Edward III E-Book

W M Ormrod

• Herausgeber: The History Press
• Kategorie: Sachliteratur, Reportagen, Biografien
• Sprache: Englisch

Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2011

Beschreibung

The fifty-year reign of one of England's most charismatic leaders is assessed in this lucid and incisive work. W.M. Ormrod traces Edward's life from his birth, when the very future of the monarchy in England was under threat, to his death when he was regarded throughout Europe as the very model of an ideal monarch.

Leseprobe

EDWARD III

W.M. Ormrod

Cover Illustration: Edward III, from the east window of York Minster. © Dean and Chapter of York 2005

First published in 1990 This edition published in 2005

The History Press The Mill, Brimscombe Port Stroud, Gloucestershire, GL5 2QGwww.thehistorypress.co.uk

This ebook edition first published in 2011

All rights reserved © W.M. Ormrod, 1990, 2000, 2005, 2011

The right of W.M. Ormrod, to be identified as the Author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyrights, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

This ebook is copyright material and must not be copied, reproduced, transferred, distributed, leased, licensed or publicly performed or used in any way except as specifically permitted in writing by the publishers, as allowed under the terms and conditions under which it was purchased or as strictly permitted by applicable copyright law. Any unauthorised distribution or use of this text may be a direct infringement of the author’s and publisher’s rights, and those responsible may be liable in law accordingly.

EPUB ISBN 978 0 7524 6893 8MOBI ISBN 978 0 7524 6894 5

Original typesetting by The History Press

Contents

About the Author

Preface

Introduction

1 The Early Years: 1327–41

2 The Middle Years: 1341–60

3 The Later Years: 1360–77

4 The King

5 The Ministers

6 The Magnates

7 The Clergy

8 Provincial Society and the Gentry

9 Urban Society and the Merchants

Conclusion

Appendix 1

Appendix 2

Appendix 3

Appendix 4

Appendix 5

Notes for Further Reading

Abbreviations

Notes

Select Bibliography

About the Author

Mark Ormrod is Professor of Medieval History at the University of York. He is widely regarded as the world expert on Edward III. His other books include The Kings & Queens of England (‘Of the numerous books on the kings and queens of England, this is the best’ Alison Weir), Political Life in Medieval England, The Evolution of English Justice (co-author), The Black Death in England (co-editor), Time in the Medieval World (co-editor), and The Problem of Labour in Fourteenth Century England (co-editor). He lives in York.

Preface

This book was first published in 1990; the text as set out here is the same as that found in the 1990 edition and its 1993 paperback version (with minor corrections and stylistic changes), but the book has been redesigned and includes many new illustrations. I am grateful to Jonathan Reeve of Tempus for offering me the opportunity to reissue the work, and to Kate Adams and Anne Phipps for their assistance.

The 1990s was a fruitful decade for Edward III studies and much new material has become available for the study of the reign. That work, and my own continued interest in the subject, has led me to recast some of my thoughts on both the achievements and the shortcomings of the Edwardian regime: were I writing this book in 1999, it would undoubtedly be different. However, I also hold firm to my original thesis that the long period of domestic political stability during the middle decades of the fourteenth century cannot be accounted for merely in terms of successful foreign war and can only satisfactorily be explained by examining the nature and achievements of Edward’s government in England. While recent work (including my own) has tended to place much greater stress on the theme of justice than is evident in this study, I nevertheless remain convinced that the fiscal accomplishments of the mid-fourteenth century also represent the outcome of sound political management and effective administrative control.

There is still no definitive modern biography of Edward III: in spite of (or rather, perhaps, because of) the recent spate of specialised studies of the reign, it seems that the task becomes more, rather than less, challenging with the passing of time. This is inevitably a somewhat unmanageable reign, too long, too disparate, too eventful (as it were) for its own good. To write it from the perspective of 1327 is to acknowledge Edward III’s extraordinary transformation of a monarchy brought low by the personal and political ineptitude of his father into one of the most respected regimes in fourteenth-century Europe; yet to write it from the vantage point of 1377 is to emphasise the defects and weaknesses of the regime exposed to bitter public criticism in the Good Parliament and the Peasants’ Revolt. Above all, perhaps, Edward himself remains an enigma. Lacking the vividness of contemporary sources that open windows on the characters of a Henry II, a Henry V or a Henry VIII, we are left with mere fragments and constructions that are strong on the king’s attitude to fighting, less certain on his commitment to culture, decidedly shadowy on his personal vision of governance. It may be that new techniques in textual analysis may yet fill some of the holes in our understanding. In the meantime, however, the subject (both human and thematic) remains an abiding interest precisely because it is so uncertain and so fluid.

I have never liked the notion of intellectual monopolisation that lies behind the claim that Edward III is ‘my’ king; rather, I offer this book as representing something of ‘my’ personal interpretation of that king and of his reign. It is in the contrasts that emerge between this and other, less sympathetic, studies that we will begin to find if not the definitive Edward III then at least a new, more vivid and more dynamic picture of political life in fourteenth-century England.

