Michael Collins's Intelligence War E-Book

Michael T Foy

• Herausgeber: The History Press
• Kategorie: Sachliteratur, Reportagen, Biografien
• Sprache: Englisch

Seitenzahl: 564

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2008

Beschreibung

Michael Collins is often thought of as Ireland's lost leader: a man born into a revolutionary environment who became a skilled statesman and military leader. His personality and actions fascinated both the Irish population and his British enemies, who sought to repeatedly capture him. Setting the secret war firmly within the context of the Irish capital at the time, the author draws on an extensive range of primary sources - inlcuding documents which have only recently been released - to vividly recapture the atmosphere of the period.

Leseprobe

MICHAEL COLLINS’S

INTELLIGENCE WAR

Dr Michael T. Foy is a former Head of History at Methodist College, Belfast, and Tutor in Irish History at Queen’s University, Belfast. His previous book, co-authored with Dr Brian Barton, was The Easter Rising (Sutton, 1999).

MICHAELCOLLINS’S

INTELLIGENCE WAR

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND THE IRA 1919–1921

MICHAEL T. FOY

First published in 2006

This paperback edition first published in 2008

The History Press The Mill, Brimscombe Port Stroud, Gloucestershire, GL5 2QGwww.thehistorypress.co.uk

This ebook edition first published in 2013

All rights reserved © Michael T. Foy, 2008, 2013

The right of Michael T. Foy to be identified as the Author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyrights, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

This ebook is copyright material and must not be copied, reproduced, transferred, distributed, leased, licensed or publicly performed or used in any way except as specifically permitted in writing by the publishers, as allowed under the terms and conditions under which it was purchased or as strictly permitted by applicable copyright law. Any unauthorised distribution or use of this text may be a direct infringement of the author’s and publisher’s rights, and those responsible may be liable in law accordingly.

EPUB ISBN 978 0 7524 9590 3

Original typesetting by The History Press

CONTENTS

Map

Acknowledgements

Prologue

1.

The Road to Conflict: Michael Collins and the Onset of the Anglo-Irish War, 1916–1919

2.

Director of Irish Intelligence: The Organisation Takes Shape, 1919

3.

Stumbling into the Haze: The British Response, January–July 1920

4.

Duel: The Struggle between the British and IRA Intelligence, July–November 1920

5.

Seeking a Knockout Blow: Collins and Bloody Sunday, 21 November 1920

6.

Slugging it out: Bloody Sunday to March 1921

7.

Looking for a Way out: The Quest for a Truce, May–July 1921

Conclusions

Notes

Bibliography

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My greatest debt is to Walter Grey, friend and former colleague, who was involved in the project from the start. The book is in large part the product of our continuous dialogue over three years, during which time I relied heavily on his encyclopaedic knowledge of Dublin and Dubliners, his meticulous vetting of many different drafts and the ideas generated in the course of numerous stimulating discussions. Walter also designed the maps. I would also like to thank Dr Timothy Bowman, Michelle Brown and Stewart Roulston, who read and made detailed comments on the text. I am also indebted to Dr Brian Barton, Commandant Pat Brennan, Brother Thomas Connolly, Andrew Cook, Shay Courtney, Jason Foy, Jim Herlihy, Dr Michael Hopkinson, Ivan Johnston, Grainne Killeen, Colin Kirkpatrick, Commandant Victor Lang, Susan Louden, Sergeant Patrick McGee, Peggy Mack (who provided the only existing photograph of her father, Jack Byrnes), Dan Moore, Ciaran Pope, Julian Putkowski, Harry Ramsay, Denis Rice and Alasdair Verschoyle. Finally, I want to thank Christopher Feeney of Sutton Publishing, who commissioned the book, and his colleagues Jane Entrican, Hilary Walford and Yvette Cowles, Allison McKechnie, who edited the manuscript, Jonathon Price, who read the proofs, and Helen Litton, who compiled the index.

Michael T. Foy

PROLOGUE

As the Easter Rising against British rule in Ireland collapsed on Friday 28 April 1916, the rebel Provisional Government evacuated its headquarters in Dublin’s General Post Office. Next day it surrendered unconditionally, and two of the leaders, Patrick Pearse and James Connolly, were taken into British custody. Another three, Tom Clarke, Sean MacDermott and Joseph Plunkett, stayed with rank-and-file Volunteers, whom the enemy lined up that evening outside the Gresham Hotel in O’Connell Street.

British officers at the scene regarded the prisoners as pro-German traitors, a defeated rabble that was expected to submit meekly. But instead they remained insouciantly defiant, smashing weapons at their captors’ feet and even lighting up cigarettes and cigars. One Volunteer recalled their response when ‘orders were shouted by the military to “Stop smoking!” They were an incorrigible bunch – most of them continued smoking. Then came an order in an unmistakable Etonian accent, “Stop that smoking.” Some wag repeated the order – and accent – with perfect cadence and this was followed by a peal of laughter from the other side of the street.’1 The prisoners were then marched a short distance to a grassy space at the front of the Rotunda Hospital, where they were surrounded by armed soldiers and ordered to lie down. Machine guns on the roofs of the Rotunda and nearby buildings covered the area while angry guards using rifle butts threatened anyone who even dared to stretch their legs on the surrounding pathway.

The senior British officer present was Captain Lea Wilson, a 31-year-old Englishman. Sporting a tasselled smoking cap, he circulated with junior officers, asking them repeatedly: ‘Whom do you consider worse, the Boches or the Sinn Feiners?’ As if on cue, they chorused that the rebels were indeed the foulest.2 Eventually the G-men, Dublin’s political detectives, arrived. After they had identified Tom Clarke as a dangerous subversive, Wilson smacked his face, shouting, ‘This old bastard has been at it before. He has a shop across the street there. He’s an old Fenian.’3 He then frog-marched Clarke to the Rotunda steps and searched him thoroughly; many Volunteers believed, probably incorrectly, that Wilson also stripped him naked. When a British officer disdainfully told Sean MacDermott that ‘You have cripples in your army’, the limping polio victim retorted: ‘You have your place sir, and I have mine, and you had better mind your place, sir.’4 Another officer confiscated MacDermott’s walking stick. Both Clarke and MacDermott were iconic republican figures, and their treatment seemed to smack of deliberate British humiliation. While hardly a sadistic monster, Wilson embodied that injustice, and his face became imprinted on every prisoner’s memory.

