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T Though today he is hailed as one of Britain's greatest leaders, throughout his career, Winston Churchill was an outsider, accumulating a reputation for bad judgement and untrustworthiness. Only risk-takers and fellow outsiders would back him – but these strong and often feuding personalities proved to be vital to his decision-making in war and peace alike. Winston's Bandits provides, for the first time, a detailed account of his greatest friendships. These friends were Max Aitken, Lord Beaverbrook, a press baron who craved power but only on his own terms; Frederick Lindemann, later Lord Cherwell, an ascetic and quarrelsome scientist who believed in Churchill's intellectual genius; Brendan Bracken, an Irishman from a humble background who reinvented himself as a major force in financial publishing and gave Churchill unconditional support; the young Bob Boothby, who would earn notoriety for adventurous sexual conduct and dubious financial dealings; Randolph Churchill, who was often a disappointment and burden to his father; and Duncan Sandys, who reaped the full benefits of being Churchill's son-in-law in his political career. Together, they were Winston's bandits. This remarkable book explores how Churchill's relationships with these forceful and intriguing sparring partners provide the key to understanding his greatest triumphs and disasters.
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“Winston Churchill had a rare capacity for friendship, and Adrian Phillips has unerringly homed in on the close friends who helped him achieve victory in the Second World War. In this well-researched, closely argued and occasionally revisionist book, Phillips goes beyond most conventional accounts by forensically focusing on the relationships between the friends, too, and especially their feuds. This work is an important addition to the Churchillian canon.”
Andrew Roberts, author of Churchill: Walking with Destiny
“A magnificent new account of Churchill told through the lens of his closest friends.”
Helen Fry, author of Women in Intelligence
“Adrian Phillips provides fascinating new material about Churchill’s strange bunch of outside advisers and how they took on Britain’s inner establishment.”
David Lough, author of No More Champagne: Churchill and His Moneyii
“This is a valuable book, well written and a pleasure to read.It sheds light on aspects of Winston Churchill’s career that are overlooked by those who see him simply as the man who delivered victory in 1945.
Adrian Phillips knows what many historians, dazzled by the myth, fail to see: Churchill was always vulnerable, right up to the end of the war. He was mistrusted by much of his party and disliked by the establishment. In these circumstances, he depended on the clutch of supporters, some of them slightly dodgy and unreliable but all, like him, mavericks, whom Hugh Dalton described as Churchill’s ‘camarilla’.
Phillips concentrates on their role to give a new and important perspective on Churchill’s erratic political career and brings the disparate elements into a cohesive narrative, thematic as much as chronological.
This is a novel approach, a revealing one and one which is far from uncritical. But still it is clear that whatever may be said against him, Churchill remains a very great man – indeed, perhaps all the more so for being revealed in three dimensions.”
Walter Reid, author of Fighting Retreat: Churchill and India
“A well-researched and lively foray into the curious cast of colourful characters spanning Churchill’s remarkable career. Phillips’s enjoyable account of friendship, feuds and Whitehall machinations helps us see Churchill in a new light.”
Professor Rory Cormac, University of Nottingham iii
“A fascinating insight into an unfamiliar facet of Churchill’s character. Adrian Phillips has written an important book.”
Adrian Tinniswood, author of Noble Ambitions
“Adrian Phillips’s new book examines Churchill through his circle of friends – some of them members of the so-called Order of the Bath, who enjoyed the doubtful privilege of conferring with their master in his tub. For the grandson of a duke, Winston’s coterie was anything but predictable: none of its members was drawn from school or army friends but rather formed of a motley crew, some of whom were rewarded with high office during the Second World War. It included the Canadian newspaper tycoon Lord Beaverbrook, the Irish fantasist Brendan Bracken, the half-German boffin Frederick Lindemann, Churchill’s son-in-law Duncan Sandys and, for a while at least, his hapless son Randolph. Phillips brings this world to life with considerable panache.”
Giles MacDonogh, author of After the Reich
“A fast-paced, masterfully written tale of fascinating political intrigue and cunning activity woven by Churchill’s ‘bathroom group’ of confidants, who helped shape the course and outcome of the Second World War. In particular, the behind-the-scenes roles of businessman Brendan Bracken and scientist Frederick Lindemann are highlighted, along with other leading characters such as press baron Lord Beaverbrook, politician Duncan Sandys and Churchill’s son Randolph.”
Mungo Melvin, author of Manstein: Hitler’s Greatest General iv
“Adrian Phillips offers a riveting analysis of an area of Churchill’s life that, until now, has not received enough scholarly attention: the great friendships, personal and political, that sustained him through the towering highs and infamous lows of the 1930s and ’40s.”
Ed Owens, author of After Elizabeth: Can the Monarchy Save Itself?
“In Winston’s Bandits, Adrian Phillips achieves no small feat, drawing our attention to a blank page in the otherwise well-thumbed tome that is the life of Sir Winston Churchill: his friendships. Churchill gathered his courtiers based on a complex interplay of privilege, political ambition and professional respect – but, above all, character. Weaker leaders have leaned on sycophants; Churchill was enhanced by surrounding himself with those confident in speaking truth to power. This would have national, if not international, implications once Churchill entered No. 10 in May 1940 and positioned his ‘bandits’ at the heart of power during Britain’s darkest hour. Ruthless towards those who fell from favour and magnanimous towards former enemies, Churchill remains the most human of our great historical figures. Phillips expertly navigates the bonds of loyalty as well as the infighting and ambitions that shaped the court of Churchill.”
Jenny Grant, historian of Polish–British relations in the Second World War
“An absorbing and illuminating account of the loyal and unpredictable mavericks of Winston Churchill’s inner circle. Drawing on new material, Adrian Phillips sheds much-needed light on an important aspect of Churchill’s story: friendship.”
Claire Hubbard-Hall, author of The Real Miss Moneypenny: The ForgottenWomen of British Intelligence
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Churchill and His Maverick Friends
ADRIAN PHILLIPS
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For Sheila
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‘My own relationship with Churchill is of negligible importance, except insofar as it sheds a light on his character.’
Bob Boothby, 1976
This section aims to provide sufficient information to situate individuals within the narrative of the book. It makes no attempt to provide a balanced assessment of their careers and, still less, an exhaustive list of their titles, honours and decorations. The titles and ranks used in the text are those held at the periods in which they are discussed. Readers seeking fuller information are directed to the relevant entries in the OxfordDictionaryofNationalBiographyand WhoWasWho, respectively.