Mark OrmrodNovember 1999

Introduction

…the Lord Edward, lately king of England, of his good will, and by the common counsel and consent of the prelates, earls, and barons, and other nobles, and all the community of the realm, has given up the government of the realm, and has granted and wishes that the government of the said realm should fall upon the Lord Edward, his eldest son and heir, and that he should reign and be crowned king…1

It was in these words, proclaimed in public places throughout the realm, that most of the inhabitants of England heard of the change of ruler effected in the winter of 1326–7. Few knew the details or understood the implications of this event. The abdication, or deposition, of Edward II was arranged by Queen Isabella and her lover Roger Mortimer during an extraordinary parliament held at Westminster in January 1327. The prelates and peers, knights and burgesses present at this meeting were closely in touch with events, as were some of the citizens of London, who put strong pressure on the assembly to deliver the realm from the ineptitude of the king. The people who knew most of all were the members of the deputation sent to Edward at Kenilworth to present the demands of his subjects that he renounce his title. Some of those who attended this meeting later told their stories, and the events were reported in the chronicles.2 It is doubtful, however, whether many were interested in the theoretical significance of the revolution which had taken place. Within the limits of legal memory no king had been deprived of his authority in this way. Edward II had simply lost the right to rule by his own blatant incapacity, and by allowing his henchmen the Despensers to exercise a quite arbitrary authority during the last years of his reign. Somehow (and the details are by no means clear) a satisfactory compromise was reached, by which the king was held to have given up the throne freely and to have bestowed it on his eldest son. Events in 1326–7 could therefore be conveniently interpreted as a simple speeding up of the natural succession. Those who best understood what had happened at Westminster and Kenilworth were precisely those in whose interests it was to draw a discreet veil over the proceedings. The majority of the new king’s subjects in the provinces were in any case more than content to know that a highly unpopular ruler had been removed, and to hope for better things from his successor.

Fifty years later, when Edward III died, the image of the monarchy was very different. Edward was to be remembered as a victorious and honourable king who had won respect abroad and popularity at home. A poem written several years after his death presented him as the minister of God, a scourge to his enemies, and a kind and just ruler to his people: one who indeed deserved the society of the angels.3 At the end of the fourteenth century the St Albans chronicler Thomas Walsingham wrote thus:

Without doubt this king had been among all the kings and princes of the world renowned, beneficent, merciful, and august; given the epithet ‘the Favoured One’ on account of the remarkable favour through which he distinguished himself. . . Certainly his fame spread so far abroad amongst foreign and remote nations that they considered themselves fortunate who were either subject to his lordship or were partly allied with him. Indeed, they did not believe that there could be any kingdom under the heavens which produced so noble, so high-minded, or so fortunate a king, or could in the future produce such another after his decease.4

Walsingham was not blind to Edward’s failings, and attributed the political problems of the 1370s directly to the old king’s moral depravity. But his eulogy left a lasting impression. Edward III was remembered as a great leader in the wars with France, a king who ‘brought back victory in triumphant glory from all encounters on land and sea’. He had ruled his kingdom ‘actively, wisely, and nobly’, showing due devotion to God, generosity to the great, and compassion to the weak.5 As the years passed, the failure of most of his successors to live up to such achievements gave further encouragement to the flourishing cult of Edward III. By the fifteenth century the most popular chronicle of the day, the Brut, claimed that this king had ‘passed and shone by virtue and grace, given to him from God, above all his predecessors that were noble men and worthy’.6 Edward III had become the very prototype of the successful king.

No modern reader could seriously accept all these compliments at face value. Since the nineteenth century, indeed, historians have become a good deal more circumspect about the supposed accomplishments of this king. Edward III is now often seen as a rather second-rate ruler, stubborn and selfish in his foreign ambitions, weak and yielding in his domestic policies. He lacked the forcefulness of Henry II, the statesmanship of Edward I, the charisma of Henry V, or the application of Henry VII. He was prepared to accept short-term compromises and to ignore the wider implications of his actions. Far from providing a model of successful kingship, Edward ultimately damaged the power of the monarchy and contributed to the political difficulties of his successors.7 The adulation of the chronicles has therefore given way to the critical judgements of the textbooks. But in their determination to destroy the myth of Edward III, historians may well have gone too far. To measure his achievements by the failures of later kings is to write history backwards, and to forget the formidable problems which Edward himself faced and overcame. The prestige of the English monarchy had never sunk so low as in 1327. Yet in the course of the next generation, Edward III successfully rebuilt public confidence in the crown. The result was one of the longest periods of political calm in the whole of the later Middle Ages.

That achievement was all the greater considering the number and variety of men that had to be accommodated in the new dispensation. The structure of politics had undergone a fundamental change since the thirteenth century as a result of the unprecedented and often outrageous pressures applied by the crown on its subjects. The disputes which had led to the issue of Magna Carta in 1215 and the subsequent attempt to reform royal government in 1258 were chiefly the concern of the barons, who in the name of the ‘community of the realm’ had sought to defend their own interests against the intrusions of King John and the inadequacies of Henry III. By 1259 the so-called ‘gentry’, the middling landholders in the shires, were also taking part in political debate, though for the next half-century they were usually content to work through the magnates.8 It was Edward I’s wars in Wales, Scotland and France that really transformed the structure of politics. From the 1290s representatives both of the shires and the towns were summoned to meet with the king and his great lords in parliament and authorize universal taxes to subsidize military expenditure. At the same time Edward began to impose extremely heavy charges on the English clergy, and to negotiate special taxes on overseas trade with native and foreign merchants. In return for such financial support, these groups naturally expected some recognition and respect. If the crown asked too much and gave too little in return, then it ran the risk of confrontation. Edward I’s bitter quarrel with Archbishop Winchelsey and his struggle with the barons in 1297 were a dramatic indication of the new forces at work in English politics.9 By 1300 the crown had obtruded itself on to the lives of its subjects in a manner unthinkable in the twelfth century. If Edward I’s successors were to continue with his policies, it was essential that they should also come to terms with the new political society that had grown up in response.

Edward II failed not only in this respect, but also in almost every other of the challenges left him by his father. His clash with the nobility indicated a complete disregard for the interests of any but a handful of his personal followers. In 1311, as in 1258, the great lords took it upon themselves to remove royal favourites and to force on the king ordinances for the better governance of the realm. Had Edward subsequently come to terms with the magnates, he might yet have re-established his credibility with the wider community. But the 1320s witnessed the complete breakdown of cooperation. In 1322 the king defeated and killed his cousin, Thomas of Lancaster, at the battle of Boroughbridge, and began to persecute all those who had supported the Ordinances of 1311. For a while, political society was left leaderless and powerless. Edward II’s deposition was really a palace revolution, the work of Isabella and Mortimer. But the delegation sent to Kenilworth to secure the king’s abdication included a complete cross-section of the community: bishops, monks and friars; earls, lords, barons of the Cinque Ports, provincial knights, Londoners, and possibly representatives from other lesser towns.10 Under exceptional circumstances it was found necessary to mobilize the whole realm against its common enemy, a perverse and grossly incapable king. The lessons for the future were plain enough. Any ruler who so obstinately refused the wise counsels of his great subjects and so consistently failed to provide good governance for the realm was not worthy to hold the title of king. This lesson was not lost on Edward’s successor.