Saturday night was long and bitterly cold. There was little food or water available, and with no sanitation many Volunteers relieved themselves on the grass. The ground was hard and damp, and an area suitable for about 150 men was eventually crammed with over 400 prisoners as captives arrived steadily from surrendering outposts. Anyone snatching some sleep was liable to be awakened by others trying to work themselves into a more comfortable position or by the torch beam of a British officer searching for rebel leaders. One person who suffered agonising cramps was 21-year-old Liam Tobin. Having barely slept for a week, he was slipping into a dreamlike state, though he remembered Wilson turning down a comrade’s request to allow Tobin to rise. ‘I know that when he refused to allow me to stand up I looked at him and I registered a vow to myself that I would deal with him at some time in the future.’5 Nearby, another young man was watching Wilson’s behaviour intently. Twenty-five-year-old Michael Collins was already exercising command over others, and he passed along an order to ‘get that fellow’s name’.6

Prisoners debated long over their likely fate, which some envisaged as a specially raised punishment battalion on the Western Front or trans-portation to a Devil’s Island on the far side of the world. But Clarke, MacDermott and Plunkett knew that theirs would be a one-way journey terminating in front of a firing squad. In the morning, after twelve seemingly endless hours, they were finally allowed to get up, and nurses crowded at the hospital windows could see a cloud of steaming urine rising from the ground. As it was Sunday many Volunteers knelt and prayed. They were now very hungry and thirsty, having gone without food and water for over twenty-four hours. Finally, at about 9 a.m. they were marched off to Richmond Barracks. MacDermott hobbled far behind under armed escort and arrived three-quarters of an hour late, completely exhausted. Plunkett, who was seriously ill with tuberculosis, had already fainted at the gates and had to be carried inside by British soldiers.

* * *

Four years later in 1920 the political situation in Ireland was utterly transformed. Although Clarke, MacDermott and other leaders had been executed, their revolutionary heirs were now triumphant after Sinn Fein’s overwhelming election victory in December 1918, the establishment of an as yet unrecognised independent Irish parliament and the reaffirmation of an Irish Republic. Some Rotunda prisoners had become republican leaders, including Collins, who, besides being an Irish government minister, was the Irish Volunteers’ Director of Intelligence and chief organiser of an escalating guerrilla campaign. Liam Tobin was Collins’s Deputy Director and manager of a secret intelligence department whose orders were executed by a hand-picked assassination unit known as the Squad. In a remarkable reversal of fortune, Collins and Tobin, once defeated captives, now possessed literally the power of life and death, and their hatred of Lea Wilson was undiminished. In the summer of 1920 they decided to finally settle accounts with him. Collins, as a friend wrote, ‘always finished a job’.7

Having left the British Army, Lea Wilson had returned to the RIC as District Inspector of Gorey in north Wexford, forty-five miles south of Dublin. Despite its revolutionary tradition, Wexford was relatively peaceful, partly because of a substantial but well-behaved British army and police presence, mountains and rivers that isolated the county geographically and an open terrain unsuitable for guerrilla warfare. A tranquil town of about 3,000 inhabitants, Gorey was an easy posting for a policeman, and Wilson and his wife lived undisturbed a quarter of a mile away. To kill Wilson, Collins had to dispatch his Squad to Gorey. Early on 15 June the District Inspector, unarmed and in civilian clothes, strolled to the police station, cleared up some routine business, bought a newspaper at the railway station and headed home at about 9.30 a.m. Reading as he walked, Wilson probably didn’t see a car that was parked a couple of hundred yards ahead with four men gathered round its raised bonnet, apparently examining the engine. As soon as he passed the vehicle, Wilson was shot, staggered fifteen yards and was then hit again. When he collapsed, the Squad finished him off on the ground with bullets to the thigh, chest, shoulder, jaw and skull before climbing back inside the car, which revved up instantly, turned around and headed out of Gorey.8

That afternoon Joe Sweeney, a 1916 Volunteer, was standing at the bar of Dublin’s Wicklow Hotel when ‘Mick Collins in his usual way stomped in and said to me, “We got the bugger, Joe.” I said, “What are you talking about?” He said, “Do you remember that first night outside the Rotunda? Lee [sic] Wilson?” “I do remember,” I said, “I’ll never forget it.” “Well, we got him today in Gorey.”’9

ONE

THE ROAD TO CONFLICT

MICHAEL COLLINS AND THE ONSET OF THE ANGLO-IRISH WAR, 1916–1919

Michael Collins was born on 16 October 1890 at the hamlet of Sam’s Cross in west Cork, the eighth and last child of a 75-year-old tenant farmer and his 30-year-old wife.1 Collins’s personality was decisively shaped by his birthplace, family environment and education, all of which permanently instilled distinctive attitudes, values and modes of behaviour and speech. While Collins left west Cork relatively early, in a sense it never left him. Before dying in 1897, Michael senior had taught his son respect for learning, and he read voraciously about politics, war, history, poetry and English literature. Steeped in west Cork’s revolutionary past, Collins learned about Irish republican heroes such as Tone and Emmet. He was especially influenced by Denis Lyons, who taught a militantly nationalist interpretation of Irish history at the first of Collins’s two local national schools (Lisavaird and Clonakilty), where he also excelled in mathematics, French, Greek and Latin.

Choosing among one of rural Ireland’s traditional escape routes for ambitious achievers – the priesthood, emigration or the British civil service – Collins passed the latter’s entrance examination in 1906 and became a junior clerk at the West Kensington post office savings bank in London. He resigned after two frustrating years in a dead-end job, but neither a stockbroker’s office nor a trust company proved any more satisfying. By his late teens Collins was still a shy and rather socially inept young man, channelling his restless energies into Irish culture, politics and sports. Although friendly with English colleagues, he never assimilated there, staying firmly within the expatriate Irish community, living with his sister Hannie, socialising in Irish clubs and pubs, learning Gaelic and joining the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB). Rising political tensions at home during the third Home Rule crisis made Collins even more of a republican revolutionary, and by 1914 he was prominent in the London IRB, honing his conspiratorial ability and talent spotting for new recruits at Gaelic games throughout Britain.

In January 1916 Collins moved to Dublin, partly to evade conscription (which had not been extended to Ireland) but primarily to participate in the coming rebellion. As adjutant to Joseph Plunkett, a member of the Military Council planning the rebellion, he was able to observe the inner circle’s expertise in plotting, duplicity and ruthlessness – an invaluable crash course in revolutionary politics. During Easter week Collins performed competently if unspectacularly in the GPO. Subsequently he was interned at Frongoch camp in North Wales, where, according to a fellow prisoner, he ‘got his taste of [sic] scheming and trickery . . . as well as making friends and contacts with people who were deeply involved with the IRB organisation’.2 Collins’s circle included Joe O’Reilly, who later became his personal assistant, and Mick McDonnell, the first leader of the Squad. In December 1916, when Lloyd George became British prime minister, he released Frongoch’s prisoners as a gesture of reconciliation to Ireland. They received a rapturous Christmas reception in Dublin, now literally Ireland’s central political battleground and Collins’s home for the rest of his life.