Conservative MP and passionate imperialist. At Harrow School with Churchill, who once threw him into the swimming pool. Out of office through the 1930s but was not deeply engaged over India or appeasement. Made devastating contribution to the Norway debate in May 1940 when he used Cromwell’s words on Chamberlain, ‘Depart, I say, and let us have done with you. In the name of God, go.’ India office minister outside Cabinet in Churchill government.
Civil servant turned MP and minister. Governor of Bengal 1932–37. Joined Chamberlain government. Lord Privy Seal, 1938–39; Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security, 1939–40; Lord President of the Council, 1940–43; Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1943–45. Highly influential in domestic policy. xiv
Labour politician. Leader of the Opposition, 1935–40; Lord Privy Seal, 1940–42; Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 1942–43; Lord President of the Council, 1943–45; Deputy Prime Minister, 1942–45; Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury, 1945–51. Led the Labour Party into the National government under Churchill and then into its landslide victory in the 1945 general election.
Conservative politician. Financial Secretary to the Treasury, 1917–21; President of the Board of Trade, 1921–22; Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1922–23; Prime Minister, 1923–24, 1924–29 and 1935–37; Lord Privy Seal, 1932–34 (de facto Deputy Prime Minister); leader of the Conservative Party 1923–37. The dominant inter-war politician. Accused Beaverbrook of seeking ‘power without responsibility; the prerogative of the harlot’ when he tried to impose his empire free trade policy on the Conservative Party in opposition.
Financier, press proprietor and politician. Minister of Information, 1918; newspaper titles included DailyExpressand LondonEveningStandard; Minister for Aircraft Production, 1940–41; Minister of State, 1941; Minister of Supply, 1941–42; Lord Privy Seal, September 1943–July 1945. Personal friend of Churchill but favoured appeasement.
Trade union leader and Labour politician. Minister of Labour and National Service 1940–45. One of the dominant figures in the Labour Party, rival to Herbert Morrison.
Scientist. Professor of physics, Birkbeck College, 1933–37; Langworthy Professor of physics, University of Manchester, 1937–53. Nobel Prize for Physics, 1948. From 1935, was a member of Tizard’s air defence committee. xvScientist RAF Coastal Command from March 1941 and then the Admiralty from January 1942 to the summer of 1945. Advised on anti-U-boat warfare and argued for its importance. Lindemann preferred using air resources to attack German cities and frowned on Blackett’s left-wing politics.
Anglo-Canadian politician and industrialist. Leader of the Conservative Party, 1911–21; Prime Minister, 1922–23. Closely allied to Beaverbrook.
MP East Aberdeenshire, 1924–58; parliamentary private secretary to Churchill as Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1926–29; Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Food, 1940–41; military service as RAF staff officer; a British delegate to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, 1949–57.
Press publisher and Conservative politician. MP North Paddington, 1929–45; MP Bournemouth, November 1945–February 1950; MP East Bournemouth and Christchurch, 1950–51; parliamentary private secretary to the Prime Minister, 1940–41; Minister of Information, 1941–45; First Lord of the Admiralty, 1945; director of Eyre & Spottiswoode Ltd; chairman of FinancialNews; managing director of Economist; chairman of Union Corporation.
Cabinet Secretary 1938–46; Permanent Secretary to Treasury and head of the civil service 1945–56.
Industrialist. Industrial adviser to Bank of England 1930–38; chairman of the Society of British Aircraft Constructors, 1938–43. Trusted by Chamberlain and Wilson to run the programme of air rearmament, he was accordingly influential.xvi
Journalist and public servant. Editorial staff, EveningStandard, 1929–37; Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, 1939–40; Deputy Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office; director-general of Political Warfare Executive, 1941–45. Knew Beaverbrook well from working for him as a journalist and worked closely with Bracken as Minister of Information.
Conservative politician. Under-Secretary of State, India Office, 1932–37, where he fought Churchill over the India Bill; Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Labour, 1937–38; Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1938–41, where he presented the policy of appeasement, which he supported vigorously, to the House of Commons; Minister of Education, 1941–45. Recognised the importance of progressive policies for post-war Britain.
Permanent Secretary to Foreign Office, 1938–46.
Conservative MP for King’s Norton, Birmingham. Opposed appeasement and killed in action age thirty-three. Brother of the romantic novelist Barbara Cartland.
Conservative politician. Half-brother of Neville Chamberlain. Financial Secretary to Treasury, 1900–02; Postmaster General, 1902–03; Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1903–06; Secretary of State for India, 1915–17; resigned, 1917; Member of the War Cabinet, April 1918; Chancellor of the Exchequer, January 1919–21; Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons, 1921–22; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, November 1924–June 1929; negotiated Locarno Pact for which he was awarded Nobel Peace Prize and Knighthood of the xviiGarter; First Lord of the Admiralty in National government August–October 1931.
Conservative politician. Chancellor of the Exchequer 1931–37; Prime Minister, 1937–40; Lord President of the Council, 1940. Attempted to bring peace to Europe through a policy of positive engagement with Hitler and Mussolini, usually known as appeasement, but was also convinced of the need to rearm.
Conservative MP. Parliamentary private secretary to Rab Butler, 1938–41. Strong supporter of appeasement. Socialite and diarist.
Married Churchill in 1908
Married Randolph Churchill in 1939, divorced in 1946. Married Averell Harriman in 1971.
Journalist and author. MP for Preston, 1940–45.
Politician. Secretary of State for War and Secretary of State for Air (posts held simultaneously), 1919–21; backbench MP 1929–39. Fell out with the National government over its policy of granting limited autonomy to India. Recognised the danger of Hitler earlier than most and campaigned for rearmament, especially in the air.
Junior personal secretary to Chamberlain, 1939–40, then to Churchill, 1940–41, 1943–45; served RAF 1941–44.xviii
Conservative MP. First Lord of the Admiralty, 1937–38; resigned in protest at Munich agreement; Minister of Information, 1940–41
Socialist politician and barrister. Opposed rearmament and expelled by Labour Party in 1939 for advocating ‘united front’ with the Communist Party. Ambassador to the USSR, 1940–42, where it was believed that his credentials as an extreme left-winger would be well received, but they were not and he gradually adopted a more realistic approach to Stalin; Lord Privy Seal and Leader of House of Commons, 1942; failed to reach agreement on autonomy with Indian leaders; Minister of Aircraft Production, 1942–45.
Director of ballistic research, Woolwich, 1919–39; chief superintendent, projectile development, 1939–40; director and controller of projectile development, 1940–45. Key ally of Lindemann and Churchill in promoting anti-aircraft rockets.
Labour politician. MP for Bishop Auckland, 1929–31 and 1935–59. One of the first Labour leaders to accept rearmament. Minister of Economic Warfare, 1940–42; President of the Board of Trade, 1942–45.
