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- Herausgeber: Linkgua
- Kategorie: Geisteswissenschaft
- Serie: Tought
- Sprache: Englisch
- Veröffentlichungsjahr: 2022
Perhaps this book will be understood only by someone who has himself already had the thoughts that are expressed in it—or at least similar thoughts.—So it is not a textbook.—Its purpose would be achieved if it gave pleasure to one person who read and understood it. The book deals with the problems of philosophy, and shows, I believe, that the reason why these problems are posed is that the logic of our language is mis- understood. The whole sense of the book might be summed up the following words: what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence. Thus the aim of the book is to draw a limit to thought, or rather—not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts: for in order to be able to draw a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e. we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought). It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn, and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense. I do not wish to judge how far my efforts coincide with those of other philosophers. Indeed, what I have written here makes no claim to novelty in detail, and the reason why I give no sources is that it is a matter of indifference to me whether the thoughts that I have had have been anticipated by someone else. I will only mention that I am indebted to Frege's great works and to the writings of my friend Mr. Bertrand Russell for much of the stimulation of my thoughts. If this work has any value, it consists in two things: the first is that thoughts are expressed in it, and on this score the better the thoughts are expressed—the more the nail has been hit on the head—the greater will be its value.—Here I am conscious of having fallen a long way short of what is possible. Simply because my powers are too slight for the accomplishment of the task.—May others come and do it better. On the other hand the truth of the thoughts that are here communicated seems to me unassailable and definitive. I therefore believe myself to have found, on all essential points, the final solution of the problems. And if I am not mistaken in this belief, then the second thing in which the of this work consists is that it shows how little is achieved when these problems are solved. L.W. Vienna, 1918
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Ludwig Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
Barcelona 2023
linkgua-digital.com
Credits
Original title: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
© 2023, Red ediciones.
Original English translation by Frank P. Ramsey and C.K. Ogden.
e-mail: [email protected]
ISBN hardcover: 978-84-1126-215-6.
ISBN paperback: 978-84-9953-876-1.
ISBN ebook: 978-84-9953-875-4.
Any form of reproduction, distribution, communication to the public or transformation of this work may only be performed with authorisation from its copyright holders, unless exempt by law.
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Table of content
Credits 4
TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS 23
1. The world is all that is the case. 25
1.1 25
1.11 25
1.12 25
1.13 25
1.2 25
1.21 25
2. What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs. 25
2.01 25
2.011 25
2.012 25
2.0121 26
2.0122 26
2.0123 26
2.01231 26
2.0124 26
2.013 26
2.0131 27
2.014 27
2.0141 27
2.02 27
2.0201 27
2.021 27
2.0211 27
2.0212 27
2.022 27
2.023 28
2.0231 28
2.0232 28
2.0233 28
2.02331 28
2.024 28
2.025 28
2.0251 28