Although he returned unemployed and virtually penniless, Collins’s head start over more senior republicans who were still incarcerated at Lewes Gaol in England got him the post of secretary to the Irish National Aid and Volunteers’ Dependants Fund. Tom Clarke’s widow Kathleen had established it, ostensibly as a charity for the relatives of executed and dead Volunteers and former internees, but really to help resuscitate the republican movement. She sensed Collins had the ability to use the Fund as a cover for legally resurrecting political resistance and particularly liked his insistence that ‘the fight for freedom must be continued, the Rising to count as the first blow. With his forceful personality, his wonderful magnetism and his organising ability, he had little trouble in becoming a leader.’3 A Fund employee remembered Collins as

exacting, businesslike and orderly. Sometimes he growled at being asked to do things, but he always got them done. On one occasion early in 1917 I heard him say to a helper, my fiancée, that the office was closed, that he was going out, and that he could not wait, but he did take down the name of a man whom she wanted helped, closed the notebook, put it in his pocket and walked away without a word. He cycled out that same evening to Rathfarnham, saw the man and solved his problem.4

While travelling freely throughout Ireland meeting widows and orphans, Collins simultaneously reorganised the IRB, on whose reconstituted Supreme Council he now sat. Already secrecy and power were investing his persona with an aura of command, enhanced by Collins’s formidable manipulative skills and an expanding network of republican activists whose names Mrs Clarke had given him.

In the spring of 1917 Collins entered national politics when republicans were challenging a Home Rule party weakened by widespread disillusion at its failure to deliver Home Rule and its apparent subservience to the British war effort. Furthermore, the post-Rising executions had generated enormous popular sympathy for the rebel leaders. The most credible political alternative was Sinn Fein, especially as the British had mistakenly blamed it for the Rising. And, despite republican scepticism about party leader Arthur Griffith’s moderate separatism and his espousal of a dual monarchy with Great Britain, Sinn Fein struck lucky in May 1917 when a by-election occurred in South Longford. The contest made opposition unity essential if a traditionally impregnable Home Rule majority in the constituency was to be overcome, and Collins supported a Sinn Fein candidate. But, though he argued for a strong local man, Joe McGuinness, a Volunteer prisoner in Lewes, the doctrinaire McGuinness opposed standing for the British parliament and was backed by the gaol’s republican leadership. Collins refused to accept defeat and cunningly circumvented this opposition by appealing to Thomas Ashe, the only prisoner capable of overriding the rejectionists. Head of the IRB and a Volunteer hero after his victory at the battle of Ashbourne in 1916, Ashe agreed that winning South Longford would allow republicans radically to reshape Sinn Fein policy, and he authorised Collins to push ahead with McGuinness’s candidacy. As campaign manager Collins marshalled Volunteers as election workers and used the emotive slogan ‘Put him in to get him out’ to secure a narrow but mould-breaking Sinn Fein victory.

The party quickly followed up by winning East Clare in July and Kilkenny in August – a decisive breakthrough for a resurgent republican movement. South Longford was a nerve-racking experience for Collins but ultimately a triumphant vindication. Having successfully taken a calculated gamble, he had proved his mettle. For the first time Collins had also demonstrated his pragmatism by outflanking revolutionary purists whose dogmatism risked losing everything. The realist who would sign the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1921 was already in place.

Collins’s use of Irish Volunteers as political shock troops was visible proof of that organisation’s revival, which had started the previous winter when Cathal Brugha, a hero of the Rising, established a temporary Volunteer Executive. It accelerated after December 1916, as Frongoch’s returning internees restored leadership to their local units. When the Lewes prisoners returned in June 1917, Collins worked closely with Ashe, whom he accompanied to public meetings, Volunteer gatherings and IRB conclaves. But in mid-August 1917, after being arrested and charged with inciting disaffection, Ashe began a hunger strike for political status in Mountjoy Prison. He died on 25 September while being force-fed, and his funeral five days later became ‘the most formidable act of defiance to British authority since the Rising’.5 Mourners poured in from all over Ireland, bringing Dublin to a standstill, and sealed off the Castle in a symbolic rejection of British rule. The procession included 200 priests and representatives from every public organisation; 9,000 Volunteers also turned out, most in uniform and some carrying arms. Richard Mulcahy, commandant of Dublin’s 2nd Battalion who had been Ashe’s second-in-command at the battle of Ashbourne, organised Volunteers to escort the coffin from its lying-in-state at the City Hall and marshal vast crowds lining the route to Glasnevin Cemetery. Chosen by an IRB-dominated funeral committee because of his closeness to Ashe, Collins was to deliver the graveside oration. Despite never having made a major public speech in his life, he was ready for the occasion. Like other prisoners at Frongoch’s ‘university of revolution’,6 Collins had practised oratory in preparation for future leadership, and his moral and physical courage were not in doubt.

The proceedings at Glasnevin were modelled on those at the same cemetery two years earlier for a venerable republican, O’Donovan Rossa, when Volunteers had fired shots after Patrick Pearse’s graveside declaration that ‘Ireland unfree shall never be at peace’. Collins’s tribute to Ashe consisted of only a few words in Irish and a simple proclamation that ‘Nothing additional remains to be said. That volley which we have just heard is the only speech which it is proper to make above the grave of a dead Fenian.’ But Collins spoke with great intensity, and his speech, accompanied by a volley of rifle fire, linked Ashe with an undying tradition of national resistance to foreign domination.

The funeral not only transformed Collins into a major republican figure but also established him as a politician in his own right by setting him free of Ashe’s dominance. Ashe’s preeminence had been largely fortuitous, as he had taken the credit for an Ashbourne victory that had really been engineered by his second-in-command, Mulcahy. Subsequently he had displayed insufficient modesty about his very modest abilities, and his continued leadership of the republican movement would have stifled the far more talented Collins. Although Ashe’s demise clearly saddened Collins, it also freed him to be his own man. The funeral also fused Dublin’s four uncoordinated Volunteer battalions into a new city Brigade whose first O/C was Mulcahy, while his closest associate, Dick McKee, succeeded him as 2nd Battalion commandant.7

At a vastly expanded Sinn Fein convention in Dublin on 25 and 26 October 1917, continuing republican reservations about Griffith’s moderation forced him to stand aside as leader in favour of de Valera. Collins endorsed de Valera and was himself elected last to the party executive – confirmation that his influence was still largely confined to an inner circle. An Irish Volunteer Convention on 27 October then created a new Resident Executive to equip and train an estimated 60,000 men. Cathal Brugha became chairman, Richard Mulcahy Director of Training, and Collins was appointed Director of Organisation. Mulcahy liked Collins’s ‘smiling buoyancy, his capacity for bearding tension, clearness of mind, perfectly controlled calm and a devil-may-cariness completely concealed. His clarity of mind, his whole manner and demeanour, together with his power of concentration on the immediate matter in hand, gave him a very great power over men.’8 Clearly, Collins was a born leader: charismatic, forceful and ambitious, whose all-consuming passion for politics amply compensated for his lack of wealth, a university education and influential connections. A powerful, soaring imagination, a vision of the future and an unbreakable will to realise it accorded with Lawrence of Arabia’s dictum that ‘All men dream, but not equally. Those who dream by night in the dusty recesses of the mind, wake in the day to find it was vanity. But the dreamers of the day are dangerous men for they may act their dreams with open eyes to make it possible.’9 Lawrence – a man who shook an empire – was, of course, really describing himself; but Collins likewise dreamed and sometimes achieved the seemingly impossible. In time he too would shake an empire.