Conservative politician. Parliamentary private secretary to Baldwin; President of the Board of Trade, 1921–22; parliamentary private secretary to Bonar Law, 1922–23; Chancellor, Duchy of Lancaster, xix1923–24; Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty, November 1924–27; chairman of the Unionist Party, 1927–30; Chancellor, Duchy of Lancaster, 1931–37; hon. adviser, commercial relations, 1940; and controller of production, Ministry of Information, 1941. Baldwin’s close confidant.
Editor of TheTimes, 1912–19, 1923–41. Tried to advise government during the 1936 abdication crisis, but his influence is often exaggerated. Important support of Chamberlain’s appeasement policy.
RAF officer. Rose to command a wing of the Royal Flying Corps. Air officer commanding Fighting Area, Air Defence of Great Britain, 1929; Air Member for Supply and Research, 1930; Air Member for Research and Development, 1935; air officer commanding-in-chief, Fighter Command, 1936–40. Devised and implemented integrated air defence system which made full use of technology such as radar. Despised by the leadership of the RAF who believed that only bombing could protect against bombing.
Conservative MP. Parliamentary private secretary to Chamberlain, 1936–40; Prime Minister, 1963–64 (as Sir Alec Douglas-Home).
Conservative politician. Foreign Secretary, 1935–38; resigned after being bypassed by Chamberlain in pursuit of appeasement policy; Foreign Secretary again, 1940–45; Leader of the House of Commons, 1942–45; de facto Deputy Prime Minister.
Journalist. FinancialNewsand TheBanker.xx
RAF officer. Chief of Air Staff, 1933–37; Inspector General RAF, 1937–40. Opposed rearmament because he believed the danger of Nazi Germany was exaggerated and feared diluting the quality of the RAF. Opposed national radar system because he felt it offered bad value.
Civil servant. Head of the civil service/Permanent Secretary to Treasury, 1919–39. One of the dominant Whitehall figures between the wars.
RAF officer. Air Member for Research and Development, 1936; Air Member for Development and Production, 1938; transferred with his department to the Ministry of Aircraft Production, where he resisted Beaverbrook’s policies until he returned to the RAF as Vice-Chief of Air Staff in November 1940; Chief Executive, Ministry of Aircraft Production, 1942–45. Clearly understood the industrial and technological dimension to air warfare.
Conservative politician. Foreign Secretary, 1938–40.
Administrator. Secretary to Committee for Imperial Defence, 1912–38; Secretary to the Cabinet, 1917–38; member of War Cabinet as Lord Hankey, 1939–42. Dominant figure in the military establishment and Whitehall between the wars.
US businessman and close associate of Franklin Roosevelt, who sent him to Britain, Egypt and the USSR as a special envoy. Lover and much later husband of Pamela Churchill (née Digby), then married to Randolph Churchill.xxi
RAF officer. Group captain and deputy director of plans on Air Staff, 1934–37. Highly influential despite comparatively junior rank. Air officer commanding-in-chief Bomber Command, 1942–45, where he advocated for a policy of bombing German cities to the exclusion of other forms of air warfare.
Economist. Student of Christ Church, Oxford, 1924–67, where he was a friend of Lindemann. Served on Churchill’s private statistical staff in Admiralty, 1940, and in Prime Minister’s office, full-time, 1940–42, and subsequently in advisory capacity; also statistical adviser to Admiralty, 1943–45.
Conservative politician and Territorial Army officer; assistant government whip, 1938–40; lieutenant colonel commanding 31st Battalion RE TA, 1938–41; promoted to brigadier to command 6th Anti-Aircraft Brigade, 1941; parliamentary private secretary to Churchill, July 1941–July 1945. Unabashed at Churchill’s change of allegiance, Harvie-Watt was an efficient and loyal assistant but never part of Churchill’s inner circle.
Politician. Secretary of State for Air, 1922–24 and November 1924–June 1929; with seat in Cabinet, 1923–24, 1924–29 and (briefly) 1940; Secretary of State for India, 1931–35, when he oversaw the tortuous passage through Parliament of the India Act in the teeth of opposition of Churchill and ‘diehards’. Enthusiastic supporter of Trenchard during his second term as Chief of Air Staff.
National Liberal MP. War Secretary 1937–40. Continued to entertain hopes of high office and remained an MP until he lost his seat in the 1945 election.xxii
Soldier and administrator. Took over the military side of Hankey’s functions in 1938. Deputy secretary, Committee of Imperial Defence, 1936–38, and secretary, 1938; chief of staff to Minister of Defence (Winston Churchill), 1940–45; deputy secretary (military) to War Cabinet, 1940–45. Smoothed Churchill’s often fraught relationship with service chiefs. A key figure in the wartime administration.
Scientist and intelligence officer. Worked in the Clarendon Laboratory, Oxford, with Lindemann, under whose auspices he went on to work on air defence problems before being attached to the Secret Intelligence Service in 1939 to work on German technology. Deeply involved in British attempts to understand the V-weapons.
Economist and public servant. Contributed much to the debate on post-war economic arrangements, notably to prevent recurrence of mass unemployment. Negotiated financial package with the US which created the International Monetary Fund.
Film producer. City contact of Bracken. Helped the Churchill family in their media careers.
Scientist and politician. Experimental pilot and researcher in the Royal Flying Corps in the First World War. Fellow of Wadham College, 1919, and professor of experimental philosophy, Oxford; student of Christ Church from 1921; headed Churchill’s Statistical Section, 1939-1945; Paymaster General, 1942–45 and 1951–53; again professor of experimental philosophy, Oxford, 1953–56. Note on Lindemann: After he was made a peer in 1941, Lindemann was generally known as Cherwell after his title, but as the narrative moves back and forth xxiiibetween both periods, he has been referred to as Lindemann throughout for the sake of clarity. His usual and widespread nickname ‘Prof’ is also used.
Conservative politician. Harrow School. Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Home Office, 1935–39; Secretary for Mines, 1939–40; Secretary for Petroleum, 1940–42; chairman of Oil Control Board, 1939–45; Minister in charge of Petroleum Warfare Department, 1940–45; Parliamentary Secretary (Petroleum), Ministry of Fuel and Power, 1942–45; Minister of Information, 1945. Likely candidate for a promotion favoured by Churchill but not by Bracken, who told Churchill that he only preferred him because he had gone to ‘that old Borstal of yours’.
