just three weeks since Hitler had first travelled to Zaporozhye. Then, his intention had been to sack and personally assume the command responsibilities of the man whom he had conveniently blamed for presiding over the string of German reverses since Stalingrad. However, even Adolf Hitler, normally so certain of his military genius and convinced that his much-vaunted ‘iron will’ would be enough to redeem any situation, had paled in the face of the dire situation revealed on the map boards at Army Group South. At that moment, even he realised that it was clearly inopportune to dispense with the services of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, who was regarded even among those who considered themselves his peers as possessor of the finest strategic mind in the Army. A judgement with which von Manstein – who was certainly not one to ‘hide his light under a bushel’ – would have been loath to disagree.

On 18 February, Soviet forces were driving virtually unopposed for the River Dnieper, thrusting through a 300-mile rent in the German line. With the nearest tanks of the First Guards Tank Army just 36 miles from Zaporozhye, Hitler had reluctantly acquiesced to Field Marshal Erich von Manstein’s demand that he be granted unfettered ‘operational freedom’ in seeking a solution to this appalling situation. Under any other circumstances the request to be granted such autonomy by his field commanders at this stage in the conflict would have made the German leader see red, interpreting such as an excuse for retreat and the abandonment of territory – which was anathema to him.

Although he always maintained a studied politeness towards his subordinate, it was apparent to many who were present at the five situation conferences held over the two days since his arrival that the tense atmosphere and Hitler’s demeanour betrayed his continuing ambivalence towards von Manstein. This derived from a compound of envy and fear of the man’s abilities, allied to the awareness that beneath his aristocratic façade von Manstein nursed immense ambition. In particular, what had always grated on the leader was the man’s independence of character. In consequence, Hitler had never been able to trust this particular representative of the German General Staff. The Führer had first expressed this view in February 1940, following his meeting with a then lower ranking von Manstein in the Reich Chancellery. On that occasion he had embraced the latter’s ‘sickle-cut’ plan for Fall Gelb – the invasion of France and the Low Countries – although later claiming the idea as his own. ‘There’s no doubt he’s exceptionally bright, with great operational talent; but I don’t trust him.’ At that time, Hitler’s aversion to von Manstein derived from his perception of him as yet another – albeit extremely capable – example of the reactionary individualist Prussian military officer caste that he viewed with such profound distaste.

It was however Hitler’s need to employ the man’s exceptional military ability that was to govern his relations with von Manstein thereafter. This saw the Führer confer a degree of latitude to the Field Marshal in their professional relationship that he extended to few others, save possibly Walter Model. However, even with this ‘turbulent priest’, tolerance had its limits. When, in December 1941, Field Marshal Keitel for the second time (the first in the autumn of 1939 and the third, in September 1942) recommended to Hitler that von Manstein replace him as Chief of the OberKommando der Wehrmacht (OKW – High Command of the German Armed Forces) he again said no, retorting that: ‘He may have a brilliant brain, but he’s too independent a character.’ Ability or no, Hitler required a pliable instrument in that role, not one who would see it as his professional duty to gainsay the Führer whenever he felt the need, because he assumed he always knew better – which is why he retained Keitel notwithstanding his limitations. Dictators brook no rivals in any sphere, especially in war. Hitler certainly regarded this one as his own, to be fought as he determined, and by none other.

Antipathy notwithstanding, since that meeting in Berlin in 1940, Hitler had promoted von Manstein to the highest rank in the German Army, creating him Field Marshal on 1 July 1942, in reward for the capture of Sevastapol. In the months following his success in the Crimea, the new Field Marshal had become a military talisman for Hitler – a military commander to whom he could entrust any task and presume a successful outcome. His first was oversight of ‘Operation Northern Lights’ – to capture Leningrad. Then, on 20 November 1942, with the Soviets having surrounded the Sixth Army in Stalingrad, it was to von Manstein that Hitler turned to give command of Army Group Don – the hastily assembled, inadequately equipped force charged with relieving von Paulus’ beleaguered command.

In December, in what the German leader would come to hear as a recurrent and irritating refrain, von Manstein had forcibly requested that he be granted ‘unrestricted operational freedom’ to conduct operations regarding Stalingrad and the southern front in the manner he best saw fit. Ever certain of his own ability, he had added the rider that should Hitler accede to his appeal: ‘I’ll fight a decisive battle in southern Russia, at the end of which you’ll be able to get oil from wherever you want!’ Hitler refused the offer, the price of granting the Field Marshal’s imperious demand being greater than the German leader was prepared to pay.