In March 1917 Collins’s growing prominence prompted G Division to enter him on its suspects register. This was being constantly updated by a 30-year-old clerical officer, Eamon Broy, an unusual political detective who secretly nursed a fanatical hatred of British rule. His farming family lived in a remote area of County Kildare, whose history of rack-renting landlords, agrarian violence and revolution ensured that ‘we of the rising generation hated the very name of England’.10 Broy had only joined the Dublin Metropolitan Police in 1911 because of its excellent sporting facilities, a liberal reputation and an apparently imminent transfer to a Home Rule government. Shifting from the uniformed branch to G Division just before the Rising, he rose swiftly, as many detectives were retired, promoted or transferred in a mistaken belief that the revolutionary threat had evaporated. Increasingly disaffected with British policy, Broy passed many days alone in his office digesting rebellion documents and pondering ways of helping republicans.

I spent my time thinking what the Sinn Feiners could do to win and whether, in fact, they had the slightest chance of winning. I was well aware of all the dangers that the national movement would have to encounter, some of which were: – traitors in the movement, spies from outside, drinking and boasting by members of the organisation; loose talking, the respectable, safe type of person who wanted to be arrested and be a hero: leakages of information from the USA; accident, papers discovered, on arrest or otherwise, coincidence, chance, unauthorised shooting. Notwithstanding all these dangers, I made up my mind that I would go all-out to help them, regardless of the consequences. The question then was how I could help.11

Fascinated by men wrestling with conflicting loyalties or leading lives as double agents inside an enemy system, which they ostensibly served, Broy was a textbook study in duplicity. From espionage literature he knew about Russian Nihilists infiltrating the Czarist secret police. Broy was also intrigued by Lady Gregory’s play The Rising of the Moon and its depiction of an Irish policeman being torn between duty and fidelity to his own community, foreseeing ‘the possibility of acting, as it were, in a highly modernised version of the RIC Sergeant in that play’.12

In Broy’s version of the play, though, the characters would be flesh and blood and their deaths all too real. Broy relished the prospect of secretly shaping the lives of others and exercising a dramatist’s power of life and death by killing off those cast members he most disliked. Clearly he immensely enjoyed outwitting his supposedly more intelligent superiors, settling old scores and watching panic and confusion become etched in colleagues’ faces. In March 1917 Broy finally decided to cross over and work for the other – or, as he saw it, his own – side. Calculating that only an extreme republican would risk responding to a G-man’s approaches, he tried Harry O’Hanrahan, whose brother Michael had been executed after the Rising. Initially Broy established his credentials by warning about the imminent arrest of two middle-ranking republicans. Then he began passing on every confidential document and police code that came his way, ranging from slips of paper to substantial files, including the Volunteers’ own plans for resisting conscription, which an internal spy had leaked to the British. For some time Broy knew nothing about his information’s final destination. O’Hanrahan was one of Collins’s IRB couriers.

In early March 1918 a great German spring offensive on the Western Front compelled the British Government to mobilise new troops and the possibility that it might extend conscription to Ireland prompted the Volunteer Executive to create a General Headquarters Staff to lead resistance. Although Collins was a leading candidate for the post of Chief of Staff, it went to the better known Mulcahy, who was strongly supported by Dick McKee, the 2nd Battalion commandant who succeeded him as Dublin Brigadier. Mulcahy later recalled McKee’s relief at the outcome, ‘because there was a certain feeling that Collins was an impetuous fellow; they didn’t know very much about him in any case and Dick was quite satisfied that Collins was not the Chief of Staff’.13 Collins settled for the posts of Director of Organisation and Adjutant-General and shrewdly exhibited no bitterness towards Mulcahy and McKee. He needed them more than they needed him. Only by winning both men over could Collins play a major role in the capital’s Volunteer movement. Fortunately for him, Mulcahy had discerned Collins’s potential in Frongoch and now began discreetly nurturing it: ‘One of my achievements in the work of the Volunteers was that I created a kind of shelter for Collins to get known and to get appreciated.’14 Collins also worked assiduously to change McKee’s lukewarm opinion of him, and the future of the Irish Volunteers – and much else besides – was largely determined by this burgeoning triangular relationship.

* * *

By early 1918 Collins was deeply immersed in the intelligence world through the IRB and Broy’s confidential information, an involvement that distinguished him from other Volunteer leaders who had not grasped the importance of intelligence gathering. Although the new GHQ had finally established an Intelligence Department in March 1918, its first Director, Eamon Duggan, was a rather dull solicitor who lacked political drive, conspiratorial ability, personal contacts and mercilessness. He operated out of his legal offices in Dame Street with a single assistant and, like a glorified filing clerk, collated mainly publicly available information. In truth, nothing more seems to have been expected of him. Collins was meanwhile establishing a nucleus of agents in G Division, where two of Broy’s colleagues had already defected. Joe Kavanagh, a short dapper 60-year-old clerk with a waxed moustache, spied for Collins from early 1917 until his sudden death from a blood clot in September 1920. At the Castle, James McNamara served as confidential clerk to the DMP’s Assistant Commissioner. Both men communicated with Collins through a courier network that included Harry O’Hanrahan, Greg Murphy, Michael Foley and Tommy Gay, a librarian in Capel Street Municipal Library. Broy remembered Gay as ‘a tiny Dublin man who suffered from chronic bronchial trouble which made his life a burden. Like nearly all the dramatis personae of the revolution, he led a double life; a bookworm openly and also, secretly, a confidential courier for Collins. He was so unobtrusive that neither the library nor his home ever came under suspicion.’15 The library’s reading room, inhabited mainly by down-and-outs, provided ideal cover, though Collins also met Gay at his quiet suburban house in Clontarf.

During April 1918 the German army’s seemingly relentless advance forced the British Government’s hand over conscription, and, despite Chief Secretary Henry Duke’s warning that he might as well conscript Germans as Irishmen, Lloyd George introduced a Military Conscription Bill on 9 April. Although he delayed its application to Ireland, Irish Nationalist MPs immediately withdrew from Parliament and joined Sinn Fein in a national resistance campaign that was endorsed by the Catholic Church. Three days later police arrested Joe Dowling, a member of Casement’s Irish Brigade whom a German submarine had landed on the north Clare coast. His orders were to inveigle Sinn Fein leaders – who knew nothing about his mission – into another Rising on the promise of a German expeditionary force. While British Intelligence investigated this so-called German Plot, the Irish situation deteriorated rapidly. Membership of Sinn Fein and the Volunteers soared, armed attacks were made on police barracks in Cork and Kerry, hundreds of thousands pledged to ‘resist conscription by the most effective means at our disposal’ and a one-day general strike took place on 23 April 1918. On 2 May an exhausted Duke resigned, along with Viceroy Wimborne, and for the next two years Irish policy was shaped by the 64-year-old Colonial Secretary Walter Long.