Conservative politician. Governor of Bombay, 1918–23; MP Eastbourne, 1924–25; made peer in 1925; High Commissioner for Egypt and Sudan, 1925–29; Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1940–41. Along with Churchill, the most high-profile politician to support the campaign against the India Act.
Liberal politician. Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1908–15, where he worked closely with Churchill on social legislation; Minister of Munitions, 1915–16; Secretary of State for War, 1916; Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury, 1916–22. Deposed as Prime Minister by Carlton House coup led by Bonar Law and Baldwin but continued to hold great ambitions. Persistent critic of successive governments. Ambiguous attitude to Hitler; suspected of ambitions to lead a British surrender government in 1940.
Politician. Secretary of State for Air, 1931–35. Supported Ellington. xxivReplaced by Swinton to bring urgency to rearmament and became enthusiastic appeaser. Cousin of Churchill.
Leading political cartoonist of the 1930s. Drew for Beaverbrook’s Evening Standard. Criticised both governments and Churchill’s India campaign. Beaverbrook claimed – improbably – to exercise no control over his work.
RAF officer. Air officer commanding-in-chief, Bomber Command, 1937; Inspector General RAF, 1940.
Businessman and later politician. Managing director of the British Metal Corporation; controller of non-ferrous metals, 1939–40; Conservative MP, 1940–54; President of the Board of Trade, 1940–41; Minister of State in Cairo and member of the War Cabinet, 1941–42; Minister of War Production and member of the War Cabinet, 1942–45. City contact of Bracken and technocrat minister. Gave political direction to the war effort in the Middle East.
Labour politician. Prime Minister, 1924 and 1929–35.
Conservative politician. Opponent of appeasement. His wife Dorothy had a long and agonised affair with Boothby. Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Supply, 1940–42, where he encouraged Beaverbrook’s ambitions.
Soviet ambassador to London, 1932–43.xxv
Conservative MP and Chief Whip, 1931–40. One of the most formidable whips ever; savagely punished dissidents from Chamberlain’s appeasement policies. Transferred his allegiance to Churchill, for whom he was Secretary of State for War, 1940–42.
Attorney General to Prince of Wales, 1932–36; Attorney General to the Duchy of Cornwall, 1936–47. Liaised between King (later Duke of Windsor) and government. Director-general of the Press and Censorship Bureau, 1939–40; subsequently director-general of Ministry of Information Affairs, 1940, 1940–41; director-general of British Propaganda and Information Services Cairo, 1941–42.
Labour politician. Minister of Supply, 1940; Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security, 1940–45; member of the War Cabinet, 1942–45. Rival of Ernest Bevin.
Intelligence officer. Director of Industrial Intelligence Centre, 1929–39, where he fed Churchill with data on German rearmament; principal assistant secretary, Ministry of Economic Warfare, 1939; personal assistant to Prime Minister on intelligence matters, 1940–46.
RAF officer. Rose to command Independent Air Force in the First World War, awarded CB and Albert Medal; air officer commanding RAF Middle East, 1931; Air Member for Supply and Organisation, 1935; Chief of Air Staff, 1937–40; Governor General of New Zealand, 1941–46. Removed as Chief of Air Staff in putsch organised by Beaverbrook, Trenchard and Salmond.xxvi
National Labour MP so theoretically a government supporter but opposed to appeasement. Parliamentary Secretary to Ministry of Information, 1940–41; governor of the BBC, 1941–46.
Industrialist. Founder and owner of Morris motor company and other enterprises. Picked by Kingsley Wood to manage Spitfire shadow factory at Castle Bromwich and the RAF Civilian Repair Organisation. Removed from both missions by Beaverbrook.
RAF officer. Air Member for Personnel on the Air Council, 1939–40; Air officer commanding-in-chief Bomber Command, 1940; Chief of the Air Staff, 1940–45.
Public servant. First general manager of the BBC, 1922, then managing director, 1923, and director-general, 1927–38; chairman of Imperial Airways, 1938–39; first chairman of British Overseas Airways Corporation, 1939–40; Minister of Information, 1940; Minister of Transport, 1940; first Minister of Works, 1940–42, leading to Ministry of Works and Planning; lieutenant-commander, Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (RNVR), Coastal Forces, 1942; extra naval assistant to 3rd Sea Lord, 1943; captain, RNVR; director of Combined Operations Material Department, Admiralty, 1943–45.
Newspaper proprietor and politician. Secretary of State for Air, 1917–18. Appeaser but strong advocate of air rearmament.
British politician. Headed the British mission to Czechoslovakia, July–September 1938.xxvii
RAF officer. Air officer commanding-in-chief, Air Defence of Great Britain, 1925–28; Chief of the Air Staff, 1930–33. Plotted with Beaverbrook and Trenchard to remove Newall and Dowding from office.
Conservative politician. Diplomatic Service, 1930; MP Norwood division of Lambeth, 1935–45, Streatham, 1950–February 1974; commissioned in Territorial Army (Royal Artillery) lieutenant-colonel, 1941; Financial Secretary to War Office, 1941–43; Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Supply, responsible for armament production, 1943–44; chairman, War Cabinet Committee for defence against German flying bombs and rockets, 1943–45; Minister of Works, 1944–45; Minister of Supply, October 1951–October 1954; Minister of Housing and Local Government, October 1954–January 1957; Minister of Defence, January 1957–October 1959; Minister of Aviation, October 1959–July 1960; Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, July 1960–October 1964; chairman Lonrho, 1972–84. Married Diana Churchill in 1935, divorced in 1960.
Politician and lawyer. Foreign Secretary, 1931–35; Home Secretary, 1935– 37; Chancellor of Exchequer, 1937–40. One of the top figures in Chamberlain’s government.
Politician. Leader of the Opposition, Liberal Party, 1935–45. Close to Churchill, whose adjutant he had been during the First World War when Churchill commanded a battalion in combat on the Western Front. Swung Liberal Party in favour of rearmament. Secretary of State for Air, 1940–45. Whipping boy for Beaverbrook and Churchill.
Judge, 1934–48. Conducted inquiries on behalf of Winston Churchill xxviiiduring the war on controversial topics: manufacture of stabilised bomb sights (Beaverbrook wrongly thought this was into the wider behaviour of RAF leadership); estimates of Luftwaffe strength; the effectiveness of bombing Germany; and supply of Churchill tanks).
Barrister and Conservative politician. Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, 1919–22; Secretary for India, 1924–28. Despite notional party differences, a great friend of Churchill. Also a reactionary over India.