2.026 29
2.027 29
2.0271 29
2.0272 29
2.03 29
2.031 29
2.032 29
2.033 29
2.034 29
2.04 29
2.05 30
2.06 30
2.061 30
2.062 30
2.063 30
2.1 30
2.11 30
2.12 30
2.13 30
2.131 30
2.14 31
2.141 31
2.15 31
2.151 31
2.1511 31
2.1512 31
2.15121 31
2.1514 31
2.1515 32
2.16 32
2.161 32
2.17 32
2.171 32
2.172 32
2.173 32
2.174 32
2.18 33
2.181 33
2.182 33
2.19 33
2.2 33
2.201 33
2.202 33
2.203 33
2.22 33
2.221 34
2.222 34
2.223 34
2.224 34
2.225 34
3. A logical picture of facts is a thought. 34
3.001 34
3.01 34
3.02 34
3.03 34
3.031 35
3.032 35
3.0321 35
3.04 35
3.05 35
3.1 35
3.11 35
3.12 36
3.13 36
3.14 36
3.141 36
3.142 36
3.143 36
3.1431 36
3.1432 37
3.144 37
3.2 37
3.201 37
3.202 37
3.203 37
3.21 37
3.221 37
3.23 37
3.24 38
3.25 38
3.261 38
3.262 38
3.263 38
3.3 38
3.31 39
3.311 39
3.312 39
3.313 39
3.314 39
3.315 39
3.316 40
3.317 40
3.318 40
3.32 40
3.321 40
3.322 40
3.323 41
3.324 41
3.325 41
3.326 41
3.327 41
3.328 42
3.33 42
3.331 42
3.332 42
3.333 42
3.334 42
3.34 43
3.341 43
3.3411 43
3.342 43
3.3421 43
3.343 43
3.344 44
3.3441 44
3.3442 44
3.4 44
3.41 44
3.411 44
3.42 44
3.5 45
4. A thought is a proposition with a sense. 45
4.001 45
4.022 45
4.003 45
4.0031 45
4.01 46
4.011 46
4.012 46
4.013 46
4.014 46
4.0141 46
4.015 47
4.016 47
4.02 47
4.021 47
4.022 47
4.023 47
4.024 48
4.025 48
4.026 48
4.027 48
4.03 48
4.031 48
4.0311 49
4.0312 49
4.032 49
4.04 49
4.041 49
4.0411 49
4.0412 50
4.05 50
4.06 50
4.061 50
4.062 50
4.0621 50
4.063 51
4.064 51
4.0641 51
4.1 52
4.11 52
4.111 52
4.112 52
4.1121 52
4.1122 52
4.113 52
4.114 53
4.115 53
4.116 53
4.12 53
4.121 53
4.1211 53
4.1212 53
4.1213 54
4.122 54
4.1221 54
4.123 54
4.124 54
4.1241 55
4.125 55
4.1251 55
4.1252 55
4.126 55
4.127 56
4.1271 56
4.1272 56
4.12721 56
4.1273 57
4.1274 57
4.128 57
4.2 57
4.21 57
4.211 57
4.22 58
4.221 58
4.2211 58
4.23 58
4.24 58
4.241 58
4.242 59
4.243 59
4.25 59
4.26 59
4.28 59
4.3 59
4.31 60
4.4 60
4.41 60
4.411 60
4.42 60
4.43 61
4.431 61
4.44 61
4.441 61
4.442 61
4.45 62
4.46 62
4.461 62
4.46211 63
4.462 63
4.463 63
4.464 63
4.465 63
4.466 64
4.4661 64
4.5 64
4.51 64
4.52 65
4.53 65
5. A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions. 65
5.01 65
5.02 65
5.1 65
5.101 66
5.11 67
5.12 67
5.121 67
5.122 67
5.123 67
5.124 67
5.1241 68
5.13 68
5.131 68
5.1311 68
5.132 68
5.133 69
5.134 69
5.135 69
5.136 69
5.1361 69
5.1362 69
5.1363 69
5.14 69
5.141 70
5.142 70
5.143 70
5.15 70
5.151 70
5.101 70
5.1511 70
5.152 70
5.153 71
5.154 71
5.155 71
5.156 71
5.2 72
5.21 72
5.22 72
5.23 72
5.231 72
5.232 72
5.233 72
5.234 72
5.2341 73
5.24 73
5.241 73
5.242 73
5.25 73
5.251 73
5.252 73
5.2521 74
5.2522 74
5.2523 74
5.253 74
5.254 74
5.3 74
5.31 75
5.32 75
5.4 75
5.41 75
5.42 75
5.43 76
5.44 76
5.441 76
5.442 76
5.45 76
5.451 77
5.452 77
5.453 77
5.454 77
5.4541 78
5.46 78
5.461 78
5.4611 78
5.47 78
5.471 79
5.4711 79
5.472 79
5.473 79
5.4731 79
5.4732 79
5.47321 79
5.4733 80
5.474 80
5.475 80
5.476 80
5.5 80
5.501 80
5.502 81
5.503 81
5.51 81
5.511 81
5.512 81
5.513 82
5.514 82
5.515 82
5.5151 82
5.52 83
5.521 83
5.522 83
5.523 83
5.524 83
5.525 83
5.526 84
5.5261 84
5.5262 84
5.53 84
5.5301 84
5.5302 85
5.5303 85
5.531 85
5.532 85
5.533 85
5.534 85
5.535 85
5.5351 86
5.5352 86
5.54 86
5.541 86
5.542 87
5.5421 87
5.5422 87
5.5423 87
5.55 88
5.551 88
5.552 88
5.5521 89
5.553 89
5.554 89
5.5541 89
5.5542 89
5.555 89
5.556 90
5.5561 90
5.5562 90
5.5563 90
5.557 90
5.5571 90
5.6 90
5.61 91
5.62 91
5.621 91
5.63 91
5.631 91
5.632 91
5.633 92
5.6331 92
5.634 92
5.64 92
5.641 92
6. The general form of a truth-function is [p, E, N(E)]. This is the general form of a proposition. 93