This former Conservative Chief Secretary, Dublin MP and Irish Unionist leader blamed past British Governments for not arresting republican leaders planning rebellion. Invested by Lloyd George with special authority for Ireland, Long determined never to allow another Rising on his watch. He would help a new Viceroy and Chief Secretary administer the smack of firm government and guide them through the snake pit of Irish politics.

The new Viceroy was Long’s old friend Lord French, a 65-year-old former Chief of the Imperial General Staff who had been forced to resign in 1915 after two difficult years commanding the British Expeditionary Force in France. Now languishing as Commander-in-Chief of Home Forces, he welcomed the opportunity to redeem his battered reputation, particularly as he regarded himself as well versed in Irish affairs.16 Although born in Kent, French always thought of himself as Irish because of his family’s origins as Norman settlers in Wexford, and before the war he had served in Ireland, where he subsequently bought a country home in Roscommon. Having strongly endorsed the execution of the rebel leaders in 1916, French became Viceroy as the acknowledged head of a quasi-military Irish administration. Originally he even intended ruling as a military governor and decided only at the last moment to make his old chief of staff, Sir Frederick Shaw, Commander-in-Chief. French’s Chief Secretary, Edward Shortt, was a compliant Liberal MP without any previous ministerial experience. He accepted the Viceroy’s political seniority and was expected faithfully to implement Long’s and French’s policy of pacifying Ireland and resisting Irish nationalism.

At a flurry of meetings in London between 6 and 10 May 1918, Long and French formulated a hardline Irish policy in conjunction with Basil Thomson, head of Special Branch and widely regarded as an Irish expert. Although Long expected French to act ‘with an unsparing hand’,17 the Viceroy struck Thomson as ‘rather old and decrepit’18 – though he was impressed when French dismissed assassination attempts ‘with the greatest composure as a chance you had to take’.19

Long regarded Ireland as strategically vital to the Allied war effort, because another rebellion while British and French armies were retreating all along the Western Front might mean the difference between victory and defeat. He demanded that ‘the most drastic steps should be taken to stamp out pro-German intrigues’.20 On 8 May Thomson found Long agitated by Sir Edward Carson’s claim in The Times that the government had incontrovertible evidence of a Sinn Fein–German alliance. He, in turn, astonished Long by claiming already to have shown proof to Duke and Wimborne, only for them to block the internment of Sinn Fein leaders.21 This finally confirmed Long’s perception of Dublin Castle as an Augean stables needing to be utterly cleansed of such arch appeasers, and he told Thomson that any government that ignored such information deserved impeachment.

Long also instructed Thomson to compile a list of republican ringleaders immediately, and by the time French departed for Ireland three days later, plans for a crackdown were well under way. On Monday 13 May he informed Thomson that large-scale arrests were timed for Friday night and confidently predicted a smooth operation. Reminiscing about his time as Chief Secretary, Long recalled his then chief of police describing an Irish peasant superstition that the deaths of assassins from accidents or disease was ‘a judgement, and when the next generation (the present one) grew up they would be too well educated to murder. This is also the view of the Irish police.’22

As G Division finalised its arrest list, Broy was leaking the contents to O’Hanrahan, whom he warned on Friday morning, 17 May, that raids would take place that night. After advising that targets avoid their usual haunts, Broy was stunned when over eighty prominent republicans were rounded up. Only later did he learn that, while Collins had tipped off Sinn Fein leaders at a meeting in Harcourt Street, most – including de Valera, Griffith and Countess Markievicz – preferred mass arrest in order to portray British policy as the crude repression of Irish nationalism. Whatever Duggan’s formal role, it was on 17 May 1918 that Collins emerged as the Irish Volunteer GHQ’s de facto Director of Intelligence. By displaying his access to the enemy’s most confidential information and acting as protector of the republican leadership, Collins had transformed his power and standing in his colleagues’ eyes.

Having failed to anticipate the Easter Rising, the British authorities were elated at scooping up most of the republican leaders so easily, satisfied, according to Broy, ‘that they could lay their hands on anybody they wanted at any time’.23 Long was pleased that ‘the coup seems to have been a complete success’,24 while Thomson crowed that ‘de Valera, who had always said he would not be taken alive, went like a sheep’.25 But any idea that normal service had been resumed was an illusion. Broy noted ‘a certain eerie feeling’26 among fellow detectives when they arrested suspects with their belongings already packed, as if anticipating a journey. But their unease did not percolate to the upper echelons, where Broy saw that, even after Sinn Fein had filled its organisational gaps with surprising ease, ‘there was no suspicion however awakened in the Castle’.27

Some republican leaders went on the run. From the end of April to October 1918 Cathal Brugha was in London preparing but eventually abandoning plans to assassinate the entire British Cabinet if it imposed conscription on Ireland. Collins spent the next ten months underground in Dublin, surfacing only briefly at a Sinn Fein Executive meeting to pack the candidate list for December’s general election with militants.28 Mulcahy also remained in the capital, hoping that a republican election victory would lead to the creation of an independent Irish Parliament and government, which in turn would confer legitimacy on the Volunteers as the army of a new Irish state. Until then, he believed Volunteers had to exercise maximum restraint in order to deprive the British of any excuse for cancelling elections and suppressing the republican movement. Mulcahy also worried about an enormous disparity between the British army and the comparatively tiny, untrained and virtually weaponless Volunteers. Since this would have made any premature clashes suicidal, he urged ‘prudence, patience and discipline in avoiding situations leading to conflict and exposing the Volunteers and the people to the losses and the danger of disclosing to the aggressors our intrinsic weakness’.29 But his delicate balancing act was made even more difficult by police raids, arrests and heavy surveillance of Sinn Fein meetings, which Mulcahy feared might provoke local Volunteer units into literally jumping the gun. ‘In many areas, where the pressures of aggression were very great and the support of opposition strong, violent reaction by the people created different problems of control for the general headquarters.’30

On the British side, Long’s grand project stalled quite rapidly after May’s apparently successful crackdown, as French discovered that making progress in Ireland was even more frustrating than advancing through the mud of Flanders. Expected to restore order with a government machine that was extraordinarily resistant to change, the Viceroy especially bemoaned the inefficiency of five rival intelligence services, one of which, Thomson’s Special Branch, told the military authorities in Dublin hardly anything. He recommended overhauling the intelligence system and increasing its budget in order to locate Irish Volunteer weapons. ‘I think all sides feel that the present system should be altered and that it should be replaced by a thoroughly coordinated effort. All the different branches of intelligence appear to be jealous of each other, which is not a good start.’31 Later on in early April 1919 French complained to War Secretary Churchill about the crippling lack of a proper Criminal Investigation Department in Ireland and unsuccessfully requested the loan of the head of MI5, Captain Vernon Kell.32