It was in the reign of Edward III that the crown finally came to terms with the new political conditions which had emerged since the later thirteenth century. Realizing the dangers of perpetual conflict and the positive advantages to be gained from consensus, Edward III acknowledged the influence not only of the magnates but also of the other politically active classes – the clergy, the county landholders and the prosperous townsmen – and tried to win their active support for his domestic and foreign policies. It would obviously be a mistake to exaggerate this development. The process of reconciliation was gradual and often painful, and the compromise eventually struck in the middle years of the reign benefited only a small number of men. In many ways it was the nobles who continued to dominate politics and to dictate the fortunes of the crown. The great mass of the king’s subjects remained powerless, and were increasingly resentful of the way in which the ruling classes manipulated power for their own ends. Indeed, certain sections of the rural and urban population felt sufficiently betrayed by their betters to take the only form of political action open to them and launch the Peasants’ Revolt within four years of Edward’s death. Nevertheless, it is clear that by the mid-fourteenth century the ‘community of the realm’ incorporated a larger cross-section of the population than ever before.11 By the end of Edward III’s reign a new political society had emerged in England, one that was to remain substantially unaltered for the rest of the Middle Ages and beyond.

The principal purpose of this book is to examine that society and to explore the political implications of its relationship with the crown. But in order to appreciate these developments, it is first necessary to give a brief outline of Edward III’s long reign. The period divides itself naturally into three phases. The years until the parliamentary crisis of 1341 form a postlude to the reign of Edward II and indicate the formidable problems inherited by Edward III. The middle period from 1341 to 1360 was, by contrast, one of extraordinary good fortune, during which military success abroad and political harmony at home helped to re-establish the prestige and power of the monarchy. After the high point of the early 1360s, however, Edward’s last years witnessed the gradual disintegration of royal authority. Finally, diplomatic and military failures combined with domestic mismanagement to produce a serious political confrontation in the Good Parliament of 1376.

- 1 -

The Early Years 1327–41

The forcible removal of Edward II made an inauspicious start to the new reign. Edward III was a boy of fourteen when he was set prematurely on the throne of England. At his coronation, which took place just a few days after the publication of his succession, he was asked whether he would take the additional oath made by his father in 1308 to observe the just laws chosen by the community of the realm. He was reputedly told that if he did not so swear, he would not be crowned.1 Those who took part in the coronation, however, were well aware that the real political problem lay not with the young king but with Queen Isabella and Roger Mortimer. They had put Edward on the throne, and they clearly intended to control his government.2 In their rush to establish some form of legitimate and workable regime, the queen and her lover won the initiative. The parliament of February-March 1327 was preoccupied with efforts to undo the evils of the previous reign, securing the posthumous rehabilitation of Thomas of Lancaster, acknowledging the succession of Thomas’s brother Henry to most of the family titles, and guaranteeing an amnesty for those of Lancaster’s followers victimized by the Despensers.3 The assembly lacked the authority and missed the opportunity to dictate the form of a regency government, and merely asked that suitable wise men be chosen by the magnates to advise the king.4 A council of sorts was set up, led by Henry of Lancaster, and including some of the leading opponents of the Despenser regime such as the old king’s brothers, the Earls of Norfolk and Kent, and Bishops Stratford of Winchester and Orleton of Hereford.5 This was in no sense a regency council, however, for it enjoyed no executive power. It was Mortimer, through his intimacy with the queen and his influence over the boy king, who actually held the reins of government.

For a while, popular measures helped to disguise the self-seeking ambitions of Isabella and her paramour. The popular cult of Thomas of Lancaster, which had been repressed by Edward II, now received some degree of official support. In 1327 the commons actually demanded that the Ordinances of 1311, for which Lancaster had fought and lost his life, should be added to the list of great and solemn charters observed by the crown.6 Although the government balked at this idea, it did take up the commons’ proposals for the canonization of Lancaster and began to negotiate with the Curia for the making of a new St Thomas.7 The liberality of the new regime also won the queen some powerful allies. Sympathies for Edward II remained, especially in the Welsh Marches, where the Despenser stronghold of Caerphilly held out well into 1327. Even those who had welcomed the queen’s invasion in 1326 might be ambivalent unless rewarded for their support. Erstwhile servants of the Despensers were therefore left at their government posts; and important figures such as the new king’s uncles, who might have expected a greater share of power, were bought off with large grants of money and land. None the less, it was soon obvious who were the real beneficiaries of the coup. The queen and Mortimer helped themselves greedily to the large financial resources left by Edward II, and made free with the possessions of his followers. The Despenser estates in South Wales and the lands of Edward II’s partisan the Earl of Arundel in the northern march now fell under Mortimer’s control. Despite his formal acceptance of the revived Lancastrian inheritance, Mortimer also insisted on seizing Thomas of Lancaster’s former lordship of Denbigh. By snatching marcher lands from Edward II’s supporters and opponents alike, Mortimer consolidated an enormous block of territories on the Welsh borders.8 Before long, he was king in all but name. He held ostentatious tournaments, and married his daughters off to the heirs of the great earldoms of Norfolk and Pembroke. The climax came late in 1328 at the parliament of Salisbury, when Mortimer assumed the title of Earl of March. Within two years of the collapse of the Despensers, an overmighty marcher principality was once again threatening to upset the political balance. The political community braced itself for another confrontation.