Army officer, Conservative MP and businessman. Friend of Churchill who encountered him during the First World War where he conducted high-level liaison with the French Army. Intermittent opponent of appeasement but also linked to Sir Joseph Ball, Chamberlain’s personal adviser. Major-general, 1940; Churchill’s personal representative with the French Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, May–June 1940; head of British mission to General de Gaulle, June 1940, and to Syria and Lebanon, July 1941; head of Spears mission, Syria and Lebanon, July 1941; First Minister to Republics of Syria and Lebanon, 1942–44. Fell out badly with de Gaulle.
Financier. City contact of Bracken. Rescued Churchill from the financial consequences of unwise investments in US equities during the Great Slump.
Conservative MP. Deputy Chief Whip, 1935–41; government Chief Whip, 1941–45. Another of Chamberlain’s whips who transferred their allegiance to Churchill.xxix
Politician. Born Philip Lloyd-Graeme and adopted surname Cunliffe-Lister in 1924. Secretary of State for Air, 1935–38; Minister of Civil Aviation, 1944–45.
Publicist and public servant. Secretary to Empire Marketing Board, 1926–33; public relations officer, General Post Office, 1933–35; director-general designate, Ministry of Information, 1936–39; controller public relations of the BBC, 1935–40, and overseas services, 1940–41.
Historian. Began with a low opinion of Beaverbrook but gradually was won over to a positive view. He became a well-paid columnist on the SundayExpressand the first (and last) director of the Beaverbrook Library.
RAF officer, director-general of Research and Development, 1938–40; air officer commanding-in-chief Middle East, 1941–43; air commander-in-chief Mediterranean Air Command, 1943; Deputy Supreme Commander under General Eisenhower, 1943–45.
Scientist, science administrator and government adviser. Experimental Royal Flying Corps pilot and assistant controller of experiments and research during the First World War. Rector of Imperial College London, 1929–42; chairman Committee of Imperial Defence committee for the scientific study of air defence, 1935–40. Advocate of radar and other scientific aids. Feuded with Lindemann.
RAF officer. General Officer Commanding Royal Flying Corps, France, 1915; Chief of Air Staff, 1918; General Officer Commanding xxxIndependent Air Force, March 1918; Chief of Air Staff, 1919; commissioner, Metropolitan Police Force, 1931–35. Trenchard was raised to the peerage in 1930. He was a passionate advocate of the view that future wars would be won by bombing. Conspired with Beaverbrook and Salmond against Newall and Dowding.
Conservative politician. MP for Kidderminster, 1922–45.
Government scientist. Superintendent radio department of the National Physical Laboratory, 1933; appointed to lead development of RDF (now called radar) at Air Ministry, 1935. Often erroneously considered the inventor of radar.
Writer. Moved in London high society in the 1920s and 1930s. Military service in Layforce in 1941, together with Randolph Churchill, who took him on his mission to the Yugoslav partisan forces in 1944. Consistently helped by Bracken as Minister of Information, whom he caricatured as Rex Mottram in BridesheadRevisited.
Army officer. Commander-in-chief, Middle East, 1939–41; commander-in-chief, India, 1941–43; Supreme Commander, South-West Pacific, January–March 1942; Viceroy and Governor General of India, 1943–47. Churchill’s bête noire amongst the generals.
Aristocrat. Friend of Churchill but pro-appeasement.
Civil servant. Personal civil service adviser to Baldwin then xxxiChamberlain, based at 10 Downing Street, 1935–40; head of the civil service, 1939–42. The éminence grise of the Chamberlain government who resolutely fought anyone who opposed appeasement. Sidelined by Churchill when he became Prime Minister.
Government scientist. Director of scientific research, Air Ministry, 1925–37. Early advocate of radar.
Conservative politician. Under-Secretary for India, 1922–24 and November 1924–29; Chancellor of Duchy of Lancaster, 1937–39; deputy to Secretary of State for Air, March–May 1938. Diehard over India. Incompetent Air Minister.
Politician. Postmaster General, 1931; Minister of Health, 1935; Secretary of State for Air in succession to Swinton, 1938–40. Had earned a great reputation promoting the public telephone service but left the practicalities of air rearmament to his subordinates. Delivered the decisive advice to Chamberlain that he should resign in May 1940. Chancellor of the Exchequer 1940–43.
Demonstrator and lecturer in human anatomy, 1934–45, Oxford University; Oxford Extra-Mural Unit of Ministry of Home Security, 1940–41; scientific adviser to Combined Operations Headquarters, 1941–43; adviser RAF Middle East, 1943–44; scientific adviser on planning Allied Expeditionary Air Force, 1944–46xxxii
It is a truism to describe Winston Churchill as a towering figure. No one doubts his stature. Even the most enthusiastic of his many detractors has never claimed that he was insignificant, although every aspect of his greatness has been held up to critical examination and been found wanting by some.
The aura and reputation of the great figures of history can often mask the human being which lies behind. The scale of the events and ideas with which they are associated can make us lose sight of the fact that they were subject to the same instincts and needs as us all. Churchill stands out amongst the big people of history as most obviously cut from ordinary human cloth, not least because it is easy to understand what he was thinking. If ever a huge personality wore their heart on their sleeve, it was Churchill. We can read the intentions and opinions which lay behind his achievements with unusual clarity. We can understand him. It is easy to believe we know him as a person. He is arguably one of the most human of history’s big names.
The importance of friendship is one of the defining characteristics of humanity. It is one that Churchill shared to an immense extent, a facet of his warm and emotional character. The company of people he liked, or in whom he found something to like, was an elemental pleasure to him. What he wanted and expected of others ran the full gamut of needs and desires. To those that met them, he was capable of profound loyalty which went far beyond any calculation of self-interest. Friendships are often asymmetric and unbalanced, but that does not xxxivmake them any the less a key part of the lives of the individuals involved. Looking at Churchill, the historical figure, somehow distinct from the individual, will only give part of the story.
The size of Churchill’s personality and the scale of the historical events with which he was involved cast long shadows which can easily obscure those around him. To thrive, those around powerful figures must often abase themselves and flatten their own personalities, make themselves insignificant. The reverse is true of Churchill. His greatest friends were strong, distinct personalities. Churchill’s ambition and self-confidence translated into egoism, not uncommon in senior politicians, if not the rule, but this is different to the vanity of power. The cut and thrust of conversations were some of Churchill’s great joys in life and were something that cautious sycophants could not give. They work by feeding self-regard. Churchill wanted and needed something quite different.
The friends whom this book examines resembled Churchill in their openness and accessibility. All were incomplete personalities; all maintained barriers of some kind; but none effaced themselves. What you saw was what you got. It might have been baffling or repulsive, but it was not the product of compromise. It would be naive to suppose that the friends did not adjust their behaviour to get the best from Churchill’s volatile personality, but their integrity stayed intact.