Once again, Long blamed the Irish administration and especially Shortt, whom a coterie of Dublin Castle conservatives told him had gone native, by espousing Home Rule to curry favour with nationalists and the Roman Catholic hierarchy. By late August 1918 Long had had enough, and the Chief Secretary became the first – but not the last – Irish official to whom he dealt the black spot. Increasingly isolated, Shortt survived only until December, when he could be quietly jettisoned after the general election. Meanwhile another whispering campaign gathered momentum against the Catholic Under-Secretary, James MacMahon, supposedly in Cardinal Logue’s pocket, and his co-religionist Sir Joseph Byrne, the RIC Inspector-General who allegedly lacked zeal in combating republican militancy.

As Mulcahy had hoped, Volunteer restraint held sufficiently for Sinn Fein to win a landslide general election victory in which Collins was returned unopposed for South Cork. Although many Sinn Fein MPs were imprisoned or in hiding, an inaugural meeting of the Dail convened on 21 January 1919 in the Round Room of Dublin’s Mansion House. When this direct challenge to British authority fuelled rumours of troop movements and a pre-emptive strike, McKee filled the hall with armed Volunteers disguised as plain-clothes stewards as well as posting scouts outside to warn about any attempt to storm the building. Inside, 3,000 spectators, foreign reporters and honoured guests watched deputies quickly endow Ireland with ‘the trappings of an independent state’33 by reaffirming the Republic of Easter Week, issuing a declaration of independence and electing a cabinet in which Brugha was temporary president (because de Valera was still in jail). Collins became Minister of Home Affairs.

Mulcahy wanted the Dail to meet peacefully, allowing a smooth transition in which new national institutions could be established and new political leaders installed. But he was nagged by the fear of a violent incident in some volatile county like Cork, Tipperary or Limerick. So he was not entirely surprised on the afternoon of 21 January when news filtered through of a Volunteer ambush at a quarry in Soloheadbeg, just outside Tipperary town, in which two policemen escorting a civilian dynamite wagon had been shot dead. As rumours of imminent martial law swept Dublin, McKee assembled armed Volunteers at houses throughout the capital and only stood them down in the early hours after the immediate danger had passed.34 The Soloheadbeg killers were a local unit commanded by Dan Breen and Sean Treacy, both of whom were imbued with a militaristic contempt for Sinn Fein’s timidity. Breen’s sole regret was that ‘the police escort had consisted of only two peelers instead of six. If there had to be dead peelers at all, six would have created a better impression than a mere two.’35 His remarks have usually been dismissed as bravado, and many nationalists regarded the killings as a tragic accident, but significantly the gelignite, ostensibly the intended target, lay unused for nearly a year. Undoubtedly, a minority of Volunteers regarded Soloheadbeg as an action waiting to happen.

But, although historians almost universally regard Soloheadbeg as the start of an Anglo-Irish War, the ambush contravened Volunteer GHQ’s official policy, and Mulcahy privately denounced it as an irresponsible attempt by extremists to bounce the army leadership into open war. He loathed the Tipperary leaders,36 and summoned Treacy and his commanding officer, Seamus Robinson, to Dublin, intending, in effect, to deport them. Mulcahy refused even to have them in his office and arranged a street-corner meeting between them and Collins, who as Adjutant-General was responsible for Volunteer discipline. Mulcahy had ordered Collins to have them ‘escape’ to America, but Robinson was having none of it:

‘We don’t want to go to the States or anywhere else.’ ‘Well,’ said Mick, ‘that is what many people seem to think is the only thing to do.’ I began to think that GHQ had begun to give way to Sinn Fein pacifism and with a little acerbity I said ‘Look here, to kill a couple of policemen for the country’s sake and leave it at that by running away would be so wanton as to approximate too closely to murder.’

‘Then what do you propose to do?’

‘Fight it out of course.’

Mick Collins, without having shown the slightest emotion during the short interview, now suddenly closed his notebook with a snap, saying as he started off with the faintest of faint smiles on his lips but with a big laugh in his eyes, ‘That’s all right with me.’37

Far from sharing Mulcahy’s revulsion, Collins was keen to discover whether Robinson and Treacy were simply undisciplined hotheads or serious revolutionaries. Once they realised that he too believed war was inevitable, and the sooner the better, an unofficial alliance was forged between national and local radicals. In a pub that evening, Dublin Volunteer officer Joe Lawless saw both Tipperary men’s contentment and ‘from their joking references, I gathered that they had received a formal reprimand with one hand and a pat on the back with the other’.38 After returning home Robinson and Treacy continued chipping away at what they and Collins regarded as simply an armed truce, doomed to collapse when the British were ready to crush the republican movement.

Convinced that war was unavoidable, Collins was concerned only with ensuring that it began in the most favourable circumstances for the Irish. However, in early 1919 this belief was confined to a small minority, because most republicans, let alone the population as a whole, neither desired nor expected a conflict. But manipulating a reluctant nation into war without a democratic mandate hardly troubled Collins, who only three years before had observed a revolutionary junta, ‘a minority within a minority within a minority’,39 brush aside the Volunteers’ President, the IRB’s Supreme Council and even the secret organisation’s own constitution in its unstoppable march towards rebellion. Collins had learned well from masters like Clarke and MacDermott, who had virtually written the manual on duplicity. Unlike the Military Council’s seven members, Collins began his road to war in a minority of one, though he was sustained by the same messianic determination and daring imagination. His strategy in 1919 was to first create a radical coalition – a war party – by winning over Volunteer GHQ and the Dublin Brigade, then create a war atmosphere by exploiting British Government mistakes and increasing popular frustration at political stagnation before bringing the crisis to a head through calculated acts of provocation.