6.001 93
6.002 93
6.01 93
6.02 93
6.021 93
6.022 93
6.03 94
6.031 94
6.1 94
6.11 94
6.111 94
6.112 94
6.113 94
6.12 95
6.1201 95
6.1202 95
6.1203 95
6.121 97
6.122 97
6.1221 97
6.1222 98
6.1223 98
6.1224 98
6.123 98
6.1231 98
6.1232 98
6.1233 99
6.124 99
6.125 99
6.1251 99
6.126 99
6.1261 100
6.1262 100
6.1263 100
6.1264 100
6.1265 100
6.127 100
6.1271 101
6.13 101
6.2 101
6.21 101
6.211 101
6.22 101
6.23 101
6.231 102
6.232 102
6.2321 102
6.2322 102
6.2323 102
6.233 102
6.2331 103
6.234 103
6.2341 103
6.24 103
6.241 103
6.3 103
6.31 103
6.32 104
6.321 104
6.3211 104
6.33 104
6.34 104
6.341 104
6.342 105
6.343 105
6.3431 105
6.3432 106
6.35 106
6.36 106
6.361 106
6.3611 106
6.36111 107
6.362 107
6.363 107
6.3631 107
6.36311 107
6.37 108
6.371 108
6.372 108
6.373 108
6.374 108
6.375 108
6.3751 108
6.4 109
6.41 109
6.42 109
6.421 109
6.422 109
6.423 110
6.43 110
6.431 110
6.4311 110
6.4312 110
6.432 111
6.4321 111
6.44 111
6.45 111
6.5 111
6.51 111
6.52 111
6.521 111
6.522 112
6.53 112
6.54 112
7. What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence. 112
Map of the Tractatus 112
TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS
By Ludwig Wittgenstein
Perhaps this book will be understood only by someone who has himself already had the thoughts that are expressed in it—or at least similar thoughts.—So it is not a textbook.—Its purpose would be achieved if it gave pleasure to one person who read and understood it.
The book deals with the problems of philosophy, and shows, I believe, that the reason why these problems are posed is that the logic of our language is misunderstood. The whole sense of the book might be summed up the following words: what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence.
Thus the aim of the book is to draw a limit to thought, or rather—not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts: for in order to be able to draw a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e. we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought).
It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn, and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense.
I do not wish to judge how far my efforts coincide with those of other philosophers. Indeed, what I have written here makes no claim to novelty in detail, and the reason why I give no sources is that it is a matter of indifference to me whether the thoughts that I have had have been anticipated by someone else.
I will only mention that I am indebted to Frege’s great works and to the writings of my friend Mr. Bertrand Russell for much of the stimulation of my thoughts.
If this work has any value, it consists in two things: the first is that thoughts are expressed in it, and on this score the better the thoughts are expressed—the more the nail has been hit on the head—the greater will be its value.—Here I am conscious of having fallen a long way short of what is possible. Simply because my powers are too slight for the accomplishment of the task.—May others come and do it better.
On the other hand the truth of the thoughts that are here communicated seems to me unassailable and definitive. I therefore believe myself to have found, on all essential points, the final solution of the problems. And if I am not mistaken in this belief, then the second thing in which the of this work consists is that it shows how little is achieved when these problems are solved.
L.W. Vienna, 1918
1. The world is all that is the case.
1.1
The world is the totality of facts, not of things.
1.11
The world is determined by the facts, and by their being all the facts.