Throughout his life, Churchill was noted as a foul-weather friend, willing to stick by acquaintances when they were going through difficult periods. It is one of his most attractive characteristics. Often it was repaid by a degree of loyalty and affection that is not necessarily the common coin of politics. In a similar vein, Churchill’s wilderness friends appeared to transcend unappealing calculations of self-interest. It would be foolish to assert that there was no self-interest whatever in what drew Frederick Lindemann and Brendan Bracken to Churchill; part of his appeal was the same magnetism and strength of personality that made him such a force in politics.
A graph of Churchill’s political standing would show sharp fluctuations from top-level influence at a national scale to near insignificance, taking in almost every intermediate stage. The classic pattern of steady xxxvrise to power and the associated accumulation of subsidiary figures that goes with it is not Churchill’s story. The friends discussed in this book were with him all the way, closer at some times than at others, but still part of his life.
Churchill was a man of strong ideas, but he was also a flexible, pragmatic politician: ‘It is better to be both right and consistent. But if you have to choose – you must choose to be right.’1 Notoriously, he changed his political party allegiance twice, but his life was defined by big, simple causes which he followed faithfully. Two were catastrophically wrong – opposing autonomy for India and supporting King Edward VIII in the abdication crisis – but one was entirely right: that Britain needed to rearm to be able to survive against a Germany ruled by Hitler. Many of Churchill’s detractors wish to obfuscate this and elevate Neville Chamberlain’s reputation to do so. Certainly, it is easy to find flaws in the detail of Churchill’s proposed policies, both conceptually and in terms of practical politics, but it is impossible to claim that Chamberlain was correct to believe that a peaceful modus vivendi with Hitler was the best way forwards.
In all three causes – India, rearmament and the abdication – some friends were involved, supporting Churchill, with one exception where a friend saw his error and tried to save him from himself. His lost causes – India and Edward VIII – were, at least in hindsight, doomed from the start in themselves, so it is idle to ask whether the friends weakened Churchill here. Churchill’s stance on his lost causes, though, created a vicious circle in which the standing of his supporters suffered as much as his and compromised the seriousness with which he was treated over his ultimately winning cause, rearmament.
Compromise, fudge and half-measures did not belong in his makeup. If he suppressed a belief for the sake of expediency, he did so with clarity and commitment, distasteful though this might have been. Above all, Churchill knew that Britain had to have a truly national government to fight the Second World War and was willing to set aside his visceral hatred of socialism to achieve this. He similarly acquiesced in alliance with the Soviet Union for pragmatic reasons but xxxvisaw clear limits to what was possible and necessary, unlike one of his friends. He was just as clearsighted on how an alliance with the USA was key to victory, but here he could be wholehearted as well. As the war was coming to an end, he reverted to his principled opposition to socialism with the encouragement of two friends.
When Churchill attained power in 1940, his friends stayed with him (one, not for long). He brought them into his government in the widest sense, because he needed them. He gave them power and made some sacrifices to do so, but he knew he needed other politicians, bureaucrats and military men just as much as them, so the friends had power but not control. Churchill never doubted the importance of democracy, and his wartime regime gave a voice not only to his friends but to the military and political establishments as well. The three-party wartime national government did not make politics disappear as if by magic, and Churchill’s personal position was complex and he needed allies. Like any Prime Minister, he wanted people whom he could trust personally at key positions in the machinery of government. In turn, his friends did not supplant established structures however much they might have disliked them.
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This book looks closely at four of Churchill’s friends and two members of his family who were also part of his public life – Max Aitken (Lord Beaverbrook), Frederick Lindemann (Lord Cherwell), Brendan Bracken, Bob Boothby, Randolph Churchill and Duncan Sandys. The intensity of the relationships varied; two came practically to an end, but the others lasted for their lifetimes. All were substantial figures in their own right, although only one would have anything more than a tiny fraction of his historical standing without Churchill.
Lord Beaverbrook’s friendship with Churchill was the most uneven and erratic of the group, which rather reflects Beaverbrook’s own ambivalent personality. He had tasted power and craved it but only on his own terms. He relished politics, but he was not a working politician. xxxviiHe could never make the bridge between his easy existence as the autocratic owner of a large profitable business and the contingency and compromises of government. The balance of power in Beaverbrook’s relationship with Churchill was the most complex of the group. Even when Churchill was Prime Minister, Beaverbrook enjoyed an unmatched personal standing with him. Churchill needed the psychological boost of Beaverbrook and his optimism and positivity.
By contrast, the mutual loyalty and commitment between Churchill and two of his friends, Professor Frederick Lindemann and Brendan Bracken, was unshakeable and stayed constant both in power and out. Lindemann was a friend who only gradually became a colleague as their common belief in the importance of rearmament came to dominate Churchill’s political life. Churchill revered him for his intelligence and clarity of thought. Lindemann was his closest and most consistent wartime colleague. Bracken successfully aspired to become Churchill’s colleague and doggedly supported him through thick and thin. He helped Churchill dig himself into a hole over India and then dig himself out in the fight against appeasement. He showed his loyalty to Churchill when he sacrificed his position as a close colleague to take an unloved and unpromising wartime ministerial job. Bracken was utterly loyal but anything but slavish. At the risk of delving into amateur psychology, Bracken appears as something of the kind of son whom Churchill wanted.
The fight for rearmament and against appeasement was by far the most important cause of Churchill’s life. It had to be sustained against the overwhelming hostility of most of British public and political opinion, which took immense moral courage on his part and those of his allies to challenge. It was the acid test of loyalty and united all the figures in this book except for Beaverbrook. Churchill’s son Randolph faithfully supported his father over India to their mutual cost. Randolph’s hugely flawed personality made him a disappointment and then a burden to his father. Bob Boothby rekindled his friendship and collaboration with Churchill when he recognised independently the threat which Hitler posed and the vital importance of standing up to him. Boothby was too much of a friend to Churchill to let him xxxviiicommit suicide over the abdication, but he paid a personal cost for having done so. He was also a professional politician and hedged his bets too often to earn the benefits of unconditional loyalty. Duncan Sandys, who married Churchill’s daughter Diana, had no difficulty backing his father-in-law over appeasement and reaped the benefits in the form of wartime political preferment.
But the friends were anything but a cohesive group. Beaverbrook and Lindemann were notoriously prone to long and savage vendettas and conducted a venomous feud with each other for most of the war. Sandys also fell foul of Lindemann over one of the professor’s pet projects and their dislike and distrust deeply marked Britain’s preparations to fight Germany’s V-weapons. Beaverbrook was jealous of Bracken and competed for Churchill’s loyalty.2 But they did join forces when Churchill swung back to his traditional anti-socialism at the end of the war as a return to party politics loomed.