Although in the first half of 1919 Collins was not yet strong enough to bring about open war, he strained to get at the police, the British Government’s first line of defence. Broy saw his impatience when they finally met a few days before Soloheadbeg, an encounter to which he arrived

very deeply intrigued to know who or what this man Collins was like. The moment I saw Michael at the door before he had time to walk across and shake hands, I knew he was the man. He was dressed in black leggings, green breeches and a trench coat with all the usual buttons, belts and rings. He was very handsome, obviously full of energy and with a mind quick as lightning.40

Their four-hour discussion left Broy elated at Collins’s scorn for compromise and his belief that the British were only stringing the Irish along in order to split Sinn Fein while preparing an all-out offensive. Broy thought ‘there was not a chance of getting anything from the British Parliament by constitutional means’ and ‘agreed entirely with Michael Collins that force was the only chance, however difficult and dangerous’.41 After describing a demoralised and ageing police force that was 2,000 men under strength, Broy recommended that Collins begin by driving the RIC from its smaller barracks and weakening its physical and psychological grip on the population. The uniformed DMP should be left alone because it was less politicised, and many nationalist officers with Volunteer relatives would remain passive as long as they were not attacked. Even most G-men were not on full-time political duty and could be persuaded to back off, while a ‘ruthless war was to be made on the hard core that remained’.42

But, in the shocked aftermath of Soloheadbeg, Collins could not risk assaulting G Division, and instead an uneasy coexistence between British and Irish authority limped along. This stand-off suited Lloyd George, who was immersed in domestic, international and imperial problems and confidently expected Sinn Fein to moderate its republican rhetoric eventually and adjust pragmatically to Britain’s overwhelming power. Until then he wanted Ireland kept quiet by French and the new Chief Secretary, Ian Macpherson, a Scottish Conservative who had arrived in January 1919. Sinn Fein, for its part, hoped that American pressure and the Paris Peace Conference would bring about international recognition of Irish independence. But once again provincial bit players refused to stick to the agreed script, and on 23 February Robinson’s turbulent 3rd Brigade ordered all British military and police forces out of South Tipperary. Seething at another flouting of his authority, Mulcahy ‘refused to sanction this proclamation, but the Brigade authorities went ahead, notwithstanding, and made it public. It was not the first time differences of opinion had arisen between GHQ and the South Tipperary Brigade, nor would it be the last.’43

By April 1919 events were moving in Collins’s favour. He had forged a new relationship with Dick McKee, an IRB member and revolutionary extremist whose reservations about Collins had been personal, not ideological. As GHQ Director of Training, McKee met Collins regularly, and their burgeoning political alliance was sealed when Collins invited him to supervise an important training camp for Cork Volunteer officers.44 Mulcahy regarded theirs as ‘one of the great companionships of our period. Linking as it did in the heart of Dublin the striking force of the Dublin Brigade and the information and striking force associated directly with Collins, the Collins–McKee companionship was the core of that aggressive defence which saved our political leadership, Dail and Government from complete destruction.’45

McKee’s role was pivotal because he made the Dublin Brigade’s resources available to Collins, who began attending Brigade Council meetings in February 1919. In addition, through McKee’s friendship with Mulcahy, Collins was able to cultivate a relationship with the Chief of Staff. A 26-year-old bachelor, McKee was already an iconic figure to the Dublin Volunteers: a tall, imposing natural leader whose languid exterior and soft beguiling drawl concealed a driven and ruthless personality. At Brigade headquarters McKee had assembled a like-minded inner circle typified by Mick McDonnell, the quartermaster of 2nd Battalion, a firebrand who was constantly baying for action. Early on he had ‘advocated the execution of those who were responsible for the identifying of the men executed in 1916 and who were at the same time watching us. This was at first turned down by Dick McKee, who felt that the people would not stand for this action at the time.’46 But McKee’s closest confidant was his future vice-brigadier, Peadar Clancy, who ran an outfitter’s shop in Talbot Street that doubled as a revolutionary drop-in centre. These inseparable friends had grown up, conspired, fought and been imprisoned together. Ultimately and violently, they would die together.

Like Collins, McKee thought war inevitable, an idea to which his rhetoric in An t-Oglac (the journal that he produced virtually single-handed) subtly conditioned ordinary Volunteers. Frank Henderson, McKee’s 2nd Battalion commandant, recalled that ‘Nobody exactly spoke as a rule of the coming fight but it was accepted that we were preparing for something which could hardly be anything else than an armed struggle.’47 McKee prepared by re-equipping his virtually weaponless Brigade with grenades bought or stolen from British soldiers or manufactured at an underground munitions factory in Parnell Street. A large raid at a British military aerodrome in March 1919 had also netted 75 rifles and 6,000 rounds of ammunition. McKee also made Dublin a sanctuary for displaced provincial revolutionaries like Breen and Treacy after they were hounded out of Tipperary in the autumn. He shielded them from Mulcahy in the capital, particularly as he knew Collins was planning to use these enthusiastic gunmen.

By April 1919 Collins still only imperfectly understood G Division’s structure and operating methods, and, when Broy offered him a surreptitious guided tour of its Brunswick Street headquarters, he could not resist. Broy was often on night duty, and shortly after midnight on 7 April he admitted Collins and Sean Nunan and escorted them upstairs to the political office. Built into a wall was a small, permanently darkened room containing all G Division’s records. It was an archive of failed Irish revolutions brimming with documents and photographs – a rogue’s gallery of spies, traitors, agents provocateurs and informers. Carrying candles and matches, Collins and Nunan approached like archaeologists entering a long-forbidden secret chamber and, no doubt, with the same hushed expectancy. After five hours reading and note taking, Collins emerged into the morning light a changed man whose questions had been answered, whose ideas had crystallised and who now knew what G-men knew – and did not know – about the republican movement. Having entered and toured his enemy’s mind, Collins was now in a position to create ‘his own G Division’48 – one that would emulate and finally outclass the original model.

In February 1919 Collins engineered de Valera’s escape from Lincoln Gaol and smuggled him back to Ireland, where he hid for a month until the British Government freed the remaining ‘German Plot’ detainees. At the same time Collins and others on the run resurfaced. Around April 1919, and probably to his own immense relief, Duggan was shunted aside as intelligence chief. When the Dail cabinet was reconstructed on 2 April, de Valera became President, Brugha switched to the Ministry of Defence and Collins became Minister of Finance. Mulcahy records him then also as definitely being GHQ Director of Intelligence, an apparently routine reshuffle that Brugha must have rubber-stamped without realising that he was vastly expanding Collins’s power and authority. Mulcahy claims Brugha ‘took no part in the discussion of any matters that could be regarded as purely staff or military matters. And that would almost refer even to the development of policy.’49 Instead Brugha continued working as a director of a firm of candle-makers and functioning as a part-time Minister of Defence.