That circumstances forced him to continue to retain the services of a man whom he so distrusted galled Hitler, as is apparent from the testimony of Oberst von Tresckow who was serving with the OberKommando des Heeres (OKH – High Command of the Army) at Rastenburg in the early spring of 1943. He observed that ‘Among his closest associates, Hitler has recently been given to loud outbursts of rage whenever the name Manstein is mentioned.’ Others in the Führer’s entourage also shared his dislike of the Field Marshal, Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels noting in his diary that ‘Manstein is anything but a supporter of National Socialism.’

Nor was the aversion one-sided. The Field Marshal, in his turn, while always formally respectful when communing with his commander-in-chief, nonetheless did little to disguise his judgment of what he saw as Hitler’s misguided and amateurish approach to the conduct of military operations. Although willing to concede that the Führer displayed a certain ‘eye for operational opportunities’, for von Manstein this was a world away from the higher military skills acquired through experience of command in the field that were required successfully to conduct the complex war in which Germany was now engaged. By the forthright manner in which von Manstein addressed Hitler, for he had little compunction about challenging his commander in chief on military questions or of expressing his own opinions on such matters, the Führer could hardly have been unaware that the Field Marshal expressed disparaging views about him in private. Observing their exchanges, Graf von Kielmansegg – who was serving on the Field Marshal’s staff – thought that ‘no one picked arguments with Hitler like Manstein.’ Another recalled the Field Marshal giving vent to his frustration after a particularly fractious situation conference with Hitler by stating: ‘My God, the man’s an idiot!’ Furthermore, as a former page to the Kaiser’s court and a man who saw himself as ‘a real gentleman’, von Manstein also viewed with patrician distaste what he saw as the German leader’s coarse manner, and expressed numerous critical opinions concerning the state ideology. That being said, he was prepared to hold his nose and ride this particular horse in the service of his military ambition, which, Hitler was not alone in sensing, was insatiable.

One has only to examine the body language of Hitler and von Manstein in each other’s presence – as caught in the weekly newsreel, and especially in the period after Kursk – to witness their mutual distaste. Nonetheless, in February 1943, Hitler subordinated his irritation and distrust of the man to his pragmatic need to employ what even he admitted to be von Manstein’s ‘brilliant brain’ and grudgingly conceded to the Field Marshal the free hand that he demanded. It was only because he found himself in extremis that he granted von Manstein his head. He would not deign to do so again.

Having procured this warrant – albeit from a clearly reluctant Führer – the Commander of Army Group South moved quickly to order a radical and risky re-deployment of his panzer and motorized infantry formations. This was but the prelude to the execution of a counter-offensive that he intended to direct against the greatly over-extended enemy forces of the South-Western Front. Unencumbered by the usual constant interference and oversight from Rastenburg, von Manstein rapidly concentrated his forces in the days that followed, unleashing his mobile units on 18 February against a completely surprised enemy. In one of the classic demonstrations of mobile warfare, von Mackensen’s 1st Panzer Army and Hoth’s 4th Panzer Army had cut off the enemy spearheads, forcing the remnants of the Soviet South-Western Front and then the Voronezh Front into a hasty retreat on the city of Kharkov and the line of the River Donets.

Regarded by many in the Wehrmacht as the foremost strategist in the German Army, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein had concluded by the late winter of 1942/43 that a decisive military victory over the Soviet Union at that point lay beyond Germany’s resources. His preferred strategy for the conduct of the war in the East for the summer of 1943 was rejected by Hitler as being too risky and not serving the Führer’s agenda.

A key element in the unfolding German success was the performance of the Luftwaffe. Under the clear-sighted and highly effective command of Wolfram von Richthofen, with whom von Manstein worked very closely and in whom he expressed great confidence, the air force had succeeded in raising its sortie rate to an average of 1,000 per day during the three weeks of the counter-offensive. All fighter, Stuka and even medium bomber units was ordered by von Richthofen to service the needs of the advancing ground forces. This effort was the high-water mark of the Luftwaffe in the East, being the last occasion during the Russian campaign wherein close air support succeeded in emulating the proficiency that had so characterized operations in the heady days of the campaigns of 1940 and 1941. These two prickly and egocentric individuals had worked extremely well together, so it was not surprising that von Manstein would later rue the transfer of his Luftwaffe colleague to the Mediterranean, just one month prior to the launch of the German summer offensive in July.