This story of Churchill and his friends is anything but the complete story of Churchill, but it covers some of the most important episodes in his career. No attempt has been made to manufacture a flattering or unduly respectful picture of what happened. They, as much as he did, made mistakes, but this does not detract from any of them. The friends and the friendships were a vital part of Churchill’s life and his story.
1
Winston Churchill made his first foray into the political wilderness during the First World War, and he liked it no better than either of his next ones. It was the first break in a meteoric political career that had seen him elected to Parliament at the age of twenty-five, a Cabinet minister at thirty-three and the holder of one of the great offices of state at thirty-five. Becoming the First Lord of the Admiralty and the political head of Britain’s premier fighting service in 1911 as the First World War approached and then broke out seemed a step forwards in his career, a move towards being a great war leader like his ancestor, 1st Duke of Marlborough. The first months of the war appeared to bear this out. At first, the mobilisation of the Royal Navy for war had gone with impeccable smoothness. The pretensions of Imperial Germany to challenge Britain’s global maritime predominance appeared to evaporate almost overnight. Britain’s army was ferried to France to join the land war with Germany entirely unhampered. A minor defeat at the Battle of Coronel off the coast of Chile was swiftly and massively avenged at the Battle of the Falkland Islands. Moreover, Coronel fell squarely into the tradition of British heroic defeats with the commanding admiral losing his life. Even the Royal Navy’s one conspicuous embarrassment was not a defeat but its failure to sink two German warships that seemed to be at its mercy. These ships, the Goebenand the Emden, were able to flee to safety in Turkey and this contributed to Turkey’s decision to enter the war on Germany’s side.
Here things began to go seriously wrong for Churchill. He believed 2that Turkey could be defeated easily and quickly by forcing the Dardanelles Strait and attacking the capital, Istanbul. He won Cabinet approval for the plan, but the initial, purely naval attack was beaten off. Next the British tried an amphibious operation against the Gallipoli Peninsula, but this degenerated into a bloody stalemate of trench warfare just as the larger campaign in France had done. Neither phase of the attack was well thought out or planned, so Churchill’s grand strategic calculation was never put to the test. Churchill certainly deserves blame for this episode, but he also served as a useful political scapegoat. It was almost inevitable that he would be removed from the Admiralty. His demotion to the minor, non-departmental job of Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster was little short of an outright dismissal from government. The arrival of the Conservatives in government, albeit as junior partners in the coalition, in May 1915 further undermined Churchill’s position. Churchill may well simply have judged that he would have been sacked entirely and anticipated this by resigning voluntarily, going to France as a mere infantry battalion commander. His qualification for this was minimal: after school he had served as a cavalry subaltern and then been a minor officer on the staff of Kitchener in the invasion of Sudan, but the move fulfilled his craving to command in combat operation. In the early days of the war, he had seriously proposed leaving his political responsibilities to take personal command of the British defence of Antwerp. These aspirations cemented a growing reputation for impulsiveness if not downright instability. Churchill’s departure for France was also unsound political tactics. To parlay a spectacular resignation into a spectacular return to office, he would have needed a substantial body of support amongst the rank and file of the governing party or with other ministers. Churchill never tried to recruit the mundane claque of less gifted followers that is indispensable to the first element and he also managed to inspire passionate distrust and hostility from more conventional politicians. He had defected from the Conservatives, for whom he had first been elected to Parliament 1900, to the Liberals in 1904 and had rapidly been rewarded with ministerial office. The Conservative leader 3Andrew Bonar Law detested Churchill. Not merely did Churchill lack support, he also faced powerful positive opposition. Bonar Law was a dangerous enemy and had held the principal position since 1911, when he emerged as a middle-way candidate in a leadership election marred by two divisive issues: Unionism and tariff reform. His rivals were Walter Long, who was seen as a firm, albeit moderate, Unionist, and Austen Chamberlain, who was an advocate of tariff reform. Bonar Law went on to lead the Conservatives until 1923. His importance as party leader eclipsed his career as a minister. He was Chancellor of the Exchequer in David Lloyd George’s government, but the office is far less important in wartime than peace. Bonar Law did become Prime Minister but terminal cancer limited his time in Downing Street to a few months.
When Lloyd George replaced Herbert Asquith as Prime Minister in late 1916, Churchill had some reason to hope his political fortunes had turned. Churchill had been a close ally of Lloyd George in Asquith’s pre-war Liberal administration. They had been partners at the radical wing of the government, promoting measures of economic reform and social justice. They also shared a deep strain of unconventionality and personal sympathy, strong but short of outright friendship. Churchill had actively spoken out on Lloyd George’s side during the Marconi scandal of 1912 which could easily have ended Lloyd George’s career. Lloyd George certainly wanted to bring Churchill into his new government. He would be far more of a loyal personal follower than his Conservative allies in the coup against Asquith, and he had political talents manifestly lacking amongst the mainstream Conservative mediocrities and a growing number of technocrats who featured ever more in the wartime government. But Lloyd George faced severe headwinds. It was Bonar Law’s decision to back Lloyd George that decided Asquith’s fate. To secure the support of the Conservatives for his government, Lloyd George had specifically promised Bonar Law that he would not bring Churchill back as a minister. Lloyd George would need to get his feet far more firmly under the table before he contemplated seriously taking the risk of Churchill’s return.4
The bad news came to Churchill through Max Aitken, Lord Beaverbrook. He had been one of the many players in the removal of Herbert Asquith from office. In his book PoliticiansandtheWar, Beaverbrook later claimed to have been a major force in the coup, but his contribution was far from decisive. Beaverbrook consistently imagined that his power and influence was greater than it was in fact. Like Beaverbrook, Bonar Law had grown up in Canada and, more important than this shared heritage, the two men had extensive business dealings which had begun whilst they were still in Canada and were highly lucrative to Bonar Law. These continued after Bonar Law entered the Cabinet and were the major, if not the dominant, part of the relationship. Beaverbrook’s generally adulatory biographer A. J. P. Taylor estimated the benefit to Bonar Law at the then colossal sum of £10,000 per year. Even in the gentler ethical standards of the era, the relationship was questionable. Beaverbrook’s personal political standing was modest, but as Bonar Law’s jackal, he was a power in the land. Beaverbrook had built a fortune in his native Canada through obscure financial dealings, which many in the Canadian business and political establishment labelled as dishonest and corrupt. He had come to Britain with hopes of parlaying this fortune into political influence. To begin with, he pursued the conventional path of winning a seat in the House of Commons, but the world of Parliament was never one that appealed to him or that offered a profitable field of action for his talents. He was happy to swap the House of Commons for the House of Lords and took the peerage under which he is best known. He far preferred the world of hidden influence and intrigue.