Creating a proper Volunteer Intelligence Department would have daunted anyone less confident and resilient than Collins. He started with only a nucleus of police moles and IRB helpers and weighed down by a conviction that time was rapidly running out, that, once G Division had completed gathering intelligence on republicans, the British would destroy Dail Eireann, Sinn Fein and the Irish Volunteers. Collins believed the Irish nation faced a stark choice between the obliteration of its legitimately elected government and an Anglo-Irish War in which victory would be attainable through an effective Volunteer intelligence system. But building such an organisation would take months, whereas Collins’s immediate priority was destroying G Division. Just two days after secretly visiting Brunswick Street he began peeling off the division’s soft outer layer. Collins had McKee distribute detective lists to his Brigade Council, after which, according to Frank Henderson,

in all the Battalion areas these junior detectives were rounded up on the same night close to their homes or lodgings as they were returning from duty, taken down quiet laneways and beaten until they solemnly promised to take no further part in such treacherous work against their country’s efforts to regain freedom. They were told that if they did not keep their promise they would be shot but that they would not be prevented from doing detective work against criminals. This action had the desired result and drove in the outer ring of police spies.50

Broy saw one detective, Denis O’Brien, angrily remonstrating with Superintendent Purcell, who had accused him of not standing his ground. ‘He said: “I would like to know what anyone else would do in the same circumstances.” He said to some of us afterwards “They were damned decent men not to shoot me, and I am not doing any more against them”.’51 But some senior G-men were beyond intimidation. They included Detective Sergeant Hally, who fired shots at Volunteers raiding his Norfolk Road home on 9 April, and Detective Sergeants Daniel Hoey, John Barton and Patrick Smyth. Broy considered Smyth, an aggressive 48-year-old police veteran, ‘most dangerous and insidious when he laughed, and he laughed often’.52 Hoey retaliated on 9 May with a full-scale police and army raid of a civic reception at the Mansion House, from which Collins only narrowly escaped by slipping out through the back door and climbing a high wall.

* * *

By May 1919 Viceroy French was complaining angrily that ‘every day brings fresh proof of the underground actions of these Irish Volunteers which are nothing more or less than a regular constituted and organised Sinn Fein army’.53 But radical action needed the backing of Deputy Prime Minister Bonar Law, who was in charge during Lloyd George’s prolonged absence at the Paris Peace Conference. Law was the Conservative Party leader and a Canadian of Ulster extraction who had unswervingly supported Carson’s pre-war campaign against Home Rule. But when Chief Secretary Macpherson met him on 15 May and recommended suppressing Sinn Fein and the Volunteers, Law accepted instead Carson’s advice that this would kill off political life in Southern Ireland.54 He urged Dublin Castle to consider the idea of proclaiming Dail Eireann, and the Chief Secretary, a political cushion wearing the impress of whichever political superior had last sat upon him, returned to break the news to a disappointed French.55 But Law sensed that ‘a big decision’56 about Ireland was inevitable in the near future.

Soon afterwards French and Macpherson met Long, who was on a fact-finding mission to Ireland. He had found the population sullen, Sinn Fein well organised, and ‘more deliberate, coldblooded crime, than in any previous period’.57 The Viceroy claimed certain Dublin streets were mined to assassinate him, while Long himself needed the protection of five detectives and armed soldiers. As usual, Long blamed Dublin Castle, which, unless urgently reformed, would make any attempt to suppress Sinn Fein ‘suicidal’. ‘The moment Government attempted to give effect to the proclamation, the weapon would break in their hands and they would suffer – not the rebels.’58 Long believed the RIC’s Inspector-General, Sir Joseph Byrne, had lost his nerve and that some of his senior police officers were ‘either utterly incompetent or hopelessly worn out’.59 He recommended a complete overhaul, starting with Byrne’s replacement by a capable county inspector such as the Belfast Commissioner T.J. Smith. But, as this would take about three to four months, he persuaded French and Macpherson to wait until August or September before renewing their demands for radical political action. Once a reliable police system was in place, he maintained, ‘there will be very little difficulty in dealing with these troubles’.60

* * *

Collins’s decision to eliminate G Division’s hard core was endorsed by Chief of Staff Richard Mulcahy. This cautious bureaucrat had finally given up on a peaceful settlement after the Paris Peace Conference had rejected Irish independence and detectives had exerted pressure on republicans by raiding the homes of Volunteer and Sinn Fein activists. Mulcahy regarded this as deliberate British provocation, and was more concerned now with persuading the Irish people that they were being forced into fighting a justified defensive war against foreign aggression. By the middle of 1919 Mulcahy agreed with Collins that British preparations for a pre-emptive strike made decisive action by Volunteer GHQ imperative:

The authorities were apparently biding their time to have certain preparations made before the Dail was suppressed. The work of men like Smyth, Hoey and Barton and the G Division generally was being effectively snowballed to increase the information regarding the persons who were particularly active and important both on the political and the volunteer side. To have allowed it to develop any way effectively would have been disastrous. The initiative against the detectives was only begun just in time.61

Mulcahy’s crucial shift to the war party was accelerated by his increasing regard for Collins. The 33-year-old Chief of Staff was originally a post office engineer who had joined the IRB and the Irish Volunteers in Dublin before the war and whose coolness and tactics as Thomas Ashe’s second-in-command had really won the Battle of Ashbourne in 1916. Superficially the reserved, bookish Mulcahy had little in common with Collins, but both were products of the British civil service who brimmed with organising ability, and they complemented each other perfectly. Mulcahy was clearly enthralled by the slightly younger man and revelled in their almost symbiotic relationship of ‘the completest understanding and effective cooperation . . . I don’t think that I ever had occasion to discuss a problem with Collins for more than five minutes or to argue with Collins on any particular kind of line of thought.’62

Always happiest behind the scenes, Mulcahy became mentor, friend and an indulgent protector of Collins’s somewhat wayward genius, and by skilfully cultivating Mulcahy and McKee, Collins emerged as de facto Volunteer leader. By July 1919 this revolutionary troika – an unofficial Military Council – was ready to attack G Division. Collins’s strategy was a masterly combination of defence and aggression. On the one hand, by assassinating G-men he protected the Volunteers from enemy pressure and infiltration; on the other, he goaded the British authorities and police into retaliation and overreaction, encouraging nationalist Ireland to unite behind Sinn Fein. As the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 had demonstrated, national unity in every country depended on the conviction that it had been attacked and left with no choice but to defend itself.

Still, Collins’s decapitation of G Division was an extraordinarily daring policy, unauthorised by the Dail government and far ahead of mainstream republican thinking. It was something he had to conceal from almost all his colleagues and superiors. He was helped in this by Brugha’s distancing of himself from Volunteer GHQ, and de Valera’s departure from Ireland on an extended American tour on 1 June 1919. Just as in 1916, but in a different way, having an absentee Volunteer President enabled revolutionaries to bend the organisation to their will. Collins also shrouded his preparations in secrecy and distanced himself from any disastrous mistake by subcontracting the killings to McKee and Mick McDonnell. In mid-July 1919 they assembled a group of hand-picked Volunteers, but were surprised when a majority of the potential assassins blanched at their job description. Most who signed on, like Paddy Daly, Joe Leonard, Tom Keogh and Jim Slattery, were from McKee’s old and super-militant 2nd Battalion. Collins was taking a gamble in sending this embryonic squad into action only six months after Soloheadbeg, especially as this time deliberately killing a policeman could not be passed off as a tragic accident. As the first attack drew near, Broy saw Collins becoming ‘extremely anxious as to what effect the shooting of detectives would have on the Volunteers themselves and on the Sinn Fein movement generally, and how it would be taken by the public’.63