The first opportunity for criticism came with the failure of Mortimer’s foreign policy. Edward II had been humiliated by the Scottish leader Robert Bruce at Bannockburn in 1314 and defeated by the French in Gascony during the war of St Sardos of 1323–5. Military or diplomatic victories were much needed in order to re-establish the political credibility of the crown. But Queen Isabella had already tarnished her reputation by working out a humiliating truce with her brother, Charles IV, in 1325. This had required the English king to pay £60,000 as a relief for his duchy of Gascony, and an additional 50,000 marks (£33,333 6s 8d) by way of a war indemnity. Moreover, in 1326 the French and Scottish kings had made a treaty at Corbeil, guaranteeing the integrity of their alliance irrespective of any English approaches to either side. The diplomatic and military situation was therefore unpromising in 1327. On the very night of Edward III’s coronation, a Scottish force crossed the northern border and laid siege to Norham Castle. When news reached the court of Bruce’s plan to launch a combined Irish, Welsh and Scottish attack against Edward, preparations for a campaign were immediately put in hand. But Mortimer proved less than adequate as a war leader. When the two armies eventually drew up at Stanhope Park near Durham in early August, the Scots were able to launch a surprise night attack on Edward III’s quarters and then withdrew before battle could be joined. The whole affair proved a fiasco, and an expensive one at that. All that was left of Edward II’s considerable financial reserve was now used up, and the government had to pawn the crown jewels to pay for the campaign. There was no alternative but to sue for peace. By the treaty of Northampton of 1328 the English renounced all claims to feudal suzerainty and to lands in Scotland. The queen and her lover salvaged some personal satisfaction from the treaty by securing the promise of £20,000 from the Scots, most of which found its way into their own treasuries. But for the young king, and for many of his subjects, the terms were an unmitigated disaster.

It was in the wake of the treaty of Northampton that the first signs of active opposition to Mortimer began to emerge.9 Although the treaty was presented to parliament in 1328 for ratification, a number of the barons, including the Earl of Lancaster, declined to give their assent. In the summer, Lancaster refused to support a projected campaign in Gascony; and later in the year he absented himself from the parliament of Salisbury, returning to his estates in the midlands with the intention of raising rebellion. He was joined by the Earls of Norfolk and Kent and by his son-in-law Sir Thomas Wake. In the event, the uprising was short-lived. The king’s uncles rapidly made peace with the court, and in January 1329 Lancaster was forced to surrender. He and most of his followers were treated leniently: their forfeited estates were restored and the fines imposed on them were pardoned. But Lancaster was now permanently alienated from the court. Others soon followed. Bishop Orleton, who had acted as treasurer for a short while after the deposition, had already fallen out with the queen and her lover by the end of 1328; and Bishop Stratford gave public support to Lancaster in 1328–9, firmly establishing himself as one of Mortimer’s bitterest enemies.10 Several of those implicated in Lancaster’s rebellion, including Henry Beaumont and Thomas Wake, were excepted from the general pardon and forced into exile on the continent, where they plotted Mortimer’s downfall. Those who remained in favour at court hoped that Mortimer’s magnanimous treatment of the rebels would revive public respect for the regime. But such expectations were dashed early in 1330, when the Earl of Kent was arrested and executed. There were rumours that Edward II was still alive, and Kent was charged with the highly unlikely crime of conspiring to put his brother back on the throne.11 The accusation of treason conjured up memories of the very worst moments of Despenser rule. The government’s arbitrary methods now made it plain that the whole revolution of 1326–7 had been redundant.

Mortimer’s influence in government depended entirely on his ability to dominate a puppet king, and for three years he did not miss a single opportunity to humiliate his young charge. Edward III’s father had intended that he should marry a French or Aragonese princess, but his mother had forced him into a hasty marriage with the young Philippa of Hainault in order to secure military backing for the invasion of 1326. Edward and his bride then found their precedence flouted by Isabella and her lover, who blocked Philippa’s coronation until February 1330 and consistently kept the king’s household short of cash. Mortimer quite obviously distrusted Edward from the very start, and set spies in the royal household to track his every move.12 By the summer of 1330 the king was seventeen years old and had just become a father to a healthy boy child. But his efforts to involve himself in government were getting nowhere. A letter to the Pope revealed that he was unable even to secure patronage for his clerical servants and followers.13 He could however depend on two close associates: Master Richard Bury, the keeper of the privy seal, who had served Edward since his earliest years; and William Montagu, the son of one of Edward II’s personal favourites, who had ingratiated himself with the new regime and won the confidence of the young king. With their connivance, Edward managed to inform the Pope that the only royal letters sent to Avignon which really reflected his personal wishes would be those bearing the words pater sancte (holy father) written in the king’s own hand. By such clandestine means did Edward serve out his apprenticeship as king and count the days to Mortimer’s downfall.

His chance finally came late in 1330. Mortimer was increasingly suspicious of Edward’s actions, and insisted on interrogating him and his followers before a great council at Nottingham in October. The king was infuriated at this insult to his title. In the company of Montagu and a small band of young men, he entered Nottingham Castle secretly on the night of 19 October, took the Earl of March unawares, and dragged him off to London to face trial and execution. The enormous earldom which Mortimer had created fell forfeit to the crown, and Edward eagerly carved it up to reward his own supporters. The events at Nottingham confirmed the popular opinion of the Earl of March as an unscrupulous usurper of the king’s rightful power. Few had mourned for Edward II; and although Queen Isabella probably shed more tears for her lover than for her husband, fewer still can have regretted the passing of Roger Mortimer.

On the morrow of the Nottingham coup Edward III issued a proclamation to be read by the sheriffs in public places throughout his realm.