As Lloyd George was forming his government on 5 December 1916, Beaverbrook and Churchill had dinner together in the company of the lawyer and politician F. E. Smith, an intimate ally of Churchill.1 Beaverbrook later claimed in his memoir PoliticiansandtheWarthat he had been charged by Lloyd George with hinting to Churchill that he would be left out of the new government. According to Beaverbrook, Churchill became violently angry as well as being predictably disappointed. Whatever the truth, Churchill described it as one of the 5toughest moments of his life. It may have helped set the tone for their future relationship. Even if Beaverbrook was only acting as Bonar Law’s messenger, he was still in the position of power. The episode might have been bitter, but it did not deter Churchill from persisting with Lloyd George. He gave him striking and effective support in a secret parliamentary debate on the conduct of the war. By July 1917, Lloyd George was confident enough to bring Churchill back into the government as the Minister of Munitions. This was a key job in the war government and had been held by another Liberal, Christopher Addison, who was one of Lloyd George’s closest and most loyal allies. Addison left the Ministry of Munitions willingly to take up the question of post-war reconstruction. The Conservative reaction was the only potential obstacle. By Beaverbrook’s later and suspect account, Lloyd George chose not to tell Bonar Law directly and, with a degree of symmetry, sent Beaverbrook to bring the bad news to him. Beaverbrook claimed that Lloyd George had used the pretext that as Beaverbrook had been advocating Churchill’s return to the new Prime Minister, the task was rightfully his. Beaverbrook reported that Bonar Law believed that the appointment might come at a heavy price to Lloyd George – ‘Lloyd George’s throne will shake’ – but Bonar Law rode out pressure from his backbenchers and refused to make an issue of Churchill’s return.2
Churchill remained as a minister for as long as Lloyd George held office and the pattern of master–servant relationship endured. Churchill paid the penalty of having a weak political constituency of his own. As opposition to Lloyd George amongst the Conservatives grew, ultimately to fatal levels, Churchill had no real alternative but to tie his fortunes to those of Lloyd George. Bonar Law’s mainstream Conservatives did not need defections from what came to be labelled ‘the thieves’ kitchen’ of the coalition government;3 they just wanted their leader to pull his support.6
2
Once he had been brought back into government, Winston Churchill remained a minister as long as David Lloyd George’s coalition endured. He could share the kudos that it earned as the government that won the war. Lloyd George reaped the reward for military triumph in the shape of a resounding win for the coalition at the ‘coupon’ general election of December 1918 held immediately after the Armistice. The victory masked a severe deterioration in Lloyd George’s political position and, by extension, Churchill’s. Churchill held his seat at Dundee by a comparatively narrow margin. The true victors in terms of solid political coin were Andrew Bonar Law’s Conservatives, who increased their number of MPs by more than one third and provided even more of the parliamentary bedrock on which Lloyd George’s power rested. The Conservatives won 379 seats and the Liberals only 127. The Conservative MPs were becoming ever-more disenchanted with the coalition and the dubious characters who appeared to dominate the Cabinet. Lloyd George had split the Liberal Party by turning against Herbert Asquith and it remained split. But worse for Lloyd George and Churchill was that those Liberals elected to support the coalition did not form a cohesive group. Neither Lloyd George nor his ministerial allies succeeded, despite lavishly financed attempts in Lloyd George’s case, in building significant independent constituencies for themselves. Lloyd George funded his party-building from the blatant sale of honours, many to conspicuously unworthy recipients. Lloyd George’s touts offended the Conservatives by approaching potential buyers whom they regarded as their party’s preserve.
Lloyd George’s peacetime government was tumultuous and 8unstable. Even his personal allies did not constitute a harmonious bloc. His old ally from his days of radical social measures, Christopher Addison, failed as Minister of Health, attracted Conservative ire for heavy government spending and was increasingly out of step with the government’s rightward drift. He resigned and began a bitter public feud against his old friend. Lloyd George controversially appointed F. E. Smith as Lord High Chancellor, but Smith’s increasingly drink-fuelled wilful behaviour dented the government’s image. Perversely, Churchill’s most important achievement came when he reversed his previous hard-line stance and shepherded through Irish independence, which was only reluctantly accepted by most Conservatives.
Churchill was a key figure in the second coalition government. After the Armistice in 1918, he was put in charge of shrinking the army and the Royal Air Force to meet peacetime requirements. Next in 1921, he was Secretary of State for the Colonies, handling uprisings in Ireland and Iraq. Churchill fought battles against Lloyd George, notably over recognising the Soviet Union, and won some of them, but he could do nothing to uncouple his fate from Lloyd George. They would stand or fall together. But being trapped by a common destiny is not the same as creating a common front stronger than the individuals. For all their occasional and deep disputes over policy, Lloyd George and Churchill were close. Churchill classed himself as Lloyd George’s ‘principal lieutenant’. The problems of peace offered far less scope for either to build a heroic reputation. The urgent need to win the war had been the justification for Lloyd George to be wartime coalition leader and his sometimes-questionable expedients; the challenges of post-war Britain offered no such get-out clause. Lloyd George was one of the leading figures in the succession of summit conferences which sought to rebuild a lasting European order after the war, but his international status was of little help at home. He still needed the votes of the Conservative MPs to govern.
Whilst Lloyd George battled unavailingly to replicate his achievements of wartime, Bonar Law bided his time. His political capital remained intact. Conservative grandees such as Lord Curzon and 9Austen Chamberlain were loyal to him. As well as the backbench mediocrities, he could count on the continuing support of Lord Beaverbrook. His newspaper empire was not yet the mighty beast that it was to become, but in the frantic haggling and plotting of the peacetime coalition, Beaverbrook had his part to play. His authority and influence stemmed wholly from his relationship with Bonar Law, but it was powerful nonetheless. As a senior minister, Churchill outranked Beaverbrook in the ostensible pecking order, but in the hidden balance of power, the future belonged to the Canadian. That the peacetime coalition survived as long as it did may have been due to the accident of Bonar Law’s health which forced him to step down from politics, resigning the leadership of the Conservative Party in March 1921. He was replaced by Sir Austen Chamberlain who proved inept and ineffectual. He also offered the Conservative rank and file a convenient lightning rod for their unhappiness at the Irish settlement.