1.12
For the totality of facts determines what is the case, and also whatever is not the case.
1.13
The facts in logical space are the world.
1.2
The world divides into facts.
1.21
Each item can be the case or not the case while everything else remains the same.
2. What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs.
2.01
A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things).
2.011
It is essential to things that they should be possible constituents of states of affairs.
2.012
In logic nothing is accidental: if a thing can occur in a state of affairs, the possibility of the state of affairs must be written into the thing itself.
2.0121
It would seem to be a sort of accident, if it turned out that a situation would fit a thing that could already exist entirely on its own. If things can occur in states of affairs, this possibility must be in them from the beginning. (Nothing in the province of logic can be merely possible. Logic deals with every possibility and all possibilities are its facts.) Just as we are quite unable to imagine spatial objects outside space or temporal objects outside time, so too there is no object that we can imagine excluded from the possibility of combining with others. If I can imagine objects combined in states of affairs, I cannot imagine them excluded from the possibility of such combinations.
2.0122
Things are independent in so far as they can occur in all possible situations, but this form of independence is a form of connexion with states of affairs, a form of dependence. (It is impossible for words to appear in two different roles: by themselves, and in propositions.)
2.0123
If I know an object I also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs. (Every one of these possibilities must be part of the nature of the object.) A new possibility cannot be discovered later.
2.01231
If I am to know an object, thought I need not know its external properties, I must know all its internal properties.
2.0124
If all objects are given, then at the same time all possible states of affairs are also given.
2.013
Each thing is, as it were, in a space of possible states of affairs. This space I can imagine empty, but I cannot imagine the thing without the space.
2.0131
A spatial object must be situated in infinite space. (A spatial point is an argument-place.) A speck in the visual field, thought it need not be red, must have some colour: it is, so to speak, surrounded by colour-space. Notes must have some pitch, objects of the sense of touch some degree of hardness, and so on.
2.014
Objects contain the possibility of all situations.
2.0141
The possibility of its occurring in states of affairs is the form of an object.
2.02
Objects are simple.
2.0201
Every statement about complexes can be resolved into a statement about their constituents and into the propositions that describe the complexes completely.
2.021
Objects make up the substance of the world. That is why they cannot be composite.
2.0211
If they world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would depend on whether another proposition was true.
2.0212
In that case we could not sketch any picture of the world (true or false).
2.022
It is obvious that an imagined world, however difference it may be from the real one, must have something—a form—in common with it.
2.023
Objects are just what constitute this unalterable form.
2.0231
The substance of the world can only determine a form, and not any material properties. For it is only by means of propositions that material properties are represented-only by the configuration of objects that they are produced.
2.0232
In a manner of speaking, objects are colourless.
2.0233
If two objects have the same logical form, the only distinction between them, apart from their external properties, is that they are different.
2.02331
Either a thing has properties that nothing else has, in which case we can immediately use a description to distinguish it from the others and refer to it; or, on the other hand, there are several things that have the whole set of their properties in common, in which case it is quite impossible to indicate one of them. For it there is nothing to distinguish a thing, I cannot distinguish it, since otherwise it would be distinguished after all.
2.024
The substance is what subsists independently of what is the case.
2.025
It is form and content.
2.0251
Space, time, colour (being coloured) are forms of objects.
2.026
There must be objects, if the world is to have unalterable form.
2.027
Objects, the unalterable, and the subsistent are one and the same.
2.0271
Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what is changing and unstable.
2.0272
The configuration of objects produces states of affairs.
2.03
In a state of affairs objects fit into one another like the links of a chain.
2.031
In a state of affairs objects stand in a determinate relation to one another.
2.032
The determinate way in which objects are connected in a state of affairs is the structure of the state of affairs.
2.033
Form is the possibility of structure.
2.034
The structure of a fact consists of the structures of states of affairs.
2.04
The totality of existing states of affairs is the world.
2.05
The totality of existing states of affairs also determines which states of affairs do not exist.
2.06
The existence and non-existence of states of affairs is reality. (We call the existence of states of affairs a positive fact, and their non-existence a negative fact.)
2.061
States of affairs are independent of one another.