. . . the king’s affairs and the affairs of his realm have been directed until now to the damage and dishonour of him and his realm and to the impoverishment of his people. . ., wherefore he has, of his own knowledge and will, caused certain persons to be arrested, to wit the earl of March [etc.], and he wills that all men shall know that he will henceforth govern his people according to right and reason, as befits his royal dignity, and that the affairs that concern him and the estate of his realm shall be directed by the common counsel of the magnates of his realm and in no other wise. . .14

These were fine words, by which Edward was able to deflect criticism from himself and lay the blame for the misrule of the previous three years firmly on the shoulders of his enemy, Mortimer. It was less easy to live up to such pious declarations of good intent. Historians have tended to see the assumption of personal rule by Edward III as the start of a new period in English politics, when the disagreements and factions of the previous twenty years gradually broke down. But the ineptitude of Edward II and the discord within the ruling elite had left a deep and lasting impression on political society. The fiscal demands of the government, combined with the famines of the early 1320s, had also left the economy, and especially the lower levels of the population, materially weakened.15 The king’s laws were flouted as bands of thugs set up local protection rackets and terrorized their neighbours with complete impunity.16 Edward III therefore had to do much more than win a few noble allies. He had to re-establish some respect for himself and some sense of order in the society over which he theoretically ruled. In the long term, he achieved these ends by diverting the latent hostilities within his realm towards a common external enemy. The wars against Scotland and France helped to unite the realm in a series of national military adventures. But this political transformation did not come about quickly or easily. The campaigns of the 1330s were costly and unproductive, and only temporarily disguised the serious divisions still remaining in political society – divisions which appeared again, and as wide as ever, in the crisis of 1340–I.

The single most important reason for the outbreak of the Hundred Years War was the long-standing dispute over the feudal status of Gascony. Since the treaty of Paris of 1259, the kings of England had been forced to acknowledge that they held this duchy as a fief of the French crown. The reluctance of both Edward I and Edward II to accept this personal and political subjugation had already provoked seizures of their French lands in I294 and I324. So from his earliest years, Edward III was conditioned to the idea of an Anglo-French struggle. He was also well aware of the many reasons for holding on to the English possessions in Gascony. The duchy was the last remnant of the once enormous Plantagenet empire that had sprawled across western France from the Channel to the Pyrenees. To withdraw without a fight would be to betray those Gascon lords such as the Captal de Buch and the Sire d’Albret whose families had given long and honourable service to their English rulers. Gascony was also rich: in 1324 it was said to yield £13,000 a year for the crown,17 and it was the source of most of the wine consumed in fourteenth-century England. Finally, any losses on the continent would inevitably produce criticism at home. Edward II’s failure to defend his possessions in France, Scotland and Ireland was cited as one of the principal reasons for his deposition in 1327.18 The interplay of long-standing points of feudal principle with more pragmatic concerns made it inevitable that Edward III would one day have to defend his titles and lands in France by force of arms.

In the early I330s, however, the king could hardly afford to take an aggressive stance towards the French. It was Scotland which occupied most of his energy and time during these years. Robert Bruce had died in 1329, leaving the throne to his infant son, David II. This inevitably reopened the longstanding dispute over the Scottish succession, and encouraged the English king to give public support to his own preferred candidate, Edward Balliol. It also offered an opportunity to placate a group of powerful English lords, led by Henry Beaumont, who had been deprived of their possessions in the Lowlands in I328 and been alienated from the regime of Mortimer and Isabella. 19 When these northern magnates defeated the Scots at Dupplin Moor in 1332, Edward III agreed to give his official backing to the new Scottish pretender. He moved his administrative resources to York, won control of Berwick, and launched a long campaign which culminated in a battle at Halidon Hill on I9 July I333 . Employing the mixed formation of archers and dismounted men-at-arms later to be used to such good effect against the French, Edward won a great victory. David Bruce was forced into exile, and Balliol seized his throne. Edward pushed a hard bargain with his new royal ally, gaining full sovereign control over eight Lowland shires and securing the homage of Balliol at Newcastle upon Tyne in June I334.

The English king therefore had every reason to consider his first Scottish adventure a resounding success. Unfortunately, he had reckoned without the strength of the Franco-Scottish alliance. He had already been forced to make diplomatic compromises with the new French king, Philip VI. Indeed, in I33I he had actually declared himself willing to perform liege homage for the duchy of Gascony and had made an incognito trip across the Channel to discuss his continental possessions and a possible marriage alliance with France. 20 But the deposition of David II inevitably changed the situation. In the spring of I334 Philip VI took David into his protection and announced that the Scottish succession must be included on the agenda in any future Anglo-French talks. Every warlike move made by Edward III towards Scotland now brought his country one step closer to open hostility with France. The king and his advisers were acutely aware of this danger, and were anxious not to go to war until they were adequately prepared. Wiser and more modest men might indeed have left Scotland to its own devices. But the English intervention there had become a matter of personal pride for Edward III. For a brief while an enormous show of military strength in the summer of 1335 gave Balliol some semblance of authority and allowed the English king to hold control of the Lowland shires. But from 1334 there were frequent threats of French reprisals, and in August and September I335 it was rumoured that a great armada amassed by Philip VI was about to attack the south coast of England. Edward was forced to deflect attention and resources away from the north, and the Scottish war rapidly settled into an uneasy series of border raids from which neither side secured much advantage.

Philip VI’s public support for the Bruce family partly reflected his growing frustration over the question of Gascony. Despite their overtures of peace in 1331, the English showed no sign of capitulating in the protracted talks over the Agenais, the land between the Dordogne and the Garonne which had been ceded to the French after the war of St Sardos of 1323–5 but was now being claimed as a part of the duchy of Gascony by Edward’s negotiators.21 By the end of 1335, with things going badly in the north, Edward was briefly prepared to respond to papal requests for an Anglo-French settlement, and later in 1338 he patched up a truce with Scotland. But in 1336 the signs of impending war with France were plain enough. When Philip VI moved his fleet from the Mediterranean to the Norman ports in the summer of that year, he was not only abandoning the crusading project to which both he and Edward had earlier given dilatory support,22 but was also making a clear declaration of hostile intent. Both the Scottish war and the French negotiations had foundered. It was time for a larger and more decisive confrontation between Edward and the Valois king.