Now a grateful Hitler was returning to congratulate and honour von Manstein as the architect of the still-unfolding counter-offensive by awarding him the Oakleaves to his Knight’s Cross. Having stepped gingerly down from the plane, his ears still plugged with the cotton wool plugs he habitually wore on such journeys, the Führer strode forward with his hand outstretched to greet von Manstein, who having drawn himself to attention, acknowledged his commander-in-chief with a curt nod of his head and raised his Marshal’s baton in salute. Taking Hitler’s proffered hand, von Manstein received the warm and voluble congratulations of his grateful leader. A witness to the scene was von Richthofen, who was later to observe in his personal diary that Hitler was in fine fettle as they drove to Army Group South headquarters.

The euphoria among the assembled senior officers of the Heer and Luftwaffe summoned to the conference at the headquarters from their various commands was palpable, for they too shared their commander’s conviction that the Soviet winter storm had at last been weathered. This conviction received further reinforcement as von Manstein proceeded to regale Hitler with the statistics of the Soviet defeat to date: 615 tanks, 400 guns, 600 anti-tank guns either captured or destroyed, and 23,000 Soviet dead on the battlefield. The Führer was even more pleased when the Field Marshal also relayed to him the news that the troops of ‘his’ SS Panzer Corps had that very morning begun to penetrate the suburbs of Kharkov. Though the Russians were offering fanatical resistance, it was nonetheless anticipated by all present that the city would fall in the coming days.

For von Manstein, the crumbling Soviet position to the west of the River Donets was offering a tantalizing prospect, which, if properly exploited, would crown the German effort with a great victory that would go far to negating the impact of the massive defeats inflicted on the Ostheer by the Russians during their triumphant winter campaign. If successful, the Field Marshal’s plan would garner an immense harvest of captured prisoners and equipment. More importantly, it would deprive the Soviets of the recently created great salient that projected deep into the German front between Orel and Belgorod, thereby denying the Red Army the use of this perfect springboard in future operations. Indeed, the respective planning staffs at Rastenburg and Zaporozhye already assumed that the Soviets would avail themselves of the position to launch a great offensive from here to encircle and destroy Army Group South in the summer. The benefits that the Germans could accrue by seizing the moment and inflicting such a defeat on the Russians would be profound. With time of the essence, the Field Marshal proceeded to set forth his case in the hope of prompting Hitler to give his rapid assent to the proposed operation.

Directing the Führer’s attention to the table, von Manstein leant across the large-scale situation map of southern Central Russia and began rapidly jabbing with his fingers and forcibly employing his hands to convey to an attentive Hitler what he had in mind. With his Knights Cross dangling from the ribbon around his throat, he explained in a precise fashion in that incongruous high-pitched voice of his, how, following the fall of Kharkov, he intended to despatch fast mobile forces northward to capture Belgorod and seize bridgeheads across the frozen Donets. These would then be positioned dangerously astride the flank of the Voronezh Front, where Soviet forces lay deeply echeloned westward in the southern half of the extremely large salient, centred on the city of Kursk. This had formed in late February, when Colonel General von Salmuth’s 2nd Army and Colonel General Schmidt’s 2nd Panzer Army finally managed to block the westward advance of the Bryansk, Central and Voronezh Fronts. The Soviet intention then had been to employ the Central Front under General Konstantin Rokossovsky to envelop Army Group Centre from the south by thrusting into the rear of the German-held Bryansk-Orel salient. The Soviet plan had miscarried when 2nd Army and 2nd Panzer Army, having given ground in the face of these enemy thrusts, had managed to retrieve the situation with the assistance of elements transferred from 9th Army, which was in the process of redeploying following the staged abandonment of the Rzhev salient. In consequence, the Germans were now holding the Soviet forces on a line running from Rylsk southward to Sumy.

Field Marshal Erich von Manstein greets Adolf Hitler on his arrival at Zaporozhye on 10 March 1943. Even though his counter-offensive still had a number of weeks to run, Hitler had already decided in principle that the Kursk salient would be the focus of German offensive attentions with the return of the warmer weather.

A Panzer IVG belonging to the 2/SS Panzer-Regiment of the 1st SS PanzerGrenadier Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler takes part in the counter-offensive unleashed by von Manstein on 18 February 1943.

A Panzer IVG of the same regiment covers infantry as they attack a village en route to Kharkov.

By the time of Hitler’s visit to Zaporozhye on 10 March, the SS Panzer Corps was penetrating the outskirts of Russia’s fourth largest city. This Mark IV is notable for its employment of Ostketten