On 24 May 1337 Philip VI formally confiscated the duchy of Aquitaine and the county of Ponthieu. It was claimed that Edward III, who owed liege homage for those lands, had broken his feudal bond by giving sanctuary and aid to Robert of Artois, the cousin, brother-in-law and mortal enemy of the French king. In the normal course of events, this would have been followed by a brief show of English military strength in northern France and Gascony and a diplomatic compromise allowing Edward to repossess his lands on condition that he acknowledge the suzerainty of Philip VI. What made the dispute so different after I337 was the decision of Edward III to break free of the subordinate status imposed on him by the treaty of Paris. Through his mother, Edward was the grandson of Philip IV of France and the nephew of the last Capetian king, Charles IV. When Charles had died without a direct male heir in I328, some attempt had been made to forward Edward’s claim to the French throne. But the comparative weakness of his case, depending on descent through the female line, and the acute problems of his own kingdom meant that the claim had been ignored, and the crown had passed to Charles IV’s cousin, Philip VI. It was almost inevitable, then, that Edward would respond to his opponent’s hostility by reasserting his own title to the French throne. He came very close to making a public declaration of that claim in 1337, and in 1340 he formally assumed the title ‘King of England and France’.23 The dual monarchy which was to cause so many diplomatic and military problems for Edward’s successors had thus come into being.

Whether Edward III had any intention of making this title a reality is, of course, quite another matter. The claim was useful primarily because it allowed him to escape his feudal obligations and assert full sovereign control over the English lands in France. It was also a clever publicity stunt designed to attract allies. In the initial stages of the war Edward relied much on promises of assistance from the princes of the Netherlands. Flanders also fell under his influence when the pro-French count was forced into exile and the cloth-producing towns sought to maintain their trade links with England. He even won the support of the Emperor Louis IV, who in I338 created Edward his imperial vicar-general and gave him extensive authority over Germany and the Low Countries. For a while, indeed, it seemed that most of north-western Europe was falling within Edward’s grasp. His formal assumption of the French royal title in I340, representing a characteristic mixture of personal vanity and political opportunism, was the inevitable climax to this diplomatic success story. But the inconsistencies and inadequacies of military policy in I337–40 speak more of Edward’s aims than do any empty titles. There was virtually nothing in the first phase of hostilities that could possibly justify the pretentious claims of the English king.

The early years of the French war were later to be remembered chiefly for the naval victory at Sluys in 1340. But contemporaries saw the war in different terms. The two factors that conditioned English politics in this period were the enormous fiscal pressures applied on the country to subsidize the war, and the king’s almost complete failure to justify his huge expenditure with any military or diplomatic gains. The Scottish war had already witnessed a considerable outlay of manpower and money, and after 1336 the scale of such demands increased considerably.24 In 1337 a great council was induced to grant three successive fifteenths and tenths, each estimated at just over £38,000, and the clergy were cajoled into granting three tenths valued at about £19,000 each (see Appendix 1–2). This was only the start of an extraordinary bout of public taxation. Successive impositions on wool exports raised the customs duties to new and unprecedented levels. In 1337 the king attempted to make a compulsory seizure of 30,000 sacks of English wool; and when this plan collapsed in 1338, a great council was persuaded to grant the remaining 17,500 sacks as a tax. Finally, in 1340 the king was allowed to take every ninth lamb, wool-fleece and sheaf of corn produced from the year’s crop. The total value of the money and the agricultural produce collected towards these various taxes and forced loans was well over £500,000. The only previous occasion on which royal taxation had approached these levels was during Edward I’s French war of 1294–8, when the crown raised something in excess of £450,000 from a comparable series of levies. There is every indication that other wartime exactions also reached unprecedented peaks in the late 1330s. Undoubtedly the most controversial and oppressive of these was purveyance, the compulsory purchase of foodstuffs for the king’s troops at prices which, if paid at all, were usually well below the market value. Coinciding as they did with a period of economic recession, these various fiscal burdens were bound to create real hardship and widespread resentment among Edward III’s English subjects.

What really provoked criticism, however, was the king’s failure to make productive use of such resources. Although Edward left for the continent in the summer of 1338, he spent his whole time in the Low Countries, and the promised offensive into northern France had still not been attempted when he returned home to plead for more funds in March 1340. Such inactivity was highly unpopular, and after the initial euphoria of 1337 a substantial section of the English population quickly became disillusioned by the war effort. Much of the protest literature of this period concentrated on the iniquities of royal taxation and the corruption of the king’s agents. Official and unofficial sources alike stated that the country was ripe for revolt by 1340, and attached the blame for this situation to the wilful and obstinate king.25 Many politically active men felt that Edward III was abrogating his true responsibilities by pursuing reckless ambitions abroad and ignoring the tribulations of his subjects at home. Parliaments and convocations were more or less obliged by the state of war to respond to the king’s requests for supplies; but this did not prevent such assemblies from making heart-felt pleas for the alleviation of onerous taxes and outright condemnations of the king’s domestic and foreign policies.

If any sense of common purpose had been created after the fall of Edward II and the demise of Roger Mortimer, it was therefore wearing very thin by the late 1330s. The crisis of 1340–1 was to make it clear that the king had done little to resolve the political problems inherited from earlier regimes. Even the appearance of stability in the government was deceptive. 26 Bishop Stratford took over as chancellor after the Nottingham coup, and he and his family dominated the civil service for the next decade. But their ascendancy did not go unchallenged. In 1334–5 Stratford, now Archbishop of Canterbury, was temporarily replaced as chancellor by the royal confidant Richard Bury, who had recently been made Bishop of Durham. In 1338, before leaving for France in the company of the archbishop, Edward likewise removed Stratford’s brother Robert from the chancellorship and put in Richard Bentworth, the new Bishop of London and an influential member of the royal household. These reshuffles suggest that the king was somewhat suspicious of the older generation of political bishops and entertained hopes of creating his own following in the civil service. But his efforts were too erratic to have much effect. In his preoccupation with warfare, Edward was content to leave the more mundane aspects of administration to others. The potential threat posed by this arrangement was to become acutely obvious when a rift developed between Edward and his chief ministers in 1340–1.

A similar lack of positive action characterized the king’s treatment of the nobility during the early 1330s. Edward III’s generosity towards the victims of earlier regimes is well known.27 One of his first actions on assuming power in 1330, for instance, was to secure the restoration of Richard Fitzalan to the earldom of Arundel. What has not been sufficiently recognized is Edward’s tendency to create political factions among the nobility by promoting a small group of personal friends. Indeed, the royal clique of the 1330s was almost as exclusive as those which had dominated the court of Edward II. The principal beneficiary of the new regime was undoubtedly William Montagu, who remained the chief influence behind the throne from Mortimer’s downfall in 1330 until his own death in 1344. His faithful service in the Scottish campaigns won him many honours, culminating in the title of Earl of Salisbury in 1337. After 1335, admittedly, Edward III attempted to spread his patronage more widely. He revived the lapsed earldoms of Devon and Pembroke, and he cultivated the support of his Lancastrian cousins by bestowing on Henry of Grosmont the title of Earl of Derby. This was one of six earldoms created in March 1337 in an obvious attempt to strengthen the baronial ranks on the eve of a major war.28 But although Henry of Grosmont and the new Earl of Northampton, William Bohun, were drawn from the greatest noble houses, there was still a worrying tendency to promote relatively humble men purely because of their intimacy with the king. One such was William Clinton, an obscure household knight, who now received the earldom of Huntingdon and, like Montagu, secured a generous allowance worthy of his new dignity. On the eve of the French war, then, Edward’s relations with the nobility were still uncertain. Much would depend on his ability to unite the baronage in support of his great offensive against France.

In the event, the opening stages of the Hundred Years War proved not only a military disappointment but also a political disaster. In July 1338 when Edward embarked for the continent, he left behind a regency council staffed by the Earls of Arundel and Huntingdon, and Lord Neville. A series of instructions, the so-called Walton Ordinances, set out the administrative procedures to be used during Edward’s absence. 29 These Ordinances were quite straightforward, and caused no conflict at the time. They were simply intended, like similar orders issued during the Scottish campaign of 1333,30 to establish the primacy of the war over all other administrative and political concerns. Problems only emerged when the king began to make totally unreasonable financial demands on the home government. In September 1339 Edward tried to resolve his differences with the regency council by granting it greater initiative and sending home Archbishop Stratford to take charge of the administration.31 But in practice this simply meant that military policy became the exclusive preserve of the Earl of Salisbury and a number of other household officials including William Kilsby, keeper of the privy seal, and the steward, John Darcy. Back in England, Stratford found that his new authority was no solution to the basic problem of war finance. The requests made to parliament in 1339–40 for more supplies received grudging responses, and the commons refused to concede a tax until they had referred back to their constituencies. The king returned home to press his case, and his presence in the parliament of March–April 1340 was sufficient to secure the grant of the ninth. In return, however, Edward was forced to make royal tax collectors accountable to parliament, and to grant legislation which restricted the worst abuses of his purveyors and reserved the ninth solely for the costs of war.32 The king returned to the continent resentful of such serious concessions but hopeful that the new tax would solve his financial problems and allow the war to continue.

Such confidence proved ill-founded. The crown issued assignments totalling approximately £100,000 on the income from the ninth, but by January 1341 this tax had yielded only about £15,000.33 Edward was now effectively bankrupt, and had little hope of securing more money from his beleaguered subjects. With the failure of the siege of Tournai, he was forced into an ignominious truce at Esplechin in September. The king’s refusal to respond to the advice of his ministers and barons had left him in an untenable position. The regency council reappointed in 1340 was led by Stratford and Huntingdon and included the Earls of Lancaster and Surrey and the northern lords, Percy, Wake and Neville. They were joined after July by Arundel and Gloucester. Warwick, Derby and Northampton had already given themselves up as hostages for the king’s debts in the Low Countries.34 A significant number of the earls and great barons were therefore removed from the war, and were becoming increasingly annoyed by the actions of Salisbury and his associates. Edward now conceived the notion that Stratford had poisoned the minds of the lords, and wrote in hysterical terms to the Pope of the archbishop’s deceptions and treachery. Taking ship from Sluys, the king landed unannounced at the watergate of the Tower of London early on the morning of 1 December.35 In scenes reminiscent of the Nottingham coup, he dismissed the chancellor and treasurer, arrested five of the royal judges, imprisoned several prominent financiers, and even seized one member of the regency council, Sir Thomas Wake. As in 1330, a spontaneous decision carried through in secret by the king and a small band of followers had given Edward the opportunity to wreak vengeance on his enemies. But whereas the arrests at Nottingham had been a welcome relief from the rule of Mortimer, the dismissals of 1340 served merely to intensify political divisions, and provoked a major political crisis.

As soon as Edward appeared back in the capital, Stratford retired to Canterbury. He remained there through the winter months of 1340–1, refusing summonses to the court and writing vitriolic letters of protest to the king. On 29 December, the feast of St Thomas the Martyr, he preached a sermon in the cathedral declaring his intention to stand as a worthy successor to Becket.36 A public war of words ensued. Edward accused Stratford of advocating extravagant policies and failing to supply funds, making the king the scorn of his enemies both at home and abroad. The archbishop indicated several times that he would only answer such charges before the king, prelates and peers in parliament. When parliament met in Westminster Palace at the end of April 1341, however, Edward set his henchmen John Darcy and Ralph Stafford at the door of the Painted Chamber and stubbornly refused to allow Stratford access for over a week. The king attempted to carry on as normal, and asked the assembly to authorize a second instalment of the ninth. Such a demand was hardly designed to appease the already outraged assembly. Finally, the Earl of Surrey declared his contempt for Edward’s actions:

Sir king, how goes this parliament? Parliaments were not wont to be like this. For here those who should be foremost are shut out, while there sit other men of low rank who have no business to be here. Such right belongs only to the peers of the land. Sir king, think of this.37

Finding that Surrey’s appeal was supported by Arundel and other members of the regency council, Edward had no option but to admit the archbishop and make his peace with him. The events of the previous months had struck a tender nerve among the lords, who now declared that none of their rank should be arrested, tried or imprisoned except in full parliament and before his peers. The commons also seized the opportunity to voice their grievances. They combined with the lords to demand a detailed public audit of the king’s finances, and requested that the great officers of the realm should be appointed by the king in parliament and be sworn therein to obey the law. Edward had no choice but to give his hasty, if qualified, assent to all these demands, and solemn legislation was duly composed and written up on the statute roll.38 Stratford’s opposition had left Edward dangerously isolated and soundly defeated.

The crisis of 1340–1 was a serious blow to the crown, and evoked uneasy memories of earlier political confrontations. Historians have often pointed out the parallels between the legislation of 1340–1 and the aims of the baronial ordainers of 1311. The connections are not surprising given Stratford’s earlier involvement in the opposition to Edward II. Moreover, the circumstances in 1311 and 1341 were in many ways very similar. On both occasions the king had shown himself unwilling to accept the advice of his great men, and had followed evil counsels which brought shame on the throne and danger to the realm. In some respects, indeed, the opposition of 1341 was even more ominous. Although Edward II’s misrule had touched the lives of many and produced widespread disaffection, the only effective challenge to his policies had been mounted by a baronial elite. During the Despenser regime when the magnates had been cowed into submission, the commons had tried to maintain the pressure for reform, but had been unable to make any real headway.39 By 1340–1, however, the pressures of war had given each section of the community, from the greatest nobleman to the humblest peasant, ample grounds for complaint against the monarchy. The hostility shown by the commons and clergy in 1340, and mobilized by Stratford and the lords in the crisis of 1341, had become a conditioning force in English politics. Edward III’s disregard for the welfare and rights of his subjects had produced a powerful coalition of disaffected parties drawing strength and inspiration from their support in the country. If the dynastic upheavals of 1326–30 and the military pressures of 1337–40 had altered political conditions in England, it looked very much as though the balance would weigh increasingly heavily against the crown.

- 2 -

The Middle Years 1341–60

The parliamentary crisis of 1341 had been a severe blow to Edward III, and for a short while it put a stop to his controversial foreign policies. Yet in the months and years that followed, the king staged one of the most remarkable political recoveries ever witnessed in medieval England.1 On 1 October 1341 Edward announced that he had annulled the statute passed earlier that year on the grounds that it was contrary to the law of the realm and had been forced on him against his will. He was using a prerogative exercised by several of his predecessors, and most recently by Edward II in 1322: namely, the right to dispense with any legislation which the king believed to have compromised his authority. Even if concerted resistance continued, there was very little that the political community could do to challenge this principle. The renunciation of the statute demonstrated vividly that the medieval monarchy almost always had right on its side.

It also exposed the weaknesses in the political opposition. Edward quickly dismantled the temporary coalition that had gathered under Stratford’s leadership. He showed no sign of restoring the archbishop or his followers to their positions in the government departments, and for the moment filled the offices of state with laymen who would be answerable for their actions before the royal courts. He also won over a sufficient number of the magnates to be able to claim that he had renounced the statute with their consent. Within weeks of this declaration, Stratford acknowledged his political isolation and made his final peace with the king. Two years elapsed before another parliament met in April 1343, and this assembly formally accepted the abolition of the earlier legislation. Although the commons expressed their annoyance at the king’s actions, they could achieve little without the support of the great lay and ecclesiastical lords. The remaining opposition to the crown had therefore lost its effective bargaining position. In the decade that followed, the commons too were eventually won over to a working compromise with the crown. The scale of Edward’s achievement in the middle years of his reign has not always been fully appreciated, because it has often been felt that he merely sought popularity at the expense of power. But such arguments give little consideration either to the seriousness of the conflicts that had divided political society for three decades before 1341 or to the enduring qualities of the new dispensation, which prevented any further confrontation for another generation. The period from the Stratford crisis to the treaty of Brétigny of 1360 witnessed one of the greatest royal success stories of the later Middle Ages.

The single most important reason for Edward’s political recovery after 1341 was the lucky change in his military fortunes. At first, the situation looked depressing. The allies in the Low Countries fell away and Edward was deprived of his imperial vicariate. The return of David Bruce to Scotland in 1341 meant a renewal of cross-border raids, and forced the English king to undertake a northern campaign in the winter of 1341–2. But in 1341 new and more promising prospects emerged in France when the duchy of Brittany fell vacant. Edward decided to support the claim of John de Montfort against the French-backed Charles of Blois in the Breton war of succession. Thus emerged his so-called ‘provincial strategy’,2 a technique already attempted in Flanders and soon to be extended into many other areas of France. The idea was simple, but effective. The English king sought to intervene in private disputes between the Valois and their feudal vassals, thus creating new allies, challenging Philip VI’s rights as suzerain, and dissipating French military resources. Edward’s claim to the throne of France was an essential part of this strategy, since it could be used to create alternative feudal relationships with the dukes and counts. Indeed, it was not long before the military situation encouraged Edward to believe that his somewhat empty dynastic claim might one day become a reality.